Takaful 2012
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Selected Research
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Introduction

Following the 2011 waves of mass mobilization that swept across the Arab region, high hopes continued in 2012 and so did high frustrations. The revolutionary fervor did not wane; it ebbed and flowed across and within the mobilized masses calling for the downfall of autocratic regimes, social justice and a new Arab world that was more representative of the hopes and dreams of its people. That fervor was bound to expectations of swift and revolutionary change, a removal of structures of domination, a change in leadership and the passing on of the baton to a younger generation in one of the most youthful parts of the world - 21% of the population in the region is between the ages 15-24. Promises were made, but to-date not fully realized and not without challenges, both regional and at country-level.

Participants at the Takaful 2011 conference in Amman called for an informed solidarity at a time of crisis and reconfirmed the importance of empirical research to shine a spotlight on urgent and intractable social problems. Shortly thereafter, the Research Program was born at the Gerhart Center with the annual Takaful conference as one of its key components. Takaful is the first regional conduit to showcase and develop original research on philanthropic practices and citizen engagement in the Arab region. The vision for Takaful was to create a platform that would function in a double capacity; it would aggregate and disseminate research on philanthropy and civic engagement within the region, while at the same time actively participate in building a pool of multi-disciplinary and geographically diverse scholars. Takaful also operates at the crossroads between the thinkers and doers, theory and practice; in 2012 in Cairo, the conference provided a creative space within which an exchange of ideas between academics and practitioners took place with the goal of solidifying an infrastructure for the field. A community of practice is in the making and we are heartened to see it expanding.

From Tunis to Cairo, our keynote speaker, Radhia Nasraoui epitomized that revolutionary fervor in her person as well as her vocation. A human rights activist, lawyer and director of the Association for the Fight Against Torture (ALLT), Nasraoui opened the conference with a talk on the role of women in the Arab awakening, more specifically in Tunisia. She questioned whether or not women have reaped the fruits of their struggle and if promises made to them and the people were kept by Tunisia’s new leadership. I still remember our conversation in Tunis, a few months back at a café in Habib Bourguiba Avenue, the heart of the capital and the revolution, where Nasraoui passionately reiterated the necessity that “promises be kept” by Al Nahda party. Her talk later in the conference segued nicely to another account presented by Zahra Langhi on the role of women in the Libyan Revolution as agents of peace and security.

Our second keynote speaker was Hafez Al Mirazi, Director of the Kamal Adham Center for Television and Digital Journalism at the American University in Cairo and professor of practice at the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication. Al Mirazi delivered a thought-provoking talk on the role of media in the transitional period in Egypt, while relating his experiences in Tunisia and Egypt and looking at the “Arab Spring” in both countries through a comparative lens.

In 2012, as many transitions, economic, social and political continue to unfold; the papers delivered at the conference of which a selection is made available in this volume sought to take stock and make sense of those changes, both conceptually and at the level of practice. At the conceptual level, a recurrent theme was definitional confusion and the need for a shift in understanding based on historical and geographic specificities. Brian Barber and Jim Youniss’ paper explores new definitions of Egyptian citizenship from
the perspective a small group of young activists from Cairo and Alexandria. A more complex and nuanced approach is deemed necessary to an understanding of those terms as applied to different parts of the “Arab Spring” world. Another theme was the need for a rethinking and a reconceptualization of structures and categories of understanding. Riham Khafagy’s paper explores the role of Waqf or the Islamic trust; and how building on this model of institutional philanthropy can build a more impactful civil society. Salah Soliman’s paper looks at philanthropy in the Boulaq El Dakrour area of Cairo, and explores how charity by the poor towards the poor plays a critical and essential role in sustaining this community – a notion that departs from the usual discourse that links impact to amount of money.

At the level of practice, papers looked at the nexus between resource mobilization and social movements, formal (institutionalized) and informal types of giving. Catherine Herrold’s paper offers insights on philanthropic foundations in Egypt posing the question of whether or not practices of philanthropy were safeguarding or fueling change in Egypt. Rania Hammoud’s paper offered an interesting model of corporate responsibility in times of crisis and how resources were effectively mobilized to address needs on the ground during the intense days of the Egyptian Revolution thus, making an opportunity out of a threat. Shawn Flanigan and Anna Khatchadourian explore the dynamics and structures of aid provision, and role of religious actors, NGOs and the state in the Palestinian territory.

A final cluster of papers focused on youth citizen engagement and their role in driving change. Jon Kurtz and Ricardo Gomez’s paper looks at linkages between Arab youth’s political voice, social capital and employability in light of an increased level of civic engagement. Sara Lei Sparre explores youth volunteerism at one of the largest youth-led organizations in the Arab world with now around 100 thousand young volunteers.

That week in June just before the conference was to convene, protests broke out in Tahrir where the original AUC campus is proudly situated; a very dedicated team exhibited responsible crisis management as we shifted the venue overnight from the old to the new campus, so did we shift all other arrangements. The Takaful team stood strong and stood together. I would like to acknowledge and thank our team who made the conference possible under uncertain and shifting circumstances: Safa Beitawi, Christine Beshay, Mirna Anwar, Michael Ayoub and the leadership of Dr. Barbara Ibrahim, Director of the Gerhart Center. Special thanks to our team of very talented editors who went above and beyond and were very patient throughout the process of edits and revisions: Joseph Viscomi and Ahmed Shaaban. It has been a pleasure and an honor to work with all of you.

I would also like to acknowledge our able program committee members Dr. Atallah Kuttab, Dr. Judy Barsalou, Dr. Mona Amer and Dr. Moushira Geziri. Takaful would not have been possible without the support of two very committed donors who share our mission and vision for the conference and the advancement of knowledge and practice within the region: The Ford Foundation and Mansour Foundation for Development.

Sherine N. El Taraboulsi
Research Manager
Cairo, November 2012
Keynote Speech

Have Tunisian women reaped the fruits of their participation in the Revolution?

Tunisian women have made undeniable contributions in the January 14, 2011 Revolution which ousted Tunisia’s long-time dictator. They were present from the very beginning in Sidi Bouzid which saw the first spark of the Revolution; it was a common rural lady who triggered the first protest following Bouazizi’s self-immolation as she cried out before the governor’s office: “Where have you gone, men of Hamama?" Women have been present throughout the Revolution as housewives, workers, students, attorneys, intellectuals, artists, and employees. They have carried the grievances of the whole nation, calling for freedom, equality, dignity, democracy, and social justice. On January 14, 2011—the day that marked Ben Ali’s fall—a significantly large number of female protesters participated in the demonstration at the Ministry of Interior calling for the toppling of Ben Ali.

Tunisia has a rich history of female participation in national struggles throughout the modern era. Tunisian women played a major role in the struggle against the French occupation and formed anti-colonial organizations and associations that were also engaged in social reform advocacy. Tunisian reformist Tahar Haddad's gender-equality calls—which also included inheritance—were not, therefore, a spur-of-the-moment urge. They were a sign of a progressive socio-political movement that involved women. This has had its impact on post-colonial Tunisia. Newly-enacted state laws included significant and substantial reforms that granted women more rights. These reforms were published on August 16, 1956 in the Tunisian Personal Status Code (Code du Statut Personnel, CSP) which outlawed polygamy, abolished repudiation, created a judicial procedure for divorce, and required marriage to be performed only in the event of the mutual consent of both parties. Higher levels of education and employment were part of the overall change and improvement in the status of women, despite the despotic regime. Women became allowed to practice professions such as medicine and law.

During the authoritarian Bourguiba era (1955/1956-1987), women participated in all political, social and cultural battles for freedom, democracy and social justice. They were often visibly present in every secret—especially leftist—society that was put on trial, and in each suppressed social (student or workers) movement. Advocacy and cultural movements had mostly female leaders. Feminist societies, associations and clubs were established in this context not only to defend women’s rights, but also to improve and protect these rights against the growing regressive powers that seemed intent on dragging women by the hair back to the dark ages in the name of Islam.

Under Ben Ali’s rule, women struggled against his despotism and corruption despite Ben Ali’s attempts to use his feigned progressive stance on women’s rights to polish his image worldwide. Women refused to be used as a political football to limit freedoms and violate human rights.

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1 A large tribe that populates the western-central part of Tunisia, including the governorate of Sidi Bouzid.
2 See his book Our Women in Shari’a and Society (1930). Tahar Haddad is a graduate of Ez-zitouna University.
3 The unilateral right of the husband to end the marriage at will.
under the pretext of fighting extremism. Women, therefore, took part in all social, political and rights-based struggles that eventually led to revolutions. They played a leading role in the 2008 six-month Revolt of the Gafsa Mining Basin in southeast Tunisia, which was marked by demonstrations against poverty and marginalization. The social mobilizations which shook this poor area may be considered the ‘mother of the Tunisian Revolution’; as they stirred up discord and created tension between the people and Ben Ali’s tyranny. Similar uprisings broke out in different areas of Tunisia, until it was time for Ben Ali to leave.

The Tunisian Revolution brought together women from different backgrounds, particularly including those living in poor suburban districts. They marched in massive protests and engaged in clashes with riot police, which resulted in the death of two women and injury and detention of several others. Women took part in the Revolution not only to topple dictatorship, but also to achieve legal gender-equality and bridge the gap between the legislation and the actual social status. This made almost all active political powers, including the Islamist Nahda (Renaissance) movement, support their cause. This agreement was a result of an earlier consensus by the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms which included leftist, Islamist, liberal, and nationalist forces. On 8 March 2007, these forces declared their commitment to support and apply women’s rights (prohibiting polygamy, right to work, right to hold state positions, etc) legally and socially.

During the Tunisian parliamentary elections, all forces maintained women’s rights. However, Al-Nahda’s capture of over 40% of the seats for the Constituent Assembly triggered a change of discourse that coincided with the drafting of the new constitution. In the Islamist Nahda movement, some called for a go-back on some of the gains that have been made, including adoption. Although they did not have the courage to approach the polygamy ban, some proposed to modify the legal text so as to omit the criminal sanctions of polygamy claiming that it falls under personal freedoms. In the same context, an MP for Al-Nahda movement attacked single mothers. Meanwhile, the Minister of Women’s Affairs, who is also an MP for the Congress for the Republic (Al-Mottamar) Party—led by interim President Moncef Marzouki—considered urfi marriage a personal freedom, which eradicates the idea of civil marriage and the prohibition of polygamy. Some Nahda officials called for the application of the Islamic Sharia Law as the sole and main source of legislation.

This happened in early discussions of the constitution, beyond the Constituent Council and Al-Nahda movement. Other forces, including the Salafi camp and the Liberation Party strove to go back on women’s rights, claiming that they are against Islam. Radical ‘Islamist’ groups have been harassing unveiled women on the streets, hence stirring up contention over the khimar (long, cape-like veil) and niqab (full face-veil). All such threats to women’s rights were overcome thanks to the efforts of progressive and liberal parties and institutions. Al-Nahda eventually withdrew its call for the integration of Islamic Sharia into the constitution. Discussions of polygamy waned and Al-Nahda movement declared its commitment to women’s rights and considered the wearing of khimar and niqab personal matters and not religious obligations to be forcefully applied to women. The Al-Nahda MP had to apologize to single mothers and the Minister of Women’s Affairs changed her stance toward urfi marriage, accepting civil marriage as stated in the Tunisian Personal Status Code.

The battle being now fought by progressive—including feminist—forces is to achieve complete gender-equality and the constitutionalization of women’s rights, resting on the principles of the

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4 Arabic: Al-Hawd Al-Manjami
5 Marriage without an official contract
Tunisian Revolution: freedom, equality, dignity, democracy and social justice. It was a popular revolution that had no religious drives, nor did it call for the application Islamic Sharia.

It is noteworthy that Al-Nahda movement, which suffered oppression during Ben Ali’s rule, was not among the instigators of the Revolution nor did it take part in it. They only watched the progress of events from a distance lest Ben Ali puts the blame on them. Eventually, the blame was all laid on the leftist democratic forces. On the eve of Ben Ali’s overthrow, while the majority of the Tunisian people were asking him to leave, top Nahda officials called on Ben Ali to make the reforms he promised in his last speech.

Threats to women’s rights still persist despite the ebb of regressive powers. However, the gains achieved by Tunisian women cannot be easily swept aside since some of them have become an integral part of Tunisian culture and identity, namely the right to employment in different positions, education, participation in public life, choosing a marriage partner, and monogamy. Still, a relapse is always possible and it is important to be on the alert.

To put in a nutshell, the struggle for women’s rights is part of the wider struggle between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. Counter-revolutionary forces are not limited to the domestic scene, but rather include external powers—especially the Gulf states—which strive to abort the Tunisian Revolution so that it does not spill over the whole Arab world.

The success of the Tunisian Revolution should be gauged by the rights granted to Tunisian women in the new constitution and the ensuing changes. This would be an indicator of how far the Tunisian Community has ridded itself of despotism which has long been reflected in women’s oppression.

In conclusion, you, the Arab women, and all progressive powers in the Arab World can rest assured that the Tunisian women are capable of winning the battle for their own freedom and for the freedom of the entire Tunisian society. We will win!

Thank you,

**Radhia Nasraoui**
Tunisian Human Rights Lawyer;
Co-founder and President of the Association for the Fight against Torture in Tunisia
Children in the Garden of Democracy:
The Meaning of Civic Engagement in Today’s Egypt

James Youniss, Brian K. Barber and Rhett M. Billen

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Abstract

In this paper, we reflect on emerging themes of citizenship in the evolving political evolution of Egypt through the observations of a small group of engaged Egyptian. First, in trying to reconcile the facts of youth involvement since January, 2011, with prior survey findings, we suggest that characterizations of youth need to be conjoined with specified opportunities and resource availability for political action. Second, our informants point to two emerging shifts in Egyptian society that pertain to contemporary democratic theory regarding self-governance and efficacy. One is the blossoming and spread of public speech through which ordinary people express their political views publicly in the spirit of discussion and persuasion. The other is an understanding that people are able to weigh in on major issues, not as supplicants to government, but as citizens with legitimate voices in policy decisions. These two shifts coincide with a new understanding of democratic citizenship that is focused on self-determining actors who take a hand in policy instead of being recipients of government decisions. Third, the re-emergence of democracy in Egypt after decades of autocratic rule, necessarily is fraught with uncertainty and the need for new learning. These facts are reflected in youth’s hopeful, yet frustrated, trust in Egyptians, but also an awareness of deep divisions within society. Nevertheless, they envision a future democratic state in which citizens take responsibility in a shared effort to reconnect to Egypt’s civilized past in conjunction with the modern world in its true complexities.

Introduction

This is the second in a series of reports on the current wave of youth civic engagement in Egypt. Our goal is to offer an on-the-ground account of the unfolding political changes in Egypt from the perspective a small group of young activists from Cairo and Alexandria. Our first report was based on interviews with these youth who described their involvement in the demonstrations of early 2011 that led to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. We viewed their comments in terms of a social-movement approach to civic engagement. These young people spelled out their grievances against Mubarak’s government, the ideological outlook they shared on political reform, the opportunities that enabled their actions, and the organizational apparatus that made this momentous event possible (Barber & Youniss, 2012).

This paper is a reflective analysis of questions that have emerged in our research. We continued to interview these same youth activists over the past year and correlated their evolving views first with our further exploration of Egypt’s complex political situation and second with our knowledge of recent social scientific thought regarding civic engagement among youth. This triangulation leads us to consider three kinds of questions: 1) how to assess civic engagement adequately in a population of youth that lived under politically restrictive conditions; 2) how new definitions of active Egyptian citizenship are emerging; and 3) what these new definitions imply for engagement in the future.

Assessing Civic Engagement

The events of early 2011 caught the attention of scholars worldwide who study youth civic engagement. For the past decade, the bulk of research was focused on four issues: 1) the lack of engagement of young people in established democratic states; 2) the tendency of youth engagement to involve predominately members of higher social-economic communities;
3) the possibility that enmeshment of youth in social networking activity may detract from political engagement; and 4) attraction of youth to armed conflict and political violence in weak or failed states (Milner, 2010; Goldstone, 2011).

The initiatives taken by youth in Egypt fit none of these categories. They resemble more closely youth action during the 1950-60s civil rights movement in the United States, the 1960-70s anti-war and anti-nuclear movements in various European nations, and the series of uprisings and revolutions on behalf of democratic reform of authoritarian regimes that occurred in the former Soviet Bloc in the 1980s and 1990s (Collin, 2007). Regrettably, those instances of revolution passed without much global attention and little scholarly study (with the exception of East Germany; Oberschall, 2007; Opp & Gern, 1993) and thus there is little from those key events to guide us.

The movement was unanticipated, even in Egypt. A survey of over 20,000 Egyptian youth conducted by the Population Council in 2010 and reported in December of that year assessed engagement in terms of self-reported voting, internet use, volunteering, degree of trust, and attitudes toward the government. The authors offered the following conclusion: “Civic engagement in young people in Egypt is very weak ...Their social networks are limited to few friends and family...They do not invest time to learn more about the social and political issues from available media, in print, or online” (Population Council, 2010, p. 147).

Only one month after the study’s publication, on January 25, these characterizations proved to be misleading as hundreds of thousands of young people took public action at considerable risk, demanding the end to an oligarchic regime and the beginning of a new democratic state. The size of the demonstrations and the ability to sustain them in the face of counter-movements by the government required extensive organization and coordination among various networks and interest groups. These overlapping networks functioned together via communication linkages provided through the Internet. Thus, one month after findings of the 2010 survey were published, most of the elements in the report’s conclusion were contradicted.

We do not fault the conduct of the survey for this misreading of the population. Rather, the problem more likely lies with the nature of and assumptions behind such surveys. Items such as voting and following current political news are standard in surveys of youth in Western societies that have established democracies in which voters are recruited and the media are unfettered from government control. This leads us to ask whether these items are useful for estimating the political orientation of societies with oppressive regimes, such as Egypt under Mubarak. For example, what value did voting have if results of elections were preordained? And why would young people follow news controlled and knowingly censored by the state?

A more telling criticism pertains to the assumptions that underlie this kind of survey. Behind any survey are assumptions about the conditions that would lead to the behaviors being measured. If the behavior in question is voting, then assumptions might be that everyone in the sample has an equal opportunity to vote and that each vote is meaningful to future political decisions and policy. If these assumptions are incorrect, then it is not reasonable to conclude that failure to vote signifies disinterest in or neglect of civic duty.
This is not an esoteric point but highlights the importance of decisions about measurement when assessing civic engagement. In the United States, for example, it is common practice to survey youth and use the findings to characterize behavioral and attitudinal tendencies of cohorts. One might call this “generation labeling” as youth born between certain dates are given names, such as GenX or Millennials, and then assigned proclivities such as “consumer oriented,” “self-centered,” “highly moral,” “generous,” and the like. These attributions are nearly worthless unless one knows the context and resources that might have led to the behaviors and attitudes being measured. For instance, affluent young people in the United States are bombarded with targeted commercial advertising that encourages them to be heavy consumers of material goods. It would truly be news if young people therefore were not consumer oriented.

A positive example of a survey of Egyptian youth that took account of resource availability and opportunity was also reported in 2010. The Education for Employment, 2010 (e4e) survey sampled 1,500 youth and 1,500 employers including public and private educators, policy makers, and civil society leaders. The aim of the survey was to assess job and educational aspirations of young people in correlation with the educational and employment conditions in which they were living. By design, this survey sought to connect behaviors and attitudes of youth with the resources available to them. There would be little value if youth said they aspired to become physicians yet they had no opportunity for medical education, or to become computer programmers if they had no access to computers. It follows that there is value in the decision to assess youth attitudes alongside available education and employment opportunities.

The conclusions from this survey were quite explicable and realistic. The relative scarcity of youth with technical skills was not attributed to youth’s indolence or preferences but to the outdated curriculum used in their schools. These data came from youth and employers; the latter noting that they had had to construct on-the-job internships to compensate for the lack of skills even among college graduates. It follows that youth are capable of acquiring such skills but that they are not typically provided with them by schools using antiquated curriculums.

This point is made well by Queen Rania of Jordan who sponsored the e4e survey. She argued that the way to predict the future is to shape it through education. Instead of attributing qualities to youth as though there were no context, she recommends that youth be educated for the qualities that are needed in the contemporary job market. She claims, “We are letting [youth] down in ill-equipped classrooms with untrained teachers ... with outmoded curriculums already obsolete in the modern marketplace.” She then adds, importantly, “If I have learned one thing over the years, it is this: we can trust youth to maximize opportunities when they are presented” (Education for Employment, 2010, p. 7). In other words, when youth are given educational opportunities, they typically respond by capitalizing on them. And, therefore, to assess their capacities more effectively one should consider the resources they are provided in education to succeed.

Another positive example that reinforces this point are the findings of analysis of youth’s role in ending the Mubarak regime reported by Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at the American University in Cairo (Gerhart Center, 2011). They began by mapping assets that enabled youth to become politically engaged. Instead of assigning attributes to youth in the abstract, the authors sought to connect behavior to the available resources. For example, in trying to understand how large, orderly crowds turned out and then were sustained, the report described
youth organizations whose pre-Tahrir activities helped young people become critically aware of the circumstances that repressed their political potential and educated them in the importance of their own civic engagement. A case in point was the non-government organization, For You My Country that offered community-level training for entrepreneurs and young people wanting to create their own NGOs. FYMY was established in 2002 and has a staff of 50 persons. Its founding principle was to teach youth that charity to the poor will momentarily eliminate deprivation, "... but that sustained civic engagement and strategic social development ..." have the potential to eradicate poverty (Gerhart Center, 2011, p.17).

In addition to the substantial experiences young political activists had over the years in organizing for political change (El Mahdi, 2009), the above examples reveal that an enabling basis for the demonstrations in early 2011 was laid down by programs that gave youth experience in taking active steps to change the society around them. A similar conclusion was reached by Wael Ghonim who documented the Internet campaigns during the second half of 2010 that helped create networks of activists and led to practical experience with public vigil-demonstrations leading up to January 25, 2011 (Ghonim, 2012). These vigils provided youth with experience coordinating communication among social networks as well as with taking public stances against abuses by the security police and risking the negative repercussions.

To conclude on the first point, there are sophisticated ways to assess the civic engagement potential of Egyptian youth. They require that behaviors and attitudes not be viewed abstractly, but instead as grounded in and coupled with the proper enabling or impeding conditions. The assignment of attributes in the absence of contextual conditions can be a misleading exercise as was evident from the 2010 Population Council report. The youth depicted in that survey had little in common with the youth of Tahrir, the youth assessed in the e4e survey, the youth with multiple NGO experiences, or the youth who participated in Internet-instigated vigils described by Ghonim. Once conditions in terms of opportunities and resources are taken into account, a more realistic portrait of youth's potential for civic engagement comes into clear view. If one wants to estimate the political potential of Egyptian youth, one first has to understand and measure the resources and opportunities from which political behavior could arise.

A New Kind of Citizenship

The assessment of civic engagement also depends on assumptions about what a good citizen within a democracy is and how he or she should act. Westheimer and Kahne (2004) have shown that definitions of democratic citizens range from voting and obeying the law to working actively for equality and justice. Within democracies, there is legitimacy in these and other forms of citizenship.

Given the political events that have occurred in Egypt since 2011, it seems reasonable to ask whether people have begun to reflect on a contrast between the kinds of citizenship that fit the past and emerging concepts appropriate for the future. Although the future remains uncertain, no Egyptian can escape discussion about democratic reform, parliamentary elections, justice for killings and arrests, numerous decisions by Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the role of Islam and Islamic political parties, and the making and form of a new Constitution. It would be unusual if the broad public airing of these issues did not provoke Egyptians to consider seriously the kind of state they want and their relationships to it and to their fellow citizens.
Signs of change were already evident in the demonstrations that involved various citizen groups that previously might not have publicly interacted. Individuals from various social sectors and organized groups took part in large rallies to form a self-organizing whole. Individual but connected groups formed to take charge of communication, safety, sanitation, mediation of disputes, and so forth. In the process, generational, geographical, social, and economic boundaries were bridged through collective, collaborative action. Outside the context of the massive demonstrations, for example in cafes and during small social events, individuals began to speak openly about political views rather than keeping them private or restricting them to family and close friends.

Recent scholarship on citizenship may be helpful for understanding the direction in which Egyptians’ concepts of citizenship could be headed. As noted in the Gerhart Center’s 2011 report, many young Egyptians already had experience operating in civil society organizations and networks that extend well-beyond family and close friends. They acquired experiences of acting collectively without top-down management in dealing with creative media, entrepreneurship, volunteerism, and human rights organizing and education. Abu-Lughod documented impressive self-organizing capacities among youth in Upper Egypt prior to and during the early months of the revolution (Abu-Lughod, 2012). These activities may be seen in terms of Elinor Ostrom's “self-organizing and self-governing forms of collective action” (Ostrom, 2009). Her Nobel Prize winning work has shown that people around the globe have the capacity for managing their affairs productively without intervention from government or other formal institutions. She has studied ways in which individuals come together to manage fisheries, forests, and other common resources which might otherwise be exploited in the classic “tragedy of the commons” scenario. Her major finding is that pure market competition vs. government management is only one way to model the situation. A third possibility she suggests is when humans choose to deliberate about how to share common resources for mutual benefit and create rules for mutual gain.

Peter Levine (Levine, 2011) has built on Ostrom’s work to argue that we should not be blinded by three decades of political rhetoric that disjunctively pitted government regulation against free market activity. When limited to this either-or model, people become either voters or consumers. Lost in the process is the view that people can be “co-constructors of systems of rules and norms” to guide their own affairs (Levine, 2011, p.9). He emphasizes that citizenship often entails that people interact within networks, deliberate about issues, and plan strategies of action, both as individuals and as members of organizations. The result is “politics on a human scale” with emphasis on communication, trust, and collective cooperation.

Danielle Allen (Allen, 2004) offers another perspective on this theme. She designates the 1954-65 civil rights struggle in the United States as a threshold event which altered understanding of people-generated politics. As the civil rights movement played out, forms of human relationships sprung to public awareness so that people saw themselves in different ways. They began to comprehend that benefits accruing at large to the middle class white community were contingent on sacrifices made by the African-American community. They became aware of the segregated system and its effects on reproducing a society of inequality, in turn affecting the ways by which individuals, as members of communities, were able to envision their own acquisition of or limitation towards different means and measures of success. Once this reciprocal relationship became apparent, a choice had to be made either to continue...
In an asymmetrical fashion or to acknowledge the possibility for a more symmetrical reciprocity. Selection of the former would result in maintenance of racial segregation while choice of the latter would lead to a “consensually based political community” inclusive of everyone.

Along with Ostrom and Levine, Allen recognizes that an inclusive form of democracy must be continuously renewed. There is no pretense that all people are alike or that literal equality can be achieved. The goal, instead, is to keep striving for a kind of wholeness guided by communication, equitable treatment, and trust that others will reciprocate.

At the time of writing, Egypt’s political future remains uncertain. Will Egypt revert to oligarchy and paternalism? Will Egypt become a religious state, a secular democracy, or some mixture? We have no answer, but in this brief discussion of citizenship we will use interviews from young Egyptian activists to suggest the relevance of this thinking to Egypt’s current political evolution. As with civil rights in the United States 50 years ago, in 2011 Egyptian citizenship might have crossed a threshold which closed the door to the past and opened the path to a new future. At the very least, many Egyptians have had opportunities to glimpse a new kind of polity in which citizens can construct their political relationships in a context within which government ensures and encourages principled fairness.

Evidence that this new vision is emerging comes from interviews with our sample of young activists. We begin with what they said about conditions before the revolution. In February 2011, as the revolution was unfolding, Omar, a human rights worker, noted that the population was intimidated by being under constant threat of arrest for public statements against the government. An example he used was that one could not have a harmless conversation in a café without fearing that the stranger at a neighboring table would later haul you into his office for interrogation. Political conversations were undermined by what most of our sample described as a culture of corruption in which people with power exploited those with less power.

By July 2011, the youth in our sample noticed a dramatic shift. Mohsen, also a human rights worker, observed: “Now people are talking about military courts. People are talking about civilians’ rights... about the system, the regime. How we need to get the judicial branch to be independent...People are beginning to believe in principles that match their values.” He added later: “Now if you have a point of view and I dislike it, I will say, ‘OK, you are on the opposite side of the revolution,’ and you will say the same to me... We grew up in a system without a chance to debate. We need to learn how to talk, how to dialogue...We exchange opinions. We are like children in the garden of democracy.”

Dina, a Christian human rights educator, made the point about open discourse this way. “We are now more aware...This is not the upper-middle class; ‘we’ is everyone. ‘We’ is the taxi driver. ‘We’ is everyone. It is really impressive. Now when you sit in the taxi and you pick up a conversation with the taxi driver there is depth that wasn’t there before. And there’s interest in what’s happening.” The same before and after perspective was expressed by Kholoud: “Whatever I [previously] thought I just kept to myself. I use to think [about] what is right, but silently. Now I am not silent anymore.” Omar, several months after his initial expression of fear, described the change: “We didn’t know before that we [could] do it. Now we’re free; everyone can talk. Everyone can organize themselves... Before you avoided people; you never talked. But now I... go and talk.”
The same spirit of public discourse in which potent ideas are exchanged was expressed as well in November during the week of the long-awaited elections. Mohsen said the following: “I was discussing [politics] with a lot of people, I didn’t know one of them before. We discussed the election, the candidates, the process. It was the first time to have this kind of conversation in a café... [Everyone in] the café was discussing these issues. People are ready [to listen]. They are flexible. If you use good arguments, you could convince them.” He also recalled a conversation with a taxi driver that grew into a vigorous debate about the Emergency Law. Once Mohsen explained the manifest abuses of the law, the taxi driver said, “I don’t know all these things you said. But now I’m against the emergency law.” Aly stated succinctly: “People are free to speak out. Before, they were not allowed to talk [about] government oppression.”

For Aly, the entire political system was now open to public debate: “How are we going to establish institutions? What is the role of the state? The relation between the state and the masses? The social order?...We are fighting about an Islamic or secular state; it is more important to ask how this state is going to perform.” Mohsen, too, saw discussion about the system as a new possibility. He recounted that an old man congratulated him and his generation by saying that because of what they did “we can have a conversation about the vote [instead of being restricted] to talk about football.” Mohsen added: “The next step is to start to talk about the constitution... talking about if we need a presidential system or a parliamentary system, how we choose government, how we [ensure] laws...as we go forward.”

In summary, activists that were interviewed said that before the revolution they were “walking beside the wall,” meaning that they cautiously watched what they said as they warily traversed daily interactions with strangers. This metaphor also means that by staying near the wall, they were succumbing to the government’s insistence that it alone decided political and economic affairs. After the revolution, the activists interviewed said they had moved into the center where they actively participate in politics instead of harboring views privately. In the center, they were engaging with others. They felt they could now take up “serious” matters and topics of “depth.” Even strangers now felt free to express political perspectives to one another. They are willing to listen to arguments, to try to the change the minds of others, and to change their own minds.

A new kind of relationship was emerging among Egyptians. They trusted that by stepping away from the wall, they would not risk detention by security police, and instead participate in the re-making of society. This shift to self-organizing interaction was summarized by Kholoud: “[We] now feel secure. People have changed. People were sleeping by one another [during the demonstrations] and nothing bad happened. [We did not need] police or the security force. Nothing [bad] happened. [We experienced] social solidarity. If you have a bottle of water, you share it with everybody.” Clearly, the bottle of water could represent an idea and “sharing” refers to exchanging views in a spirit of political collaboration with one’s fellow citizens.

**Building a Democratic Polity**

Within a democracy, civic engagement can involve working to create and sustain institutions as well as opposing and reforming structures. Media accounts since Mubarak’s resignation have been focused on opposition to the regime which held power for three decades and to the culture of oppression that fostered relationships of corruption and mistrust among ordinary citizens. Many
of these accounts also portray an uncertain population waiting for decision makers to determine its fate. But if our sample of activists is to be believed, people are not standing by idly. Rather, there are signs that some engaged youth have turned from revolution to the task of constructing a new people-driven democracy to replace the former system. The point of this third section of our paper is to describe the forms of engagement that illustrate youth perspectives and actions leading to this goal.

The interviews reveal a surprising level of realism amongst highly idealistic youth. In July 2011, Kholoud observed, “it’s not yet a post-revolution. It’s still [an ongoing] revolution. There is no revolution on a date [at an appointed time]. It’s not a matter of days, or weeks, or a couple of months. It’s like the French Revolution that went on for ten years…It’s really still on the very start.” What do these youth expect to unfold with time? According to Aly, “We need the time to develop political parties. Please, we need to build structures; [to develop] natural leaders who [will rise] from their own districts.” He added, “for new political parties, you need…years. We need time to build structures.”

Mohsen reflected, “we started the revolutionary process six months ago but the philosophy of the regime is still there. It’s in the normal [Egyptian’s mind]. We get it in school. It’s [in the] relation between the people who are ruling us and [in us] as citizens. It’s about how you deal with me…It’s about the culture.” He continued, offering a glimpse of the task ahead: “we have to work to make civic education for people all over the country.” He then used the metaphor of planting seeds in agriculture. “We plant the land and then get a yield in two or three years… If this process is successful the values will come from the people. We need to educate people. Maybe it takes years. I think it will succeed in the end.” Aly offered comments similar to Mohsen’s: “Calling the military council [SCAF] to step down will not help the cause. Now we have to call for real change. How are we going to establish institutions? How are these institutions going to function?”

Not only do these activists see the situation in realistic terms, but they see their generation’s engagement as key to a democratic future. In this regard, they view themselves as committed and engaged citizens. Omar said, “we are about change happening. We reached the minimum level…against corruption, people who stole our shirts for thirty years. We are building for the [future] the next youth [who will follow us]. This is more difficult than convincing the [older generation]… I don’t think anyone is feeling satisfied, that we [can] now relax.” Aly added, “we have serious problems on different levels that need to be transformed.

Just giving some ‘pain killers’ wouldn’t work… I mean we are speaking about revolutions so just take your time and work on. Work on the issues; deepen your strategy. Allow yourself to develop more tactics and to understand the causes in a much better way.” Later he elaborated, “the World Bank is telling us that we are fine, that everything is perfect… It’s mathematics and economics. But you have to deconstruct these [data] and understand what they mean.”

Mohsen poetically suggested that, “We are like children in the garden of democracy. We have a whole society who are like children in the garden…Children want to learn by doing. If you tell them this electricity is harmful, they will burn their finger by experiencing [it].” Elaborating on this, he used his own future as an example, describing that he would one day be a grandfather narrating stories to his grandchildren: “I’ll tell them stories about me and my generation. If we succeed in this revolution, we would be like the first [founding] fathers of society. Every society has its first fathers. They place the first stone, take the first step to make a democratic society.”
In reviewing the interviews from our sample, we noted a frequent and explicit commitment on behalf of the activists to their nation’s future. Instead of viewing themselves as superiors leading the masses, they saw their actions as a means to awaken a democratic spirit within their fellow citizens. In Aly’s words, “This revolution was horizontal, not top down.” Nearly every individual in our sample expressed belonging to the social mass and, moreover, believing their actions were contributing to Egypt’s history and future. Dina expressed: “I think many of us have nationalistic feelings. We are attached to this country one way or another. But it has always been frustrating to be attached to Egypt…We live in different continents while living in the same city. People lead very different lives. They come from very different social backgrounds, social classes, economic classes.” But when people stood together against the old regime, she described, “It was beautiful. It just felt beautiful.”

Alluding to the bombing of a Coptic church which stoked tension between religious groups to make a similar point, Kholoud noted: “It was really tragic. I was crying every day. But the people surprised me again. I have faith in the people. Every time I feel [the revolution] is coming to an end…something happens that brings new energy.” In this case, Egyptians came out to demonstrate in support of religious tolerance. Describing the demonstration, Kholoud said: “It was really hot, people were tired, but they continued to sit in. When you think things are getting out of control, something happens and then you know why you invest [trust] in people. Not in political parties, not anything other than the people.”

Conclusion

There is no standard or best way to assess civic engagement among youth. Throughout this paper we have tried to show different sides of young Egyptians’ engagement. Our general thesis is that engagement cannot be approached merely as an abstract concept, but needs to be analyzed in conjunction with both enabling and impeding socio-political conditions. Using this framework, it is clear that the demonstrations which led to President Mubarak’s resignation opened new paths for social and political action for Egyptians. When people operated in a context of corruption and authoritarian control, relationships between individuals were marked by wariness and distrust. Individuals hid their ideas from public scrutiny, keeping them private or within a restricted circle of close friends and family. The revolution enabled new forms of public discourse, and as people began to express ideas publicly, feelings of trust became formed even between strangers and when disagreements were likely.

In making this argument, we have relied on a small group of youth from Cairo and Alexandria who were socially conscious and politically engaged prior to the revolution, whether in human rights education or reform-oriented civil society organizations, and all participated actively in the demonstrations. Concentrating on such youth was important because they are the ones likely to lead and train their peers through the process of democratic political change. Despite their prior engagement, each individual was transformed by the power and efficacy of the revolution. And, as illustrated above, their awareness of the real hindrances, struggles, and actions to be taken has matured.

The initial euphoria that came with Mubarak’s resignation has become a more sober realization that if the revolution is to succeed, public discourse must be accompanied by civic education. Many have become aware, painfully, that the ways of the old regime are etched deeply into Egyptian society and that it will take time for them to be replaced. Nevertheless, the revolution has provided a sense of individual and collective efficacy in no longer permitting the young activists
to be abused by leaders’ self-interest, corruption, and brutality. These youth have faith that the population can move forward with the help of strong institutions that replace those of the previous generations. This is a powerful outlook insofar as it leads to and sustains these young people’s own engagement for the sake of a new democratic Egypt.

Finally, we wish to present two observations from a broader interpretation of the interviews we conducted. First, it is essential to point out that there are many voices among Egyptian youth. Our conversations with youth, who, unlike those we have described above, are not political activists, both support and complicate the interpretations offered above. In terms of support, all youth with whom we spoke were unequivocally in favor of the revolution. For example, Sayed, a 27-year old from the Giza suburb of Cairo, did not participate in any demonstrations. Sharing the attachments of his family he was sympathetic to some degree to Mubarak. Despite this, he was thrilled by the success of the initial phase of the revolution and more so than any of the other youth we interviewed elaborately extolled the grand history of Egypt and the various ways in which the regime had defiled that cherished identity. He phrased the permanence of the change Egyptians have undergone through the revolution in the following way: “Nobody [can] come to get our throne now.”

However, Sayed has been very unsatisfied with the way political activism has preceded. Like many youth who approached us in Tahrir Square just weeks after Mubarak stepped down, Sayed feels that the revolution is “killing Egypt.” He and generations of his family work in the tourist industry and they have felt the economic consequences of the revolution severely. Beginning with our first interview with Sayed in March 2011 and in every meeting thereafter, he expressed frustration: “So, what do you need?” he asks, referring to the protesters in Tahrir. “All Egyptian people now need to stop. We made our revolution successful, it’s ok. We got our president in a jail, it’s ok. His son is in a jail, it’s ok. His wife now is very old . . . all the thieves people from the old system, now [are] in a jail.” Sayed does not underestimate the value of mass protest at Tahrir. Indeed, he continued his statement by saying that if the new president were to resemble Mubarak, then “It’s back to Tahrir!” But for him, “What do we need now? You must work! If you love Egypt, you must work.”

Thus, while it seems clear that at a broader level the revolution has facilitated an openness and trust among Egyptians, it is also apparent that there are real divisions that may complicate progress towards that democratic goal. With specific regard to youth and their commitment to change, Sayed’s narrative reveals that there may also be substantial distrust among youth regarding what kinds of changes should be made and how quickly.

Our second point has to do with the volatility of this first year of the revolution. Above, we intentionally provided excerpts from the narratives of the youth we have been studying to illustrate the paper’s central points about civic engagement and citizenship. We have come to know these youth well over the past year and have no doubt that their expressions of growth, maturity, commitment, and patience are authentic. However, these inspiring and promising comments on real change occur within narratives that are otherwise replete with frustration and disillusionment; and, it appears, this is increasingly true. In the most recent interviews in March 2012, each individual described him- or herself as very depressed and tense.

We provide this sobering portrayal not only to be true to the lived experience of these young people, but to illustrate points made above about the dependency of democratic change on enabling conditions.
Crucially, all of the activists indicated that their depression was a function of their perception that no real change in the fundamental conditions has been achieved. This was born out in the timelines of the first year of the revolution that we had them draw during the most recent interview. Invariably, those timelines can be described as “tragic” (that is, with a systematically downward slope).

On one hand, despite deeply disappointing moments – ranging from the increasingly abusive behavior by SCAF to criticisms by peers or adults that call into question the youths’ motives – these youth are still able to articulate commitment to principles of citizenship and democracy. On the other, we have to acknowledge the uncertainty in the durability of these transformations. They appear to be highly sensitive to fluctuating conditions. Despite those ever-changing conditions, the youth continue to demand respect, trust, and inclusiveness as fundamental to their movement.

Perhaps one future indicator of their growth will be the degree to which the young activists are able to adapt to changing political structures. For example, while lecturing Aly and his compatriots to abandon the Tahrir protests after the November events in Mohamed Mahmoud Street (during which Aly was shot in the face), his cherished mentor, Heba, advised them to adapt to current realities. Anticipating the completion of the parliamentary elections that began that very week, she told them that mass protests at Tahrir would no longer be useful. Rather, they should begin visiting – daily if needed – the offices of the newly elected officials and demand their action on behalf of meaningful reform (Barber, 2011).

Egypt has moved forward in establishing new political structures by electing a new parliament and a new president. Given that virtually no youth are among the new leadership, it remains important to understand how youth will adapt their attitudes and methods of engagement to align with prevailing realities. Or, should the new structures continue to violate the self-respect and dignity that Egyptians reclaimed through the revolution, perhaps it will be “Back to Tahrir!”
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Time of Up-Rise: Threat or opportunity?

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Abstract

Within the context of Arab Spring, this paper aims to present a framework that describes, refines, and explains foundations’ role in times of reformation and rapid change. It also reflects the consequences of the Arab Spring on foundations’ internal learning process. The paper is divided into three parts in an attempt to answer a set of questions addressing these issues. Section one investigates the role of the foundations sector in addressing issues surfacing during and the Arab Spring. It selectively maps the key factors of the uprising and some areas specifically related to the topic and, in doing so, the answers intersect with how the foundation sees the Arab Spring: whether as Threat or Opportunity. Section two puts forward Mansour Foundation’s as a leading-edge practice from an academic perspective to theorize and model its role in community recovery. The last part of the paper suggests an approach to develop a prototype model, concluding with the idea that times of rapid and radical change can be converted from a threat to an opportunity for the foundations sector. Worth highlighting, this paper is theoretical in design but based on genuine practice compromising professional observation in addition to a literature review and secondary empirical data.

Arab Spring Overview

For 50 years or more the pace of change in the Middle East has been slow, making the events of 2011 all the more surprising. In the time span of a mere 24 months, a wave of political upheaval began in Tunisia that shook the power structures throughout the neighborhood. In those authoritarian countries, in which until then any form of oppositional opinion or political protest had been strictly prohibited, masses of people took to the streets and demanded greater political and economic participation, better governance and the civil rights denied to them for decades. Some call it the ‘Arab Spring,’ others the ‘Arab Revolutions,’ and still others, more cautious, use the neutral term ‘Arab uprisings.’ However, there is a tendency to talk about it what happened as though it were a monolithic phenomenon.

It is true that many of the national uprisings have common features. The protests have shared techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, and rallies, as well as the use of social media to organize, communicate, and raise awareness in the face of the various regimes’ repression and Internet censorship. These protests were largely driven by younger citizens, using cell phones and social networking websites, with no visible leadership in many of these essentially grass roots movements, and using the same slogans and tactics. Yet the experiences of each Arab country have been distinct.

These demonstrations of individual courage, collective determination, and political progress continue to signify that realistic prospects for a new era are in the making. ‘History is unfolding,’ said American president Barack Obama. Hundreds of political analysts have predicted a ‘happier future’ for the people. This is good news: the Arab world is awakening. The courage and the determination of the people of Egypt were impressive. The dictator has fled and the way towards true and transparent democracy is opening. It is now time to implement the basic and immutable principles: rule of law, equal citizenship, universal suffrage, accountability and the separation of powers.

Domestic debates in Egypt over the content of the constitution, political parties, elections, and so forth are taking place. Never, at least over the last century, has such positive social and
political energy been so powerfully felt. We are witnessing what may well be the birth of true political independence, despite that everything remains fragile and uncertain. 2011 will be remembered as a date of historical import, for the peoples’ demands, hopes and expectations, and drive toward democratic reformation, economic upturn, anti-corruption, governance and transparency are now the norm in political movements.

Arab Spring Key Factors

The desperate act of a single person in Tunisia - Mohamed Bouazizi - was not only the trigger of the train of events we are witnessing everyday; but it served as a metaphor for the explosion of the pent-up agony experienced by citizens for decades. This act started a process of change that will extend beyond 5 years, I assume. As the global economic crisis played a key role in triggering the Arab spring, the unrest was about bad governance as much it was about the economy itself. The lack of good governance is the primary cause of corruption, lack of social justice, and exclusion of the society’s minorities and regression.

Since early 2001, the state-system grew old, increasingly red-taped, and dominated by old guard. Not innovative approaches to mushroomed community problems, long-term development projects, or even upgrading infrastructure were introduced into suffering communities. By 2005, communities detected blatant political deception followed by economic corruption and abuse of authority. Egyptian society, which still appears quite divided, became distorted by the disappearance of a middle classes which left two uneven classes with opposing interests.

The 2005 World Bank data show that poverty is on the rise in Egypt: 43.9% of Egyptians live on less than two dollars a day. The same report revealed that the Gini Coefficient index is 0.34, indicating a fairly high level of socio-economic inequity. The poorest 20% of the population share only 8.6% of the country’s income or consumption levels, while the wealthiest 20% of the population share 34.6% of the country’s income or consumption levels. By 2008, the situation became increasingly tense and only superficial solutions were provided by slow and deficient governments and administrations. In light of these conditions, the severe deterioration in all aspects of life was not a surprising result. The explosion was imminent, yet no one foresaw it.
Foundations and Arab Spring Dialogue

The slogans used in most revolutions across the Arab world accused their governments of abandoning their respective people. A major slogan of the demonstrators in the Arab world was ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam (“the will of the people is to bring down the regime”).

For a majority of people, this reflects determination and great courage while for few others it signified austerity and obscurity; the foundation sector was one of the latter.

And until June 2012, it remained difficult for many foundations to ascertain and assess what has happened and is currently happening in Egypt. Every foundation understood that an irreversible shift is underway but none was able to pinpoint exactly how or when to help in these mass protests.

Unfortunately, most of the foundations’ reactions were delayed. The reason for this can largely be found in the questions being asked over and over by the foundations: ‘are we going down with the regime?’ ‘What if the corporate sector downsizes?’ ‘And, if not now, maybe in two years?’ ‘What have we truly achieved in the past and what do we have to achieve in future?’ Among these questions was concern that whatever we did in that moment might be obstructed by the absence of established political structures as the situation across the country remained unforeseen. Those questions were disconcerting and time-consuming, yet rational due to the following:

1. One of the key causes of the revolution was that the Mubarak regime created a welfare state characterized by a harsh, capitalist market economy, which fashioned a small group of very wealthy and corrupt individuals. The foundation needed to keep in mind that they were often affiliated with and largely funded by corporations, high net-worth businessmen, and prominent Egyptian families who were supposedly associated with Mubarak’s regime.

2. The belief that business and civil society sectors are development partners and on some occasions serve as substitutes to the Egyptian governments - which I don’t argue against, by the way - worsened the image of foundations and demonstrated their failure in bringing about sustainable development and fulfilling the needs of Egyptian society.

3. That diverse communities in Egypt - inside and outside of Tahrir square - successfully organized and managed the recovery process without a cohesive, planned approach sent an unwelcoming message to the to the foundations sector, rendering it insignificant, ineffective and shamefaced.

Thus, factual judgment on the foundation sector alongside a more specific rejection of the businessmen’s foundations is predicted. It required great courage and risk from the foundations who decided to respond to these events with responsible acts to community after the fall of Mubarak.

Example: Mansour Foundation for Development responded quickly to incorporate a rights-based approach in all its work. Its plans encompassed short and long term activities to address main development topics: Poverty alleviation and employment opportunities for youth.
Mansour Foundation for Development (MFD): An Attempt to Keep up with Arab Spring’s Expectations

Some Facts and Figures

Mansour epitomizes a successful family business and a key player in shaping the Egyptian economy since the early 1940s. Mansour group operations currently span across several major industrial sectors; among these, automotive, capital markets, consumer and retail, and industrial equipment. The business also entails stakeholders’ social responsibility towards the communities within which it operates. MFD is one of Mansour’s responsible business practices as well as a foundation founded early 2001 that is fully funded by an Egyptian family. Over the past 12 years, MFD has evolved into a corporate foundation and, consequently, its core values come from business ethics. Thinking models and venture disciplines are applied to development programs. MFD’s directions were set with an intense attitude and a strong spirit towards development as community-driven projects that generate cultured individuals.
Mansour Foundation Evolvement

Previously: Charity acts with no organizational structure

2009: Mansour Foundation for Development/Restructure

January 2001: Inception of Mansour Philanthropic Foundation

2010: Development Agency/Corporate Foundation

Figure 3: MFD Evolvement

Pillars of Development

Education

Job Creation

Entrepreneurship

Health

Human Relief

Capacity Building

Figure 4: MFD Cornerstones
Mansour Launches a Set of Programs to Keep up with Arab Spring

The uprisings brought forth a need for a broad-spectrum view towards development to overcome the demanding present and lead the way to a brighter future. MFD’s portfolio is based on social-solidarity as well as the adoption of a radical development scheme reflected in their response to the events which dictated flexibility and rapidity in planning and execution. To do so, MFD worked as an intermediary between immediate philanthropic acts and short-term development projects - to release some of the burden on the community - and more future-minded long-term sustainable development programs.

Conceptual Framework

MFD’s mandate to a brighter future was definitive in executing a nationwide initiative to educate societies who are able to face developmental challenges. A unique illiteracy program has been put in place distinguished by its unconventionality and short duration (45 days). The pilot outputs 5,000 beneficiaries, 500 job opportunities, and 1000 volunteers. The outcomes encouraged MFD to issue a tutor manuscript of five volumes on human rights and responsibilities education among youngsters and older age groups.

Figure 5: Conceptual Framework
Moreover, MFD’s programs are serving Mansour factory workers and their surrounding communities. The foundation assisted in creating and supporting two community associations in under-served areas in Alexandria and Siwa. 2011 brought into MFD’s scope humanitarian relief as a social responsibility and solidarity even on the regional level. The Foundation team headed aid convoys to Musaed in Libya carrying 150 tons of supplies to 15,000 refugees in addition to providing volunteered professionals to Misrata hospital.
This rich portfolio recapitulates a stakeholder model of responsible acts on the corporate level, corporate-surrounding communities and society at large.

**Conclusion**

There is every reason for hope and optimism in Egypt; our society on the march towards freedom, dignity, justice and democracy. We are determined to gain political independence and have our sights set on modernity and democracy. Consequently, the foundations sector must develop a clearer picture of its work and role in this movement if it wants to conceive democratization and political change as an opportunity to improve cooperation rather than reacting with fear regarding instability and insecurity, to respond genuinely to citizens’ demands for improved living standards.

*Figure 8: Visualize The Change*
Then visualize the change externally via a comprehensive national agenda to be developed based on:

1. Full cooperation between the new governments and the civil society - including the business community - in developing strategies to promote inclusive economic growth and employment;
2. Improving governance, transparency, accountability, and citizen participation in projects;
3. Amending the legal and regulatory framework for NGOs and foundations;
4. Enhancing statistical culture and creating an official database for philanthropy;

In addition, cross-sector improvements need to include:

1. Adopting an integrated system for monitoring and evaluation of development effectiveness;
2. Increasing partnerships based on integration rather than competition;
3. Offering further technical and financial support to community foundations;
4. Dedication to long-term development causes along with current programs;
5. Increasing social and economic inclusion by expanding the opportunities available to NGOs and improving the effectiveness of support for the vulnerable;
6. Communication of human rights values within foundations as well in supported programs.

We hope that with this paper, we can contribute to clarifying and adding nuance to the role of the foundation sector in the Arab Spring.
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Philanthropic Foundations in Egypt:
Fueling Change or Safeguarding Status quo?

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Abstract

This paper explores whether, and if so how, Egyptian philanthropic foundations are responding to the January 25th revolution and subsequent efforts to consolidate democratic political reform. Before the revolution, Egypt’s Law of Associations (Law 84 of 2002) strictly prohibited Egyptian foundations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from engaging in activities that could be deemed “political.” As a result, these organizations focused on economic development and basic service delivery, and carefully avoided political reform or advocacy initiatives. Preliminary results suggest that Egypt’s private foundations are staying the course, continuing to focus on economic development and avoid political activities. Community foundations, however, have adapted their strategies to target political reform. The paper proposes that hypothesis that in liberalized autocracies, community foundations are better positioned than private foundations to support democratic transition and consolidation. This hypothesis should be tested in future research.

Introduction

On 25 January 2011, Egyptians proved that an autonomous civil society capable of challenging state authority had survived decades of government repression. For eighteen days, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians raised their voices in peaceful demonstrations, calling for an end to the 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak. On 11 February, Mubarak resigned from office and the Egyptian army was installed as a transitional government.

While Egypt’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) did not spearhead the revolution, they were credited with laying the groundwork for the uprisings by virtue of their long-standing education and civic engagement programs. Furthermore, after the fall of the Mubarak regime NGOs began working overtime to advance political reform efforts. Their initiatives on voter education, election-monitoring, constitutional reform, human rights, and civic participation placed these organizations at the front lines of Egypt’s democratic transition.

In order to sustain and build these efforts, Egyptian NGOs needed greater financial and technical support. Western donors flocked to the country, offering millions of dollars of aid for democracy promotion initiatives, and many NGOs applied eagerly for those funds. But Western grants were considered tainted, and the army placed recipients of Western donations under investigation. In February 2012, the army pressed criminal charges against 43 international NGO workers, and rumors suggested that the army planned to scrutinize the activities of up to 400 additional organizations.

Egypt, however, boasts a cadre of local donors. Over the past decade, philanthropic foundations proliferated in Egypt as the government looked to the private sector to fill the gaps it left as it retreated from the welfare arena. Egyptian businesspeople responded by establishing foundations to strategically target their charity toward “sustainable development” initiatives. These foundations strongly resembled their Western counterparts, with one significant exception: they were prohibited in their early years, under the Mubarak regime, from engaging in any activities that could be deemed “political.”

The revolution offered Egyptian foundations a unique opportunity to affect the political redevelopment of their country by supporting NGOs engaged in reform projects and by using their proximity to key
decision-makers to advocate for democratic change. Although the old NGO law remained in place, NGOs and activists described the months following Mubarak’s resignation as a period of “euphoria” in which anything was possible. During those months Egyptian NGOs became “political,” casting off fears of retribution and launching initiatives that would have led them to jail cells under the prior regime. This was the moment when Egyptian foundations had the chance to take the types of risks for which we applaud philanthropic foundations. They had the opportunity to support what was to be the largest political protest movement in the world that year, a movement toward democracy that would inspire other such efforts throughout the Arab region.

This study examines the role that Egyptian foundations played in supporting Egypt’s transition to democracy during the first 1.5 years after the 25 January Revolution. In the American context, research has shown that foundations often provide crucial financial support for the development and maintenance of public interest groups and social movement organizations (Walker, 1991). Findings are mixed, however, as to the effect of foundation patronage on social movement outcomes. Some scholars suggest that foundation grants tame social movements and guide them toward more moderate goals, making them less threatening to elites’ interests (Arnove, 1980; Roelofs, 2003). Other studies have found that while foundation support does “channel” movements into more formal methods of political participation, such professionalization ultimately helps the movement to survive and reach its goals over the long term (Jenkins, 1998).

This study finds that Egyptian private foundations did not support the country’s democratic reform movement in overtly political ways and instead remained focused on social and economic development. Unlike regional and international foundations and international aid agencies operating in Egypt, local private foundations did not direct their grantmaking to human rights organizations or to NGOs working on such reform activities as voter education and registration, elections monitoring, constitutional and legal reform, or arts and culture activities aimed at documenting and expressing the revolution and its goals. Private Egyptian foundations did however support the democratic reform process from a grassroots, rights-based approach that focused on enhancing the social skills and economic capacities necessary to participate in the politics of a democratic society. Egyptian Foundations and the NGOs they supported promoted the development of an identity of “empowered” citizens among their beneficiaries. This strategy not only responded to local needs and traditions, it also allowed local foundations to continue their work uninterrupted while other grantmakers’ activities were stymied during the government’s crackdown on politically-oriented NGOs.

Egypt’s two community foundations, the Community Foundation for South Sinai and the Maadi Community Foundation, on the other hand, took advantage of their close connections to local community members in order to more conspicuously support the aims of the revolution. They led their communities to become more civically and politically engaged, despite the risks posed by the legal environment of participating in such activities. Unlike their private foundation counterparts, Egypt’s community foundations proactively altered their strategies and tactics in order to align their organizations’ activities with the goals of the revolution.

The results of this study are based upon 73 interviews with staff of local Egyptian foundations, regional and international foundations, international aid agencies, NGOs, and experts in the field of Arab philanthropy. The first section provides a brief overview of the landscape of local foundations
and NGOs in Egypt. I then analyze prior research on the impact of foundation patronage of social movements and on foundations' larger roles in democratic societies. In the next section, I describe the data and methods used to answer the research question. I then respond to the research question, exploring the roles of Egyptian foundations in their country's transition to democracy. I conclude by arguing that Egyptian foundations have contributed to democratic reform not through the advocacy methods that are championed by Western foundations, but rather by supporting basic social and economic development through a rights-based approach intended to prepare Egyptians to participate as empowered democratic citizens.

Foundations and NGOs in Egypt: A Brief Overview

Egyptian society boasts a long history of charitable giving, much of which is rooted in religious traditions. Since Ottoman times, zakat, sadaqa, waqf, and ushr have served as vehicles through which individuals have channeled their private resources for the greater public good. Zakat, the third pillar of Islam, is a form of mandatory giving required by all followers of the Muslim faith. By far the largest form of charitable giving in Egypt, zakat funds are estimated to total more than 5.5 billion Egyptian pounds per year (Atia, 2008). Muslims also give voluntarily through sadaqa, while tithing, or ushr, is a strong tradition in the Christian faith (Ener, 2003).

While virtually all Egyptians practice individual-based charity, the wealthy have also traditionally established endowment institutions through which to channel their philanthropic giving. The waqf (plural: awqaf) has been the most common form of endowment, and its emergence in the Middle East dates prior to the Ottoman Empire. “Waqafa” in Arabic means “causing a thing to stop and stand still,” and indeed awqaf consist of either immovable objects or cash designated to fulfill a specific purpose in perpetuity. Established by private individuals as a way of providing public goods, awqaf were the primary means of welfare provision in the early Ottoman Empire (Peri, 1992; Cizakca, 1998; Hoexter, 1998; Pioppi, 2007). Overseen by wealthy and ruling elites, they provided a wide array of services including education, health care, religious and cultural programming, and municipal services and took the form of schools, hospitals, mosques, and even water wells.

Awqaf remained important in Egypt until the early 1950s, when the endowments were nationalized and placed under the administration of the Ministry of Awqaf. By the late 1950s, the schools, hospitals, and other institutions financed by awqaf were placed under the supervision of the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health (Pioppi, 2007). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Egyptian government not only consolidated the nationalization of awqaf but also greatly expanded the national welfare state (Ismail, 2006; Atia, 2008). The Ministry of Social Solidarity assumed oversight of many forms of welfare provision including education, guaranteed employment, health services, food subsidies, and pension programs (Ismail, 2006).

Egypt began to liberalize its economy in the late 1960s and with the advent of the Open Door Economic Policy in the 1970s not only increased foreign trade and investment and developed the private sector but also shifted the welfare focus “from redistribution to efficiency” (Atia, 2008). The 1992 Structural Adjustment Policy brought further privatization of the economy as well as a privatization of social services. From this time on, the variety and quantity of social services provided by NGOs increased while the number of NGOs also proliferated.
As the Egyptian government ceded responsibility for social welfare provision, Egypt’s business community stepped in to attempt to fill some of the gaps. According to Ibrahim and Sherif, “persistent societal problems coupled with rapid wealth creation in the Arab region are driving a new generation of private citizens to commit resources for the greater public good” (2008, p. 2). In Egypt that commitment of resources has taken a variety of forms, chief among them being corporate social responsibility programs and philanthropic foundations.

Egyptian foundations proliferated in the past decade, and umbrella groups and research centers that support foundations in the Arab region were established to help these organizations connect with each other and share “best practices.” The most prominent of these include the Arab Foundations Forum, the World Congress of Muslim Philanthropists, and the Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at the American University Cairo. Recently, the director of the Arab Foundations Forum recognized the need for an organization formally devoted to helping Arab foundations improve their effectiveness, and toward that end he established SANEED for Philanthropy Advisory in the Arab Region.

Developing a typology of foundations in Egypt is, as Atia (2008: 30) notes, a “difficult and contentious task that sparks debate.” She does, however, identify six types of foundations: 1) operating foundations, 2) grantmaking foundations, 3) religious charities, 4) community foundations, 5) private sector partnership, or shilla foundations, and 6) corporate grantmaking. Atia adds that “venture philanthropy” is an emerging form of philanthropy in Egypt, and points out that many foundations employ more than one type of grantmaking. Some efforts have also been mounted to revive the concept of the waqf. Chief among these is the Waqfeyat al Maadi, a community foundation that is modeled after the waqf and advocates for the restoration a modern form of awqaf.

Organizations in Egypt may register either as an association (gam‘iya) or as a foundation (mu‘assasah) (Atia, 2008). Associations are based primarily upon membership, with at least 10 founding board members required, while foundations are based upon the allocation of a fund. Associations are governed by Law 84 of 2002. This Law of Associations, considered one of the most strict in the Arab region, gives the Ministry of Social Solidarity the authority to regulate an organization’s registration, approve an organization’s receipt of funds from abroad, investigate an organization’s board members’ backgrounds and financial records, and shut down an organization if it disobeys any aspects of the law. Furthermore, the law forbids organizations from engaging in political activity or in acts that threaten national unity or disrupt political order (Atia, 2008).

Despite this strict Law of Associations, Egypt boasts the largest NGO sector in the Arab region. Estimates suggest the number of Egyptian NGOs to total approximately 30,000. As with foundations, the task of developing a map or typology of NGOs in Egypt has sparked vigorous debates among scholars. For the purposes of this paper, I follow Ben Nefissa et al’s (2005) and Hafid’s (2011) classification of NGOs into two types: those that engage in charitable and development activities and those that focus their efforts on social mobilization and advocacy. Traditionally, local foundations have directed their funding to development NGOs, while advocacy NGOs have had to rely almost exclusively on foreign donors for support.
Foundations, Social Movements, and Democracy: Findings from Western Contexts

From grants in the mid-20th century to organizations working for civil and women’s rights, to funding in the 21st century for advocacy related to gay rights and environmental protection, philanthropic foundations in the United States have long been active supporters of social movements (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Walker, 1991; Jenkins, 1998; Jenkins and Halci, 1999; Jenkins, 2001; Faber and McCarthy, 2005; Bartley, 2007; Goss, 2007; Minkoff and Agnone, 2010; O’Connor, 2010). Not long after their founding, some of America’s oldest and largest foundations catalyzed or supported a variety of social and political reforms. The Rockefeller Foundation funded the development of social science research that would come to tackle major questions of social, economic, and political importance; the Ford Foundation focused its efforts on the rights of poor and marginalized citizens; and the Russell Sage Foundation promoted national standards in housing, infrastructure, and workers’ rights (Faber and McCarthy, 2005).

Foundations have built upon these early efforts and increasingly integrated support for advocacy and public policy reform into their grantmaking strategies. With umbrella groups such as the Council on Foundations and Grantmakers for Effective Organizations calling upon foundations to ramp up support for advocacy activities, foundations are jumping on the policy reform bandwagon with the idea that by influencing policy they can make a greater impact than by solely supporting individual organizations and projects. In addition, new foundations have been created that focus exclusively on policy reform issues. The Gill Foundation, for example, arose from the battle for equality amongst gay and lesbian citizens and is today singularly committed to securing equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender populations (www.gillfoundation.org).

In recent years, scholars have coined this form of philanthropy, ‘social movement philanthropy.’ Jenkins and Halci (1999) define social movement philanthropy as “foundation grants to social movement projects, whether these go to grassroots movement groups, professional advocacy and service organizations, or institutionalized organizations such as churches and universities that are sponsoring movement work” (p. 230). They stress that this form of philanthropy is guided by a framework of civil, political, economic, and social rights for all people. Of particular importance for the case of Egypt, Jenkins and Halci suggest that social movement philanthropy “has attempted to realize the model of a pluralistic democracy where all interests are politically represented” (p. 254).

Research suggests that the share of total foundation funding dedicated to social movement philanthropy is small yet significant. Evidence from the U.S. indicates that somewhere between one and three percent of institutional funding is dedicated to social movements or economic justice projects (Grantmakers, 1998; Jenkins and Halci, 1999). According to Jenkins and Halci (1999), this type of philanthropy “has become institutionalized as a significant force in American society....It constitutes a highly leveraged form of ‘risk capital’ philanthropy, having major impact on most of the social movements that have developed in the past four decades. It has fueled these movements in that it has provided needed technical resources and created new organizations that have been vital to securing and implementing gains” (p. 253).

Resource mobilization theory, popularized in social movement literature in the 1970s, suggests that support from wealthy patrons is crucial for movements’ development and maintenance
Responding to earlier grievance-based theories of social movements, resource mobilization theory suggests that movement success depends not upon the psychological status of movement participants (e.g. grievances over perceived mistreatment) but rather upon structural factors such as the availability of resources and connections within and between networks. Elite patrons play an important role in both supplying resources to movements and in conveying legitimacy upon movements’ goals.

In his seminal research on interest groups in America, Jack Walker contends that patron support is the driving force behind interest group emergence and maintenance. He argues, “The key to the origins and maintenance of interest groups in the US… lies in the ability and willingness of patrons of political action to expand the representative system by sponsoring groups that speak for newly emerging elements of society and promote new legislative agendas and social values” (1991, p. 102).

Other scholars, however, condemn foundation and elite patron support for social movements as attempts to tame them. The social control thesis suggests that foundation support for movements seeks to diffuse movements’ more radical elements, moderate their goals, and professionalize them in ways that lessen movements’ threats to the status quo (Arnove, 1980; Roelofs, 2003). Evidence from early social movements in the US lends some support for this argument. Foundations were slow, for example, to support the civil rights movement. Their grantmaking for this movement was reactive, coming only after the movement had gained momentum and legitimacy, and even then most foundation grants went to moderate, professional institutions such as the NAACP (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Minkoff and Agnone, 2010; O’Connor, 2010).

More recent research, however, suggests that rather than fully controlling movements, foundation and elite patronage “channels” movement goals and tactics toward more moderate ends but is nonetheless crucial for movements’ success after the early mobilization periods (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Jenkins, 1998; Jenkins and Halci, 1999; Jenkins, 2001). By funding professional organizations and urging grassroots organizations to become more professional, foundations tend to steer movements toward less radical goals, strategies, tactics, and discourses. But by channeling movements into more institutionalized forms of participation, foundations also increase movements’ capacity to continue to mobilize constituents and reach their long-term goals (Jenkins, 1998; Jenkins and Halci, 1999).

In their studies of the environmental and feminist movements, Bartley (2007) and Goss (2007) not only confirm the channeling thesis but also explore the mechanisms by which channeling occurs. Bartley points out that most studies of channeling assume that some combination of two mechanisms underlie the channeling process. First, foundations select moderate and professional NGOs instead of more radical, grassroots organizations. Second, foundations transform organizations and movements over time by encouraging organizations to develop more bureaucratic, professional strategies and tactics. But Bartley points out that these two mechanisms are not exhaustive. His study finds that through coordinated efforts, foundations significantly contributed to building a field of forest certification both by recruiting organizations into the project and by leveraging protest to further promote the field’s development (Bartley, 2007). In her study of the U.S. women’s movement of the 1960s-1980s, Goss concludes that by supporting various subgroups within the women’s movement foundations legitimized
these groups’ identities as well as their policy agendas. This diversification of identity groups “contributed to the fragmentation of public policy making and to the rise of special interest politics in the United State” (Goss 2007: 1176).

Notably, existing studies of foundations’ and elites’ patronage of social movements are situated in advanced democracies. This is likely due to the fact that, until recently, there were few opportunities to study foundations’ impact on social movements in non-democracies or their impact on social movements calling for democracy. In the Arab region, however, foundations proliferated within liberalized autocracies and continued to operate during these states’ democratic transitions. This presents an opportunity to examine not only foundations’ impacts on democratic social movements, but also the broader question of foundations’ roles in building democracy. Proponents of foundation-based philanthropy argue that foundations offer crucial support to the organizations that comprise civil society, thus contributing to the public sphere that is a hallmark of the democratic state.

The legitimacy of foundations within democracies stems from their independence from political and market forces (Prewitt, 2006; Anheier and Daly, 2007; Fleishman, 2007). Not only are foundations free, because of their relative lack of accountability requirements, to make “risky” investments in organizations experimenting with new approaches to tackling social problems, they also, through both grantmaking and advocacy, “promote innovation in social perceptions, values, relationships, and ways of doing things” (Anheier and Daly, 2007: 32). But the legitimacy of foundations within democracies derives not so much from what they do, but from what they symbolize. These organizations’ independence, and the variety of interests they represent, signals a society’s preference for a state with limited government powers and a pluralistic society in which a wide array of preferences influence the policy agenda.

In addition to supporting the development and maintenance of democracy at home, Western foundations have embarked since the last decade of the twentieth century on ambitious efforts to build civil society and democracy abroad. According to Benjamin and Quigley (2010), their efforts have focused primarily in three areas: “supporting open and competitive democratic processes, strengthening formal and informal institutions that make democracy more robust, and encouraging civic values and practices that undergird democracy, like tolerance and respect for minorities” (p. 245). Western foundations have supported democratic reform in a variety of contexts and at a variety of stages of states’ democratic transitions.

International giving by large U.S. foundations grew dramatically during the Cold War, from $75 million in 1982 to more than $500 million in 1990. By 2008, U.S. foundations were sending more than $6 million abroad (Spero, 2010). While the targets of these grants are varied – they include such areas as health, the environment, education, and arts and culture – democracy promotion and the development of civil society has been a major focus of international giving since the Cold War. U.S. and other Western Foundations, notably the Open Society Institute, have championed the development of liberal democracies in both the post-Communist states and in other developing regions (Spero, 2010).

Western foundations such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Open Society Institute, and the US-funded Foundation for the Future have been working in Egypt for decades. But unlike in Central and Eastern Europe during the cold war, they are not alone. Local Egyptian
foundations have established and increased their presence in the Egyptian philanthropic landscape, replacing the awqaf form of endowment that was nationalized decades ago. Their existence during the Mubarak era posed a puzzle for the theory of philanthropic foundations: if foundations are presumed to gain legitimacy from their independence and their support for an autonomous civil society, why did we see indigenous foundations emerging in a liberalized autocracy under which civil society was not free? Were these foundations covertly working to foster a more sovereign civil society and a more democratic form of governance? Or were they simply tools of the autocratic regime? The 25 January revolution offers an opportunity to begin to answer these questions, by exploring whether local foundations supported the aims of the revolution or instead remained on the sidelines and conducted business as usual.

Data and Methods

• Fieldwork

The researcher administered a pilot study for this project from 25 January 2010 – 20 March 2010. In this study the researcher conducted 17 semi-structured interviews with foundation and NGO staff in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Qatar and also attended and presented at the 3rd Forum of the World Congress of Muslim Philanthropists. Data from these interviews and the conference are relevant to the current study despite the fact that they were collected before Egypt’s 2011 revolution. The data reveal the goals and strategies of Egyptian foundations prior to the country’s democratic transition and thus allow the researcher to study whether or not foundations changed those goals and strategies after the revolution. Results of the pilot study show that under Mubarak, Egyptian foundations refrained from engaging in any activities that could be deemed “political.” Not only did they fear being shut down by the government, they also pointed out the strong need for economic development work in both Cairo and in rural areas.

Since May 2011, the researcher has conducted 56 additional semi-structured interviews with:

1. Staff of Egyptian foundations,
2. Staff of regional and international foundations operating in Egypt,
3. Staff of Egyptian NGOs,
4. Staff of international aid agencies operating in Egypt, and
5. Local experts on Egyptian foundations and NGOs.

The researcher also attended, and gathered data from, the 2010 conference of the World Congress of Muslim Philanthropists, the 2011 and 2012 conferences of “Takaful: The First Annual Conference on Arab Philanthropy and Civic Engagement,” and the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Arab Foundations Forum.

Interview topics include the organization’s response to Egypt’s revolution; opportunities and challenges the organization has faced since the revolution; if the organization has changed its goals and strategies since the revolution; how the organization perceives Egyptian civil society’s response to the revolution; how the organization perceives the changing opportunities, challenges, and roles of Egyptian foundations and NGOs since the revolution; whether and if so how the roles of and relations between the private, government, and civil society sectors have changed since the revolution; the impact of
Egypt’s legal and regulatory environment on the organization’s goals and strategies; the activities and/or achievements since the revolution that the organization feels most proud of; opportunities that the organization believes it missed after the revolution; and the organization’s vision for the future of Egyptian civil society.

- Primary Documents

To supplement fieldwork, data are also drawn from primary documents about local and international grantmaking in Egypt. Primary documents include: 1) annual or other reports published by foundations and NGOs operating in Egypt; 2) aid declarations published by international aid agencies operating in Egypt; and 3) reports of conference proceedings.

Egyptian Foundations’ Role in Democratic Reform: A Rights-based Approach

This section of the paper lays out results of the research. It explores how local foundations, international donors, human rights NGOs, and development NGOs responded to the changes that took place in Egypt over the 1.5 years since the revolution.

Context: A Challenging Environment for Civil Society

Virtually all interviewees noted the challenging environment in which Egyptian civil society is currently operating. Many cited instability and the fast, unpredictable pace of change as a major challenge to their work. Said one staff member of an international aid agency, “The roadmap is not clear. Security conditions are very loose. There are many worker strikes. People are not happy on the democracy side so they go to Tahrir. All the tension on the political level affects the economy... The long transition process prolongs uncertainty.” Most, however, were optimistic that some sense of stability would resume in June 2012, after the presidential election. This quote from the director of a human rights organization was typical: “We all wait for the elections. Everything depends on who will come into the parliament and president.” Said another, “Hope comes after the June elections. We will have a president, a road map, rules and regulations, and the cycle [of instability] reverses.”

International donors as well as both development and human rights NGOs cited strained government and media relations as another significant challenge to their work. In the first few months following the revolution, NGOs were optimistic that they would be able to work with the government on political reform. By March or April, interviewees said, those hopes were dashed as the SCAF began to investigate NGOs’ funding streams, fail to approve grants and projects, and stoke the public’s fears that NGOs were influenced by “foreign hands.” The staff member of one human rights organization told me, “I don’t want to give you a dream scenario. Things changed a lot but they changed for the worse. We are under the worst attack by SCAF ever, I think. Until now the SCAF says no human rights activists have been jailed but all indicators say this happens. The worst thing is that it is under very broad, vague terms, with vague accusations.”
But human rights organizations were not the only NGOs affected by the government’s attack on civil society. According to one development NGO that very clearly avoids activities that could be deemed ‘political,’ “The major challenge is the NGO crackdown. It began six months ago. Why? I don’t know. What will be the future? I don’t know. We weren’t blamed or accused but all funds and activities stopped. We need approval for projects from the Ministry of Social Solidarity and we didn’t get approval for nine months. Now we are just trying to cover our salaries. No one knows when it will improve. I have gone to officials to ask if we were doing anything wrong but I received no answer. We are registered and report all of our funds. I don’t know why they are stopping the money.”

As a result of both the unstable political and economic environment and the government crackdown, many organizations adopted a “wait and see” approach, temporarily halting their donations or projects. One local foundation explained that they had ceased grantmaking for the foreseeable future. The coordinator of a group of international donors said that, “Within our group everyone is in a state of reflection and anticipation. But there are no new joint initiatives. Most organizations are waiting until things settle down.” According to one of the donors in this group, “For us, we have a squeaky clean reputation. We hope that we won’t be seen different. But the investigations are affecting everyone. Everyone is waiting and seeing. Everyone is paused. There are no counterparts to discuss things with. No one wants to make decisions.” And in the view of the leader of a development NGO, “Change might come later. Everyone is looking to see in what direction things will go. This is a very dynamic era. Everyone is waiting for a clear situation to make decisions. We will see over time. The number of projects is currently at a minimum. There are many promises but they are not yet realized.”

Both human rights and development organizations identified Egypt’s Law of Associations, Law 84 of 2002, as another major challenge to their work. They also feared that a draft law currently under consideration would create an even more challenging environment for civil society. Human rights organizations, with the support of the International Center for Nonprofit Law, convened meetings of a variety of NGOs to propose a new draft law. The leader of one human rights organization said, “Yes we have meetings about this law all the time. It is a very, very bad law, it controls all aspects of NGOs.” His colleague at another human rights organization indicated that, “We called for holding an open workshop to draft a new law. We asked for participation and received it from other human rights organizations. We held a press conference in which we announced a new draft law (drafted by NGOs) and this was given to all NGOs in Egypt to sign. About 500 have signed so far.” The leader of a development NGO was particularly critical of the law but optimistic that a solution could be found. He said, “The draft law is more repressive. We reject it. But it is just a draft. The Ministry of Social Solidarity is making meetings to discuss it with NGOs. They are listening in a way, but it is still in progress. The committee in parliament includes some liberals so that could be good. No one denies that the government should have some oversight. But we need freedoms too. We are in process. We sent ideas to the committee. We want to be able to just inform the government that we are starting an NGO. We don’t want to have to ask approval.”

Despite this challenging environment in which Egyptian civil society finds itself, most interviewees spoke enthusiastically about Egypt’s prospects over the long term and civil society’s role in building the “new Egypt.” The rest of this section explores how these organizations are responding to the aftermath of Egypt’s revolution.
Private Local Foundations: Staying The Course

While private local foundations were generally pleased by and proud of the revolution, most did not significantly alter their goals, strategies, or tactics in response to the changes brought about by the revolution. In fact many described their continued work as being more relevant after the fall of Mubarak.

Private local foundations maintained their pre-revolution objectives, which primarily included job training and employment, literacy, education, health, and the strengthening of local community development associations and local governments. These foundations focused on social and economic development and devoted a significant portion of their resources, whether financial grants or technical assistance, to organizations that work outside of Cairo in more rural parts of Egypt. All foundations included in the sample used the word “empowerment” to describe their grantmaking objectives, either on their websites, in interviews, or both.

None of the foundations in the sample claimed to work on “political development,” and in fact many were very clear that they avoided political work. According to the staff member at a corporate foundation, “We don’t go to anything political or religious. It is too controversial. There are too many debates in these areas.” The leader at another corporate foundation indicated that her foundation focuses on social and economic development and avoids political development because, “I don’t want the beneficiaries to think that I am trying to influence them. They are very smart.”

But local private foundations focused on social and economic development not just because political development was controversial. All local private foundations in the sample indicated that the greatest needs are in social and economic development. According to a senior staff member of a corporate foundation, “We are staying with the same thing. Jobs and unemployment caused the revolution. Who will employ the people? We are trying to offer support, and NGOs must fulfill the need.” Another interviewee indicated that, “Our work is even more relevant – strengthening Community Development Associations and government officials. This is very relevant. We must do more of it. We need officials that have the skill set to take decisions.” The leader of another local foundation added, “We focus on health and education. These are the legs of development for any country.”

The leader of one local private foundation was highly critical of international donors’ recent focus on political development. According to this interviewee, “It’s easier, and I don’t mean in terms of money, to support democracy because democracy is a notion or idea that you can sell and it doesn’t cost people to adopt it. They can do democracy through Facebook and over coffee, etc. It’s easy to sit and promote democracy. But we’re not implementing. It takes much more time to implement economic development. This is hard work – creating value, producing. We need physical, mental, and economic effort. On the political side, you just need money/economic and mental effort. Moving the body to Tahrir is more exciting than moving the body to work on a daily basis... Americans and Germans offer the largest amount of aid money to Egypt. Most funds in the past years have been to human rights, democracy, etc. They haven’t put a fraction of that amount into economic development. Why? It is more difficult; also, because of their agendas. This is a Pandora’s box.”
The leader of another local corporate foundation also stressed that the country needs more youth looking for and creating jobs and fewer youth continually protesting in Tahrir. This interviewee was furthermore critical of both human rights organizations and the international donors who fund them. According to her, “We need economic development. I don’t like human rights organizations. I conduct their assessments. I don’t like how they manage their finances. They aren’t efficient at all. Economic development organizations are more efficient. Human rights organizations are only 38 out of 20,000 NGOs in Egypt but they receive the most funds from abroad. Focusing on economic development would be more efficient.”

Local private foundations identified “needs at the base of the pyramid,” or basic human needs, as offering significant opportunities for their work. The revolution made some of these needs even more apparent. Not only did a challenging economic situation increase the demand for job training and employment, the elections helped one local foundation see an even greater need for literacy. This foundation realized that without literacy training, many Egyptians could not read the election ballots and relied on symbols to identify candidates. According to the interviewee at this foundation, the revolution made their literacy initiative even more relevant.

Thus despite calls by leaders in the Arab philanthropic sector for local foundations to integrate political reform initiatives – by, for example, advocating for public policy reforms, publicizing policy positions, focusing on issues of citizenship, and expanding the space for NGOs to operate freely – Egyptian foundations remained focused on economic and social development projects. Nonetheless, as this paper argues later, such efforts are essential components to a strategy of building democracy from the ground up.

**Local Community Foundations: Integrating Political Development**

Unlike local private foundations, Egypt’s two community foundations responded to the revolution by integrating political development activities into their initiatives. The Maadi Community Foundation, which works in a Cairo suburb, actively supported the revolution and its goals. It did so first by advocating for rights of martyrs’ families and later by monitoring elections, teaching children about politics through the foundation’s art center, and hosting workshops and training sessions about democratic rights, social justice, and advocacy. According to its founder, “[Egyptian] civil society is coming from a culture of strict government control. It is scared. It thinks it is not free. Also it is charity oriented. It doesn’t have the idea to lobby, to change. The community foundation is more empowered and is trying to empower NGOs. After the revolution we are working as if there are no constraints.”

The Community Foundation for South Sinai, which works with Bedouins in the South Sinai, received a grant from the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to encourage civic engagement within the local Bedouin community. A foundation-trained team of facilitators and staff implemented the work. The first phase of the grant - prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections - encouraged men and women to discuss community priorities and what qualities they wanted in their new leaders to help them achieve those priorities. The foundation’s campaign surveyed voting intention in men and women; however, staff realized that not only were many Bedouins not informed about their rights and choices, they were also not registered to vote. The foundation thus implemented a follow-up campaign through which they helped to drastically increase the number of Bedouins registered, canvassing the Bedouin community with the message, “If you want to vote, you must register.”
Volunteers offered information on what documents were needed and where citizens could go to register, as well as being on hand in registration offices to help people with the process.

The second element of the grant - still in progress at the time of writing - aimed to give Bedouins information about their rights as citizens and how to access them, encouraging self-advocacy and promoting voluntarism. Through these and other projects, the foundation helped the Bedouins to realize the concept of citizenship. While careful to support local community members in maintaining their identity as Bedouins, the foundation also helped them to identify as active Egyptian citizens with both national rights and responsibilities.

Thus unlike Egyptian private foundations, Egypt's two community foundations quickly and dramatically altered their strategies in order to integrate political reform activities into their grantmaking repertoires. While not abandoning social and economic development initiatives, these foundations also led their communities along the early path to democratic political reform.

International Donors: Integrating political and economic development

International donors in the sample integrated economic, social, and political development in their grantmaking strategies. After fall of Mubarak, a number of international donors saw increased opportunities in political development and devoted more funds to such projects. According to the coordinator of a group of international donors, “In 2011 we began to have more political discussions. One topic was working with civil society. We were trying to come out with common positions, joint talking points.” A program officer at one of the donors in that group indicated that, “Immediately after the revolution we launched a request for proposals. We received an extra $1 million from headquarters. We were quick, reactive, and we did topics that were more sensitive – freedom of speech, anti-torture, etc.” Another said that, “Before the revolution we couldn’t do democracy here. The revolution presented the opportunity to do democracy and to go deeper into economic development and target the poor.” These donors did not forget economic development. As the coordinator of the international donors group noted, “We need both [economic and political development]. Many donors work in education quality, access to health, a social fund for development, and the development of small-medium enterprises. Discussions in the group in recent months were primarily on democracy and political development, but we also have meetings on economic and social development.”

Virtually all international donors cited the Egyptian government’s crackdown on NGOs and international donors as the most significant challenge that they face. According to the program officer at one international aid organization, “After the revolution we have seen increased problems. They all came in the past year. They are not linked to the activity performed. Not only political NGOs are targeted. Under our non-state actor program we help children and women and even those organizations were targeted. There were delays in project approval and stops were put on their bank accounts. For example there were no responses to authorization requests. Files were returned unopened. They [NGOs] couldn’t even apply. It was up to the NGO to move forward or freeze. In the summer the climate became strange and culminated in the raids [on 17 NGOs].”
A program officer at another international aid organization voiced similar concerns:

“Things developed in bad ways. There were government and media campaigns against NGOs. Because of this, NGOs began to focus on economic development. Some NGOs returned grants to us. The attacks were threatening. NGOs had high expectations. Then the Ministry of International Cooperation attacked. There was disappointment. Now the big attack is theatrical. The Ministry of International Cooperation and the SCAF want to find third parties or foreign fingers to blame.”

International donors took a risk in funding democracy promotion activities and suffered some consequences. While their funding was critical to NGOs implementing new reform initiatives, it also sparked a controversy over foreign intervention in Egypt’s transition process. Furthermore, the government’s crackdown on donations from abroad had a ripple effect that negatively impacted the NGO sector as a whole. Even NGOs that focused exclusively on economic and social development felt threatened by increasingly negative perceptions of the field.

Development NGOs: Integrating Political Rights while Remaining Focused on Economic and Social Development

Development NGOs cited both opportunities and challenges brought about by the revolution. Development organizations in the sample focused on economic and social development but also integrated political development in subtle ways. Some interviewees indicated that the revolution offered a greater opportunity to develop democratic political engagement skills among their beneficiaries. The leader of one organization told me that, “We don’t do politics, human rights, or religion. We do education, development, and microcredit. These are not sensitive areas.” But he went on to say that the organization did integrate rights into their project through children’s and women’s rights and participation. The leader of another organization that worked to increase literacy among handicraft producers indicated that the project’s aim was two-fold: to increase the literacy rate among producers and to get them talking about issues of local and national importance. In her words, “We think about how to get [the producers] talking. We do this in an indirect way because it is not allowed. We are one month into the project. We think about how to reach producers and touch them. The work plan is how to use each producer’s skills in teaching them how to read and write. We use graphic ways, simple ways. Through this we do awareness on democratic rights.”. Another organization that worked with farmers on economic and social development also incorporated political skills: “When we empower local farmers we help them create Democratically Elected Committees from the community. We aren’t ‘teaching’ but conveying the democratic process to elect their own representatives. Then the democratically elected committees and local groups work together to discover their needs and design their own interventions.”

A number of development NGOs stressed the unique challenges of working in rural communities. In the words of the leader of a development NGO in the Sinai, “To do development in rural areas you have to do it all – education, health, security, etc. We can’t just do ‘awareness.’ It’s all connected. For example we have an internet technology space that is filled with computers and a projector. We do education and awareness there. We show films that interest the Bedouins and then we discuss them. We build awareness through films and discussions. We use films in a scientific way. Awareness is connected to education, health, and the environment.”
He explained, “We created a women’s center. Not a ‘club’ or an ‘NGO’ but a space where women can come together. They wind up talking. I asked them what they want to do and you will never guess what they said: aerobics. Their way of life is more sedentary now and they are gaining weight. They don’t like that and want to do aerobics. In this women’s center they are talking. They are discussing priorities and making decisions. I can’t call it an association because the men won’t like it.”

Furthermore, he said, “People in the Sinai don’t care about [politics]. We build democracy through talking. We do women’s rights but we don’t call it that. People need education and health. If you have a bad headache do you care about politics?” The leader of another development NGO, this one operating in Upper Egypt, said that: “People in villages are just concerned with basic needs. We try to work on the link between political and economic rights. The first challenge in development is the diverse set of great problems in Upper Egypt due to poverty and illiteracy. Statistics show that villages in Upper Egypt are the poorest in Egypt. The second challenge is the absence of people organizing themselves. Here in Upper Egypt people are marginalized because they are not organized so they don’t reach for their rights. It is different in Cairo. There, people are organized. These poor people [in Upper Egypt] are isolated because their only source of information is television. They don’t use the internet so they are isolated from information. They only get ‘official’ [state] information.”

As part of its strategy, this organization worked to educate villagers about political issues at both the local and national levels and increase their participation skills.

Development NGOs are known for enhancing the economic and social contexts of the communities that they serve. But in Egypt, many development NGOs have integrated political awareness and skills training into their work. By adopting a rights-based approach to development, Egyptian development NGOs have contributed to their country’s democratic transition by supporting democratic practices and principles at the local level and thus preparing community members to participate actively as informed citizens in post-Mubarak Egypt.

Human Rights NGOs: Advancing New Political Rights

Egyptian human rights organizations worked tirelessly since the fall of Mubarak on a variety of political development initiatives. They organized public awareness campaigns surrounding military trials, voting, legal and constitutional reform, anti-torture, anti-corruption, and a variety of other human rights. These organizations took a particularly active role in the recent parliamentary elections, educating voters about the parties’ platforms, urging the public to vote, and monitoring the elections as voters went to the ballot boxes.

In the months immediately following the revolution, these organizations felt liberated and eager to work more openly and create significant impact on Egypt’s political transition. According to the leader of one human rights organization, “In January the revolution gave civil society organizations and our organization a good chance to participate. In some places we were able to document what happened in the revolution: the number injured and the number of martyrs. We also interviewed the martyrs’ families. There was a good chance to observe the electoral process in Egypt.” By April, however, human rights organizations were disillusioned by the SCAF’s crackdown on NGOs and cited their relationship with the government as a significant challenge. According to the leader
of one human rights organization, “The SCAF...was our friend. We believe in human rights and democracy, but [they don’t].” None backed down from engaging in political reform activities, however, and these organizations have spearheaded an effort amongst civil society organizations to reform Law 84 of 2002 in a way that maintains some government oversight of the NGO sector yet also offers organizations greater freedom to assemble and operate autonomously.

When asked from whom they receive funding, human rights organizations indicated that they received all of their grants from international donors. Unlike development NGOs, which received funding from a mix of international and local donors, human rights organizations criticized local foundations for failing to consider supporting their work. According to a program officer at one human rights organization, “We receive our funds from international donors. After the revolution they are focusing a lot on Egypt, sending lots of money, and it is easy to get funds. For example from the National Endowment for Democracy, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the European Union, and the Open Society Institute.” Said the leader at another human rights organization, “International donors are responsive to our mission – human rights, freedoms, transparency, justice. Local donors focus purely on development goals and miss the rights aspect of it.” A program officer at another human rights organization echoed these thoughts: “At the local level there are no local grantmakers for human rights organizations. Businessmen won’t pay the cost for our work. The cost is too high. That funding would be against the government and the government would put restrictions on his work and investments. There was an incident in the 1980s, with Egyptian human rights organizations. Donors wanted to give money but they said, ‘Please don’t mention our names.’ Even after the revolution local grantmakers don’t fund us.”

Conclusion

Human rights organizations’ criticisms of local foundations are not entirely unfounded: local foundations indeed do not fund advocacy organizations and instead focus their grantmaking on development NGOs. However, this should not be taken as a sign that Egyptian foundations do not support the revolution or democratic political reform. Egypt’s two community foundations, which work primarily as operating foundations, incorporated a variety of political reform activities into their project portfolios. And, all of the development organizations included in the sample that have maintained funding partnerships with local private foundations incorporate human rights and empowerment of local citizens into their economic and social development projects. In what may be the initial phases of a new social movement, Egyptian foundations and their grantees worked to foster identities of “empowered citizens” among rural and marginalized beneficiaries. It is far too early to measure the impacts of this work, but future research that explores Egyptian foundations’ roles in advancing the revolution’s goals must look beyond overt support for political reform and should carefully evaluate the more subtle, but critical, efforts foundations have made to increase the presence of marginalized voices in the political process.

While theories of Western philanthropy stress the importance of foundations’ democratic roles in supporting advocacy and prominent social movements, this paper argues that foundations can play an equally important role in democracy building by supporting political development and participation at the most local of levels. It also challenges the assertion often made by Western philanthropists that support for basic needs is “just charity” and should not be part of a strategic grantmaking agenda. In order for Egypt’s democratic transition to incorporate all citizens, economic
and social development work that addresses basic human needs is an essential component of any grantmaking strategy. Local Egyptian foundations, and their NGO partners and grantees, are not only supporting economic and social development, they are also integrating political development into their strategies by nurturing empowered citizens who possess the education and skills required to participate in both local and national decision making. As the director of one development NGO declared, “I don’t need money to build democracy. All I need is tea. Give me tea, and I will get people talking. This is the beginning of democracy.”
References


Youth Civic Engagement in The Arab Region: An Analysis of Key Outcomes

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Abstract

In the wake of the Arab Awakening, development actors are increasingly looking to civic engagement initiatives to harness the recent surge of political activism by Arab youth and to promote more participatory forms of governance and equitable development within the region. However, the impacts of these programs are largely untested, leaving program planners and policymakers to rely on assumptions and conventional wisdom when designing strategies for promoting civic engagement among Arab youth. To help fill this evidence gap, Mercy Corps recently undertook research into successful promoting of and expected benefits from youth participation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The study provides strong evidence on what changes to Arab youth’s political voice, social capital, propensity towards political violence, and employability are likely to result from increasing their levels of civic engagement. The results show that few of these changes are automatic. Rather, youth civic engagement initiatives must make deliberate efforts to influence these areas, including doing more to reach young women, youth from rural areas, and at-risk youth whose voices are the most underrepresented in public debates and decisions. The findings carry important implications for government, donor, and development agencies’ thinking and priorities regarding youth policies and programming in the MENA region, and for additional avenues of research.

Background and Rationale

Youth have been at the heart of the many of the recent movements for political change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). These movements include the dramatic revolutions in places like Egypt and Tunisia, as well as less visible yet significant calls for reform in countries like Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine. Young people’s involvement in the protests and demonstrations has stemmed largely from their frustration with the existing institutions and norms that have denied them economic and social opportunities and political voice.

Young people have high expectations that these movements will bring with them greater and more equitable access to decent jobs, relevant education, engagement in the public realm, and more responsive and accountable governance (Khouri & López, 2011). Failure by national governments to make timely and tangible progress in these areas—or at least to demonstrate a real effort to do so—risks pushing more youth towards violent means to achieve the types of change they seek (Mercy Corps, 2011a). Yet addressing the endemic corruption, nepotism, political oppression, and other deep-seeded issues that lie at the roots of youth marginalization in MENA countries will not happen simply as a result of a new head of State or even a new constitution.

What appears to be important to youth in the MENA region is influencing the changes taking place in their societies, and in particular on their economic and political landscapes (Khouri & López, 2011). Mercy Corps, along with other agencies engaged in youth development in the MENA region, have been working for over two decades towards this end by promoting young people’s civic participation, and by extension their agency, voice, and opportunities for activism. Such efforts are a core part of Mercy Corps’ work to develop inclusive and effective civil society groups. Programs that increase young people’s opportunities to be civically engaged can be critical to enabling more participatory governance in the wake of the Arab Awakening, especially given the history of civic society repression in the region.
Broadening the base of youth civic engagement in MENA is a major priority among donors and development agencies, perceived as a possible pathway towards political reform and more equitable development in the region. A number of positive outcomes are believed to be linked with increased involvement of youth in civic activities. These include: 1) decreased likelihood of involvement in violent and extremist movements; 2) stronger social and civic values, which are important foundations for good governance; and 3) increased employability.

However, these assumed relationships are largely untested, especially within the current context of the MENA region. Lacking reliable evidence, program planners and policymakers are left to rely on assumptions and conventional wisdom when designing strategies for promoting civic engagement among Arab youth.

**Purpose and Scope**

Mercy Corps undertook this research to better understand what benefits can realistically be expected from increased youth civic engagement in MENA countries—to both the youth who participate in civic activities and their broader societies. To do this, the research identified key assumptions underlying Mercy Corps' youth civic engagement programs in the MENA region. Through extensive analysis of existing data from survey of youth in the Middle East, the research set out to examine the following question: What are the outcomes of youth civic engagement in the MENA region? Specifically, the study examined the extent to which civic engagement is linked to: 1) political voice, including confidence in being able to influence government and actions taken towards this end, such as petitioning and demonstrating; 2) social capital, including a shared sense of identity, tolerance for others, trust in local officials and institutions, and attitudes towards democracy; 3) peacebuilding-related outcomes, such as attitudes towards the use of violence for political causes; and, 4) employment-related outcomes, such as employment status, type, and job satisfaction.

Mercy Corps undertook this research across multiple countries within the MENA region, including Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen, with the intent of generating generalizable evidence to inform donor and policy makers regarding priorities and approaches to youth civic engagement programming. It is acknowledged that this approach may have yielded conclusions that overlook important geopolitical and cultural differences between and within each country. There are many studies on civic engagement within individual Arab countries that provide such specificity. The intention of this study however was contribute a region-wide analysis on the topic, for which there is a dearth of available information.

**Conceptual Framework**

Civic engagement, as defined by this study, includes both community service activities and political actions. Civic engagement can take many forms: volunteering in a community service project; being involved in an organization working to address a social issue like corruption; voting; and joining with others to raise concerns through actions such as protesting.

A core set of strategies and intended outcomes are common across a number of Mercy Corps youth civic engagement projects. The conceptual framework developed for this study,
presented in Figure 1, attempts to capture these elements and the relationships between them. It illustrates the main assumptions believed to connect the program interventions to their intended intermediate and longer-term outcomes.

Based on the conceptual framework and a review of literature and existing studies on youth civic engagement, the researchers identified a set of assumptions, or theories of change that reflect how youth civic engagement programs are expected to work. The purpose of this research was to explore whether or not these theories hold true within the current MENA context. The study aimed at finding evidence to support or challenge the assumptions in the literature and in previous studies. The theories of change tested are:

**Theory 1:** Political Voice. If young people are involved in civic activities in their communities, they will be more likely to be actively (and non-violently) engaged in political life.

**Theory 2:** Social Capital. If young people are civically engaged, they will be more likely to develop and exhibit forms of social capital that are conducive to the functioning of democracy and to peaceful co-existence.

**Theory 3:** Propensity towards Political Violence. If young people are civically engaged, they will be less likely to become involved in or support the use of violence to promote political objectives.

**Theory 4:** Economic Engagement. If young people are civically engaged, they will gain important skills, contacts, and experience which make them more employable, or attractive to potential employers, than their non-civically engaged peers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic Engagement</th>
<th>Outcomes Tested</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Civic Action</strong> (volunteer, community service, civic group membership)</td>
<td><strong>Social Capital</strong> (shared social identity, trust, tolerance, respect for pluralism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Activities</strong> (voting, participation in campaign meetings or rallies)</td>
<td><strong>Propensity towards Political Violence</strong> (hesitance to use force to promote political objectives, stability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Voice</strong> (petitioning, protesting, or joining together with others to raise an issue)</td>
<td><strong>Economic Engagement</strong> (employment status, income, plans to pursue a career)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Efficacy</strong> (belief in ability to influence the actions of politicians and government)</td>
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![Figure 1. Conceptual Framework](image)

These four theories were chosen for analysis based on their centrality within Mercy Corps’ youth civic engagement programming; these are the intended impacts, either explicit or implicit, of such
programs. This analytical approach is rooted in the practices of theory driven evaluation (Donaldson, 2007). Measures of the constructs contained within the conceptual framework were developed using data from the sources described below. Definitions of the key concepts within the conceptual framework, and how each of them was measured within this study, can be found in Appendix A.

Methodology

This research utilized existing sources of data, including previous studies and recent surveys of youth in the Middle East conducted by other organizations, to answer the research questions. The three major sources of quantitative data analyzed by the study were the Arabbarometer Round 1 surveys for Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen conducted during 2008(2); the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) conducted by the Population Council in 2010(3); and surveys from 2010 on the Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa (SWMENA) in Lebanon, Yemen, and Morocco, commissioned by International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Institute for Women’s Policy Research (IWPR), see Appendix B(4).

Data Collection and Analysis

Literature Review

The first step was to search for current literature on the key concepts and theories being examined, as well as evidence from recent studies regarding the predictors and outcomes of youth civic engagement. In addition to external sources, the literature review included relevant Mercy Corps proposals, reports, evaluations, and guidelines. The key findings from literature are summarized under each of the theories of change in the Findings and Discussion section, below.

Identification of Theories of Change to Test

Most Mercy Corps youth civic engagement programs are based on some explicit causal logic, often reflected in the project proposal. Through taking stock of the design documents for a number of these programs, the research was able to develop an overall, generic model reflecting the main outcomes and assumed links between them. Based on this model and findings from the literature review, the researchers defined a set of broad theories of change, which appear to be applicable to many Mercy Corps youth civic engagement programs.

Literature Review

The researchers developed operational definitions for the key concepts in the theories of change, and then identified available datasets that could be used to measure the concepts and analyze the relationships between them. Measures were developed and statistical tests were used to determine if there were significant interactions between the key factors being examined and the strength of the relationships. The choice of the tests to use was based on the type of data for each variable, and included loglinear and logistic regressions, independent sample t-tests, and chi-squared tests. The researchers considered several potential moderators of these relationships and associations, including gender, level of education, employment status, and country, as well as urban/rural status.
Interpretation and Contextualization of Findings

The researchers solicited input from experts—both subject-matter and Middle East specialists—to identify the most plausible explanations for the results. Key regional and technical Mercy Corps staff members were also engaged in determining the implications of the findings for its programs and strategies, and recommendations for Mercy Corps and other agencies working on youth development in the MENA region.

Limitations

It is not possible to attribute causality based on the cross-sectional data used in this study. Where significant relationships between factors were found, the direction of the relationship is unknown. To try to explain the causal directions, this research relies on the strength of the underlying theories as evidenced by existing studies and literature. Some hypotheses are grounded in well-established theory; for example, Putnam’s theory supporting the contributions that civic participation makes to individuals’ and groups’ political efficacy. For other hypotheses where the theoretical basis is thinner, such as the contributions of civic engagement to future employment, making strong causality claims is more difficult.

One strength of the study was that the data was taken from representative samples of youth in multiple countries in the MENA region, using standardized instruments and questions, which contributed to the external validity of the findings. However, the lack of usable data from Mercy Corps programs may limit the generalizability of the findings to the specific groups of youth being targeted by its programs, who may differ in significant ways from the overall youth population in the countries. For example to date, pre- and post-tests have not been consistently implemented in Mercy Corps youth civic engagement programs, making it challenging to reliably test the programs’ effects on the intended outcomes.

Findings and Discussion

For each theory of change explored, evidence from the literature and other studies is presented first to determine if there are theoretical, logical, or existing empirical bases for the theory of change. This is followed by the results of this study’s tests, and a discussion of possible explanations for the key findings.

Theory 1: Political Voice

*If young people are involved in civic activities in their communities, they will be more likely to be actively (and non-violently) engaged in political life.*

Theoretical basis and existing evidence

The major factors believed to connect civic engagement and political participation are civic skills, political efficacy, opportunities for interaction, and social trust (see Appendix A for definitions of key components). People who participate in civic activities develop skills, such as the ability to organize a meeting and articulate demands, which increases their sense of political efficacy (Wilson & Musick, 2000). They
are also more likely to have opportunities for engaging in political discussions with other association members (Knoke, 1990). Putnam’s (2011) theory claims that active membership in voluntary associations contributes to the social trust necessary for people to organize effectively and act collectively in wider political spheres. This theory appears to be relevant within the context of the MENA region, as evidenced by a recent study of political behavior in the Arab world which found that people who are involved in civic associations are more likely to extend their involvement to the political realm, in both conventional (e.g. voting) and unconventional (e.g. rallying) forms of participation (Tessler, Jamal, & de Miguel, 2008).

**Results**

The data analyzed by this study strongly support the political voice theory of change. Membership in civic associations was found to be significantly and positively associated with both electoral and political activism. Compared to non-members, youth across the seven Arab countries included in the study who are members of civic associations were: (a) seven times more likely to attend a political campaign or rallies ($\chi^2(1)=228.2, p<0.001$), with men being approximately 2.5 times more likely to have done so than women ($\chi^2 (1)=74.3, p<0.001$); (b) over two times more likely to have voted in the last election ($\chi^2 (1)=8.57, p<0.05$); (c) four times more likely to have joined others to draw attention to an issue or sign a petition ($\chi^2 (1)=161.6, p<0.001$); and (d) three and a half times more likely to attend a demonstration or protest march ($\chi^2(1)=136.5, p<0.001$), with men being 2 times more likely to do so than women ($\chi^2 (1)=55.4, p<0.001$).

Civic engagement among youth in the region was also found to be strongly and positively correlated with political efficacy. Youth were significantly more likely to feel that citizens have the power to influence government policies and activities if they were (a) members of a civic organization ($\chi^2 (1)=22.32, p<0.05$), (b) had joined with others to raise an issue or sign a petition ($\chi^2 (2)=15.95, p<0.05$), (c) had attended a campaign rally ($\chi^2 (1)=28.49, p<0.05$), or (d) recently protested or demonstrated ($\chi^2 (2)=33.38, p<0.05$). These findings are illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. Associations found for the political voice theory of change](image-url)
Beyond basic electoral participation, this study was also interested in determining whether youth with higher levels of civic engagement prioritized different factors when voting for political candidates. No associations were found between youth’s level of civic engagement and the likelihood that they would vote for a candidate based on their qualifications and policy views over their party, religious, or tribal affiliations.

Discussion

The findings show strong connections between all the different forms of civic engagement measured. However, this finding does not necessarily imply a cause-effect relationship—i.e., that increasing youth’s involvement in civic activities in their communities will lead to increased political action. Underlying, unmeasured factors such as personal motivation may drive Arab youth to participate in civic groups, to vote and to demonstrate. The role of such factors warrants further examination in future studies.

The findings on political efficacy suggest that membership in civic groups may indeed be an important contributing factor to political activism (findings under the social capital theory of change presented below do not show the same to be true for political trust.) However, the data cannot reveal if the skills and experience gained from participating in civic groups contributes to youth’s confidence in influencing governance, as theorized. It may be that initial higher levels of political efficacy are driving all the forms of civic actions.

We argue, youth participation in local civic actions is a natural stepping stone to other forms of civic engagement, and past studies (Wilson & Musick, 2000) have shown they lead to higher electoral and political participation later in life. The combined evidence lends support to the efficacy of youth volunteering and service projects to contribute to youth political voice.

Theory 2: Social Capital

If young people are civically engaged, they will be more likely to develop and exhibit forms of social capital that are conducive to the functioning of democracy, and to peaceful co-existence.

Theoretical Basis and Existing Evidence

The basic premise of this theory is that civic groups are important “seedbeds” of democracy, which bring people together, expose them to information and ideas, and increase their motivation and capacity to improve their societies (National Conference on Citizenship, 2009). Civic engagement is assumed by Inglehart to be linked to norms of trust and tolerance of others and respect for pluralism because participation often increases interactions between people with different backgrounds and opinions (Inglehart, 1997). A significant supply of these forms of social capital is believed to be necessary for a functioning civil society, good governance, and peaceful co-existence (Grootaert, 1998).

Previous research has produced a mixed picture of support for the links between civic engagement and key forms of social capital. Evidence from several studies in European
countries has shown that participation in civic associations is not strongly correlated with levels of inter-personal or political trust (Wilson & Musick, 2000). Across Africa, higher levels of volunteering, such as helping the community or a neighbor, have been linked to greater social capital and other forms of civic activism (CIVICUS, 2012).

Within the Arab world, conventional forms of political participation, such as voting, have been found to be consistently linked to higher trust in government institutions. However, unconventional forms, such as petitioning, were not; thus reinforcing other findings that citizens in non-democracies often perceive elections primarily as a way for authoritarian rulers to further legitimize their rule (Tessler, Jamal, & de Miguel, 2008). Building social capital among Arab youth is critical at present, as evidenced by studies which have shown that citizens in countries with recent political transitions tend to have lower levels of trust in political institutions (Klingeman, 1999).

Results

The vast majority of findings from the data analyzed do not uphold the social capital theory of change within the MENA context. Only three factors tested under this theory of change were found to be significantly associated with levels of civic engagement among youth, as illustrated in Figure 3.

The first significant finding is related to interpersonal trust. Youth who have joined others to draw attention to an issue or sign a petition are more likely to feel that people can be trusted, than those who have not ($\chi^2 (2)=9.13, p<0.05$). However, this result only applied to those who had done so multiple times in the past three years, indicating that one-time participation in such actions is not enough to contribute to building trust of others. This finding also suggests that other factors are likely to play a role in the relationship between civic engagement and interpersonal trust.

The second factor relates to youth’s perceptions of government performance. Youth who had joined together with others to draw attention to an issue or sign a petition were more likely to feel that their government fails to provide all citizens with services, compared to youth who did not ($\chi^2 (1)=10.4, p<0.05$). The same was true for youth who had attended a recent protest or demonstration ($\chi^2 (1)=14.2, p<0.05$). Along similar lines, youth who believe that the government is performing badly in their responsibility to create jobs are more likely to have petitioned and protested than those who feel the government is managing this role well.

These findings indicate that youth frustration with their government’s ability to meet people’s basic needs, and employment needs in particular, may be a driver of certain forms of civic participation.
Figure 3. Associations found for the social capital theory of change.

Discussion

Overall, it does not appear that civic participation of youth in MENA countries helps to instill greater civic values in youth. The findings raise the question of why civically engaged youth do not look different on most of these measures than their non-civically engaged peers, as was assumed would be the case. Based on lessons from previous studies, conducting separate analyses by the types of civic groups in which youth are involved might have produced different results. For example, it is likely that youth sports and cultural groups would contribute to higher social trust, while economic associations would have greater political trust (Stolle & Rochon, 1998). But when treating the various types of civic groups together as a whole these differences may be lost. It would also be worthwhile to further examine the connections between trust, both social (i.e. of other citizens) and political (i.e. of institutions) and political action, which was beyond the scope of this study.

Measures for many of the types of social capital analyzed are uniformly low across the region. Among Egyptian youth, trust of other people stands at 10%, compared to an average of 22% among youth worldwide. The social and political systems in many Arab countries may contribute to this failure to generate sufficient quantities of political and interpersonal trust to motivate youth to be civically engaged.
Theory 3: Propensity Toward Political Violence

*If young people are civically engaged, they will be less likely to become involved in or support the use of violence to promote political objectives.*

Theoretical Basis and Existing Evidence

Where youth feel alienated from decision making and political processes, they may turn to violence to have a voice (McLean Hilker & Fraser, 2009). This reaction is particularly a risk in fragile political and economic contexts, such as many countries in MENA at present, where youth encounter fewer opportunities for decision making and responsibility, effectively blocking their transition to adulthood (Assaad, Binzel, & Gadallah, 2009; Dhillon & Yousef, 2009). Civic engagement is presumed to be positively associated with an individual’s levels of political self-efficacy and likelihood to use established channels to voice grievances, and thus negatively associated with use of violence (Bhavnani & Backer, 2007).

For example, recent research by Mercy Corps found that youth in Kenya and Liberia who are civically engaged and took action to try to address local or national governance problems are less likely to have engaged in or be disposed towards political violence (Mercy Corps, 2011b). In post-conflict contexts, structured civic engagement opportunities can help youth to see themselves as resources for positive social change, and can allow them contribute to reconstruction (Chae, Taylor, & Douglas, 2007). Mercy Corps’ experience in Lebanon demonstrated how engaging youth in positive social outlets is central to converting youth frustration away from violence and social unrest toward positive civic participation (Mercy Corps, 2011c).

Results

Only one among several of the findings supports the theory of change on propensity towards political violence. Youth who have joined others to draw attention to or petition about an issue more than once are less likely to agree that US involvement in the Middle East region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere ($\chi^2 (2)=6.84, p<0.05$). No other forms of civic engagement were found to be associated with measures of Arab youth’s attitudes towards violence.

These results raise an important question: What factors do contribute to propensity towards political violence among youth within the MENA region? While this question was outside the original scope of this study, it was explored due to the high interest among Mercy Corps and other development actors in the role that addressing youth employment can play in mitigating conflict and promoting peaceful change in MENA under the present circumstances.
The results reinforce the findings of other studies showing that economic conditions and opportunities are significant predictors of proclivity towards political violence among youth (Mercy Corps 2011b; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Notably, Arab youth who are unemployed are more likely to: (a) agree that the violation of human rights is justifiable in the name of security and stability ($\chi^2 (1)=4.4, p<0.05$), and (b) agree that armed groups are justified in attacking civilians in order to resist American occupation ($\chi^2 (1)=5.84, p<0.05$). Among employed youth, attitudes towards the factors above did not differ based on the type of job they held or full versus part time employment status. Further, youth who believe that the government is performing badly in their responsibility to create jobs are more likely to agree with the above statements, as well as to agree that US involvement in the region justifies armed operations against the US everywhere. These findings are summarized in Figure 4.

**Discussion**

Based on the factors analyzed, it is possible to conclude that there are few links between levels of civic engagement among Arab youth and their tendencies towards extremism or politically motivated violence. This contradicts much of the existing evidence, including findings from previous Mercy Corps studies. One explanation for these results may be that the attitudinal measures used were not the most ideal for gauging youth propensity towards political violence. Other studies have shown that there is little relationship between young people’s self-reported attitudes and their behaviors towards political violence; even among those who admit that they have participated in political violence, it is rare for them to respond that they feel such actions are justified (Mercy Corps, 2011b). In addition, these measures did not directly address the forms of political violence aimed at young people’s own governments, which are often of most concern from a stability perspective.
Another possible reason for the largely null findings for this hypothesis is that the percentage of youth who hold views that may indicate a propensity towards engaging in political violence is relatively small. Civic engagement programs would need to deliberately and accurately target such youth to have the potential to impact their risk of becoming (further) involved in extremist groups or violent actions. In practice, the opposite is typically the case, with youth self-selecting into civic engagement programs who are already more inclined towards or even involved in non-violent civic engagement (IREX, 2011).

What does appear to influence Arab youth’s attitudes toward political violence is their employment status and perceptions of their government’s efforts to address unemployment. The combination of lack of economic opportunities, rising cost of living, and frustrations over government inaction on these fronts, were primary factors that drew youth to the streets as part of the Arab Spring revolutions (ASDA'A Burson-Marsteller, 2011). Job creation has consistently been cited by youth across the region as their number one priority for their governments to address (Silatech & GALLUP, 2011). The findings indicate that such conditions, if not addressed, have the potential to contribute to greater propensity towards violence among Arab youth(9).

**Theory 4: Economic Engagement**

*If young people are civically engaged, they will gain important skills, contacts, and experience which make them more employable, or attractive to potential employers, than their non-civically engaged peers.*

**Theoretical Basis and Existing Evidence**

A growing number of sources assert that increasing youth civic engagement holds the potential for improving the employability and economic opportunities of the young people involved (Douglas & Alessi, 2006). Volunteering is often believed to be a stepping-stone to paid employment by both researchers and youth themselves. Among Egyptian youth who are members of civic groups, major motivations to join include finding a job (11%), advancing their career opportunities (19%) and learning a skill (54%) (Population Council, 2011). The main mechanisms assumed to connect civic participation and employment outcomes are the development of social capital, human capital, and job-related self-efficacy.

An eight-year impact evaluation of the Americorps program in the United States showed that participation boosted volunteers’ employment prospects within the public service sectors, including non-profit organizations, especially among youth from low-income backgrounds (Corporation for National & Community Service, 2008). Within the Arab world, a strong relationship has been found between entrepreneurial inclination and civic engagement. Based on the findings of the 2010 Silatech Index, which surveyed youth in the League of Arab States, aspiring youth entrepreneurs are more likely to have volunteered and expressed their opinion to a public official in the past month than youth who do not plan to start a business. While this finding does not factor in class or other potential explanatory variables, “these results suggest a vibrant civic society may be the foundation of a vibrant business environment” (Silatech & GALLUP, 2010, p. 28).
There is solid evidence supporting the contributions that civic participation makes to employment outcomes. Volunteering positively correlates to the number of social contacts people have (Wilson and Musick, 2000). Evaluations of youth civic engagement initiatives in multiple countries have shown that participants acquire competencies, often through hands-on experience, making them more qualified for work in many fields, including healthcare, education and social services (IREX, 2011; Corporation for National & Community Service, 2008).

Results

The data analysis yielded mixed support for the economic engagement theory of change. Through analysis of the Arabbaromer survey data, no links were found between any of type of civic engagement and the economic engagement. The results from the SYPE data on Egyptian youth yielded some significant associations: (a) Egyptian youth who volunteer are twice as likely to be employed as those who do not ($\chi^2 (1)=26.43, p<0.05$); (b) Egyptian youth who are members of civic groups are 1.6 times more likely to be employed ($\chi^2 (1)=18.83, p<0.05$); and (c) Egyptian youth who are members of civic groups are 2.6 times more likely to have a permanent (versus temporary) job, than youth who are not members ($\chi^2 (1)=25.9, p<0.05$).

There were no significant differences in employment status based on the whether Egyptian youth had been repeatedly involved in civic activities or groups. For example, Egyptian youth who volunteer once a week were not necessarily more likely to have a job than those who only volunteer once a year. No associations were found between Egyptian youth's participation in civic groups and their levels of job satisfaction.

Analysis of the SWMENA data produced a number of significant findings illustrating strong relationships between civic engagement and employment-related outcomes. Compared to their non-civically engaged peers, youth in Morocco, Yemen, and Lebanon who belong to civic groups or have participated in one or more civic activities in the past year were on average: (a) over 4 times more likely to have compensated work; and (b) over 2 times more likely to have plans to pursue a career.

The results of additional analyses were not conclusive across all countries, though still provide some insights. In Yemen and Morocco, the analysis shows that people who are involved in civic groups are more likely to have monthly salaries in a higher bracket than those who are not. Also, in Lebanon, civically active youth seem to have access to better formal employment.

Specifically, they are more likely to have salaried employment and less likely to be self-employed or employed in casual, informal, in-kind, unpaid jobs than their non-civically engaged peers. The summary findings from all the data analyzed are illustrated in Figure 5.
Discussion

The findings point to a meaningful relationship between civic participation and economic engagement among Arab youth. However, the significant relationships found are difficult to interpret\(^{(14)}\). Findings from this cross sectional study cannot answer the question of whether civic participation contributes to greater employment among youth or employment leads them to be more civically active. For example, the fact that youth have jobs may have also enabled them to participate in volunteer activities. The lack of any congruency between the frequency of civic participation and employment–related measures does not help in determining possible causality.

Looking at the demographics of Egyptian youth who are civically involved, it is clear that they tend to be from more urban areas and wealthier families. Egyptian youth from the highest wealth quintile are over five times as likely to participate in civic groups as those from the lowest quintile, and urban youth are nearly twice as likely to do so as those from rural areas. These results point strongly to socio-economic status, including employment, as a predictor of civic engagement levels, rather than a result of it, as shown in the findings on determinants.

While multiple associations were found, it would be a stretch to conclude that simply getting Arab youth more involved in civic groups or civic actions will improve their chances of securing a job. The types of civic participation programs that have succeeded in influencing employment outcomes tend to have some unique characteristics. They facilitate actual work experience, such as extended placements of volunteers in social service agencies, and intentionally set out to develop job-related skills. The implication is that to have the potential to increase youth employment, civic engagement projects must be designed with that as a goal (Douglas & Alessi, 2006).
Conclusions and Implications

This study’s findings yield a mixed picture of what benefits can be expected from increasing the participation of young Arab men and women in civic actions and groups. There is strong support for the political voice theory. Political self-efficacy appears to be the main linking factor, wherein civic involvement in their own community contributes to greater confidence among youth in their abilities to influence broader issues, which they then apply in the political realm, for example through demonstrating or petitioning. It follows that investment in programs that provide youth opportunities for volunteerism and activism in their communities can also drive greater youth engagement in the political reform and democratization processes currently taking place in many countries in the MENA region.

Civic engagement among Arab youth does not appear to contribute to greater political trust, tolerance of others, respect for pluralism and diversity, or a sense of shared identity, as assumed in the social capital theory. Rather, frustration with government institutions appears to have recently been a force in motivating youth to engage in petitioning and demonstrations—key forms of civic action. This may indicate that during periods of political transitions—which are characterized by changes to the status quo—higher levels of social capital, at least as defined in this study, are unlikely to be an outcome of greater civic engagement among youth.

By and large, attitudes among Arab youth that may indicate their propensity towards political violence or extremism do not appear to be influenced by their levels of civic participation. Rather, economic opportunities appear to be more closely linked to Arab youth’s attitudes toward the justification of use of violence for political causes, as well as their levels of civic engagement. In light of this, donors’ and policy makers’ current emphasis on programs to expand youth employment in the Middle East appear to be well founded. However, to have an influence on young people’s propensity towards the use of politically motivated violence, employment programs would need to effectively target the small percentage of youth that appear to be at risk of such actions.

In many of the countries studied, civically engaged youth were found more likely to be employed than their non-civically engaged peers. However, the causal direction is unknown, leaving it unclear whether civically engaged youth gain skills that make them more employable. When taking into account the findings of other studies, the results imply that for civic engagement programs to have an impact on young people’s economic opportunities, they need to include deliberate activities geared towards preparing youth for the job market. These may include business development skills and extended apprenticeships or volunteer placements through which youth can gain practical experience. It remains an open question whether such activities fit well within youth civic engagement projects, or are more appropriately designed as part of youth employment projects.

The findings make evident a number of important implications for government, donor, and development agencies’ thinking and priorities regarding youth policies and programming in the MENA region, and for additional avenues of research. As Arab countries begin to emerge from the current political transitions, a greater supply of social capital may prove essential for enabling more participatory governance and a functioning civil society to take root. There is a pressing need for research into what does contribute to support for pluralism, political trust, and other forms of social capital among Arab youth, so that the evidence can be used to inform programs and policies in the near term.
Overall, it is clear that few of the changes that are expected to result from increasing youth’s civic engagement are automatic. For program designers, the message here is that boosting levels of youth civic activity is not likely to be enough on its own. Efforts that promote civic engagement alongside or via development of young people’s life skills (such as leadership), social connections (including strong relationships with peers and mentors), and civic knowledge (such as understanding the channels for influencing public debates and policies) are needed to achieve real transformational development, as defined by the outcomes examined by this study.

Participation alone in civic groups or activities is not enough to contribute to the intended impacts on youth. Across several of the theories of change tested, only youth who were involved in civic activities multiple times in the recent past were found to differ on the outcome measures, compared to their non-civically engaged peers. This highlights the need for civic participation programs to provide deep, sustained engagement of youth.

This recommendation is supported by the evidence from a recent multi-country impact evaluation of Mercy Corps Global Citizen’s Corps program, which found that frequent participation and longer term involvement of a year or more in civic action projects helps youth cement their skills and supports the desired impacts on youth attitudes and behaviors (Improve Group, 2012). While this recommendation may appear self-evident, employing such an in-depth approach is challenging in practice due the high costs per youth and limitations to taking such programs to scale.
References


### Definitions of Measures and Key Concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Measures used</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic participation</td>
<td>Civic participation is primarily about fostering citizen voices in governance processes (Mercy Corps 2011b). This study examined three main types of civic participation among youth: Civic activities: These generally focus on improving ones' local community or society in general. Electoral activities: These concentrate on the political process and include activities such as voting, persuading others to vote, or volunteering for a political campaign. Political voice: These are things people do to express their political or social concerns and opinions in a non-violent and constructive manner.</td>
<td>Volunteer service; participation in civic groups. Voting in the most recent election; participation in campaign meetings or rallies. Joining together with others to raise an issue or petitioning; attending a protest march or demonstration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital</td>
<td>For this study, defined as the characteristics associated with being a good citizen. Specifically, values and behavior that contribute to good and responsible governance.</td>
<td>Trust of others; trust of government institutions; tolerance of others; respect for pluralism and diversity; support for gender equality and non-traditional roles of women; perceptions of democracy; and sense of shared identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity toward political violence</td>
<td>The likelihood of becoming involved in or supporting the use of violence to promote political objectives, including through violent or extremist groups.</td>
<td>Attitudes towards the use of violence in response to US involvement in Middle East region; attitudes towards the abuse of human rights in the name of promoting security and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic engagement</td>
<td>Encompasses multiple forms of potentially economically productive activities.</td>
<td>Employment status (including full-time versus part-time), job satisfaction, and job security.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix B. Sources of Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of data</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year of administration</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabbarometer</td>
<td>Multi-country social survey to assess citizen attitudes about public affairs, governance, and social policy in the Arab World, and to identify factors that shape these attitudes and values. First round of survey conducted in 2006 in Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, Yemen, and Palestine—Kuwait data were later removed from the first round of Arab Barometer due to “problems with a significant number of interviews.” Analytical categories of survey included: (1) economic questions, (2) evaluation of political institutions, political participation, and political attitudes, (3) identity and nationalism, (4) politics and religion, (5) religiosity, and (6) the Arab world and international affairs.</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>N=6,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE)</td>
<td>Nationally representative survey of young people in Egypt aged 10-29. The survey covers issues of health, sexuality, education, employment, family formation, and civic participation.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>N=15,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa (SWME-NA)</td>
<td>Survey administered by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFE). The survey collects data on women’s status in Lebanon, Morocco and Yemen. The survey covers several areas, including political representation and participation; economic participation and opportunity; poverty, ownership and social welfare; and health, violence and wellbeing.</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>N=7,754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Mercy Corps is an international, non-profit, non-religious humanitarian and development organization. Its mission is to alleviate suffering, poverty and oppression by helping people build secure, productive and just communities. Mercy Corps current works in over 40 countries across the world, primarily in fragile and transitional contexts, such as those affected by or recovering from conflict or natural disasters.
http://arabbarometer.org
http://www.popcouncil.org/projects/SYPE
http://swmena.net

2. This approach of reconstructing program theory is increasingly practiced as part of program evaluation (Donaldson 2007; Leeuw 2003).

3. Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen. Findings on Egypt were from a separate dataset, and are noted on their own throughout this report.

4. When connected by arrows, the variables on the left hand side are significantly and positively associated with the variables on the right hand side. Lack of arrows means no significant interactions were found.

5. This finding is based on one of the items included in the Arabbarometer surveys, which was among the closest measure from the existing data sources for examining propensity towards violence.

6. For a more extensive discussion of the relationships between youth employment and risk of violence see (Mercy Corps 2011c) Youth and Conflict Toolkit.

7. The activities included: Contacted or visited a public official—at any level of government—to express your opinion; called in to a radio or television talk show or written to a newspaper or magazine to express your opinion on a political or social issue; sent in an SMS vote to express your opinion on a political or social issue; signed a written or email petition; taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration; contributed to a blog or internet site to express your opinion on a political or social issue.

8. Lebanon, χ² (1)=8.16, p<0.05, and only the case for youth involved in civic actions, not members of civic groups. Yemen, χ² (1)=94.46, p<0.05 for youth involved in civic actions, and χ² (1)=166.1, p<0.05 for members of civic groups. Morocco, χ² (1)=35.00, p<0.05, for youth involved in civic actions only.

9. In Yemen, χ² (1)=23.91, p<0.05 but only for rural youth. In Morocco, χ² (1)=6.16, p<0.05 but only youth involved in civic actions, not members of civic groups. Lebanon, χ² (1)=4.43, p<0.05 only youth who are civic group members but not involved in civic actions.

10. In Yemen more than 40,000 Riyals (approx. US$182), and in Morocco more than 5,000 Dirham (approx. US$590).

11. It is not typical to treat employment and other economic factors as outcome variables in single cross sectional studies. They are generally used as controls alongside other socio-demographics such as age, sex, and education.
Requesting and Providing Aid: The Roles of NGOs, Religious Actors, and the State in the Palestinian Territories

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Abstract

The balance of responsibility among the private, public, and nonprofit sectors to meet a variety of public needs varies among countries and cultures (Salamon, 1999; Salamon, Sokolowski & List, 2003). While in the “west” one may be accustomed to public needs being met by the state, a formal NGO or nonprofit organization, or by purchasing services through the private sector, the dominant actors in public goods provision differ substantially in the developing world (Anheier & Salamon, 1998; Clark, 1991; Fisher, 1998; Salamon, 1999; Salamon, Sokolowski & List, 2003). This is particularly true in contexts of conflict, where the state may be relatively weak or dysfunctional, and where actors such as religious leaders and organizations, political parties, village or tribal elders, armed resistance organizations and other groups may be highly involved in service provision, crime prevention, and conflict mediation.

Using survey data collected from more than 1000 individuals in Gaza and the West Bank, Palestine, this paper examines citizen reliance on a variety of community actors in contexts of occupation and resistance. In this context, the state, local and international NGOs, armed groups, and religious leaders are all active participants in providing public goods, identifying and punishing criminal activity, and mediating interpersonal and commercial conflict. This paper is part of a larger research project that seeks to answer the broad question of what sectors of society emerge as predominant providers of public services in contexts of conflict, with specific focus on the role of the nonprofit sector in comparison to other actors. This particular paper also seeks to examine closely the role that religious actors play in service provision and the degree to which individual practice of Islam is correlated to seeking services and giving charity.

Furthermore, this paper presents an opportunity to explore various theories regarding the origins of the third sector and the relationship between nonstate actors and government by looking at the unique position presented by the creation of the Palestinian National Authority with the 1993 Oslo Accords. This presents a natural experiment that allows us to examine how the newly arrived presence of a large government structure affects individuals’ reported service seeking behavior and the comparative strength of nonstate actors such as religious leaders and NGOs.

Methodology

This paper examines these questions using survey data collected in 2009-2010 from 1012 individuals in five districts in Gaza and eleven districts in the West Bank (see Table 1). Survey questions were adapted based on input from Palestinian academics, and data for the study were gathered in the field via oral surveys conducted by Palestinian survey enumerators. The survey contained questions regarding what organizations individuals would approach for assistance with employment, illness, infrastructure improvements, a variety of crimes, and various types of dispute adjudication. The survey then asked individuals for their opinions about the influence a variety of state and nonstate actors had on security, the economy, and community well-being, and on their own experiences of occupation, resistance, and religious practice, among other topics. At this early stage in the analysis the relationships among these factors were tested using Chi square and Fisher’s exact test.
Table 1: Sample Composition in Gaza Strip and West Bank by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubas</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarem</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalqilya</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salfit</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah &amp; Al-Bireh</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Bank</strong></td>
<td><strong>643</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Gaza</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza (the city)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dier Al-Balah</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gaza Strip</strong></td>
<td><strong>369</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestinian Territory</strong></td>
<td><strong>1012</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey respondents were asked who they would first approach if they were in need of different types of assistance. These types fell into three broad categories. First, what we will refer to as “traditional” public welfare, which includes assistance for family illness, unemployment, or local infrastructure such as repairing a school or digging a well. Second, what we refer to as “dispute adjudication,” which includes assistance with contract negotiations, dispute resolution, and addressing unfair government decisions. Finally, what we refer to as “criminal justice” services, which includes assistance if one were a victim of a crime, a theft, or had witnessed theft from a neighbor, or if one’s family member were murdered.

For each of these needs, individuals were given a card and asked to choose which among twenty different actors they would first approach for assistance (see Figure 1). Individuals who were old enough to have been adults at the time of the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords were also asked to recall what entities they would have turned to for assistance prior to the creation of the Palestinian Authority.
The questions posed in the survey allow the researcher to determine under what circumstances citizens seek assistance from government, religious groups, the nonprofit sector, military actors and armed groups, and other actors such as political parties and village elders to meet needs for public and social assistance, address instances of crime, and adjudicate interpersonal conflict. The data allow us to understand: 1) what actors are more heavily relied upon for specific public needs; 2) respondents’ perceptions of the benefits different actors bring to the community; and 3) respondents’ perceptions of the motivations different actors have for service provision. The questions also address the role of Islamic practices in conflict areas, individuals’ beliefs about institutions such as Sharia law, and individuals’ engagement in practices such as the giving of zakat. These data will permit an analysis of if and how these beliefs and practices correlate with other aspects of seeking and providing services. Demographic data will also allow us to understand how these factors may vary based on religion, income, gender, and other socioeconomic characteristics.

**State-Civil Society Relationships: A Brief Review of Relevant Theory**

There are a number of reasons why it is important to examine organizations operating outside the United States. As Salamon, Sokolowski, and List (2003) note, “The structure and character of the civil society sector differ markedly from country to country,” (p. 27). Scholars know that there are differences between the sector in the developed and less-developed world; while the nonprofit sector in the developing world is much larger than once assumed, it is still smaller than that of an average developed country. In addition, nonprofit revenue structure in the developing world is characterized by much lower reliance on government assistance than that of western countries (Anheier & Salamon, 1998). The nature of the relationship between the nonprofit sector and the state may be one of the critical differences between the third sectors in developing and developed nations. While in the United States third sector organizations are usually called nonprofit organizations on grounds that they are not primarily profit-seeking (Gidron, Kramer & Salamon, 1992), outside the United States the term nongovernmental organization (NGO) is often used (Frumkin, 2002). This term defines these organizations in contrast to government, rather than in contrast to business. This semantic choice may reflect an essential difference in the character of state-third sector relations between western and nonwestern societies. In developing countries, the state often possesses significant power in the face of a relative lack of opposition. Furthermore, when opposition does occur, it is often local NGOs that take the lead in challenging government (Frumkin, 2002).
In the developing world, the NGO sector began to expand during the 1970s and 1980s. This was due in part to expanded communication capabilities and support from foreign foundations and religious institutions. However, an educated middle class that was frustrated with government and in search of greater economic and political opportunities was perhaps a more powerful stimulus of growth. The NGOs they formed often developed a confrontational posture toward the government and were frequently breeding grounds for resistance movements. As these movements gained influence, they were positioned to advocate for pro-NGO policies within government, thus increasing NGO involvement in welfare provision (Salamon, 1999).

As Anheier and Salamon (1998) note, much of the available third-sector theory emerged in western societies. These theories often are based on assumptions of developed market economies and democratic political systems, a history of feudalism, or the presence of cultural traditions and social arrangements associated with Judeo-Christian religions. The use of these theories is questionable in societies where the market is poorly developed, where political and cultural traditions are different, and where a history of colonial rule has often distorted or destroyed the indigenous forms of culture and sources of power. Anheier and Salamon (1998) posit a number of alternative theories that might apply to the expansion of the voluntary sector in the developing world. They suggest focusing on supply-side theories of the evolution of the voluntary sector; rather than NGOs emerging in response to a demand for nonprofit services, growth may be a result of the supply of entrepreneurs committed to establishing NGOs to meet such demands (Anheier & Salamon, 1998; Frumkin, 2002). Religious organizations are thought to be an important source of such entrepreneurs.

Theories of Government/Market/Voluntary Failure

A longstanding theory regarding the nature and origins of the nonprofit sector has been Weisbrod’s (1977) theory of market and government failure. This theory is an extension of economists’ discussions of the inability of markets to supply sufficient public goods, with “market failure” often cited as the chief explanation for the emergence of government in supplying public goods. Weisbrod builds on this by explaining that while government meets the median voters’ demands for public goods, in communities with a diversity of preferences, a large number of demands for public goods will remain unmet (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). This “government failure” causes nonstate actors such as nonprofit organizations emerge in order to supply these goods and services (Weisbrod, 1977). Weisbrod’s theory presupposes the existence of a functional state that at least meets the needs of the median voter, which is an assumption that may not be valid in some developing countries and certainly in numerous contexts of conflict. However, one might assume that even in the absence of a functional state, this gap may lead to nonstate actors emerging to provide goods and services needed by the population.

Anheier and Salamon (1998) suggest that Salamon’s partnership theory, or theory of voluntary failure, might be applicable in the developing world. This theory conceives of nonprofit organizations as the primary response to public need, and presents government intervention as a response to “voluntary failure” due to the inherent limitations of the nonprofit sector (Salamon, 1995, p.44). Examples of service provision by NGOs in the relative absence of the state (van Tuijl, 1999) seem to offer support for this perspective. Either a “government failure” approach or a “voluntary failure” approach would lead us to expect an inverse relationship between nonprofit sector activity and government activity in
provision of collective goods (e.g. education and health services). In other words, the failure of one section would lead to the growth of the other (Anheier and Salamon, 1998).

**Interdependence Theory**

Anheier and Salamon note that theories of government and voluntary failure “take as given that the relationship between the nonprofit sector and the state is fundamentally one of conflict and competition” (1998, p.225). However, according to Salamon (1995), this “paradigm of conflict” may be overstated. Rather than an inverse relationship, he suggests that interdependence and partnership between nonprofits and the state may cause their levels of activity to rise and fall in tandem. This takes place when nonprofit organizations have networks and expertise that government can draw upon when entering a particular community, and nonprofit organizations may be able to generate political support that encourages government involvement (Anheier and Salamon, 1998).

**Religious Supply-Side Theories**

In their discussion of the social origins of the nonprofit sector, Anheier and Salamon (1998) refer to Estelle James’s (1989) important work on supply-side theories of the nonprofit sector, and more precisely to the role that religious entrepreneurs play in creating organizations to meet this demand in her work. In other words, the demands of citizens that are clearly modeled by theories of government/market/voluntary failure are not enough to explain the prevalence of the nonprofit sector. While demand is certainly necessary, motivated individuals committed to meeting these needs are essential as well (James 1989). Since at least the early twentieth century, sociologists studying religion have recognized the role religious belief plays in motivating human behavior and giving rise to communal activity (Weber 1905; Durkheim 1915). The sociology of religion has been incorporated into theorizing on a number of subjects often associated with the nonprofit sector, including altruism (Wuthnow, 1993), civic engagement (Skocpol, 2000), and civil society (Wuthnow, 1999). It is important to note that religious competition is also an essential component of James’s (1989) supply-side theory. Where we see more competition among religious organizations in gaining adherents, James suggests we should expect to see more nonprofit activity because religious actors use these services as one form of recruitment.

There are of course many other theories on the emergence of nonstate actors vis-à-vis the state, notably economic theories regarding trust and contract failure (Hansmann, 1980, 1987), and Anheier and Salamon’s (1998) social origins theory, but the variables needed to assess these are beyond the scope of our particular dataset. Theories of government failure, voluntary failure, and interdependence are particularly applicable to this paper. The creation of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993 allows us to consider variations in the ways in which individuals place demands on government entities, NGOs, and religious actors before and after the formation of a large state apparatus. In addition, our data on religious actors and individuals’ practice of Islam should give us more insight into the viability of religious supply-side theories in Palestine.
The Palestinian NGO Context: Considering Israeli Occupation and Donor Behavior

While the prior discussion acknowledges variation in civil society across countries and cultures, it is critical for us to recognize that the Palestinian context is unique due to Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. The occupation and the burdens it places on the Palestinian people create a high level of demand on the NGO sector, while concurrently creating structural barriers that pose great difficulty in meeting this demand. With the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the demand for the provision of services increased (Jarrar, 2005). Some experts report that nearly everyone in the occupied Palestinian territories has been affected by poverty, home demolitions, imprisonment, or torture. Important health problems like malnutrition, stunted growth in children, and high infant mortality rates have been caused by decades of violence and border closures (Hanley, 2009). Following the 1967 occupation, nonprofit organizations assumed the role of providing services in the social, educational and medical fields (Jarrar, 2005).

The state of human needs is particularly grim in Gaza, with its border sealed by Israel since October 2007. Following the collapse of the already fragile private sector, the poverty level in Gaza is dire and creates a tremendous amount of unmet human needs. As per Israeli policy, building materials such as cement, steel, wood, and glass are barred from Gaza, as are pipes and other parts used to repair water, sanitation, and electrical systems. Fuel and cooking gas are restricted as well, at times causing food shortages and the forced closing of bakeries. Farmers have been unable to continue to produce food locally except with international aid (Myers, 2009). Ten percent of Palestinian children, and as high as 30 percent in some parts of Gaza, have stunted growth due to malnutrition, affecting cognitive development and physical health (Hanely, 2009). In addition to these physical needs, fall the devastating trauma and stress affecting people under heavy strain and frequently subjected to violence (Myers, 2009). As Richard Horton, editor of the British health journal Lancet, stated at a press conference in 2009: “The single most important message of (the Lancet’s) report is the devastating impact of occupation on the lives of the 3.8 million men, women and children who live in the occupied Palestinian territories. The story that we hear in the media is of intermittent crises such as the war in Gaza. The story that we never hear is the chronic crisis that is destroying a society and killing the future generations of Palestinians” (Hanley, 2009).

Myers (2009) describes the Gaza Strip as being sustained almost entirely by humanitarian assistance due to these conditions, even as the siege simultaneously inhibits the delivery of humanitarian assistance. She blames Israel, Fatah and Hamas for policies that hinder the distribution of humanitarian assistance to a population dependent almost exclusively on aid. The flow of human and physical resources is limited by the blockade of Gaza and by border closures throughout the occupied Palestinian territories. The operating environment of NGOs is also constrained by the body of restrictions on their interactions with Hamas due to its being labeled a terrorist organization by the United States and other foreign governments. As Myers (2009) notes, “In some cases, the harm done to the innocent seems to be inadvertent, a by-product of policies whose intent is focused elsewhere. In many cases, the intent seems painfully clear — that the people of the Gaza Strip will pay for supporting Hamas” (p. 117).

Changes in donor behavior and the flow of resources have played an important role in the NGO sector in Palestine as well. Many portray the rise of formal NGOs as detrimental to Palestinian civil
society. The process of "NGOization" is described as one imposed by foreign donors, who emphasize professionalization in their attempt to promote civil society. It is argued that the development of professional NGOs, caused largely by donor intervention, has demobilized Palestinian civil society and has been detrimental to Palestinian national aspirations (Bornstein, 2009; Challand, 2008; Jad, 2007; Jarrar, 2005). Before and during the first intifada, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip mobilized their own civilian organizations that encouraged political participation, battled Israeli policies of de-development, and provided basic services (Bornstein, 2009; Challand, 2008). Foreign governments and organizations were attracted to the struggle, sending billions of dollars in aid in the 1990s (Bornstein, 2009). Some experts contrast this period with civil society's incapacity "of organizing at the mass level" during the second uprising (Challand, 2008, p. 234); and some attribute this to an era of donor-driven NGO professionalization, calling the process a tool of imperialism and creating a dorm of dependency within Palestinian civil society (Bornstein, 2009).

Experts also report a rapid defunding of the NGO sector in Palestine. Some suggest that with the creation of the Palestinian National Authority, funds previously directed toward the NGO sector shifted to this new government entity. Secular NGOs have also suffered due to both support for, and fear of, Islamists. Donors from the Gulf region who preferred supporting Islamist NGOs shifted their donations, with the result that, following the second intifada, Islamist NGOs did not have financial difficulties and even managed to grow. In contrast, secular NGOs lost funding both from Gulf donors and from Western donors fearful of funding Islamists, who withdrew from the region more broadly (Challand, 2009).

Shifts in Requesting Aid with the Creation of the Palestinian Authority

As in many locales, NGOs and religious actors play an important role in addressing human needs in Palestine alongside the state. Table 2 shows that almost 25% of survey respondents reported that NGOs are active in development activities in their communities. In contrast, Table 3 shows that religious actors and NGOs are far outpaced by the Palestinian Authority as a target for requests for assistance.

Table 2: Percent Reporting NGOs are active in development in their community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refused to respond</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Has it always been the case that government entities were more dominant than NGOs and religious actors in service provision? Or, is this phenomenon an example of the inverse pattern described by government/voluntary failure theories? The creation of the Palestinian National Authority occurred as a result of the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” on September 13, 1993, which has been referred to more frequently as the Oslo Accords. It signified a major shift in governance in the Palestinian Territories. The tables contained in Appendix A show a clear centralization of reported requests for assistance by the Palestinian Authority, with reliance drawn away from municipal government, tribal or family leaders, and other entities. By examining the specific ways in which reliance on NGOs and religious actors shifted after the creation of the Palestinian Authority, we can interrogate some of the theoretical perspectives mentioned earlier and assess how well they apply to the Palestinian case.
Many different types of NGOs are represented in this data set. As individuals indicated what entity they would approach for assistance with various social needs they were given four categories of NGOs from which to choose: international NGOs, NGOs operated by Hamas, NGOs operated by Fatah, and other Palestinian NGOs. There is great variety among NGOs and we could have easily chosen many other categories, but these were selected because of an interest in better understanding how services offered by armed political organizations may influence service recipients’ behavior and beliefs. (While we do not discuss this topic in this paper, it is the subject of a forthcoming parallel line of research). In the tables in Appendix A we present data for each of these individual categories of NGOs, as well as NGOs in the aggregate. We also asked questions about several different types of religious actors in the survey: official religious leaders, unofficial religious leaders, and international Islamic political leaders. Because the number of individuals reporting these as sources of service is so small, we report these data only in the aggregate.

For ease of discussion, Table 4 presents important data from the tables in Appendix A collectively. We see from this table that in all categories of assistance, following the 1993 Oslo Accords reliance on government entities for assistance increases dramatically. While this may seem commonsensical given the creation of a large state body with the Oslo Accords, it is important not to let this summative figure obscure the fact that substantial changes take place within service seeking from the public sector itself during this period. Notably, in many of the tables in Appendix A we see a significant drop in reliance on local municipal governments even as reliance on government as a whole increases. In other words, individuals are not only seeking assistance from government more frequently, but they have made changes in which government bodies they approach for assistance.

Table 4 shows us a different picture for NGOs and religious actors. We see in the tables in Appendix A that there is certainly variation among different types of NGOs before and after Oslo, with some experiencing greater requests for assistance and others experiencing less. However, in spite of reports from scholars like Challand (2009) regarding a nahda (awakening) of charitable organizations, on the whole Table 4 shows relative stability in the NGO sector before and after the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Where there are large changes, there is a decrease in seeking assistance from the NGO sector. This is particularly the case for employment assistance, where the number of individuals reporting having sought assistance from NGOs decreases more than 6 percentage points, a 37% drop.

While religious actors were approached relatively infrequently even before the Oslo Accords, we see a stark decrease in requests for assistance after the creation of the Palestinian Authority. While the numbers in comparison to other sectors are relatively small, the proportional decrease for religious actors is quite high; in some cases more than 80%. In the area of assistance for crime victims, for example, reported requests for assistance from government increased by 166%, while reported requests for assistance from religious actors decreased by 82.2% (Table 4).
Table 4: Percentage of Respondents who first seek assistance from each category of actor before and after Oslo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>+69.9%</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>-37.3%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>+49.3%</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Resolution</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>+98.9%</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-13.5%</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victim</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>+166%</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-82.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft Personal</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>+108%</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>+3.2%</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-60.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft Neighbor</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>+115%</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>+4.4%</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>+118%</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-20.4%</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-78.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Increases are color coded as green. Decreases are color coded as red.

The changes we see in Table 4 are supportive of theories of government and voluntary failure, where the activity of government and nonstate actors should have an inverse relationship. Following the creation of the Palestinian Authority, we see that reported requests for assistance from the government rise drastically, while requests from NGOs moderately decrease and requests from religious entities drastically decrease. This supports the notion that nonstate actors fill a gap in state services and take a backseat role when and if the state emerges to fill that hole.

Exploring the Limited Role of Religious Actors

Our data show relatively limited requests for assistance from religious actors, although it is important to note that our categorization of religious actors is not complete. By examining official religious leaders, unofficial religious leaders, and international Islamic political leaders, we neglect the fact that many NGOs themselves and other actors such as political parties and armed organizations have distinctly religious orientations. Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider the small role the preference of religious actors seems to play and what implications that may have for supply-side theories of nonstate service provision.

Our data present little evidence of religious competition in Palestine; while there is religious diversity in Palestine, 98.4% of our sample report being Sunni Muslim. (While this figure is reflective of the demographic composition of Gaza Strip, it is over representative of Sunni Muslims in West Bank, who make up only about 75% of the population there, CIA World Factbook 2012). According to James (1989) and other heterogeneity theorists, religious competition is critical to increased activity in the nonprofit sector, and a lack of religious competition between religious groups themselves and between smaller sects might account for the relatively low levels of assistance sought from religious actors.
On the other hand, religious motivation that would indicate a propensity for religious entrepreneurs certainly seems present. As Table 5 shows, survey respondents report high levels of communal prayer attendance, with more than half of respondents reporting that they attend communal prayers at least once a day. We also find high levels of participation in zakat, the charitable contributions of material goods and labor obliged by Islam as a form of alms giving (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2003). More than 75% or respondents report giving zakat. Interestingly, the likelihood of reporting that one gives zakat decreases as perceived economic wellbeing increases, in an inverse relationship that is statistically significant (see Table 6). The fact that those who report to be more inclined to participate in charity are lower income may in itself present a resource constraint that prevents potential religious entrepreneurs from being able to consider creating such organizations. In fact, in her influential study of Islamic charitable institutions in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, Clark (2004) finds the creation of such institutions to be a primarily middle-class phenomenon.

![Table 5: Percent Reporting Various levels of Communal Prayer Attendance](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 times a day</th>
<th>1 time a day</th>
<th>1 time a week</th>
<th>1 or 2 times a month</th>
<th>on holidays</th>
<th>never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Table 6: Relationship between perceived economic wellbeing and giving zakat](image)

| Perceived economic wellbeing |  | Perceived economic wellbeing |  |  
|-----------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------|--|--|
|                            | % | Std. Residual | Chi-Square | P value | % | Std. Residual | Chi-Square | P value |
| LOWEST - Hard to buy food   | 88.5 | 1.4 | 13.44 | .001* | 2.5 | -3.1 | 13.44 | .001* |
| LOWER - Hard to buy clothes and pay social obligations | 89.8 | 1.9 | 21.38 | .000* | 3.8 | -3.3 | 21.38 | .000* |
Yet another aspect of religious entrepreneurism that is neglected by James (1989) is the desire one may have to help one’s coreligionist. Group loyalty is often a motivator for altruistic behavior (Simon, 1993) and often voluntary activity is characterized by an explicit focus on within-group giving and activities that benefit others sharing a similar identity. Indeed, numerous studies of philanthropy indicate that charitable giving and the voluntary work of nonprofit organizations often target specific populations based on factors such as religion (Anand, 2004; Anheier and Salamon, 1998; Ilchman, Katz, and Queen II, 1998; James, 1989; Smith et al. 1999); race (Joseph, 1995; Smith et al. 1999); ethnic or tribal identity (Smith et al., 1999; Greenspan, 2004; Osili, 2004), kinship ties (Isdudi, 2004; Paulos; Smith et al., 1999); or national origin (Cochrane, 2004; Smith et al., 1999). Research shows that religious organizations do have a tendency to serve others of one’s own faith in contexts of conflict in the developing world, including in Lebanon, which shares certain cultural characteristics with Palestine (Flanigan, 2010). Indeed, the presence of conflict may actually lead individuals to direct more of their efforts inward toward members of their in-group and more carefully avoid interactions with the “other” (Tilly, 2003). Our data demonstrates some desire among those with strong indicators of Islamic practice (for example, those who frequently attend communal prayers) to seek services from religious actors and NGOs. However, what is much more powerfully demonstrated is the apparent distaste those who attend prayer five times a day have for interaction with government. As can be seen in Table 7, in almost all categories of assistance, attending communal prayers five times a day is negatively and significantly related to seeking assistance from government. For those who report giving zakat, the results are more mixed (Table 7). These findings seem to negate arguments that with the rise of Hamas, religion has been institutionalized and service recipients view Hamas and the state as synonymous, and both Islamic.

| LOWER MIDDLE | can’t replace broken TV or refrigerator | 74.3 | -0.6 | 16.69 | .000* | 9.3 | -1.4 | 16.69 | .000* |
| UPPER MIDDLE | can replace broken TV or refrigerator | 73.8 | -0.7 | 16.19 | .000* | 18.5 | 3.0 | 16.19 | .000* |
| HIGHEST | can buy almost anything we want | 69.6 | -1.2 | 16.49 | .000* | 21.6 | 3.5 | 16.49 | .000* |

*Positive relationships are color coded as green. Negative relationships are color coded as red.
Table 7: Directions of Statistically Significant Relationships between Religious Practice and Sources Approached for Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government (domestic)</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>Religious Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zakat givers</td>
<td>Pray 5 times</td>
<td>Zakat givers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Resolution</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Victim</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft- Personal</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft- Neighbor</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Positive relationships are color coded as green and indicated by “+”. Negative relationships are color coded as red and indicated by “-”.

Conclusion

This analysis allows us to further explore the relationship between nonstate actors and government through the creation of the Palestinian National Authority with the 1993 Oslo Accords. This major shift in governance in the Palestinian Territories created greater dependence on the Palestinian Authority for assistance, whereas municipal government, tribal or family leaders, and other entities took a back seat to this new phenomenon. As a newly emerged government structure, the Palestinian Authority’s operational role as a service provider is supported by the theories of government and voluntary failure. This is most evident in the drastic increase of reported requests for assistance from government, while requests from NGOs moderately decreased and those from religious entities drastically decreased. This supports the notion that nonstate actors fill a gap in state services, and step aside when and if the state emerges to fill that void.

Though it appears reasonable to explain this overt dependence on government entities, such as the Palestinian Authority, it is important to consider the role religious indicators play in its success. Though our data presents little evidence of religious competition in Palestine, it appears that religious motivation would indicate a propensity for religious entrepreneurs. High levels of respondents reported they attended communal prayer, with more than half reporting they attend at least once a day. This also includes a report of high levels of participation in zakat, with more than 75% of respondents making this form of alms giving. Interestingly, the likelihood of reporting zakat donations by an individual decreases as perceived economic wellbeing increases. This statistically significant data therefore reflects some motivation among those with strong indicators of Islamic religiosity to be religious entrepreneurs.

In essence, the data allows us to surmise that individuals are not only seeking assistance from government more frequently, but that a shift occurred in which bodies they approach for assistance.
While NGOs and religious actors were approached more frequently prior to the Oslo Accords (NGOs more so than religious leaders), we see a stark decrease in requests for assistance following the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Thus, our analysis presents a substantial shift in this request for aid in the Palestinian Territories and provides us preliminary insight into the viability of religious supply-side theories in Palestine.
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End Notes

1. It is important to note that due to the length of the survey, which took between 40-80 minutes per respondent, respondents were asked only for their first choice regarding who to approach for aid. In all likelihood individuals would approach multiple actors for assistance with at least some needs.

2. Relying on human memory for this information is, of course, problematic. This is evidenced by the fact that in all service categories, at least some respondents reported relying upon the Palestinian Authority for services prior to 1993 in spite of the fact that the Palestinian Authority had not yet been created. (We have asked about this phenomenon and some experts on Palestine have suggested that these respondents may be conflating the Palestinian Authority with the PLO, but we are unable to know for certain if this is true.) In spite of the certain inaccuracies of some of this information, we believe that posing the question is still preferable in the absence of alternative data from the period.

3. We should note that we attempted to use the wearing of head cover (such as hijab) as an indicator of religious practice in our data analysis. While this variable was highly significant in relation to various forms of service seeking, the significance vanished when analyzing female respondents only. In other words, head covering was merely serving as a proxy for gender; it is gender that has a significant relationship to various types of service seeking. While it is beyond the scope of this paper, we find the fact that woman and men have significantly different patterns of service seeking to be fascinating, and we hope to explore this further in future research.

4. The data in Table 7 are derived from Table B-1 in Appendix B, which is a summary of statistically significant relationships between indicators of Islamic practice and service seeking behavior.
Women Leading Change in the “Arab Spring”:
Libyan Women as Agents of Peace and Security

Zahra’ Langhi

Libyan Activist
Abstract

Women’s political and civic engagement in Libya has historical roots; waves of women’s participation rushed forward and receded depending on the sociopolitical environment. The Libyan Revolution marks a watershed moment in Libyan history and more specifically in the history of women’s participation in the public space. The paper sheds light on the role of Libyan women during the revolution along with some of the obstacles that remain in the way of women’s participation and security proposing some recommendations for action that aim at enhancing the status of women in Libya.

Women and the Libyan Revolution

“The struggle of the revolution is not over yet. The struggle for democratic constitution and institutions, with full participation of women and guarantees for women’s human rights is taking place right now. The international community’s encouragement and direct support to civil society are crucial in ensuring the revolution delivers a positive change for Libyan women.” Libyan women’s rights advocates in New York, February 22, 2012

Women constitute 60% of the Libyan population which is estimated to be around 6.4 million living in an area of 1.8 million square kilometers, making Libya the third largest country in Africa regarding land area and the 17th largest in the world. Like the rest of the segments of the Libyan society, women were subjected to the spiral of injustice Qaddafi’s despotic rule is notoriously known for. Unbroken and inspired by waves of mass mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt, when the Revolution broke out, women were at the forefront; and the first demonstrations that took place in Benghazi, historically the seat of all Libyan revolutions, were co-led by women. Young Libyan women then joined forces and established networks that brought news of the loss and heroism of the Libyan Revolution beyond the geographic borders of the homeland to the world. This paper explores the current and potential role of Libyan women in context in an attempt to go beyond the news headlines and reviews on Libya’s politics and to think of possible steps forward. Moreover, we offer suggestions for ensuring the increase in women’s presence in post-Qaddafi Libya.

There are conflicting numbers of those killed in the struggle against Qaddafi; those vary between 30,000 and 50,000 and there are no clear statistics that point out the percentage of women to men. What is a certainty, however, is that in any conflict, women suffer the impact of violations disproportionately; they are more vulnerable to specific types of violence such as sexual violence and exploitation. The role of women post-conflict thus becomes critical, and as shifts in the sociopolitical environment continue to change every aspect of people’s lives, a major restructuring of the role of women in society needs to take place for an effective transition towards democratization. Its success is to a great extent determined by the society’s capacity to welcome and empower women to meaningfully contribute to rebuilding their communities and country.

After the fall of Qaddafi’s regime in February 2011, a number of social initiatives and civil society organizations such as the very active Attawasul Association for Youth, the Forum of Supporting Women’s Political Participation, Women for Libya, Wefaq for National Reconciliation and the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace were launched and led by Libyan women with the objective of restoring women’s peace and security through public participation and representation. This focus on participation and representation is embedded in the conviction that women are better
informed about other women’s suffering and deprivation and thus their voices are valuable and critical to forging a path towards democratization.

Women’s political and civic engagement in Libya has historical roots; waves of women’s participation rushed forward and receded depending on the sociopolitical environment. The Sanusi period was particularly welcoming, those that preceded and that followed were not. After the independence of Libya from the Italian occupation, on the grounds of the constitution of 1952, King Idris’s regime tried to establish a participatory political system in which all segments of Libyan society were represented. The objectives were twofold: first to restore the position of societal forces that were crushed by occupation and second to translate a vision that participation and representation are rights and duties to be enjoyed by all members of society; women’s presence was thus enhanced and they formed unions and associations, and participated in shaping public opinion through their writings and work in the media.

This space for participation did not last long. In 1969, the coup d'état led by Qaddafi launched a new era in which political participation was heavily circumvented. Qaddafi’s years saw virtually all societal forces disenfranchised and deprived from participation and representation in political life. Qaddafi banned political parties and unions; the famous slogan of the Qaddafi period was “man tahazab khan” or “whoever forms a party is a traitor.” This put a brutal end to all shades of political and civic participation. Women continued to fill certain positions but their participation was reduced to formalities.

The Libyan Revolution marks a watershed moment in Libyan history and more specifically in the history of women’s participation in the public space. Political participation was also civic participation, as is the case with the succession of revolutions across the region, the lines of demarcation separating one from the other were blurred. Women were at the forefront of the demonstrations as protesters, medical workers, and aid providers, as well as organizing behind-the-scenes and in the diaspora for political change and a peaceful, just resolution to the ongoing unrest. Women, particularly young women, have been instrumental to the birth of a new Libyan civil society calling for an inclusive and just transition to democracy and national reconciliation. More than 200 organizations were established in Benghazi during and immediately after the fall of Qaddafi and more than 300 in Tripoli. Many of those organizations were initiated and/or led by young people and women’s participation was central.

Post-Qaddafi Libya is burdened with its thorny past yet remains full of promise. The lack of an institutional infrastructure has given the Libyan people a chance to rebuild their nation anew. There are important challenges, however, mostly related to the need for effective policy change and to resolving a legacy of regionalism and division from the Qaddafi period. Women’s meaningful engagement in public space emerges at the crossroads between both Qaddafi’s legacy and the current problems that have resulted from it and the promise of a new Libya. The absence of civil society under Qaddafi’s government and women’s limited political and economic influence in the past 40 years suggests that this issue requires urgent and careful support. Societal forces, including women, seem to have positioned the participation in elections as their top priorities, though in post-conflict societies national reconciliation should become the priority.
The country is in pressing need for civil amity. Libyan society is torn between those who are tainted as advocates of Qaddafi’s regime since they belong to cities that referred to as Qaddafi’s remaining strongholds and those who are supporters of the 17th February Revolution due to the fact that they belong to cities or tribes which initiated the Revolution. Even within the educational system, schools and students are sharply divided between pro-Qaddafi and anti-Qaddafi currents. The sense of societal brotherhood and citizenship is eclipsed by regional and factional inclinations which were reinforced during Qaddafi’s rule by his dividing policies. Should reconciliation not be achieved in a timely manner, societal gaps will only widen. The quantity and quality of current initiatives that are designed to restore societal amity are insufficient.

Many women are busy with untargeted political agendas such as calling for more representation in the government or the Parliament at the expense of an agenda which places women’s peace and security as the most urgent priority. Women and youth remain relatively absent from the decision making table. There are only two women in the Cabinet out of 24 ministers and only two women in the National Transitional Council (NTC) out of 62 members. Women have run for the local council elections. However, only one woman won the majority of votes in the local council elections in Benghazi, Najat Kikhia, a university professor, community organizer, and a co-founder of the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace (LWPP).

While the extreme violence against women which was practiced by the former regime during the liberation war/armed conflict has stopped, its repercussions are still present and the moral wounds of injured women are not yet healed. A number of women who were subjected to forceful disappearance are still not found. Raped women have not yet been put into counseling treatment. Some women and young girls are caught in the middle of the frequent military confrontations that have since taken place between armed militias, using heavy and light weaponry, that refuse to disarm. Each of the armed militias tries to impose its own deformed conception of order on the area it controls. The spread of chaotic armament results in increasing fear to move in the militarized areas. The NTC and the government have been calling for willful disarmament and demobilization. However, such calls have yielded no positive outcome. To date, no viable legal schemes have been put to work. Many women were forced to desert their homes to escape the hazards of the frequent military confrontations that have been taking place between armed militias of different cities. For example, we can look to the mixture of tribal, ethnic, and political feuds that took place recently in Kufra and Sabha. Some leave to other cities and become domestic refugees, unable to find work or generate income. Others travel abroad mostly to bordering countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. Naturally, women suffer the most in such conflicts. That said, women’s engagement in public and political affairs must come from within Libyan society with the support of regional and international advocates.

At the policy level, the NTC declared early on that one of its objectives was to restore women’s participation and representation during the transitional period. However, policies and laws seem to lack a gender sensitive approach. In November 2011, the NTC passed an election law for 200-member National Conference which will draft a permanent constitution and will hold both legislative and executive powers during the period when a permanent constitution is being drafted and put to referendum. In the first draft, there was a 10% quota for women. However, it was later dropped.
Similarly, the LWPP formed a committee of independent legal experts to pose an alternative law that stipulates a zipper list, composed of male/female alternation vertically and horizontally in lists of political parties. Then, the NTC released a controversial amendment to Article 30 of the Constitutional Declaration. This amendment grants a committee of 60 individuals from outside the NTC or National Conference unilateral power to draft and re-draft a constitution should it fail in a national referendum. The move acknowledges the pressing issue of regionalism by allocating seats on the basis of Libya’s three main historical regions: 20 to Tripolitania in the West, 20 to Cyrenaica in the East and 20 to the southern region of Fazzan. However, there is no mention of gender representation in the committee that will draft the constitution. The NTC also passed a Transitional Justice Law that lacks a gender sensitive approach; there is no mention of raped women as victims of the armed conflict nor that the truth seeking committee will have gender representation.

The NTC and the Transitional Government have failed to develop a National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, the landmark legal and political framework that acknowledges the importance of the participation of women and the inclusion of gender perspectives in peace negotiations, humanitarian planning, post-conflict peace-building and governance adopted by the UN Security Council in 2000, or any policies that indicate interest in advancing women’s security. Furthermore, there is no reference in the Constitutional Declaration or any of the laws or policies so far taken by the NTC to CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. On the contrary, there is fear after the speech given by the head of the NTC on the Day of Liberation regarding polygamy and the annulment of laws that contradict Shari’a that Libya’s rectification of CEDAW will be revoked.

A number of obstacles remain in the way of women’s participation and security, including:

- Spread of armed factions, ex-revolutionary groups and armed groups recently entering Libya from abroad, and the spread of weaponry and of militarized action resulting in continued absence of sufficient order and in frequent military engagements within cities and towns.
- Lack of Law enforcement: Absence of a viable police able to provide a sense of security, deter crime, and enforce the law.
- Absence of a deep understanding of transitional justice has made it difficult to manage the transition phase. Hence, people in general and women in particular do not have a clear conception when and how this transitional phase will end and yield to a better phase. The outcome is that women are deprived of the necessary sense of stability.
- Absence of minimal pro-gender equality legislation.
- Under-representation of women in state institutions: The power conflict between the National Transition Council and the Government continues to hinder the building of national reconciliation. Over politicization/polarization and ideological dichotomization in Libyan social life precludes a healthy restoration of main societal ethics. Due to the perpetual sense of tribalism and regionalism, proposals for post-conflict electoral transitions following local practices of selection/representation are likely to replicate the exclusionary structures of the Qaddafi regime and favor well-organized groups or traditional decision-making systems that do not necessarily champion the protection of women’s rights and gender equality.
- Socioeconomic problems: The inability to find suitable jobs or to put together sound assistance programs to respond to the needs of tens of thousands of women who are without sufficient financial support due to the loss of or serious injury to their husbands in
the Liberation war. Suddenly becoming single parents or supporting parents the majority of those women are not able to find suitable jobs, lacking the qualifications needed to meet the requirements of the job market. The government does not offer them qualification programs, nor work to create jobs that meet their abilities. They rely instead on irregular financial assistance from relatives or friends. Moreover, the inability to meet or realistically address the demands of the revolutionaries/freedom fighters of the Liberation war to be absorbed in state institutions or to be granted suitable jobs has resulted in their insistence to refrain from submitting their weapons.

- Cultural schisms, regionalism, tribalism and cultural exclusiveness are augmenting in the relations between the different cities (Tripoly/Misrata/Sabhaha/Zintan/Ben Gazi) and between different ethnic/cultural backgrounds (Arabs/Amazigh). Large segments of each culture adopt a zero-sum discourse in which the “other” is always excluded. This cultural schism is resulting in familial tension and the rise of inter-city and inter-culture prejudices, and in some cases is destabilizing inter-city and inter-culture marriages and relations.

Furthermore, the absence of the culture of gender equality means that large segments of women are hindered by the absence of an inclusive sense of identity. In Libya’s case the sense of exclusiveness is more complicated for it is a concoction of a modern quasi-tribal state. For example, a large segment of women who hold dual citizenship - whether living in Libya or living abroad and considering coming back to settle in Libya - face exclusion and disenfranchisement by parties still holding old conceptions of identity and loyalty which belong to exclusivist nation-statism. This wave insists on excluding and disenfranchising Libyan women who hold other nationalities from running or holding various offices in the Libyan state based on the allegation that they may have divided loyalty. Many of the women who hold more than one nationality are therefore unable to make decisions about their political contributions, and many living abroad are reluctant to return. Most of the women living abroad are highly qualified, familiar with the international environment in terms of its conventions, policies and modules of cooperation, and importantly are eager to help their country after being deprived of this honor for decades by Qaddafi’s regime.

Going Forward: Recommendations for Action

In light of the challenges mentioned above, it is important to think forward and below is a list of suggested recommendations to address some of the root causes of problems women face in getting fully integrated in Libya’s transition towards a democracy.

1. How to increase women’s participation in state-building and peace and security issues:
   - Adopting the principle of quota in representative bodies
   - Due to absence of gender equality, there is a need to adopt a quota of no less than 30% female participants according to International conventions like CEDWA and SCR1325 within the electoral system. This would ensure women’s representation.
   - Building a female police force
   - There is a need to establish a female police force to help in law enforcement and in spreading a sense of security. Female police forces are present in most countries worldwide and have proven indispensable in times of crisis and in maintaining a sense of security among women in public space. They are needed in a conservative society.
   - Improving the appointment policy in state apparatus
• There is a need to improve the appointment policy in state apparatus to ensure the appointment of capable and promising women in important positions in every state sector. In addition to the need to address competence in government appointments, there is also a need to address the issue of gender in order to reinforce notions of equal citizenship.

2. How to increase knowledge and capacity of women activists for full participation in peace and security institutions and policymaking processes:
   • Providing governance education schemes: Designing customized intensive modules of governance education to be presented to a large number of accomplished and promising women activists from various fields. The modules should be comprised of a mixture of themes related to boosting women’s participation in political life. For example: the concept of order, the concept of state, constitutionalism, intermediate structures’ initiatives, human rights, civil wars, societal ethics and economy building. The programs would be an initiative by either local or international non-governmental organizations and would help in laying the foundation of the intellectual infrastructure of women activists.
   • Awareness raising campaigns: Creating a public discourse on women’s participation in political life is vital. Hence, it is important to encourage and finance the publishing of articles, papers and books related to women’s participation. This should include works focusing on the experiences of women of other countries. It is also important to encourage and finance the production of documentaries discussing the various dimensions of women’s participation. There is also a need to hold targeted public lectures and symposia, seminars conferences, workshops and consultation meetings.

3. Key gaps to be addressed, or strategies to be prioritized:
   • In relation to disarmament and demobilization: Through the help of elected women and lobbying, pressure should be placed on government to absorb ex-fighters in the state army and apparatuses so as to encourage them to submit their arms. Moreover, media campaigns need to be designed and launched against the random use of arms and against armed manifestations.
   • In relation to building societal amity: Design and hold a multi-level national dialogue which serves the objective of restoring societal amity. The dialogue should be inclusive of all the ethnic, tribal and regional groups. The objective of the dialogue should be laying the foundations of order in the country. Being multi-level means that a dialogue should be held between the representatives of political powers, youth, and intermediate structures (syndicates, associations, unions, etc). The dialogue should not be confined to representatives of political powers as has previously been the case. At the same time, the dialogue should be multi-dimensional in that it covers ethical, economic, social, legal and political domains.
   • The exaggerated focus put on elections should be brought to a reasonable level and simultaneously a focus on the realization of reconciliation and restoration of social amity should be built. By this I mean that elections are a means to reconciliation, and not an end in themselves, as many seem to believe. Elections do not automatically generate public tranquility, understanding, or tolerance. If focus is placed only on elections without being devoted to social amity, elections may lead to sharper polarization.
   • In relation to raising awareness: Awareness needs to raised among women through civil society campaigns and media regarding the vitality of their participation in politics
and how it affects the shaping of their futures. This includes raising awareness of key national and international interlocutors and mechanisms of women's priorities and also in the experience of the conflict and priorities in transition. Furthermore, in order to ensure appropriate support is generated to address women's concerns, awareness in utilizing mediation and post-conflict planning is essential. These include CEDAW, and UNSCR 1325, 1820, among others. Women's awareness of their rights through the available media channels and communication networks should be built, as well as the development of a sustainable and integrated strategy capable of achieving cultural and social advancement on issues affecting women.

• In relation to interacting with external actors: Women should be enabled to share information and learn from key regional and international resource people on the engagement of women in democratization struggles across the region. This can be done through creating a network of Libyan women’s groups and international women’s groups in order to coordinate in projects. Furthermore, women should be positioned to engage effectively with regional and international decision-makers to ensure that they fully contribute to the transition and post-conflict decision-making.

• In relation to discourse: The centrality and relevance of religious values in shaping Libya’s socio-political present and future should be utilized. Women activists should engage moderate and reformist religious discourse and should not alienate religious values or those who espouse them so as to win credibility and legitimacy.

• Women activists should be invited to transcend and avoid ideological dichotomization. The debate should oriented towards a nationalist democratic discourse and uphold Islamic ethical values, thus geared towards development issues such as human development, capacity building of youth and local development of suburbs. In inviting women to be more inclusive and collaborative, their discourse should address the whole nation. They should be working on proposing national projects such as disarmament and national reconciliation. In a word, they should be peace-builders.
‘Resala – a message about giving’:
Charity, youth voluntarism and an emerging imaginary of Egypt

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Abstract

Focusing on the time both before and after the Egyptian revolution, this paper explores the formation of a specific imaginary of Egypt among middle class youth engaged in charitable activities in the youth organization, Resala. Through the case studies of two young female volunteers, I present examples of how participation in Resala’s activities simultaneously exposes volunteers to and engages them in the production of a certain imaginary of Egyptian society, an imaginary of an imperfect society that can be improved through their voluntary effort. The experiences of the two women furthermore reflect important differences and tendencies within the organization as a whole. These differences tell us something about how the imaginary is understood and practiced in slightly different ways, but more importantly, they demonstrate how a shared imaginary has the potential of uniting young people of various backgrounds and experiences. Although Resala was established with the explicit purpose of assisting Egypt’s poor, I argue that Resala is also – and perhaps primarily – a space where a new collective consciousness about Egyptian society was fostered, a consciousness which somehow has prepared these young people for the Egyptian revolution.

Introduction

‘It wasn’t like a dream to come true. It was beyond the level of dreams,’ explained Dr. Sherif Abdelazeem, the founder and chairman of the Egyptian youth organization Resala. He was referring to the level of enthusiasm, devotion and energy that young volunteers displayed during the initial phase of Resala. To him, this was proof ‘that youth wanting to do good are capable of actually doing it.’ Resala began as a student initiative at the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University in 1999. In 2000, a relative of one of the volunteers donated a piece of land on the condition that within three years the volunteers would raise sufficient funds and establish a workable charitable organization. In six months, the volunteers succeeded in meeting this goal, raising materials equal to half a million Egyptian pounds and erecting a six-storey building in the district of al-Haram in Cairo. Since then, Resala has developed into the largest youth organization in the Arab world with 63 branches and almost 100,000 volunteers dispersed across Egypt’s 29 governorates. It is now a formally registered NGO providing basic services and support to Egypt’s underserved groups.

There are several ways to approach a phenomenon like Resala. Throughout my study of the organization, I have often been confronted with questions such as: ‘Isn’t this just about a bunch of naïve young people providing charity to the poor in order for themselves to feel better?’ Or ‘Do they really contribute to any long-term development or change?’ Instead of answering these questions directly, I will illustrate how organizations like Resala facilitate shared experiences and understandings among the young people involved. Put differently, the question is whether and in which ways spaces like Resala foster a certain ‘imaginary’ (Castoriadis, 1987) about Egyptian society. I argue that Resala provides the organizational space and discourses allowing people to practice something shared which, in combination with important historical events, society’s prevailing ethos and specific intergenerational relations, cultivates a particular shared imaginary of conceivable possibilities within Egyptian society.

More specifically, through an ethnographic study of ‘giving’ among youth involved in Resala this article will show how possibilities of social change are constituted within a specific group of young people. Through the case studies of two young female volunteers, I present examples of
how participation in Resala’s activities simultaneously exposes volunteers to and engages them in the production of a certain image of Egyptian society. This image both reflects back on the volunteers themselves and the way they see their own role in society as givers and contributes to the imaginary of an imperfect society that can be improved through their sadaqa, i.e. voluntary acts of giving exceeding minimal Islamic social obligations towards the poor. The experiences of the two women furthermore reflect important differences and tendencies within the organization as a whole. These differences tell us something about how the imaginary is understood and practiced in slightly different ways, but more importantly they demonstrate how a shared imaginary has the potential of uniting young people of various backgrounds and experiences.

Most data for this article was collected among young Muslim volunteers immediately before the Egyptian uprising in early 2011[2]. Then, in late 2011, I returned to Egypt to follow up on Resala and my key interlocutors. I was curious to hear their thoughts about and reactions to the changes in the country. I was not surprised to learn that the vast majority participated in the demonstrations at Tahrir Square in January 2011 and February 2011 and again in November 2012 and December 2012. It is a common assumption that the recent political changes in Egypt will lead to ‘a new political imaginary’ (Challand, 2011; Hanafi, 2011) and generational consciousness especially among the young generation (Shahine, 2011). This article addresses these assumptions by highlighting the situation of youth during political rupture in light of their prior situation. Although Resala was established with the explicit purpose of assisting Egypt’s poor, I argue that Resala is also – and perhaps primarily – a space where a new collective consciousness about Egyptian society was fostered, a consciousness which somehow prepared the young people for the Egyptian revolution and the changes that have followed.

‘Resala Association for Charity – The Pleasure of Giving’[3]

Since around 2000, a new group of actors has emerged in Egyptian civil society. An increasing number of middle class young people began engaging in voluntary social service work and forming their own organizations. Constituting a minor but growing part of Egyptian civil society, these youth-founded and youth-led organizations represent a phenomenon distinct from other Egyptian youth organizations, as well as from more traditional religious charity organizations.[4] They engage in social service activities in ways that differ from many traditional charity organizations. Moreover, while many youth organizations have an explicitly secular approach, for these young people Islam plays an important role. Introducing a new approach to Islam, charity and voluntarism, these organizations combine more or less conventional religious charity and aid provision with a focus on human development, as well as activities associated with awareness-raising aimed at mobilizing young people to participate in civil society.[5]

Resala is the largest and most famous organization within this new trend. One of its major branches is in Heliopolis, approximately 15 kilometers northeast of downtown Cairo. It is located on a quiet street, behind one of the main streets in Heliopolis. The building is a five-storey concrete block similar to many of the residential buildings in the area. When this branch first opened in 2005, the building provided space for volunteers, staff and activities. But like all other Resala branches, in the last few years there has been a rapid increase in both the numbers of volunteers and the scale and variety of activities, and most activities and volunteers recently moved into a newly constructed, larger and more luxurious building on the neighboring lot. This twelve-storey building,
painted white and with decorated balconies, is one very tangible sign of the success of the Resala Association for Charity. Land is expensive in Cairo, in particular in upper-middle class areas like Heliopolis, nevertheless every year at least one new Resala branch opens. Parallel to this, the number of employees and volunteers has exploded. In 2011, Resala had 4,600 employees and more than 98,000 volunteers, of whom approximately 580 employees and 8,000 volunteers came to the Heliopolis branch. Other obvious signs of Resala’s success are the commercials on radio and TV as well as the billboards on the Ring Road and other main roads in Cairo. The size and growth of Resala has been facilitated by a steady increase in donations. In 2011, the total amount of in-cash donations to Resala reached 193 million Egyptian pounds for the organization as a whole, and 34.8 million for the Heliopolis branch.

The vast majority of Resala’s volunteers are college students and recent graduates whose ages range from eighteen to twenty-five. Resala’s immediate beneficiaries are poor families and other vulnerable groups; including orphans, disabled and illiterate persons. By providing material aid such as food, shelter and clothes, as well as education, training, and emotional support, Resala and its volunteers strive to improve the lives of Egypt’s underserved groups. This is also the message they seek to convey to potential donors and other ‘outsiders.’ However, on several occasions Abdelazeem explained to me that charity is in fact only a secondary aim of Resala. For the founders of Resala, the main intention in establishing the organization was to foster a culture of giving, especially among young Egyptians. ‘My dream is to see the day in which everyone is helping everyone, voluntarily and without asking for anything in return,’ Abdelazeem stated in one of his speeches. He saw it as his mission to convey to the young people a message about social responsibility towards society. This goal is also reflected in the organization’s name and mission statement. Likewise, the slogans of Resala, such as ‘the pleasure of giving’ reflect this ambition of the founders. As such, it is not the recipient or even the gift of charity that is the main focus of the organization, but the actual act of giving – and the act of volunteering – which, according to Abdelazeem, is the main pillar of Resala.

In the following, we will meet two volunteers from the Heliopolis branch of Resala. While their cases will provide the empirical data for this article, my analysis and interpretation is furthermore based on long-term fieldwork in the organization and observations among the volunteers, more generally. Safa and Marwa are both in their early 20s and have been volunteering in Resala for a couple of years. Safa is a volunteer in aid provision for poor families, while Marwa is involved in various activities related to the orphans. The activities in which they engage and how they talk about them offer insight into how giving takes form in practice. Both Safa and Marwa see Resala as a possibility to give, and they share the overall vision of engagement and change. However, how they understand and practice this act of giving varies. Below, I will explore these variations not merely to display their differences, but rather to illustrate how the volunteer subject, in various ways, is generated and generates itself through the encounter with poor Egypt. Through specific practices and interactions related to the encounter with the poor beneficiaries as well as socialization into specific discourses on the poor/needy and on poverty/need, they and other volunteers achieve a new understanding of society and hence develop a collective consciousness of themselves as youth and social actors within Egyptian society. Furthermore, I argue that Resala has the ability to accommodate a rather heterogeneous group of participants; while some come from rather privileged families, others have in fact been raised in the same neighborhoods as some of Resala’s poor beneficiaries. Consequently, there are variations in how to approach the poor and
in conceptions of their needs. Thus, by comparing the experiences and narratives of Safaʿ and Marwa, my purpose is two-fold: first, to show how Resala is a place to engage in and learn about a particular moral and socioeconomic version of Egyptian society and ways of improving it; and, secondly, to show how Resala has developed into an organization which meets the demands of a rather heterogeneous group of middle class youth (13).

Giving as Community Development – the Case of Safaʿ

The first time I met Safaʿ was on a trip with Resala to Medīnat al-Salām, a poor Cairo suburb. At that time, she was 23 years old and had been volunteering in Resala since graduating from ‘Ain Shams University in the Faculty of Law two years earlier. Throughout the rest of the fieldwork, I followed her and her group of friends in Resala’s aid department. Safaʿ came to Resala approximately three times each week, depending on how much work there was. She was one of the ‘responsible volunteers,’ a category ascribed by all participants in Resala to volunteers who attended meetings with employees and leaders and was in charge of distributing tasks among the other volunteers. She was responsible for the aid and project activities in a neighborhood of Medīnat al-Salām called Nahda, and was previously responsible for the project part of the larger aid campaigns outside of Cairo but ‘found it to be more exhausting than [she] could bear.’ She was very serious about her work and was always busy helping the driver find his way around or sitting with some of the older volunteers looking through the files of the clients. Sometimes, she even helped the employees with administrative tasks, even though she also held a full time job aside from her volunteer work with Resala.

As part of the aid provision program, Resala carried out a minimum of two monthly trips to each targeted poor neighborhood (14). The first trip had the purpose of exploring the area and the particular needs of the families, while the second, usually two weeks later, entailed the actual distribution of aid, such as food, clothes, household items, blankets, medical treatment, roofs and water supply. Only a small group of volunteers attend the first trip, usually between 10 and 20 experienced members, while on the distribution trip between 100 and 200 volunteers participate. Safaʿ lived with her family in Medīnat al-Salām, and because of her in-depth knowledge of the area, she always participated in exploratory trips. Often, she would go to the houses of people in the same area in which she was raised – a situation that is not that uncommon for Resala’s volunteers. In fact, many of the volunteers in the aid department were brought up in Medīnat al-Salām or similar lower class neighborhoods like Shubra or ‘Ain Shams. The following description is from one of these exploratory trips in which I participated with Safaʿ and other volunteers from the aid department. It depicts a typical encounter between volunteers and clients, and gives an idea of how the practices related to this encounter simultaneously reflect and produce a certain image of Egyptian society.

In a dark and stuffy two-room apartment we find a middle-aged couple. The woman is overweight and dressed in a dusty black ‘abeya and a simple black hijāb, while her blind husband wears a pair of worn-out corduroy trousers and a shirt underneath a synthetic sweater. They both look unhealthy with… bad skin and yellow and black teeth. Safaʿ informs them that we are from Resala, and they immediately invite us in. The woman points towards an old couch. Safaʿ, Ahmed and I take a seat in the couch, while Manāl takes a look around in the apartment. The man sits down in the armchair to the left of us while his wife remains standing beside him. From where we sit we face...
an old wooden bookshelf with a small television and a few ornaments. It is all very dusty. Posters and a couple of family portraits cover parts of the raw concrete walls. The door to the bedroom is ajar, and from what I see the small room is stuffed with mattresses, clothes and blankets.

Safa’ starts asking the usual questions: What is your name? How old are you? Does your husband work? Do you work? How many children do you have? How much do you pay in rent? Do you receive charity from other organizations? Ahmed fills the form with the answers that he gets from the couple. The man is 49 and the woman is 36. They have three children of which two are still in primary school. The man has a technical education and used to work as a welder but had an accident a few years back where he lost his sight on both eyes. The woman is educated at primary level. She does not work due to pain in her neck, back and feet. They receive 145 pounds every month in welfare and he gets an additional 50 pounds from a center for blind people. They get no regular help from Resala, but sometimes they receive a food bag during Ramadan. Safa’ asks if the man is able to start a project, maybe do something with his hands. The man replies that he is interested in anything that will generate an income. He could sell groceries from this apartment. What about clothes? asks Safa’. The man replies that people here usually buy clothes on installments, and that they are slow payers. He wants to open a grocery shop. Safa’ suggests that he could sell liquid soap and cleaning products. The man nods. Then she asks how much money he needs and suggests 500 pounds. The man agrees to that. She adds that if he agrees to take the project he can no longer receive the food bags. The man replies: ‘One has to do what one has to do.’ Before leaving the house, we take a look around in the apartment. The small kitchenette/bathroom is in an even worse state than the rest of the apartment with half of the tiles missing on the floor and grease and dirt everywhere. I hear them talking about the condition and value of the stove and refrigerator. The moment we leave the building and head towards the next address, they start talking about the family, discussing whether or not they should be offered the loan.

Micro-finance projects, or simply ‘projects’ as the volunteers call them, were part of Resala’s aid program for poor families. Through these projects, Resala provided a family with the possibility to establish a small business by lending them goods equal to a certain amount of money. From what I saw and heard, a loan would not usually exceed 2,000 Egyptian pounds. Most people chose to establish a small shop or street kiosk, selling everything from meat, vegetables and snacks to clothes, cleaning products and plastic items. If people had specific technical qualifications, such as sewing, Resala would sometimes provide them with the necessary machines or tools to establish a workshop. During the explorative trips, volunteers would visit often as many as twenty or thirty potential ‘project families.’ As the description above indicates, the procedures of the ‘exploration’ were highly formalized. The volunteers would ask the families several questions related to issues such as family status, health condition, financial circumstances, and educational background, filling out a standard survey for the project application. As the following description of the evaluation of the Medīnat al-Salām cases shows, the volunteers proved to be rather skeptical towards the poor and their needs, and only a small percentage of the families who applied for a project would end up receiving the loan.

In the bus back to Cairo, the volunteers start a heated discussion about who deserves a project and who does not. Someone asks the question: ‘How can we detect if they cheat or not?’ The majority of the volunteers participate, most of the time with stories of people who tried to trick them into believing that they were ‘more needy’ than they actually were. Back at Resala, we meet
with May, the employee responsible for the project activities. Safa’ hands her all the filled-out forms. May goes through the files one by one. She reads aloud the name of the household head and asks which of the volunteers went there. The volunteers involved explain the case to the others and they discuss in plenum. The main question is: Should this family be granted the loan or not? Repeatedly, the volunteers mention that there are many inconsistencies in the stories of the families. They seem to enjoy joking about these contradictions. They depict the situation for the other volunteers, and the reaction is laughter. Only one of the 16 families visited in Medīnat al-Salām is granted a loan. Most others are rejected and in three of the cases, Resala will search for employment in nearby factories.

As the above description illustrates, the life circumstances and conditions of the poor in Medīnat al-Salām did not seem to move Safa’ and the other volunteers in my project group in the same way as they moved me. In fact, she was able to keep a distance by critically evaluating the information and the stories that flowed to them. The volunteers often framed it as a matter of who ‘deserved’ the loan, and who would be willing and capable of mobilizing the amount of energy and effort necessary for the project to work. Sometimes, a meeting with a potential client would even develop into an interrogation-like situation with the volunteers continuously and skeptically enquiring about particular aspects of the family’s situation, most often related to their income sources. In one case, I observed how a female volunteer continuously asked the same questions over and over again even after the wife in the house had burst into tears(16).

The exploratory trip to Medīnat al-Salām was my second of the kind, and then on the third trip, which would take place the following month, I was counted in as a full volunteer and was asked to write the answers down in the application form. In some of the more straight-forward activities such as second-hand clothes sorting or the actual distribution of aid, volunteers quickly obtained the relevant knowledge and skills, but activities like the investigation of possible beneficiaries of micro-finance projects presented a more complex learning process, requiring specific knowledge and interpersonal skills. For example, in order to assess the situation of a family, volunteers had to have some idea of the standard of living and level of expenses in the particular area. Safa’ held such knowledge, in part acquired from her job as a community coordinator in the local Red Crescent organization, but also – and perhaps primarily – because of her own background and upbringing in the community. Due to her father’s occupation as an accountant and her and her siblings’ college degrees, the family as such could be characterized socioeconomically as belonging to the lower strata of the middle class. However, they lived in a lower class neighborhood Medīnat al-Salām, and Safa’s mother, who was from an illiterate family, left school because she married and had her first child at 16 years of age. Therefore, for Safa’ (and other volunteers with similar backgrounds), illiteracy and poverty were not alien, theoretical concepts, but instead were lived and experienced realities. This might be one of the reasons why they were much more critical towards the poor and their needs than I had initially expected from young college students and recent graduates. Safa’ carefully and meticulously studied the situation of the poor families in order to determine whether or not they lived up to the criteria and regulations set by Resala: ‘We discuss the aspects of their situation and whether they deserve (aid) according to regulations here.’ Her main concern was providing material aid to those for whom the aid would help the most.

Thus, for Safa’ to be ‘deserving’ was primarily a question of material need, and she emphasized giving as a way to support and develop the neediest families in a particular community and thus contribute to raising the overall standard of living of the place. In order to decide if a family ‘deserved’
a loan, she assessed its financial and social situation, inquiring whether its members were willing to and capable of mobilizing the effort necessary for the loan to be used in an appropriate way. Her critical and development-informed approach to giving was based on formal criteria and procedures of assessment and evaluation, and she rarely displayed emotions of either concern or happiness in the encounter with the poor. Put differently, Safa’ saw the beneficiary as a responsible person, capable of controlling his or her own development (Bornstein and Redfield, 2008).

Among volunteers as well as employees, Safa’ was respected and recognized for her skills, knowledge and effort, and shortly after her entry into Resala, employees quickly entrusted her with tasks and responsibilities. Furthermore, as she described, she immediately felt the communal spirit and warmth among volunteers because of their common mission ‘to give and only give.’ For as she saw it, volunteering for the benefit of the needy is something obligatory for her as a Muslim: To me as a Muslim, I think volunteering is a duty and not something optional. Not doing any of this makes me feel useless, like I am not really letting out all my energy; it makes me feel like there are many things missing in me. So I feel that this is my place, and I have to do this. Even if I see disadvantages or flaws in the place, I still feel like I have to come, and I have to go and participate. Even if I stay away a little while without coming in order not to get bored from all the work I start feeling guilty. That’s it.

The idea that volunteering in Resala is a duty or obligation towards God was common among volunteers in Resala. All volunteers that I talked to listed God’s blessing (baraka), rewards (thawāb) and merits (ḥasanāt) as their primary motivation for coming to Resala. Like other volunteers, Safa’ was a devoted Muslim. In her upbringing religion was important, and her parents had taught her the importance of praying, veiling and doing charity at an early age. Despite her religious upbringing, she and most other volunteers to whom I talked described her involvement in Resala in terms of a religious awakening. ‘I am now more of a giver,’ she stated, explaining to me how she does not care so much about looks and instead spends all her free time doing charity. Thus, Safa’ shared with many other volunteers the story of her engagement in Resala as a story of personal development. This conception of involvement in Resala as an important personal turning point was even more pronounced in the case of Marwa described below.

Giving as Charity - The Case of Marwa

Compared to Safa’, Marwa was from a more wealthy family. She and her three siblings were brought up in Heliopolis. They attended private schools, had annual memberships in one of Cairo’s leisure clubs, and sometimes traveled abroad during vacations. But like Safa’, she had a religious upbringing. Marwa’s father started to teach her about Islam when she was three years old, and when she reached puberty, she started to veil, pray and fast. She always wore an ʿabaya and a hijāb concealing her hair and neck, and she rarely used any make-up. Her parents also taught her the importance of doing charity and helping people in need, and she started volunteering in Resala when she was 22. When I met her, she was 24 years old and in her last year at ‘Ain Shams University studying business administration in the English Department.

Marwa’s first experience with Resala lasted for three months. At the suggestion of a friend she started giving extra-curricular lessons in English and Arabic to school children from poor families, but when their parents interfered in her teaching and tried to make her teach more
hours, she left: ‘The families of the kids were not cooperative and understanding [of my situation]. I only had three days.’ Almost a year later, her mother suggested to her that she go back to Resala. Marwa’s mother had been volunteering in Resala’s Big Brother/Big Sister project for several years, where she dealt especially with one of Resala’s in-house orphans. At first, Marwa was not interested: ‘I wanted to go out with my friends, go to the cinema, go to the club.’ After a while, Marwa changed her mind and decided to go back to Resala: ‘I was depressed anyway and I wanted to get out of the mood, so I went to Nawāl [an orphan girl] and studied with her.’ According to Marwa, this was an important turning point in her life. This was when she realized that ‘God created [her] for a reason,’ and that she could ‘make a difference’ for others. She wanted to start focusing on developing her relationship with God. ‘I’m fortunate to have everything, cars, family and can go to clubs, but some people don’t have anything. […] Our prophet, peace be upon him, told us to take special care of orphans, always help them and smile to them and never give them an angry face.’ She started coming to the orphans’ apartments in Resala on a regular basis. At first, she was shy and did not talk much to the other volunteers and employees, but as time passed their relationships grew increasingly intimate, and she became close friends with most of the volunteers and employees involved in the activities for the orphan children. ‘It’s amazing – I feel like it’s my home,’ noted Marwa.

As mentioned above, Resala also runs several orphanages. In Heliopolis, the fourth and fifth floors of the organization’s building were divided into four separate apartments accommodating seventeen one to ten-year-old girls and boys, with two apartments for girls and two for boys. Each apartment had a reception area with soft chairs and sofas and bright colors on the walls. This was also the playing area and where volunteers and others would stay when they came to visit the children. The rest of the apartment was sealed off by a large sliding door. Dining room, bedrooms, kitchen and bathroom facilities were considered private territory for the children and their caretakers, and only close employees and volunteers were allowed to enter. Everything in the four apartments was spotlessly clean and in much better condition than the rest of the building. During the day, when the oldest children attended kindergarten or school, the apartments were quiet. The only people present were the children under four years of age and their employed ‘mothers’ who worked in shifts and were responsible for nursing and feeding the children day and night. From late afternoon till early evening, the apartments buzzed with life. On a usual day up to twenty volunteer ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ passed by to play or study with the children. They sat on the floor or in the couches holding the children or playing with them, while the ‘mothers’ prepared food and tidied up in the back of the apartment. The smallest children would play on the floor or cycle back and forth through the room on small plastic vehicles, and the older ones often watched cartoons or went upstairs to play football on the rooftop of the building. Usually, the spirit was high with an ear-shattering noise of volunteers’ chatting and laughter blending with the television and the children’s shouting and crying.

The activities related to the orphan children differed widely from Resala’s other activities, in particular the aid provision for poor families described above. First of all, the relation between volunteer and child was more intimate. As the name Big Brother/Big Sister suggests, Resala aimed for the volunteers to establish a kinship-like relation to the children; in the words of Abdelazeem, they sought to ‘help small children establish normal family relations where the volunteers are like the children’s own brothers and sisters.’ The primary inspiration to this project came from the Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, a US non-profit organization whose mission it is to help children reach their
potential through professionally supported, one-to-one relationships with mentors. Whereas the paid ‘mothers’ were responsible for the nursing and feeding of the children, the volunteers saw it as their responsibility to develop the children socially, intellectually and spiritually. Furthermore, unlike other activities in Resala, there were restrictions as to who could become a ‘brother’ or ‘sister.’ Before acquiring this title, volunteers had to prove to the leadership that they were truly ‘interested, keen and persistent,’ as Abdelazeem described it. They underwent a probation period of at least three months in which they became familiar with the children and chose from among them a child with whom they wanted to build a close relationship. After this, they took a written exam in order to show that they ‘understood the system,’ and finally they attended a speech by Abdelazeem, lecturing them on the responsibilities of their commitment and the severe consequences it would have for the child and themselves if they were to break the commitment. He told them: ‘Either you are with the child for your entire life or you abandon him now.’ Religious references about sins and hell were mixed with stories about children who suffered from depression and fear of commitment after having been abandoned by a brother or a sister: ‘We fear God and are aware that God sees us and that this child would take us to either paradise or hell.’

This strict training and selection process combined with the kinship terminology was unique to the Big Brother/Big Sister program. It contributed to a feeling among these volunteers that they were chosen; they were the ones who ‘passed’ the probation period and the exam and who decided to engage in a life-long commitment to a child. Furthermore, compared to the paid ‘mothers,’ the volunteers considered themselves to be intellectually and morally superior. They were responsible for the children’s development as opposed to the ‘mothers’ who would ‘only’ take care of practical tasks related to the children’s daily life. I often overheard volunteers talking about the bad influence of the ‘mothers’ or how the volunteers had to ‘spread awareness’ among them.

Marwa came to Resala at least three times each week to visit and study with Nawāl, and nearly every weekend and during holidays Nawāl would come home with Marwa or they would go with Marwa’s family to the club or to visit relatives. In accordance with Resala’s policy, Marwa always referred to Nawāl as ‘my sister, Nawāl,’ and often pointed out that Nawāl, ‘was a life-time commitment.’ Furthermore, Marwa was, together with a few other volunteers, in charge of the religious education of the orphan children in the Heliopolis branch. Through speeches, games and exercises, they introduced the children to the Quran, religious rituals and the life of the prophet. According to Marwa, it was important for her that the children learned how to distinguish right from wrong the same way as she did during her own upbringing: ‘When I was 4 or 5, my father used to tell me: ‘Allah likes this and Allah hates that,’ and he used to talk about heaven all the time, not hell, but always heaven.’ Marwa enjoyed the educational activities very much, and she dreamt about working as a kindergarten teacher after her graduation.

In sum, Marwa considered herself to be a role model for the children, and she saw it as her primary role to educate and raise Nawāl and the other children to be knowledgeable, responsible and moral persons capable of supporting themselves. Thus, drawing primarily on a morally and religious informed discourse, Marwa strived to achieve an intimate and compassionate relation to the children, a relation which somehow differed from Safa’s more bureaucratic and technical approach to the poor families. However, both talked about providing their clients with the means – intellectually, emotionally or economically – to support themselves in the future. Interestingly, when talking about poor people in the street, Marwa would display what seemed to be a very
different approach to poverty, centering on the provision of more immediate assistance:

Once, I ate a sandwich but did not finish it, so I wrapped the remaining part and put it in my bag. Then, on my way home, I saw a poor man, and I asked him: ‘Are you hungry?’ He said: ‘Yes’. So I told him, ‘Please take my sandwich.’ I love doing charity work!

At first sight, there are few similarities between the practice of handing out leftovers of a sandwich to a poor unknown beggar in the street and that of working towards improving the skills and morals of orphan children. However, both reflect an understanding of the poor as someone who is not responsible for the condition of his or her suffering. For Marwa, the financial details of the poor were of less importance; she assumed the orphans and the man in the street to be ‘deserving’. Furthermore, compared to Safa’, Marwa made use of a more emotional language, and her approach leaned more towards an understanding of giving as alms in return for gratitude: ‘What makes me happy is to see them smile and laugh because of something I did.’ Both Safa’ and Marwa wanted to help out of solidarity with the poor whom they talked about as fellow human beings or citizens. They considered volunteering in Resala a duty or obligation towards God and the nation. But the way Marwa talked about and treated the poor sometimes had a patronizing ring to it, resulting in a relation of hierarchy and inequality because she expected reward as gratitude from the poor as much as God’s rewards and blessings. Put differently, her and some of the other volunteers’ understanding of the poor as a recipient of charity can be conceptualized within the morally informed framework of ‘sympathetic equilibrium,’ where empathy towards the sufferer is closely connected to the benefactor’s expectation of the sufferer’s gratitude (Boltanski, 1999; Chouriaraki, 2010).

Egypt, Resala and the Gift of Volunteering

As the two cases illustrate, the actual encounter with the poor beneficiaries within the institutional framework of Resala is of great importance to the formation of volunteer subject. The materiality of the places, the vocabulary applied, the activity procedures, and the bodily practices before, during and after the actual encounter all contribute to their knowledge and experience of how to engage with and understand the poor/needy and poverty/need within a larger social context. For Marwa and the other volunteers in the Big Brother/Big Sister activity, Abdelazeem’s speeches as well as the various guidelines for interaction with the orphan children provided them with a vocabulary for how to talk with and about the children and how to relate to them socially and emotionally. Abdelazeem described a kind of ‘formalized’ kinship relation, which served as a structure to allow the volunteer and child to develop more intimate and spontaneous interactions. The physical environment supported this approach. At first sight, the spacious, clean and well-furnished apartments of the orphanage looked like an Egyptian middle class home. But the lack of family portraits, books or personal ornaments contributed to the institutionalized character of the place, as did the fact that half of the apartment was open to donors and whoever wished to pay the children a visit.

In the case of Safa’ and the other volunteers who participated in the aid program, the various forms and surveys provided them with a specific vocabulary for how to talk about poverty and need in families as well as how to interpret the various criteria for evaluating the families’ situations. This particular vocabulary, passed on from experienced to new volunteers through what I have called an
apprenticeship approach reflects a critical and rational conception of poverty as a matter primarily of material need. Again, this approach seemed in accordance with the physical environment: the dusty and narrow garbage filled streets in lower class neighborhoods and the cramped and worn-out apartments of the poor families immediately led one to consider the lack of material resources. This understanding is reflected in the way Safaʿ approached and talked about the situation of the poor, whom she evaluated primarily on the basis of material need.

For both Safaʿ and Marwa, their involvement in Resala and the possibility of meeting and interacting with beneficiaries provided them with the opportunity to reflect upon the situation of the poor and their own role as actors within the larger framework of Egyptian society. Put differently, through the actual encounter, an otherwise abstract ideal of giving was embodied and routinized and as such easier to relate to. Safaʿ and Marwa shared the imaginary about an imperfect society that can be improved through their own voluntary acts of giving. However, how they sought to realize that imaginary varied. For Safaʿ, it was a question of creating sustainable income possibilities for needy families, while Marwa concentrated on providing the orphan children with means – socially, morally and intellectually – to get on in the world despite their unfortunate situation. Thus, as the two cases also show, their particular understandings of need and the poor are formed in the interplay between their personal backgrounds and previous encounters with poverty, on the one hand, and methods and procedures acquired in Resala, on the other. In other words, their diverse life experiences and family backgrounds together with differences in the learning processes between the evaluations of applications for aid and the Big Brother/Big Sister activity allowed for variations in their approaches and practices.

The variations in conceptions of giving and the relation between giver and recipient also showed in the approaches of Marwa and Safaʿ toward volunteering and to Resala as a whole, revealing something about how the young people saw themselves and their role as active participants in society. They both considered voluntary work for the benefit of the poor as a religious and national duty, and to them Resala offered the possibility of concrete intervention. However, how they understood and practiced this intervention differed. Marwa preferred the warm, personalized relationship with the orphans rather than the more transient encounters with poor families. She did not talk about poverty as a structural problem, requiring initiatives aimed at long-term development of poor communities, but emphasized Islamic values and morality and saw herself as a role model to and educator of younger generations who did not grow up learning about such values and morals. Safaʿ, on the other hand, talked less about values and morals. Based on an understanding of development as economic growth, she measured poverty in terms of material need and (lack of) individual resources, finding the solution to poverty in long-term development activities such as the micro-finance projects she had been engaged in. She was critical towards the idea of giving as short-term relief, and in her opinion the management made the volunteers think too much of themselves and their effort. Unlike Marwa, she did not agree that giving a man a sandwich is equal to doing charity.

Furthermore, Safaʿ openly questioned the amount of money spent on the volunteers in Resala. She did not understand why large amounts of money had to be spent on transport and accommodation in order to make campaigns for volunteers as far away as Aswān or Siwa. Instead, she wanted Resala to allocate more money to the micro-finance projects in order to secure life-long earnings for more poor beneficiaries and contribute to the development of the local communities. In her
view, a 1000-pound loan did not change much for a family. In fact, according to her most of the projects ended up as failures. This was in 2010. When I returned to Resala in December 2011, Safa wasn’t there anymore. I called her and asked her why she left Resala. This is what she said: You can say that I got bored or I felt that I am not in the right place. I am not making the effect that I expected. In my opinion, Resala made many people lazy, and it made them become like beggars who don’t want to work and just wait for a temporary aid. Resala has a lot of money, but it is not well used. Funds are not well employed in the right place. In Resala, they have to reorganize and think of new activities that will raise the standards of living of the poor families instead of just giving them some aid which does not make a noticeable effect. Another reason is that Resala had many volunteers, many young people and teenagers who had the motivation to reform society and make it better and benefit their country, but they didn’t find a noticeable effect or maybe they found other fields of charity or other work through which they think they can work better for the good of the country. I think that the people in charge must work on new plans and new ideas in order to make an effect in society more than before.

Safa became disillusioned with regard to the effect Resala and the volunteers had on Egyptian society, in particular within poor communities. She told the management about her concerns, but as she put it, few of them shared her vision. So she left. Instead, she entered another organization focusing more on the sustainable development of local communities. Although Safa enjoyed being with the other volunteers working for the sake of people in need, it was not enough to keep her in Resala. She wanted to see real long-term changes for the people in the poor communities. Marwa, on the other hand, was still there with her group of friends. They were personally committed to their ‘sisters’ and ‘brothers.’ Furthermore, for Marwa Resala was about social belonging and personal development more than it was for Safa. And in this, the organization did not disappoint – in fact, as mentioned above Marwa considered Resala as her other ‘home,’ and it came to be her primary place for socialization and public participation.

Conclusion: Giving, Voluntarism and an Emerging Imaginary of Egypt

Initiatives like Resala present to young Egyptians ambitious ideals and visions for the individual and the society; ideals and visions which together with the participants’ reinterpretation of their sociocultural heritage foster a new consciousness of themselves and their role in society. As the two cases illustrate, participants share the imaginary about an imperfect society that can be improved through their voluntary effort. However, as the stories of the two volunteers also exemplify, there is an ongoing negotiation of aims and visions found in Resala. These differences are partly rooted in the diverse socioeconomic backgrounds of the volunteers, but also the learning processes related to the specific activities influence the volunteers’ understandings. While the leadership’s primary aim is to instill a culture of giving among Egyptian youth, some volunteers expect the organization to focus more on the actual aid to the poor, often inspired by mainstream development approaches to poverty reduction. But Resala prioritizes immediate impulses of social responsibility, solidarity and activism over formalized and professionalized assistance, distinguishing the organization from the world of professional development NGOs (Challand, 2011). In this perspective, emotionally rewarding activities like aid distribution trips and the Big Brother/Big Sister project are more suitable than the preceding investigative work distinguishing ‘needy’ from ‘just poor.’ While the latter require volunteers to critically evaluate the conditions of specific families and decide who deserves aid, the former excite and motivate them.
Smiles and grateful expressions of the poor make the young people feel as though they can actually make a difference in the lives of Egypt’s less fortunate, and this experience is necessary for the motivation of the volunteers and for assuring their continued participation in society.

Resala grew out of a student initiative at the prestigious Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University. Here, most students are from the upper strata of the middle class and they are raised in resourceful families with long traditions of higher education. During Resala’s first years in operation, the majority of the volunteers were of similar backgrounds with the majority being students and graduates from high-status studies such as medicine, engineering and pharmacy. But recently, the organization has managed to reach out to young people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, and it has proved its ability to accommodate a large and rather heterogeneous group of young people. The cases above illustrate this. In addition, the case of Safa illustrates how some volunteers have used Resala as a springboard to engage in other kinds of activism, within or outside formal politics. (19) Hence, another way to understand Resala, including its internal dynamics and ambiguities, is to focus on the role of youth within the conceptual framework of social generations, in which youth occupy an important position in movements for political change (Mannheim, 1952 [1927]).

Resala is part of a larger movement in civil society initiated by young middle class Egyptians aimed at assisting Egypt’s poor and contributing to the development of society. This movement has various manifestations, but overall it bears witness to a shared vision of engagement and change among large parts of the young generation of Egyptians. One of the most important consequences of youth initiatives like Resala is that it has contributed to a growing consciousness among young Egyptians that they as young people have the choice and the possibility to give something to society. It was not Resala volunteers who called for protest on January 25th or even stood there at Tahrir on the first day of the demonstrations. But quickly they were convinced of the possibilities of actually changing the political scene in Egypt. Learning about poverty, need and social responsibility as well as engaging in activities involving encounters and interaction with poor fellow citizens had equipped them with a new knowledge and understanding of Egyptian society, including a belief in the possibility of a better future. In other words, it is not a question of whom or what sparked the revolution but how an imaginary of conceivable possibilities within the framework of Egyptian society could emerge and how it was and will continue to be allowed a space both inside and outside of Resala.
References


End Notes

1. Resala also runs a hospital, a primary school and several second-hand clothes stores.
2. The primary fieldwork was carried out from October 2009 to July 2010. I have, however, followed the organization since 2007.
3. Translated from Arabic [jama’iyyat risāla li-l-ʾaʿamāl al-kheir – mutaʿat al-ʿatāʾ]
5. For further information on other Egyptian youth organizations, see Sparre and Petersen (2007a, 2007b), Atia (2009, 2011) and Ibrahim (2009).
6. The eight Cairo branches are in Haram, Muhandisīn, Maʿaḍī, Heliopolis, Medīnat Naṣr, Medīnat Sittat ῾Uktūbar, Helwān and Moqaṭṭam.
7. While volunteers are the ones who deal with beneficiaries and provide them with the food, clothes or services, employees are responsible for the overall planning and administration of activities.
8. To this should be added various in-kind donations, of which some are sold and thus converted to financial resources. In 2011, Resala Heliopolis was the largest branch in terms of the number of donors and the areas covered.
9. This was also the topic of a specific ethics course taught by Abdelazeem at Cairo University.
10. Furthermore, the Arabic term risāla is closely linked to the idea of a revelation of messages from the prophet Mohammed and thus associated with the Islamic tradition.
12. Safaʿ is not her real name. Except from Dr. Sherif Abdelazeem, all other names in this article are pseudonyms.
13. For insight into the historical background of poor-relief and developments of practices and policies toward the poor in Egypt, please see Ener (2003).
14. Compared to more traditional Islamic NGOs, Resala assists their beneficiaries in the poor neighborhoods instead of having the poor come to them. Resala is, in the words of Atia (2011), ‘mobile’.
15. 2,000 Egyptian pounds is equivalent to approximately 250 Euro.
16. Later, she did however ask me if I thought that she was too hard on the woman.
17. However, according to Resala’s leadership they had to make a few adjustments in order to make to system correspond with Islamic sharīʿa. For example, if a female volunteer wants to become a ‘big sister’ of a boy, he is officially a ‘cousin’ and not a brother because certain rules of segregation have to persist.
18. Every year, Resala arranges several aid distribution campaigns to far-away places like Aswān in Upper Egypt and Sīwa close to the Egyptian-Libyan border.
19. After the revolution, I furthermore have examples of Resala volunteers who started involving themselves in formal politics (such as parliamentary and presidential campaigns) and/or organized political oppositional activism (such as protest groups).
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تكافل 2012
المؤتمر السنوي الثاني للعطاء الاجتماعي والمشاركة المدنية في الوطن العربي
الإبحاث المختارة
جميع الحقوق محفوظة لمركز جون جيهارت للعطاء الاجتماعي والمشاركة المدنية

تعبر الأبحاث عن آراء كاتبيها ولا تعبر بالضرورة عن رأي المركز. جميع الحقوق محفوظة للمركز ما لم يتم ذكر ذلك. تقدم طلبات الاستشهاد والاقتباس للمركز.
تكافل 2012
المؤتمر السنوي الثاني
للعطاء الاجتماعي والمشاركة المدنية في العالم العربي

2012 يونيو، القاهرة، مصر
الأبحاث المختارة
المحتويات

الخطاب الافتتاحي

دور التكافل غير المنظم في دعم الفقراء في المناطق الشعبية دراسة حالة لمنطقة بولاقدلكرور
صالح سليمان عبد العظيم

دور الأوقاف المصرية في بناء مجتمع مدني مستقل وفعال خبرة تاريخية ورؤية مستقبلية
ريهام أحمد خفاجي

السيرة الذاتية
هل جَنَت النساء في تونس ثمرة مشاركتهن في الثورة؟

لا يمكن لأحد أن ينكر دور النساء التونسيات في ثورة 14 يناير التي دكت عرش الديكتاتورية والاستبداد، فقد كن حاضرات منذ اللحظة الأولى التي اطلقها فيها شارة الثورة في سيدي بوزيد، فذالك أعطى إشارة انطلاق أول مظاهرة بعد احتراق الشاب محمد بوعزيزي، وهو امرأة شعبية صرخت في الناس أمام مقر الولاية:

»ينكم يا رجال الهمامة؟«

أو في مقر زيارة الوزير أو المقرasje، أو بأي مكان، أو ما شاء الله، أو نساء النخبة، أو النساء العاملات، أو الناشطات في الفن والأدب والتعليم، أو النساء من الطبقة العاملة، أو الناشطات في المجال الاجتماعي والاقتصادي، أو الناشطات في المجال العام، واختيرن اختيارهن في الميدان التي تم أمام وزارة الداخلية بالعاصمة للمطالبة برحيل الديكتاتور.

هذه المشاركة النشيطة في الثورة ليست غريبة عن نساء تونس. وقد كن حاضرات في مختلف مراحل نضال الشعب التونسي في الحقبة المعاصرة، نساء تونس شاركن في مقاومة الاستعمار الفرنسي وشكلن الجمعيات والمنظمات لمقاومة المستعمر، وساهمن في التحول نحو الديمقراطية في البلاد، وحولت نساء تونس من النساء العاملات إلى النساء الناشطات في المجال الاجتماعي والاقتصادي، ودخلن المجال السياسي بشكل عام.

وفي عهد بن علي، لم تتخلف النساء عن المشاركة في النضال ضد استبداد نظامه وفساده رغم أنه حاول بكل الوسائل توظيف قضية المرأة لتحقيق أهدافه السياسية، واجتنب الاعتراف بحقوق الإنسان، وانعدمت الثورة الشعبية في تونس، وانعدمت الثورة الشعبية في تونس.

إن مشاركة النساء في الثورة كانت متنوعة؛ إذ شملت مختلف الأوساط، ولكن العنصر الأبرز هو مشاركة النساء في المجال السياسي والاقتصادي، وانعكست تلك المشاركة في القوانين الفردية والجماعية، وانعكست تلك المشاركة في القوانين الفردية والجماعية، وانعكست تلك المشاركة في القوانين الفردية والجماعية.

ولابد من الإشارة إلى أن خلال الحملة الانتخابية للمجلس الوطني التأسيسي، ظل التمسك بمؤسسات المرأة الشعورية التي تزعمها الحركة الإسلامية، وانعكست تلك المشاركة في القوانين الفردية والجماعية.

ومع ذلك، فإن النتائج النهائية لمنحة المرأة في الثورة كانت متنوعة، إذ شملت مختلف الأوساط، ولكن العنصر الأبرز هو مشاركة النساء في المجال السياسي والاقتصادي، وانعكست تلك المشاركة في القوانين الفردية والجماعية، وانعكست تلك المشاركة في القوانين الفردية والجماعية.
شخصية، وهو ما يفتح الباب لضرب مبدأ حكمة الزواج: إجراء الزواج أمام مؤسسة مدنية ومنع تعدد الزوجات، وفي نفس الوقت سعي البعض من رمز حكمة النهضة إلى فرض اعتماد الشريعة مصدرًا أساسيًا أو وحيدًا للتشريع في تونس.

وقد تم ذلك خلال المناقشات الأولية للدستور خارج المجلس التأسيسي وخراج حكمة النهضة أيضًا، نشطت قوى أخرى من بينها التيار السلفي وتعدد الزوجات خفت بشكل كبير وعادت حكمة النهضة ذاتها لتأكيد تمسكها بحقوق المرأة التونسية واعتبرت مسألة الخمار والنقاب مسألة شخصية، لا واجبًا دينيًا يفرض على النساء بالقهر، واضطرت النائبة النهضوية إلى الاعتذار للأمهات العازبات، كما اضطرت وزيرة المرأة لتصحيح موقفها من الزواج العرفي، متمسكةً بالزواج المدني كما هو منصوص عليه بملة الأحوال الشخصية.

إن المعركة التي تخوضها الآن القوة التقدمية - بما فيها التنظيمات النسائية - تهدف إلى تحقيق المساواة التامة والفعالة بين النساء والرجال وتسهيل حركة النساء، وهي تستند إلى هيئة المرأة، تسعى في تحقيق تطلعات النسائية في الحياة العملية ومساواة الفرص والكرامة الديمقراطية والسلام الاجتماعي. وقد انضمبت البعض شعبًا، ولم يفزفع فيها أي شعور ذي طابع ديني، ولم يطرأ فيها تطبيق الشريعة كحل، بل إن المرأة سلطت نظرتها إلى التطور الاجتماعي، خاصة في غضون سنوات قليلة، فقد أصبحت حكمة النهضة ذاتها لتأكيد تمسكها بمكاسب المرأة التونسية واعتبرت مسألة الخمار والنقاب مسألة شخصية، لا واجبًا دينيًا يفرض على النساء بالقهر.

وفي كلمة، فإن الصراع حول حقوق النساء هو جزء من الصراع بين القوى التي تريد الانتفاض عليها بخريفة الطبول، وهذه القوى ليست في الداخل فحسب بل توجد قوى خارجية وخصوصًا قوى خليجية تعمل على إجهاض الثورة التونسية حتى لا يمتد إلى الوطن العربي بكمية كبيرة.

ومهما يكن من أمر، فإن ما ستحصل عليه المرأة من حقوق في الدستور الجديد لن تكون سهيلة، لأنها وثيقة الصلة في الوطني العربي بكامله، فلا تكون نموذجًا للشعوب الأخرى.

ودعوني أُختم بالقول: إننا واثقون من الانتصار.
دور التكافل غير المنظم في دعم الفقراء في المناطق الشعبية
دراسة حالة لمنطقة بولاية الدكرور
صالح سليمان عبد العظيم
أستاذ علم الاجتماع المساعد بكلية الآداب؛ قسم الاجتماع؛ جامعة عين شمس
الملخص البحثي
تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى التعرف على وضعية الجمعيات الخيرية في منطقة بولاق الدكرور، من خلال دراسة خمس عشرة جمعية، وذلك عبر دراسة حالة متعمقة للقائمين على عمل هذه الجمعيات والمسؤولين عنها. وفي ضوء ذلك، تحاول الدراسة التعرف على السمات العامة المشتركة فيما بينها، ومستوى الجانب التأسيسي الخاص بها، ودرجة تطوره وإفادته للسياق المجتمعي المحيط بها، وطبيعة استراتيجيات العمل وتصورات تطويرها إن وجدت. وتعتمد الدراسة نظريًّا على نموذج التوحد الذي يجمع بين مشاعر الفرد الغيرية وبين تحقيقه لمنفعته الذاتية. وفي ضوء ذلك، توصلت الدراسة لمجموعة من النتائج شملت ضعف تمويل هذه الجمعيات، وقلة مشاركة الأفراد في العمل التطوعي، وانتشار أبوية العمل ومركزيته في هذا النوع من مؤسسات العطاء الاجتماعي، إضافة إلى شيوط العلاقات الشخصية وغياب العمل المؤسسي المتطور، كما شملت هذه النتائج ضعف البنية التحتية الخاصة بهذه الجمعيات وغياب الرؤى الاستراتيجية التي تساعد على تمكين الملففين للعطا الاجتماعي.

إشكالية الدراسة والمنطلقات النظرية لها

والبحث المنشئ المتطور المصري عن غيره من المجتمعات في تأثر المعول المادي على العطاء الاجتماعي والممارسات الخيرية المختلفة في كل المجتمعات البشرية يلعب هذا العطاء دورًا كبيرًا في هذه الممارسات، لكن الأمر اللافت للنظر يكمن في أن هناك العديد من المجتمعات التي استطاعت أن تﺅثر الأعمال الخيرية ضمن مؤسسات جمعيات تساهم في تحديد ممارسات العطاء الاجتماعي وتعظيم الفوائد المرجوة منه. ويلعب تأثير العطاء الاجتماعي ضمن مشاريعؤه المؤسسية دورًا كبيرًا في توجيه الوجهة المجتمعية المرجوة.
في إطار الاحتياجات المطلوبة والضوابط المحددة مسبقًا من قبل هذه المؤسسات والقائمين عليها. كما أن هذه المؤسسات تكتسب من خلال الممارسات الخيرية المتواصلة خبرات جديدة وتحتاج إلى قدر كبير من الإلمام باحتياجات المجتمعات المحلية التي تتعاملون معها، ومن ثم احتياجات الأفراد فيها (♩: موسي؛ البحوث 2010).

ويشترط ذلك ببعنوان الدراسة الخاص بالتكافل غير المُسبَّح من قبل هذه المؤسسات والقائمين عليها، والذي يُغني عن وجود جماعات كثيرة في منطقة الدراسة، وبالتالي في غيرها من المناطق العالمية الأخرى، دون تحقيق قدر ما من المساسة Institutionalized من المنطقتين العشوائية والفقيرة الأخرى، بدلاً من استعارة شكله الاجتماعي من خلال تكرار العطاء الخيري وم لا يمكن تحقيقها، بل تتطلب ذلك تغيير الأفكار والمفاهيم في التفكير والفهم المنطقي لل suicidé الاقتصادي والاجتماعي ورقة متصلة، بالإضافة إلى بعدة من الجوانب التي تدور حول عدم ما في بعض sectors المحيطين بها، ومن ثم احتياجات الأفراد فيها (♩: موسي؛ البحوث 2010).

ولولا يفوت الأمر فقط عند وجود مؤسسات من كم منتجات، لكن الأمر يتعدى ذلك إلى مستوى هذه المؤسسات والخبرات المرتبطة بها، والتي تتواجد في المجتمع العربي، لأن فكر.execution التفاعلية، لأن الفرد يرى في العطاء بالذات، وهو أمر أفقدها قدراتها الاستقلالية التنظيمية التي تتيح لها العمل المؤسسي وفق قواعد معينة ومحددة، كما أنه أخر من إمكانية تأسيس نزاعات وقد يمثل العطاء الاجتماعي في أداء man نشاطات، ونستعرضها في الورشة العملية (♩: ستودي؛ البحوث 2008).

وهي ضوء ما يشير حملة الدراسة الراهنة لعلاقة الجمعيات الخيرية في منطقة بولاق الدكرور؛ التي تعتبر واحدة من أكثر المناطق شعبية وتكدسًا في مصر. وعن طريق الجمعية الخيرية مؤسسةً قد ترتبط بمسجد أو قد تكون مستقلة عنه، تقوم بتقديم الخدمات الخيرية للمحتاجين من يتامى وفقراء ومعوزين، كما تقدم بعض الخدمات الأخرى مثل دفن الموتى ودور الحضانة والتسير للحج والعمرة وتوفر بعض فرص العمل، وتكتسب عملها الرسمي من خلال إنشارها وتفعيلها للدور في قطاعات المجتمع الاجتماعي، وتعتبر منظمة غير مربحة للدكتر غير المنظم، الذي يُغني علاقته من خلقها وتفعيلها في الأنشطة الاجتماعية. إذا ما تجاوزت تقديرات الجمعيات الخيرية من خلال تونو، وخلق التفاعلية، وهي متنوعة إلى حد ما من ناحية النشاط وحجم التوظيف، إلا أن هذه الجمعيات كذلك تسعى إلى التحول على مستوى النشاطات التي تقدمها في المناطق المختلفة، وتستورد التعاون من خلال تحليلها لهذه المعنى والالتزامات المجتمعية وسياقات التطور والتطور إن وجد.

ويستندهم هناك في السلوكات المرتبطة بالعطاء الاجتماعي إلى مجموعة من أسس النزاعات مختلفة والمجموعات فيها، رغم أنها تأتي من مناخ نظرية مختلفة، وترتبط هذه التوجهات النزالية أو بالداخل الغير Social Exchange Theory نظرية التبادل الاجتماعي وضعه بالإنسانية، الذي يرى العطاء الاجتماعي من خلال تفاعلات الشرائح الاجتماعية، وتشمل في النظرة على العطاء الاجتماعي من خلال تفاعلات الشرائح الاجتماعية، والتي تميزها عن غيرها من المناطق الأخرى. أن يكون على المصدرة الغربية للقوميين من أجل淑ي العطاء، ومن ثم اتجاهات الأفراد الأخرى، من تأسيس الأفكار والمفاهيم في التفكير والفهم المنطقي من خلال تكرار العطاء الخيري وم لا يمكن تحقيقها، بل تتطلب ذلك تغيير الأفكار والمفاهيم في التفكير والفهم المنطقي لل suicidé الاقتصادي والاجتماعي ورقة متصلة، بالإضافة إلى بعدة من الجوانب التي تدور حول عدم ما في بعض sectors المحيطين بها، ومن ثم احتياجات الأفراد فيها (♩: موسي؛ البحوث 2010).

ويستدعي فهم السلوكات المرتبطة بالعطاء الاجتماعي الانطلاق من مجموعة من أسس النزاعات مختلفة والمجموعات فيها، رغم أنها تأتي من مناخ نظرية مختلفة، وترتبط هذه التوجهات النزالية أو بالداخل الغير Social Exchange Theory نظرية التبادل الاجتماعي وضعه بالإنسانية، الذي يرى العطاء الاجتماعي من خلال تفاعلات الشرائح الاجتماعية، وتشمل في النظرة على العطاء الاجتماعي من خلال تفاعلات الشرائح الاجتماعية، والتي تميزها عن غيرها من المناطق الأخرى. أن يكون على المصدرة الغربية للقوميين من أجل淑ي العطاء، ومن ثم اتجاهات الأفراد الأخرى، من تأسيس الأفكار والمفاهيم في التفكير والفهم المنطقي لل suicidé الاقتصادي والاجتماعي ورقة متصلة، بالإضافة إلى بعدة من الجوانب التي تدور حول عدم ما في بعض sectors المحيطين بها، ومن ثم احتياجات الأفراد فيها (♩: موسي؛ البحوث 2010).
على المنافي السائدة في العلاقات البشرية بين الأفراد - ترى أن فعل العطاء الاجتماعي يحقق منافع متبادلة بين كل من المطورين والمتمزقين عبر عملية العطاء الاجتماعي والعبء المختلفة المزمنة بها. فالしょうية على سبيل المثال تخلق مع العطاء الاجتماعي رفعة في إعلان مكانتهم الاجتماعية. والحصول على المزيد من التقدير الاجتماعي ما يدعمهم من عطاءات مختلفة. في ضوء هذه النظرية، فإننا نستطيع أن نقول أن العطاء الاجتماعي يندرج في علاقة حية مع العطاء الاجتماعي والجوانب المختلفة المرتبطة بها. فالأثرياء على سبيل المثال يقومون بالعطاء الاجتماعي رغبةً في ارتفاع مكانتهم الاجتماعية والحصول على المزيد من التقدير المجتمعي لما يقدرونه من عطاءات مختلفة.


ويحاول نموذج التوحد Identification Model تجاوز جوانب العطاء في كل الاتجاهات السابقين من خلال الجمع بين مشاعر الفرد الخيرية وبين تحقيقاته الخاصة؛ فتحقيق الأولي يمكن عقلة لحياته وتنظيمه للحيات الشخصية. ويرى هذا النموذج في العلاقات بين المبرع والمتلقي، حيث أن التوافد الذي يحدث على أطراف الإفادة العاطفية من بين المتبوع والمبتوع، ينتج عن النواحي الشخصية، واناملها، يتطلب بالمشاركة المجتمعية من الجانب المعطيات (Rudich: 2009) ويؤدي هذا النموذج إلى محددات رئيسية، وفقاً لذلك. فنحن نحتاج إلى نموذج يجمع بين العمل الخيري، وتمكنه من التوافد الأولي والثاني (رواد). وانتقلن هذا النموذج إلى محددات آخرات، فإنه من الناحية الفردية، لا يمكن أن نجد الأدوات الفردية الخيرية، كما لا يمكننا التعامل مع هذه التوافد نظرية، وميدانياً بدون ربطها ببعض المجتمع الحاكم والمحدد لها.

ووفقًا لما سبق، تتمثل النتائج الراهنة في مجموعة من الأسس النظرية تساعد على فهم واقع الممارسات الخيرية للمجتمعات المدنية:

1. ينطلق العمل الخيري من بواعث فردية ذاتية في الأساس، تتحدد بالتعرف الشخصية لكل فرد، وبمستوى المشاعر الإنسانية الخاصة به، والتي تتقاطع في فرد لآخر.

2. رغم الهدف التبادلي للعطاء الخيري إلا أنɡ ال目的在于 العطاء الخيري فإنها ترتبط أيضًا بالسوق المجتمعي العام الذي يوجد فيه الأفراد. فالمجتمعات تتفاوت فيما بينها تجاه انتقاء العطاء الاجتماعي وفقًا للممارسات الفردية والجماعية التي تجوب عليها الأهمية من خصائص هذا العطاء، ومدى تأثيرها وتفاوت أوضاع المحتاجين، وهو أمر يساعد على نقل ممارسات العطاء الاجتماعي من مستوياتها الفردية التقليدية إلى مستوياتها المجتمعية المنظمة.

3. يُشير العطاء الاجتماعي المؤسسي في ضوء تحلية القبادته المسؤولية عنه، وغياب أهمية القيم الأولية والعائلية التي تكمن من تحقيق بعض الأهداف، وانتشار وتقويضته وتفاوتها على رؤى وتقبل وفوار قيم وثيقة.

4. رغم أهمية الفهم القومي في دعم قيم العطاء الاجتماعي فإنه قد يُضعف من تفاصيل الممارسات المدنية ككل، ويحصر العطاء الاجتماعي في الممارسات القائمة على مساعدة الفقراء والحاجين بدون أن يؤدي إلى تمكينهم وتطوير الظروف المختلفة المحيطة بهم وبنواحيهم.

تساؤلات البحث:

في ضوء ما سبق، تحدد تساؤلات البحث الراهن على النحو التالي:

1. ما هي أهم أشكال العطاء الاجتماعي التي تلقاها المؤسسات الخيرية في بولاق الدكرور؟ وما هي أشكال الفواتر التي أحرضت بها؟

2. ما هي أهم الخدمات التي تقدمها هذه المؤسسات، ومدى صلاحيتها وكفاءتها لسكان منطقة بولاق الدكرور؟

3. ما هي أهم العوامل التي تؤثر على العطاء الاجتماعي؟ ما هي علاجات إيجابية؟

4. ما هي أهم العوامل التي تؤثر على العطاء الاجتماعي، ما هي اشترك في تطور العطاء الاجتماعي؟

5. ما هي سبيل تطوير عمل هذه المؤسسات في ضوء استراتيجيات العمل المطروحة؟
منهجية التحليل

تحاول من خلال الدراسة الاستطلاعية الراهنة التعرف على أوضاع عشرة جمعية خيرية في منطقة بولاق الدكرور. وقد ملت هذه المجموعة من الجمعيات الخيرية عينة عمدية تمثل في ضوء قبول المسؤولين عليها والعاملين بها إجراة مقابلات معهم حيث إن هناك العديد من المسؤولين عن مجموعات أخرى لم يتعرضوا لمثل هذه المقابلات الخاصة بال연구 وإقامة إرشادات متعلقة.

كان الهدف من الدراسة التي قام بها هو تقييم أوضاع خمس عشرة جمعية خيرية في منطقة بولاق الدكرور. تمثل هذه المجموعة من الجمعيات الخيرية عينة عمدية تمثل في ضوء قبول المسؤولين عليها والعاملين بها، حيث إن هناك العديد من المسؤولين عن مجموعات أخرى لم يتعرضوا لمثل هذه المقابلات خاصة بال연구 وإقامة إرشادات متعلقة.

وتمت المقابلة مع المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات أو أحد القائمين عليها أو بعض العاملين بها، وذلك عبر استخدام أداة مقابلة اقتُلمت على رئيس الموضوعات التالية:

1. التعرف على ظروف وأسباب نشأة الجمعية.
2. وصف الجمعية وطبيعة مكان التأسيس.
3. طبيعة الخدمات المقدمة من الجمعية والوظائف التي تقوم بها.
4. نوعية الانتجا س خدمات الجمعية، ومدى وجود وظائف أخرى.
5. دور الخدمة الإدارية في الممارسات الخيرية.
6. الرؤية الاستراتيجية لعمل الجمعيات الخيرية وكيفية تطبيقها وتذكارها.

الجانب التحليلي لجمعيات الخيرية الاجتماعية

أولاً: الطابع العائلي والديني المرتبط بنشأة الجمعيات

من الملاحظ أن نشأة معظم هذه الجمعيات في منطقة بولاق الدكرور يرتبط في الأغلب بالنشأة العائلية بالأساس. وكلمة "عائلي" لا تعني قيام مجموعة من الأفراد ينتمون لعائلة واحدة بإنشاء جمعية خيرية وتحديد المهام الخاصة بها، لكنها تعني ارتباطًا أوليًا بالعائلة. إن إنشاء مسجد يبرهن أن هناك تأسيس جمعية خيرية من خلال المسجد، وقد تكون هذه الجمعية مبللة مباشرة أو تقع في مكان قريب.

ويمكن أن يندرج ضمن هذه الجمعيات تلك التي ترتبط بشكل غير مباشر بالمساجد، ففي مصر يوجد جمعيات خيرية تقلد مهام المساجد، وهي تتولى توزيع التبرعات على الأعمال الخيرية في المجتمع.

إذًا فالقاعدة هي إنشاء المسجد أو الجامع الأول كرمز ديني لدى المصريين في كافة المناطق، شعبية أو راقية، فقيرة أو غنية، ثم يأتي التفكير في إنشاء جمعية خيرية متعلقة به. وفي مصر يشهد شهد إنجازية لعدد من الجمعيات الخيرية التي تتعاون مع المساجد، وهي تشمل عملياتًا كثيرة تتعلق بمشاريع الخيرية في المجتمع.

ومن الملاحظ أن نشأة معظم هذه الجمعيات في منطقة بولاق الدكرور يرتبط في الأغلب بالنشأة العائلية بالأساس. وكلمة "عائلي" لا تعني قيام مجموعة من الأفراد ينتمون لعائلة واحدة بإنشاء جمعية خيرية وتحديد المهام الخاصة بها، لكنها تعني ارتباطًا أوليًا بالعائلة. إن إنشاء مسجد يبرهن أن هناك تأسيس جمعية خيرية من خلال المسجد، وقد تكون هذه الجمعية مبللة مباشرة أو تقع في مكان قريب.

ومع ذلك، فإن التأسيسات الدينية والاجتماعية تلعب دورًا كлючيًا في تأسيس جمعيات الخيرية، حيث أن القواعد واللوائح الدينية تحدد طبيعة الأنشطة الخيرية والمهام الخاصة بها.

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ورغم أن التركيز على السلطات المحلية للجمعيات الخيرية هو الهدف الرئيسي للدراسة، فإن تلك الصناعات الخيرية المتنوعة، والتي تغطي مختلف المجالات، تساهم في تحسين المجتمع المحلي وتعزز من الدينامية الاجتماعية. وتساعد على تعزيز الشعور بالمسؤولية الاجتماعية، وتعزيز القيم الدينية والاجتماعية في المجتمع المصري.
أن المسجد يتحول بمرور الوقت ليصبح عبئًا على الجمعية الخيرية والميزانية الخاصة بها. فقد أجمع القائمون على الجمعيات المدروسة أن صندوق المسجد غير مضمون ثبات عوائده؛ فالمسألة رهن بتبرعات الأفراد من خلال شرائح اجتماعيًا متعددة، وتشمل تلك التبرعات على التبرعات الدائمة والمستمرة والمتصاعد، مما يتم الحصول عليه في يوم لا يتم الحصول عليه في يوم آخر عبر صندوق التبرعات الخاص به. ورغم أهمية هذه التبرعات بالنسبة للمسجد ومن ثم الجمعية فإنها غير مضمونة وغير ثابتة العائد، كما أنها تترتب بشكل لا ينتظر في ضوء التدهور الاقتصادي الذي يواجه الرجال الاجتماعي المتوازن والقدرة وفقًا لما قاله العديد من المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات، وهو ما يزيد العطاء الاجتماعي صعوبةً. ويدعو من أن تنشئ هذه الجمعيات والخدمات المماثلة للفقراء والمحتاجين.

ولا يقف الأمر عند ضعف العائد من صناديق المسجد فقط، لكنه يرتبط بتزويق المسجد ليصبح عبئًا على مجلس الجمعية الخيرية التي تقوم بالعديد من المهمات والمهام. فالمسجد يرتبط بتبرعات أكثر كثرة، والمكافحة الاجتماعية والدينية والعائلية وغيرها من نواحي المجتمع المختلفة والتحديات الموتية. ورغم ذلك فإن المسجد مثل الحضانة التي من خلالها يرتبط的概念 إدارة جمعية خيرية، فإنه يمكن أن يسمح للجمعية إصدار المبدع السياسي المتواضع للجمعية المحلية، ويسمح بعدها برفع أو تأخير بعض التبرعات الخاصة بها. وفرات التبرعات لا ترتبط بالصناعات العامة المختلفة، والتي تلتقب السماوات المختلفة المقربة أو التبرعات المتوفرة في المسجد فقط، لكنها ترتبط بالصناعات الشيقة المتواضعة، والتي تلتقب السماوات كذلك. وللجهة التي تلتقب المسجد تدومًا بفضلًا، كما أن هذه التبرعات تدومًا في زوجة وحيدة جمعية خيرية وتحدد الخدمات المختلفة المتاحة بها. وهو أمر يدعم مركزية عمل هذه الجمعيات...

وفي أغلب الأحيان، يرتبط التفكير في إنشاء جمعية خيرية بالأساس بتقديم خدمات عاجلة للمجتمع المحلي المحيط بالمسجد، كما أن الرؤية المرتبة أكثر الإعلان غالبًا ما تكون رؤية دينية أو دينية تعمل في تحقيقها من objetive. من جانب صعب نصيحة للعمل. وللجهة التي تلتقب المسجد تدومًا، كما أن هذه التبرعات تدومًا في زوجة وحيدة جمعية خيرية وتحدد الخدمات المختلفة المتاحة بها. وهو أمر يدعم مركزية عمل هذه الجمعيات...

ثانياً: تواضع المكان وقلة الكوادر العاملة

تجد معظم هذه الجمعيات في المسجد مقرًا لها من خلال تخصيص حجرة خصوصًا بها أو عدة حجرات إذا ما كان المسجد كبيرًا، وذلك من أجل القيام بأعمالها والمتطلبات الخاصة بها. وبخلاف الجمعيات الملحقة بالمساجد فإن الجمعيات الأخرى تستقر في شقة متواضعة من أجل القيام بالأعمال المطلوبة منها، واستقبال الحالات والتعامل معها.

وينتوق الأمر على حجب المسجد في صفحات الصحف والمجلات مثلًا. وهو تأكيد للمجتمع المحلي لفكرة إنشاء جمعية خيرية وتحدد الخدمات المختلفة المتاحة بها. وهو أمر يدعم مركزية عمل هذه الجمعيات...

ولم ترتبط هذه الجمعيات باهتمام مؤلف أو مستقل للعمل الخيري، فمعظمها يقوم بالعمل بغض النظر عن طبيعة المكان وعديد الإجراءات إذا ما كان المسجد كبيرًا، وذلك من أجل القيام بأعمالهم واستقبال الحالات والتعامل معها.

وتحتاج هذه الجمعيات أن تكون في مكان يحتوي على مصادر قوية للعمل الخيري، ويفضل أن تكون تلك الموارد قوية جدًا. وللجهة التي تلتقب المسجد تدومًا، كما أن هذه التبرعات تدومًا في زوجة وحيدة جمعية خيرية وتحدد الخدمات المختلفة المتاحة بها. وهو أمر يدعم مركزية عمل هذه الجمعيات...

ولم ترتبط هذه الجمعيات باهتمام مؤلف أو مستقل للعمل الخيري، فمعظمها يقوم بالعمل بغض النظر عن طبيعة المكان وعديد الإجراءات إذا ما كان المسجد كبيرًا، وذلك من أجل القيام بأعمالهم واستقبال الحالات والتعامل معها.

وابتكار النظر هذا وعجي خصوصًا به، يقترح أيضًار جهود الأفراد وتواضعهم من أجل خدمة الفقراء وحديد العョン لهم. ولعل ذلك هو ما جعل البعض من قائلين من المسجد في مثل هذه الجمعيات والمساهمين في العمل الاجتماعي بها يرون أنه لا يليق بأن تكون مياني...
الجمعيات الخيرية فاخرة بدرجة كبيرة، الأمر الذي يتعارض مع جهودها في العطاء الاجتماعي ومساعدة الفقراء. وقد ظهر البعض مثلاً لنوعية هذه الجمعيات ببنك الطعام الذي انتقدوا مبانيه الفاخرة جدًا وطبيعة العاملين به، ورأوا في ذلك ما يتعارض مع الهدف النبيل المرتبط به والخاص مواجهة الجوع ومساعدة المحتاجين.

وبغض النظر عن مجالس إدارات هذه الجمعيات التي تشكل غالبًا من أبناء أو أحفاد من بنى المسجد، فإن العاملين فيها بأجر يكونون محترمين بشكل كبير، بل إن بعض الجمعيات تعتمد على الوجهية المالية من جمع التبرعات وتنظيم الميزانيات وتحديد طبيعة المساهمات بعد مقابلة الحالات وتفتيحها إضافة إلى ذلك فإنه نظرًا لأنها أفضل حل ممكن لهذه الجمعيات ومحدودية الأدوات التي تقوم بها فإنها لا تحتاج لمبلغات كبيرة مكلفة، فإن هذه الجمعيات تعتمد على فرق وحدات من عوامل الجمعية في ساعات محددة وقليلاً، غالبًا ما بدأ من العاشرة صباحًا حتي الثانية أو الثالثة بعد الظهر، ويفضلون استقبال الحالات. كما أن البعض الآخر منها يتكيف بجهود الأعضاء الذين رعى شخص مخصص للقيام بأعمال الجمعية بشكل رسمي وبراتب مناسب. كما أن الشخص الذي تم تعيينه يكون من أهل المنطقة المحيطة بالجمعية المسجد، وعلى متى بأي الأداء أو القانون على أعمال الجمعية بحيث لا يكلف المسؤولية.

ثالثًا: أنواع العطاءات الاجتماعية التي تتلقاها الجمعيات

تمثل التبرعات أهم الجوانب الهامة التي يعتمد عليها عمل الجمعيات الخيرية بشكل عام، وتلك الموجودة في المناطق الفقيرة والعشوائية بشكل خاص.

وتأخذ التبرعات بشكلًا عديدة منها صناديق المساجد التي سبق وأن أشرنا إليها في دعم الجمعيات الخيرية. إضافة إلى ذلك تتعدد هذه الجمعيات على التبرعات التي تأتيها من خلال إصالات الجمعية وفقًا للبالغات التي تبرع بها الأفراد، وهي تبرعات متواضعة أيضًا كلاً كلاً تمثل نسبة كبيرة من إجمالي التبرعات التي يقوم بها الجمعيات، وذلك لأن تبرعات الرؤساء غالبًا لأهداف ذاتية مثل الزكاة والصدقات وأعمال الخير المتصلة، ومن بين المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات أهمية هذه التبرعات من ناحية أنها تشكل ركناً هاماً من أركان ميزانية الجمعيات رغم ضأتsockets، ومن ناحية أخرى لأنها تأتي من عدد كبير من المرزوقين. وتلتقي النظر هنا طبيعة الرؤية الذي ياري التبرع من خلال الحدود التي يختارها المبرران لأمواله والتي توجد في الكثير من الجمعيات:

كفاية تقبل، نصيحة جارية، مزايا، وأخيراً ركود مالي.

إضافةً إلى ذلك، فقد أشار الكثير من المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات إلى وجود بعض المبادرات الكبار الذين يمولون جمعيات بشكل سنوي.

شريحة ثانية، من خلال شركات تحت مسمى وحيد أو بطاقات في الجيزة، وتم التعريف على الشركات من خلال الرسائل والاجتماعات، وقد تجاوزت هذه الشركات من ناحية إفرازات الرؤية ويتها للمؤسسة في مقدم نشر وثائقها مكتب مولات في الجيزة، وتم التعرف على الشركات من خلال الحلقات وتأسساتها، ونلاحظ أن الشركات تبرعات بهذه المبالغ من خلال حساب الزكاة الخاصة بها. كما تجد الإشارات إلى أن القبول بالمبلغ تتم بعد زيادة مسؤولين من قبل الشركات للجمعية، وتكثيفها من الأدوار الإلزامية التي تقوم بها في مساعدة الفقر، وال работу، وتم ترتيب أي الجمعيات ببعض الأفراد الذين يكبوني بمسائل سنوية كبيرة نسبيًا من حساب زكاة المال الخاصة بهم، وخصوصًا رجال الأعمال والمراقبين.

ومع ذلك، يتراوح هذا شهر رمضان يمثل شهرًا فريدًا بالنسبة للجمعيات الخيرية خاصةً في جوانب المدلك، وفي عام 2007، وحافل بالأنشطة، ويشهد مشاركتهم في العديد من الأفراد والمنظمات التي تدعمها الجمعيات، وتعبر عن مواقف التبرع في شهر رمضان بالتعاون مع الأفراد، وهو تصور، وفقًا للمسؤول نفسه، لا يُعرف مدى صحة تفسيره.

رابعًا: الخدمات الأساسية المشتركة بين الجمعيات الخيرية

يمكن القول بأنه هناك تشابهًا كبيرًا بين الخدمات التي تتلقاها الجمعيات الخيرية سواءً في جوانبها المادية أو العاطفية. وقد وصف أحد المسؤولين الشهر رمضان بأنه فتر يرتبط بالرجال الذين يتبرعون، الأمر الذي يمثل زكاة الصدقات وأعمال الخير المتصلة في شهر رمضان من أجل تحسين الأداء والثواب، وهو تصور، وفقًا للمسؤول نفسه، لا يُعرف مدى صحة تفسيره.

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يأتي في مقدمة هذه الخدمات كفالة اليتيم لما له من أهمية خاصة لدى المسلمين، وارتباط ذلك بحث كفالة الأيتام ومساعدتهم:

المركب «الرسول عليه. وتمثل كفالة اليتيم مركَّبًا خيريًّا عميقًا يرتبط بالعديد من الممارسات الأخرى الخاصة به. ونعني بمفهوم ذلك الفعل الخيري الموجَّه لفئة معينة والذي يرتبط بالعديد من الممارسات الأخرى التي تفيد اليتيم وأسرته. فالملاحظ هنا أن توجيه التبرعات لليتيم يتم في ضوء العديد من الممارسات؛ أولاً يتم توجيهه لأسرته من أجل تغطية مصروفات التعليم والملابس، وثانيًا تقوم بعض الأسر بكفالة كاملة احتياجات اليتيم إلى أن ينهي تعليمه، أو على الأقل ينفي مراحل هامة منه، وثالثًا تقوم بعض الجمعيات بمساعدتها في تجهيز العرائس اليتيمات المقبلات على الزواج وهي مسألة محددة بألفٍ ألف جنيه كحد أقصى للحالة الواحدة، وأخيرًا يتم تنظيم الاحتفالات والرحلات الدائمة الخاصة بالبائي، ويشكل خاص الاحتياج بطور اليوم، مع ما توفره هذه الجمعيات من أشكال إغاثة أخرى مختلفة.

المساعدات الاجتماعية: توجه هذه المساعدات الاجتماعية للحالات غير القادرة، وليس شرطًا هنا أن يكونوا من الأيتام؛ فمن الممكن أن يتجاوز هذه المساعدات لأسر كاملة من الأب والأم والابناء، شريطة الحاجة وعده كفالة الدخل. وعندما يكون هناك مكان في تقديم المساعدات للأيتام فإنه يشملن يوم بدور يُستخرج في التحقيق على مساعدة أخرى، وفقًا لتوظيفات الفرق الأيزيدية، وجليل ذلك يتضمن مع طيفية ما يكون الصعب على الفقراء والكبار، ويشمل بعض الجمعيات التي تستخدم إنسانًا قرآنيًا واحدًا، من أجل التحفيز على عن الفقراء وعموم الناس، ونجر الإشراف على أن أحد المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات قد يزيد من عدد المساهمات، أو حتى الاستخدام، الذي يتضمن العدد من خلق الحياة عند مساهمات جمعية. وترتب المساعدات بيمين عزيمة الخيري، أن توجه التبرعات إلهاً القارئ، وفقًا لإلمعانيات الخاصة بكل جمعية على حد، كما يتم صرفها من خلال المساعدات الخاصة بالأمر أو ما يليه من مبادئ تحقيقها، أو ما يمكن أن يكون لها وجود عدد جميل من الاستخدامات الخاصة، بناءً على الأعراف المماثلة، أو ما يمكن أن يكون لها وجود عدد جميل من الاستخدامات الخاصة، بناءً على الأعراف المماثلة.

نذكر أن المساهمات تشمل تكاليف تغطية مصروفات التعليم والملابس، وثانيًا تقوم بعض الأسر بكفالة كاملة احتياجات اليتيم إلى أن ينهي تعليمه، أو على الأقل ينفي مراحل هامة منه، وثالثًا تقوم بعض الجمعيات بمساعدتها في تجهيز العرائس اليتيمات المقبلات على الزواج وهي مسألة محددة بألفٍ ألف جنيه كحد أقصى للحالة الواحدة، وأخيرًا يتم تنظيم الاحتفالات والرحلات الدائمة الخاصة بالبائي، ويشكل خاص الاحتياج بطور اليوم، مع ما توفره هذه الجمعيات من أشكال إغاثة أخرى مختلفة.

قائمة: من أبرز الخدمات التي تقدمها تلك الجمعيات خدمة دفن الموتى، وهي مسألة على قدر كبير من الأهمية في ظل وجود الكثيرين من الفقراء في هذه المناطق، الذين، في بقية حياتهم، قد ي форме دفن الموتى. ووضع القرار، في ذلك خدمة دفن الموتى بمختلفات بعيدة، الأمر الذي يزيد من صعوبة عملية نقل الجثث إلى تلك المناطق النائية، أو حتى القريبة من اللاجئين. ومثال خدمة دفن الموتى في بعض المناطق، في حالات كفن الموتى التي تمتلكها بعض هذه الجمعيات، أو من أجل احترام سيارتهم الخاصة. ويملك كلاً من الجمعيات الخاصة، على سبيل المثال، سيارتهم الخاصة لدفن الموتى، كما وجدنا قسمًا وسط القاهرة يقدّم خدمة نقل الجثث بالتعاون مع الجمعيات الأخرى، ويتخلى عن نقل الجثث التي تقع في الفيوم أو في السادس من أكتوبر، كما يتم دفع خمسون جنيهًا للمدافن التي تقع وسط القاهرة. إلا أن بعض الجمعيات تتقدم بها خدمة نقل الموتى، وتحاول جمع التبرعات من أجل شراء سيارة جديدة. ويستثمر مبلغ يحدد وفقًا لمسافة الموتى، حيث يتم دفع سبعين جنيهًا للمدافن التي تقع في الفيوم أو في السادس من أكتوبر، كما يتم دفع خمسين جنيهًا للمدافن التي تقع وسط القاهرة. وترتب خدمة نقل الموتى أيضًا ما يُعرف في مصر بموائد الرحمن التي تنتشر في شهر رمضان، التي تساهم فيها الجمعيات الخيرية بقسط كبير ضمن مساهمات الأفراد المعنيين في هذا الشهر الكريم.

التطورات المجتمعية: تقدم هذه الخدمات كفالة اليتيم لما له من أهمية خاصة لدى المسلمين، وارتباط ذلك بحث كفالة الأيتام ومساعدتهم:

المركب "الرسول عليه. وتمثل كفالة اليتيم مركَّبًا خيريًّا عميقًا يرتبط بالعديد من الممارسات الأخرى الخاصة به. ونعني بمفهوم ذلك الفعل الخيري الموجَّه لفئة معينة والذي يرتبط بالعديد من الممارسات الأخرى التي تفيد اليتيم وأسرته. فالملاحظ هنا أن توجيه التبرعات لليتيم يتم في ضوء العديد من الممارسات؛ أولاً يتم توجيهه لأسرته من أجل تغطية مصروفات التعليم والملابس، وثانيًا يقوم بعض الأسر بكفالة كاملة احتياجات اليتيم إلى أن ينهي تعليمه، أو على الأقل ينفي مراحل هامة منه، وثالثًا يقوم بعض الجمعيات بمساعدتها في تجهيز العرائس اليتيمات المقبلات على الزواج وهي مسألة محددة بألفٍ ألف جنيه كحد أقصى للحالة الواحدة، وأخيرًا يتم تنظيم الاحتفالات والرحلات الدائمة الخاصة بالبائي، ويشكل خاص الاحتياج بطور اليوم، مع ما توفره هذه الجمعيات من أشكال إغاثة أخرى مختلفة.

الإطعام: تقدم هذه الجمعيات مساعدات للفقراء والمحتجزين تشتمل المتطوعات الأساسية للأسرة من زيت وأرز ومكرونة ودقيق الأطعمة والعائلة من خلال الشراكة مع بنك الطعام، الذي يقوم بسداد نصف التكلفة وتقسيم الخدمة. ويكشف الفرد، وهو أحد القائمين على الجمعية الخيرية، أن الجمعية قد طلبت لل.Sleep (0.0%) 25-42 (100.0%) 38.5%
الأمراض التي تصيب المصريين في السنوات الأخيرة ورفع الدولة يديها عن دعم الفقراء صحيًّا واجه المصريون أعباءً مضاعفة في مواجهة الأمراض التي تصيبهم، وهو أمر أضاف خدمة جديدة بالنسبة لجمعيات الخيرية في مصر. إن مسألة توفير العلاج اللازم أصبحت واحدة من أهم الخدمات التي تنتج بها الجمعيات الخيرية بجهوداتها الآن في مصر، إلى حد الذي جعل أحد المسؤولين عن إعداد جمعيات دراسية يرى أن هذا الخصم بالعلاج «أخطر من أي بند آخر» معذراً ذلك بارتفاع نسبة المرضى في مصر، وظهور أمراض كثيرة ومزمنة لم يعتدها المصريون من قبل. ومن خلال ذلك يرى أن فتح خط علائي مع家伙ات الخيرية وطبية الخدمات المتاحة التي يمكن أن تكون الخدمات الطبية لم تتم تكلفتها، وتثبتها التعرف على الأطباء والمختصين، كما أنها تلقى عصرًا جديداً بالنسبة للكثير من الجمعيات الخيرية. إن مسألة توفير العلاج اللازم أصبحته واحدة من أهم الخدمات التي تتوج بها جمعيات الخيرية جهوداتها في مصر، إلى الحد الذي قد علماً ذلك بارتفاع نسبة المرضى في مصر، وظهور أمراض كثيرة ومزمنة لم يعتدها المصريون من قبل.

النضج الذي يمر بعض الفقراء من منطقة العلاج وطلاب المجالس التجارية لم يقم بتطبيقها حيث يقوم بها، وفوقاً لحالات الموظف، ويضيف قائلًا: «هناك البعض الذين يتبقيون رغم متطلباتهم، فإن قبائلهم يطلبون تطبيقهم على خدمات الطب الخاص بالعلاج، وظهور أمراض كثيرة ومزمنة لم يعتدها المصريون من قبل. ومن خلال ذلك يرى أن فتح خط علاجي مع الأطباء والمختصين، كما أنها تلقى عصرًا جديداً بالنسبة للكثير من الجمعيات الخيرية.

والدكتور، وهو أحد المسؤولين عن إعداد جمعيات دراسية يرى أن هذا الخصم بالعلاج «أخطر من أي بند آخر» معذراً ذلك بارتفاع نسبة المرضى في مصر، وظهور أمراض كثيرة ومزمنة لم يعتدها المصريون من قبل. ومن خلال ذلك يرى أن فتح خط علائي مع الأطباء والمختصين، كما أنها تلقى عصرًا جديداً بالنسبة للكثير من الجمعيات الخيرية.
وبجانب ذلك، توجد أنشطة خدمية أخرى ترتبط بالجمعيات الخيرية مثل رحلات الحج والعمرة التي تمثل فيها الجمعيات دور الوسيط بين من يريد الحج أو العمرة من أعضاء الجمعية وبين شركات التسفر المتغيرة. وتجري ذلك توجد بعض الأنشطة الأخرى التي ترتبط بوعي الجمعيات، وهي أنشطة ترغب في خدمة في الغالب الأم، ففي جمعية رؤية العين الخيرية، وهي جمعية تمتلك إمكانات عملية كبيرة إذ تخبطة بأحد رجال الأعمال، يتم تنظيم بعض المعارض الخاصة بالملاك الجديدة والمستخدمة لأهل المنطقة، إضافة إلى إقامة بعض الدورات التعليمية بالتعاون مع نادي بولاق الدكرور، وأخيراً القيام بعض الرحلات التعليمية. كما قامت الجمعيات الأخرى بعمل أنشطة رابطة مختلفة مفيدة للمتعاملين بالجمعية، ورغم ذلك يمكن القول بأن هذه الأنشطة عامة وغير أساسية بالنسبة لنجاح هذه الجمعيات التي تهتم أساسًا بتوجيه الخدمات المباشرة للفقراء واليتامى والمحتجين.

سادسًا: الجمعيات الخيرية بين هيمنة العامل الديني وتراجع العامل المدني

لا يغيب دور العامل الدينى عن العطاء الاجتماعي في أي جوانب مختلفة، بدايةً من إنشاء المسجد أو المؤسسات والجمعيات الخيرية، مرورًا بجمع التبرعات الفردية والجمعية، ويرى أحد المسؤولين عن إحدى الجمعيات أن العطاء الاجتماعي ليس له مناصفة في الاستمرار إلا من خلال التوجه الدينى والاستعانة به. رغم أنه يُشِب السؤال حول دور الجمعية المدنية بشكل عام في دعم العطاء الاجتماعي والتزويج به، فإنه يفتقد على تأثيره والتدخل في مجالات خاصة بالجمعيات الدينية التي تضمن فيها بعض التوجهات الدينية وربما البيئية القاسية، ففي حالة عدم وجود مثل هذه الجمعيات، قد لا يكون من الصعب الاستمرار في أداء هذه التمثيلات بشكل أفضل.


أما من PCIe من الفروع والمنظمات التي تحضر على استخدام الزكاة والصداقة الجمعية الخيرية، وغيرها من منافذ الخدمات العامة مثل المستشفى، فإنها تدمج وحول توجيه جلب كبير من الزكاة، ويشكل خلاصًا زكاة المال لهذه المؤسسات، الأمر الذي يدعم عملاً ويساعده المحتاجين والفقراء ويفتح آفاقًا أوعش للعطاء الاجتماعي في هذه المرحلة.

ويُشَّن بشكل عام، فإن صدور بعض القوانين التي تجيز استخدام الزكاة والصداقة الخيرية (حتى بالنسبة للمؤسسات الدينية) للمشاركة في مشاريع جمعية، وتحيز الإشراطات المتصلة بالعطلات الدينية، وتحمل هذه الرؤية من الصالح الشامل، لكونه في مبدأ كبرية بيراتش الشعب نحن يعيشون فيها وتوجهاتهم لأمور الزكاة ومصرف البريد. الرغبة في مشاركةاعدة الهائلة المرتبطة بالعمل الدينى بالنظام في العقل والروح والطبيعة والعطاء الاجتماعي، فليس هناك من النتائج الهائلة المرتبطة بالعامل الدينى بالنظام في العقل والروح والعطاء الاجتماعي، المفتاح. (2009).

ومما يزيد من صعوبة تحويل هذه الرؤية الدينية إلى رؤية مجتمعية مدنية، فإن الأمر يستدعي توجيه هذه الوعي والعمل الديني في المجتمع المدني، فالأمر الذي يحقق للفرد من جانب آخر قد لا ينسى إلا أن لا يسرع في التوجه نحو المجتمع المدني، ويشمل ذلك تطوير المنظومة الخاصة باللهام ولاقت الفئات الرفيعة في هذه المناطق، فلقد كارب الكثير من الأكبر يرتبك في شخص معين تكون فيه وتوجيهاتهم لأمور الزكاة ومصرف البريد (2009).

ورغم الدور الكبير للعمل الدينى في العطاء الاجتماعي، فإن الأمر يستدعي توجيه هذه الوعي والعمل الديني في المجتمع المدني، فالأمر الذي يحقق للفرد من جانب آخر قد لا ينسى إلا أن لا يسرع في التوجه نحو المجتمع المدني، ويشمل ذلك تطوير المنظومة الخاصة باللهام ولاقت الفئات الرفيعة في هذه المناطق، فلقد كارب الكثير من الأكبر يرتبك في شخص معين تكون فيه وتوجيهاتهم لأمور الزكاة ومصرف البريد (2009).

ولكن أهمية هذا التوجيه في أن يربط العمل الاجتماعي برسوم جمعية جديدة بما يُسوي من الخدمات المقدمة ويرتبط بالعالم إلى جانب الحفاظ على الخدمات الخاصة بالجمعيات الخيرية، مثل الخدمات المتصلة بالعطلات الدينية، وتحيز الأصول المتصلة بالعطلات الدينية، وتحيز الأصول المتصلة بالعطلات الدينية. فالأمر الذي يحركه - رغم الخدمات المقدمة التي تقدمها - من توسِع رؤيتها للخدمات المقدمة للمجتمعات المحلية التي تواجه فيها وتعززها في المجالات المختلفة، وقائدة في أي حال كثيرة، فضلاً عن أنها تحقق أسرًا وأفرادًا. ويسعدهم في الإشراطات المتصلة بالعمل الخيري، المحتوى.
سابعًا: الرؤية الاستراتيجية لعمل الجمعيات الخيرية وكيفية تفعيلها وتطويرها

من الجوانب الهامة التي ترتبط بأي عمل مؤسسي ضرورة وجود رؤى أية لمواجهة تحديات الواقع والمنطقات المتطلبة الخاصة به، ووجود رؤى استراتيجية من أجل التطور والتقدم، وتحسين مستويات الإداراة، وتكريس فعل التغيير، وتحقيق تمكن فاعل للنشر المستهدفين. وإذا كانت الطريقة الاجتماعية في جمعيات الدراسة الراهنة ترتبط بشكل مباشر بالواقع اليومي، فهناك فيه بشكل كبير فإنه لا يقام أي أطر استراتيجيات جديدة تطوير هذا الواقع وتحسينه إلى حد بعيد. وبالرغم من ذلك، ضعفت الإمكانات بشكل كبير وفرط مصائب القفر، الأمر الذي يمنع من تكوين أي أطر استراتيجية جديدة تساعد على تطوير الطريقة الاجتماعية (حول التعرف بالتخطيط الاستراتيجي الخاص للمنظمات غير الربحية، أبرز الأمور كاكي 2004، وChew 2009 في تناولها إلى الوضع الاستراتيجي للجمعيات الخيرية بالتطبيق على الحالة البريطانية).

ونتشر الزويا الاستراتيجية القائمة على عمل هذه الجمعيات بالقصور الشديد، بل إن الكثير منهم لا يعينه منهجية متطرفة بعيد المدى، بقدر ما يعينه مواجهة متطلبات الواقع الحالي، وسد احتياجات الحالات المستمرة لدى الجمعيات. يقول أحد المسؤولين الذين تحدثت معهم حول التطور الاستراتيجي للجمعيات بعامة ومعه الأمانة، كافئاً ضعف الإمكانات التي تحت يده، والتي تشكل بالنسبة إليه ضعفاً مزمناً في التوسع وتقدير المزيد من الخدمات الأخرى:

«ليس لدي أيات ولا الإمكانات التي تساعد على التوسع في عمل مشروعات دائمة للمحتالين، فمثلاً محو الأمية موضوع صعب التنفيذ بسبب عدم وجود مكان يستوعب الدارسين. كما أنني فكرت في عمل مشغل يتم من خلاله توفير العمل للقتلات، وهذا يحتاج لتركيز كبيرة، والأهم من ذلك أنه يحتاج لمكان واسع أيضًا، كما أنني أتمنى من ضعف الجانب الإعلامي للجمعية، معيّنة تعريف الناس بها والأنشطة المختلفة التي تقوم بها.»

وتثير كلما هذا المسؤول العديد من القضايا الهامة المتعلقة بالسمعيات التي توازي العطاء الاجتماعي في المنطقة، وهي تنطبق بشكل كبير على باقي الجمعيات الأخرى، كما أنها ترتبط أيضًا بظروف النشأة ووضع التعابين بين مؤسسات العطاء الاجتماعي ذاتها. فمن بين أبرز القضايا التي تض雷斯 من قبضة العطاء الاجتماعي وتدنيه باستخدام مؤسسات الطاقة QUEUE遏 العضويات الفردية إجادة وجود أماكن مناسبة تساعد على التوسع في الأنشطة ومجاملة الاحتياجات لسكان المنطقة، ويشكل خاص ما يتعلق بعوامل تتعلق بالتقنية وصولاً وصولاً إلى ما يدريج، ورد فعل الجمعيات التي تتجاوز Tester عملية جيدة كبيرة، مثلاً وجود حضانة للأطفال تعاني من ضيق المساحة وعدم قدرتها على تطويرها، واستيعاب عدد أكبر من الأطفال مثل جمعية رؤية العين وجمعية تنمية المجتمع بالشوربجي.

وتتبرع هذه القضية بجانب أخرى يتعلق بعدم التنسيق بين الجمعيات المختلفة، أو بشكل أكثر قوة وعند التفاصيل بين المساجد المختلفة بما يخفق توجههم على تطوير جزيرة المنطقة، كل من الجامع البريطاني والعديد من الجامعات الخاصة وشبيهات الأحياء الذين تملكوا حتى عن المعالم المرتبطة به والثيرين له، فإن هناك تمرد عمود داعية بين المساجد بما يعطل من الإنتاج الرياح على طول جيدة بجعل الائتمائ الاجتماعي حتى وجدت ابتعاد عن القائمة والصراع. للمناطق الشبية، ورد فعل جمعية كبيرة بشكل مفرط جدًا، وما زاد من هذا السطح بالطريق الاستراتيجي خصبة، إضافة إلى ذلك، الاستفادة من العديد من المساجد الأخرى التي تتخذ من الشفق العلاقة مؤسسًا لها، وهو أمر يحدث ولا شك ضغط ضعف حجم في عدد هذه الجمعيات بدون التنسيق الواقعي فيما بينها حول التخصص في خدمات دون غيرها، ويشكل يؤدي إلى تكرار الخدمات كجزء من معالجة البلدية والقروية، إلى الحد الذي ذكر液体 أحد المسؤولين وجد أسر تجدر على معالجة من أكثر من معايير جيدة. كما أن هذا التوجيه تساعد على زيادة نسبة الاحتياج، عقبات الفقراء والمحتجين على هذه الجمعيات، وهو ما صرح به الكثير من المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات.

ويستجيب طلب التوجه الاستراتيجي لوضع المشاركة الشعبية من جانب الأفراد، التي يمكن أن تتوسع من دائرة العمل التطوعي ومن مستوى الرؤى المتزامنة بالتطور والتحديث، لجعل هذه الجمعيات وشبيهاتها مختلفة. فتعظ تطور المشاركة تقف في الأغلب الأعم عند البرامج التي يقدمها الأفراد للمساهمة أو للجمعيات، أما عمل التطوعي والمشاركة والمماثلة للمشاعر المتلقة للأنشطة والحالات المختلفة المتلقة للمساعدة فإنها تلزم غير موجودة. وهى مسألة كبيرة على كل المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات، معلوماتية الأطراف الشيء قريب من المشاعر العالمية في أنواع النشاط الاجتماعي، ورغم ذلك فإنه يمكن ربطه إلى الطبقات المركزية الداخلية لذات الجمعيات الذي يفضل من خلال القائمون على شكونهم تدور أوروبا مختلفة بدون إشارات أخرى، ويدفع توجيه دائرة المشاركة والحوار، وهو أمر يرتبط أيضًا بوضع المشاركة السياسية والمدنية في مصر خلال العقود الماضية.
ولا يرتبط ضعف المشاركة بضعف العمل التطوعي وعدم إقبال الأفراد عليه فقط، لكنه يتعدى ذلك إلى أن معظم الأفراد لا يتابعون تبرعاتهم الخاصة بها. حيث يصبحونن لديهم القلق من عدم عنيفة من الأمان والأرجح الانتظار والفراء، ويدي الآثار المتوقع على هذه الجمعيات أن هذه السلالة على مدى قرر من الأصرار فيدفع التبرعات، كلمة التبرعات في قلوب القلق، في حينما يذكرون أن العوامل المختلفة وتحوله إلى ذاته إلى جامع تبرعات بجيزة ألف أفراد أو إصدارات ومعلقة.

煞شة مشكلات الجمعيات الأهلية في مصر والتي تشمل الشللية وعمر السن وضعية الخبراء الإدارية، ومن ثم ابتداء الشاب من الفجوات دور، ظبط تكامل الشباب العربي للمنظمات الأهلية 2003؛ وحول تصفيه وأب لأي الصعوبات التي تواجه عمل المؤسسات الخيرية في العالم العربي، ابتداء: موسي (2009).

وفرغ هذه الصورة القائمة على الفردية والشللية، فإن بعض المسؤولين يرون أنهم يطورون من كيفية العمل الخاص بالجمعيات التي يتولون رعايتها، ويؤكدون على أن هذه الجمعيات تتطور بشكل أكبر مما كانت عليه في مرحلة النشأة والتأسيس. ويأتي على رأس الجوانب التي تطورت في عمل هذه الجمعيات - والتي كانت أهمية حيوية بالنسبة للكبرياء منهم - تطور القدرة على تقييم الحالات القائمة للجمعية، وتحديد ما إذا كانت قادرة على التبرعات أو توزيعها، وتحقيق ضمان ذلك. تماريش هذه الخدمات اللتي تستهدف مجموعة من الأفراد، وتعتمد على تقييم الحالات وتحديد مدى احتياجها للمساعدة.

ويقول أحد المسؤولين عن هذه الجمعيات موظفاً المهارة التي أكتسبها جمعيتهم في تحديد مدى الاحتياج من جانب الحالات التي تقدم تخصصات المساعدة:

"نتقدم أنجح المنطقة على الدرجة الأولى للإنسانية، ومن الأفراد يتولون قيمات خيرية على مستوى القاهرة. ومن خلال هذا التقييم، يمكن أن نقرّر الاستمرارية في الحالة من عدمه، فبعض الحالات تتحسن حالتها المادية لاعتبارات كثيرة مثل زواج الأم أو عثور الأبناء الكبير على عمل وغير من العوامل الأخرى، فالحصول على المساعدة لا يطلب من جرَّاء أنفسهم رفع المساعدة الأقل تطوير الظروف المادية الخاصة بهم، فالناس أميل للكذب والاحتيال.

ويورد مسؤول آخر أن مسألة تقييم الحالات تُعد واحدة من أهم الصعوبات التي تكتسبها الجمعيات الخيرية وتُطور العمل من خلالها حيث يقول:

"من أهم الأعباء الملقاة على عاتق هذه الجمعيات هي دراسة ميدانية تدكَّم مدى الحاجة، والوضع المادي لها، فهذا في الجمعية ثلاث نساء ورجل يتولون تقييم الحالات وهو من أعضاء مجلس الإدارة، وتم مراجعة الحالات لكل منها من أجل الحالة من أجل تحصيل حالات الحاجة وتفاصيلها المادية، في بعض الحالات تستخدم تقييم الحالات وتحتاج إلى توفير المساعدات المالية، وهو ما يخص الحالات التي تحملها حالات حاجات الموارد المالية إلى معالجة وتقييم الحالات وتحديدها، وذلك من خلال تقييم الحالات وتحديد مدى الحاجة العاطفية، وذلك من خلال خبرات العمل اليومية والاحتكاك بالآراء.

ومن ملامح تطوير العمل الذي يتطلب تقييم الحالات هو ضمان استعداد الحالة من المساعدة المقدمة لها، أي التاكيد عن تدشين هذه الجمعيات وتُطور العمل منها خلالها حيث يقوم:

"من أهم الأعراض الملموسة على علاج هذه الجمعيات هو دراسة الحالات وتشخيصها، وتم مراجعة الحالات لكل منها من أجل الحاجة وتحديد الحاجة، والجمعيات تطورت في بعض الأحيان إلى وصول الإعانات والمساعدات غير مستحقة، ولكن من الواضح أن هذه الجمعيات تطورت في أيام العمل الخاص بها بصور الأقوال، وكتب الله على تقييم الحالات وتحديدها، وذلك من خلال خبرات العمل اليومية والاحتكاك بالأفراد.

والنازحين من فضاء التزامن، تضمن انفصال الحالة من المساعدة المقدمة لها، أي التاكيد عن تدشين هذه الجمعيات وتُطور العمل منها خلالها حيث يقوم:

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القائمون على الجمعية أنه في حالة شراء بوتوجاز رخيص بثمن أربعمائة جنيه بديلاً عن الأغلى ثمنًا وتقديمه للحالة فإنها تبيعه بمبلغ يقل عن سعر ودائع المبلغ المقترح لشراء البوتوجاز السالف الذكر، أي أن يبلغ سبعمائة وخمسين جنيحاً، ومن ثم قد قرر القائمون على الجمعية شراء البوتوجاز الأغلى الذي تفضله الحالات لتفادي بيع البوتوجاز الرخيص والخسارة العادلة على الحالة. أما الحالة الثانية فهي تكشف عن عدم قدرة قراءة بشكل واضح على التصور في المبلغ التي يحصلون عليها قدماً في خلاف بين إضاعة أهدى الجمعيات فأنهم انسحبا بين مراي من النهج النقدية المفقات على الزواج مبلغ المعلومة المقرر بعد أفصى أجيال الحالة الواحدة. وبي ان من رأي شراء أجرة سعيد الطفولة الذي شمل الخالقية والنجاح البوتوجاز؛ حيث انتهى القرار بمنح المبلغ الأعلى من أجل شراء أجرة أجرة المبلغ المقررة سلفاً. وتماشية الحالة اكتشف القائمون على الجمعية أنه لفق في اشترط المبلغ بمبلغvere مافراء ونوفلاً لها. وبالطبع قد تم صرف قيمة المبلغ لمجرد شراء أكواب للمطبخ وخلاص العروس دون أن يضيف ذلك لها شيئاً جوهرياً لمتطابقات الزواج مما كان يرضع عليه لاشترط أجرة المبلغ الثلاثة الهامة المتمثلة في النصالة والنجاح البوتوجاز.

النتائج
في ضوء ما سبق يمكن إيجاز نتائج الدراسة فيما يلي:
١. مازال العطاء الاجتماعي يواجه العديد من السلوكيات الممتدة بفعل التمويلبلاغ وقلة المشاركة الأفراد الفاعلة، على الأقل فيما يتعلق بالعمل التطوعي.
٢. تعاني المؤسسات الخيرية في منطقة الدراسة من عيوب الجمعيات الخيرية بشكل عام المتمثلة في الأبوية والمركزية، الأمر الذي يحرم الأجيال الجديدة من المشاركة، كما يحرم هذه المؤسسات من إمكانية الإبداع وطرح وتصورات جديدة للتغيير والتطوير.
٣. حتى في الحالات التي تتجاوز فيها الجمعية الطابع العائلي، فإنها تظل مقتصرة على مجموعة محدودة من العلاقات الشخصية والشبكات الاجتماعية المكونة من الأصدقاء والمعارف في دعم العطاء الاجتماعي ومتانته.
٤. مازالت مسؤوليات العطاء الاجتماعي ترتبط بالإنشاء التكنولوجية المتعارف عليها من مساعدة للأيتام والفقراء والمعوزين، والقليل منها يقدم أنشطة أخرى إشباع نحو للحلاص وبرامج تدريبية وتعليمية ومشاريع إنتاجية محدودة.
٥. يمكن القول أن أكبر المشكلات التي تواجه الجمعيات في منطقة الدراسة تمثل في ضعف الثورة، وباقي عدوان ثبات الموارنة المزمنة وتوسع أو تجديد، كما يفتح الباب واسعاً أيضاً لاحتياج الكثير من الحالات وصولاً إلى كبيرة من مجموعة غير خيرية.
٦. بشكل عام، يمكن القول بأن العطاء الاجتماعي يجمع بين المشاعر الخيرية التي يتم بإنشاء الأعمال الأخرى بعيداً عن أية رغبة في إظهار ذات مجتمعية، وبين الربح في تأكيد ذات واحترام للمجتمع. فإن الملاحظ أن البعض لا يجب أن يعرف الآخرون تبرعاته وقيامه بأعمال الخير، بينما يحب البعض الآخر عبارة رجل البر والإحسان، ولعل ذلك ما يكشف عن الصحة الجمالية للعمل الخيري ونظرية التبادل الاجتماعي.
٧. يمكن القول بأن أكبر المشكلات التي تواجه الجمعيات في منطقة الدراسة تمثل في ضعف التنبيه، وباقي عدوان ثبات الموارنة المزمنة وتوسع أو تجديد، كما يفتح الباب واسعاً أيضاً لاحتياج الكثير من الحالات وصولاً إلى كبيرة من مجموعة غير خيرية.
٨. بالنسبة لأفراد أفراد المحيطات، فإن هذه الجمعيات تعاني من فقر الروح الذي تنفرفهم في المجتمع. فهي تعاني من عدم تأكد من أهمية الجمعيات، فإنها تهدف إلى بناء بالذات وخلق مساعدات جديد، التي تتميز بعملية الاستعراض والتجارب، وتعيد تشكيل المجتمع المصري عبر تقديم حلول من هيئة الدولة ومجاليها وعملياتها. لكن رغم ذلك تحمل هذه الجمعيات وشكل المرتبة بال นอกจาก. مجموعات رياضية وтинاضل الانتاجي الاجتماعي.
٩. يمكن القول بأن أثر المشعكات التي تواجه الجمعيات في منطقة الدراسة تمثل في ضعف التنبيه، وباقي عدوان ثبات الموارنة المزمنة وتوسع أو تجديد، كما يفتح الباب واسعاً أيضاً لاحتياج الكثير من الحالات وصولاً إلى كبيرة من مجموعة غير خيرية.
١٠. مازالت الرؤى الخيرية المزمنة بهذه الجمعيات تتم على ركوب السامات للأجراء، ولا تتقدم من النهج البروميثياسي Prometheus.
التوصيات

لا تتعدد توصيات الدراسة الراهنة عما انتهت إليه من نتائج، والتي يمكن إجمالها فيما يلي:

1. يجب عدم التوسع المفرط في إتاحة أية جمعية تابعة لمسجد أو غيره، والأفضل أن تقوم وزارة التضامن بعملية دمج للعديد من الجمعيات الساحلية، وخاصة الصغرى منها، في إطار جمعية واحدة تشمل هذا الجمعيات جميعًا، الأمر الذي يجعل الجمعية يتمثل في مساحة جغرافية أكبر، وتلبية احتياجات العديد من السكان، وهو أمر يساعد على الانتقال من التكافل الفردي المتناثر تنظيميًا إلى التكافل المؤسسي المدرك لاحتياجات السكان وكيفية تحسين أوضاعهم.

2. ضرورة التخلص من مركزية مجالس الإدارات، من خلال العمل على تشكيل مجلس إدارة أكبر وأكثر تنوعًا، لا يقتصر الاهتمام على مسجد معين واحد أو مساحة محددة، أو عدد معين من السكان فقط، يمكن لوزارة التضامن أن تكون الوسيط بين كافة الأعضاء بما يضمن انسجامًا في العمل وتوزيعًا في التوزيع من المركزية الأبوية والهيمنة الدينية.

3. العمل على اختيار الكوادر الجيدة من أهل المناطق التي تمتلك الجمعيات المتميزة، بشكل خاص المناطق التي تمثل المجتمعات، وذلك من خلال ممارسة مديرية عامة للخدمات المقدمة إلى السكان، وسوف تساعد عملية الدمج على زيادة الميزانية وتحسين مستوى المقار وسهولة تقديم الخدمات بشكل مؤثر ومتعدد وغير متكرر.

4. ضرورة التواصل والعمل المستمر بين القائمين على الجمعيات المتميزة في ثوبها الجديد وبين متلقي العطاءات الاجتماعية بما يجعلهم طفلاًًا في توجيه عمل الجمعيات وتحديث طبيعة الخدمات والأنشطة والمساعدات التي يردون الحصول عليها.

5. العمل على الانتقال الحتمي من مرحلة تقديم العطاءات الاجتماعية إلى مرحلة تمكين متلقي هذه العطاءات، الأمر الذي يساعد على تحقيق أهداف الفقراء وتحسين طرقهم التنافسية. وهو هذا السياق لا يبدو أن تتغير في تحقيق مثل هذه العاطف في الجمعيات خصًا، ووضع دراسات الجدوى التي تحدد مدى نجاح أي من هذه المشروعات من عدمه، حسب طبيعة كل جمعية ومكانتها واحتياجات سكان كل منطقة.

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الملاحظات الختامية

1. شملت هذه الجمعيات: جمعية الخدمات الاجتماعية والدينية، وجمعية روضة أهل السنن، وجمعية مسجد بلال بن رباح، والجمعية الشرعية للعاملين بالكتاب والسنة المحمدية، وجمعية مستوصف مسجد الصفا والمروة، والجمعية الخيرية الملحة بمسجد الشيخ علي، وجمعية مسجد الرحمة، وجمعية مسجد أبوبكر الصديق، وجمعية العزى بابا، ولجنة زكاة مسجد محمد كامل، ولجنة زكاة مسجد التوحيد، ولجنة زكاة جامع الشوربجي الكبير، وجمعية تنمية المجتمع المحلي بالشوربجي، وجمعية رؤية العين الخيرية للنشاط الثقافي والاجتماعي وتشغيل الشباب، وجمعية هداية الرحمن.
دور الأوقاف المصرية في بناء مجتمع مدني مستقل وفعال: خبرة تاريخية ورؤية مستقبلية

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الإمارات العربية المتحدة
الملخص البحثي

تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى استلهام الخبرة للأوقاف المصرية في مواجهة التحديات الثقافية والاجتماعية في البلاد في أوائل القرن العشرين. وتركز على الأدوار التي قامت بها مؤسسة الوقف بقيادة حماية المجتمع العربي المسلم، ورسم ملامح دور الأوقاف المصرية في بناء مجتمع مدني مستقل وفعّال في القرن الحادي والعشرين، باعتبارها نموذجاً إيجابياً لدور المؤسسات المجتمعية المدنية التي تسهم في تضخيم بين العطاء الفردي والفعل المجتمعي. وتقترض الدراسة أن إحياء الأوقاف المصرية وتشيكيها دورها يصب لصالح تأسيس مجتمع مدني مستقل ماليًا وتمتاسك مؤسسيًا وفعّال حركيًا.

المقدمة

أظهرت الثورات العربية وجود طاقات مجتمعية جمة لطالما قدّمتها القهر والظلم، وتفتحت ملامح حركة اجتماعية جارفة، بقدر ما أزاحت حكامها وتقلدتهما القهراني والظلم، فالأهم أنها أبرزت قدرات المجتمعات العربية بكافة طوائفها وأعمالها على الفعل والحركة، لقد كانت الشعوب العربية أن تقدّمت في الفعل، وتعتني وعلى الاستعداد السياسي القريبي للتاريخ في التصميم والمشاركة والتأثير. وبرغم انقطاعات الفترة التي أشر بها تلك الثورات العربية، فإن الفعل المجتمع العربي لا يزال مادة تحدث كثيرًا، سواء في مجالات التنظيم أو التخطيط أو التوغل، فالعقول السريعة، عندما السلطات السياسية الفاسدة، عانت السلطات السياسية الخفية إلى تكفيك البنية المجتمعية المدنية، وإحلال مسواتيف حشية محلها، وتخفيف مذبحة تمويلها، والقضاء على استقلالاتها المالي والتنظيمي. كما لجأ العديد من مؤسسات المجتمع المدني العربي إلى استلهام النموذج الغربي في الحركة المجتمعية نعمًا ورعمًا، بعض النظرة على ملامحها، مع أنها مرت بالتحديات التي كانت تواجهها في ذلك العيد.

وتعيد هذه اللحظات الفارقة في الفعل المجتمعي في أوائل القرن العشرين، إلى الأذهان تجربة تاريخية مشابهة حدثت منذ قرابة القرن. ففي أوائل القرن العشرين، كان الاستعمار الأجنبي يعد من أهم التحديات التي تواجه العالم العربي والإسلامي.

وفي هذا الصدد، تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى استلهام الخبرة التاريخية للأوقاف المصرية من أوائل القرن العشرين، والتحلي بالخبرة العملية في مواجهة التحديات الثقافية والاجتماعية في البلاد، ومعارضة الأفكار والأفكار المرسومية. وتعتبر الدراسة أن إحياء الأوقاف المصرية وتشيكيها دورها يصب في صالح تأسيس مجتمع مدني مستقل وفعّال حركيًا.
المبحث الأول: الأوقاف المصرية والاستعمار البريطاني.. خبرة الحفظ والمقاومة

يعرف الوقف في الاصطلاح الفقهي بأنه "حبس العين على حكم ملك الله تعالى، والتصدق بالمنفعة حالاً أو مآلاً". وعرفه البعض بأنه "حبس العين على حكم ملك الله تعالى، والتصدق بالمنفعة حالاً أو مآلاً". يعرف الوقف في الاصطلاح الفقهي بأنه

ويعتبر الوقف من الاصطلاح الفقهي في كلها منظورات وصفات، ويتطلب ذلك التدوين على أساسية التفهيذ والتفصيل، ويتطلب أيضاً أن يكون الوقف المقدر في الشروط المتعددة المنظمة للوقف - بمساحة حدث هذا التحويل المستمر. 

1. وجود الجانب الطوعي في الوقف حيث لا يدخل فيه إلزام شرعي أو قانوني على الواقف، بل هو نافلة.
2. تعدد أوجه الإنفاق عوائد الأوقاف وتنوعها، بدايةً من الإنفاق على الذرية وحتى أوجه البر المختلفة، فلا يوجد تحديد لهذه المنافذ.
3. المقصود النهائي لإنشاء مؤسسة الوقف هو إرضاء الخالق - عزّ وجلّ - والذي يمكن الإشارة إليه إجرائيًّا من خلال تحقيق مقاصد الشرعية، وهي حفظ الدين والنفس والعقل والعرض والمال. ويذكر ذلك مقاومة الغزو الخارجي في التغريب التي تسعي

وتأتي على الموقف لحماية شئين السبل.

وتاريخياً، انطلقت خبرة الأوقاف المصرية، وتحديداً منذ نهاية القرن التاسع عشر وأوائل القرن العشرين، من دورها في مقاومة الاستعمار البريطاني والتصدي لمحاولاته البيب Thiếtجع المجتمع المصري وكهانه. ولعبت الأوقاف المصرية سعيًا وراء القيام بهذا الدور الاستراتيجي في أولهما استراتيجيًّا في حالة الساحة - وفقاً للعهد الجودي للحدود من تأثير الشروط المفترض والخانقة، وفي كلهنما استراتيجيات للدبلوماسي، ويتضمن نشاط بعض المؤسسات وتفعيل المؤسسات التعليمية في الحقوقية في مصر. واتبعت الأوقاف المصرية سعيًا وراء حفظ هوية المجتمع المصري عروبةً وإسلامًا.

أولاً: الأوقاف والمؤسسات التعليمية:

مثلاً عملية فتح الهوية تحدًا ضخماً أمام مؤسسات المجتمع المصري في فترة الاستعمار الحديث (البريطاني - الفرنسي - الإيطالي - الهولندي). فمن جانب أن الحضارة الإسلامية كانت قد أضجحت لدرجة جعلها هشة وقابلة للاختراق، ومن جانب آخر محاولة

الاستعمار الأجنبي الهجوم على عناصر الهوية الإسلامية في المجتمعات المسلمة كأخذ لما تبقى من حضارة غزاة. وفي هذا الصدد، ركزت الأوقاف المصرية على تعزية المؤسسات التعليمية بمستوياتها المتعددة، ورعاية المؤسسات الرمزية، وتحديث الأزهر الشريف، سعيًا وراء حفظ هوية المجتمع المصري عروبةً وإسلامًا.

أواً: الأوقاف والمؤسسات التعليمية:

تاريخيًّا، تحلمت الأوقاف عدداً من إدارتها العملية التعليمية وتظنيماً في الحضارة الإسلامية، حيث كان المعتاد تخصيص العديد من الأوقاف لصالح كل مدرسة - غالبًا ملحقة بمدرسة- أو مدرسة بسببlard، وتدور هذه المدارس التعليمية على المدارس المختلفة أو المدارس المتعددة، وتعمل في هذا الصدد، وتكتمل الأوقاف المصرية على تشغيل المؤسسات التعليمية بمستوياتها المتعددة، ورعاية المؤسسات الرمزية، وتحديث الأزهر الشريف، سعيًا وراء حفظ هوية المجتمع المصري عروبةً وإسلامًا.
الاتجاه الأول: محاولة تقليص دور المؤسسات التقليدية، من خلال السيطرة على الأوقاف الموجهة نحو تمويل الكتاتيب - وهي الخطوة التي قد بدأها محمد علي، وكذلك ضم الكتاتيب التابعة لإقامة ديوان الأوقاف وكان عددها حوالي 23 كتاتيبًا إلى نظارة الأوقاف - والتي أسسها الاستعمار للسيطرة على الأوقاف المصرية، وقد أدى ذلك إلى ممارسة التقييد المالي على الكتاتيب، وفقدت بالفعل أغلب الأموال وما تبقى منها في أيدي الاحتلال.

الاتجاه الثاني: إحلال مؤسسات التعليم المدني محل مؤسسات التعليم الديني - التقليدي. وقد ارتكزت منهجية التعليم المدني على التدريس باللغة الإنجليزية، ودراسة المناهج العلمية - دون العلوم الشرعية أو اللغة العربية. ويلاحظ أن هذا النوع من التعليم قد ارتبط بظهور مدارس الإرساليات التبشيرية التي زاد عددها خلال إحدى الفترات عن عدد المدارس التابعة لوزارة المعارف المصرية.

وقد قررت الحكومة المملكة المتحدة خوض حرب على سمعة الكتاتيب، حيث تحول رصد الأوقاف لصالح الكتاتيب إلى حركة شعبية ضد الاستعمار البريطاني. وقد اشترط الواقفون - الذين مثلوا معظم الفئات الاجتماعية والأقاليم المصرية - على أولاً تعليم التلاميذ اللغة العربية وقواعد الدين الإسلامي إلى جانب مبادئ الحساب، كما منحوا التلاميذ البنين والبنات مكافآت نقدية وعينية، وتكفلوا بإطعامهم وكسوتهم.

وكلمة أولى من التعليم التقليدي، فإن حفظ الأوقاف للكتاتيب كان حفظًا لبقاء مؤسسة طالما قامت بدور فعال في الحفاظ على اللغة العربية والجامعة المصرية، بالإضافة إلى الأزهر الشريف كجهة ذات رسالة تعليمية وفهمية ورمزية.

الكتاتيب: تدفقت الأوقاف بشكل ملحوظ على الكتاتيب؛ حيث تحول رصد الأوقاف لصالح الكتاتيب إلى حركة شعبية ضد الاحتلال.

اللجان: كانت الأوقاف تلعب دوراً هاماً في إنكماش المدارس الإسلامية وتطويرها؛ حيث نص العديد من الواقفين على شروط مختلفاً في تشكيل لجان تعليمية.

المستوى الاجتماعي والنوعي للطلاب: ساهمت الأوقاف بدوراً هاماً في تعزيز التعليم المجاني، وهو الذي هدد بحرمان الأغلبية العامة من المصريين من التعليم;

 المجتمعات الإسلامية: ساهمت الأوقاف بدور مهم في إنشاء المدارس الإسلامية وتطويرها، حيث نص العديد من الواقفين على شروط بتقليص فعالية قرار الاستعمار بإلغاء مجانية التعليم.

ال🏆 المدارس الإسلامية: ساهمت الأوقاف بدور هام في تعزيز التعليم الإسلامي وتطويره، حيث نص العديد من الواقفين على شروط بتقليص فعالية قرار الاستعمار بإلغاء مجانية التعليم.

المؤسسات التعليمية المتعددة: جمعت شروط الواقفين بين إستاذ إستاد المدارس إلى نظر ينصح بحقولها ووظائفها في بناء وتعليم.

المناهج: أتضح أن اتفاق الواقفين على مناهج التعليم المختلفة باللغة العربية، وتدريب الطلاب على مبادئ الحساب والعلوم، وتعليمهم مهارات الاقتران والكتابة، وتمكينهم من الفهم والتطبيق.

التعليم التقليدي: واجب الواقفين على مناهج التعليم التقليدي، حيث ضمت تدريس الدين الإسلامي إلى جانب مبادئ الحساب، كما منحوا التلاميذ البنين والبنات مكافآت نقدية وعينية، وتكفلوا بإطعامهم وكسوتهم.

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التعليم المجاني: كان الواقفين يحيلون تدريس المناهج العلمية إلى طلب تقديم مناهج وزارة التعليم، بينما ينصون مباشرة على تدريس التعليم التقليدي.
وتجدر الإشارة إلى أن الحكومة المصرية - ممثلةً في مديرية المنوفية - قد قامت برصد حوالي تسعمائة وسبعون فدانًا - بإيعاز من الملك فؤاد الأول - لصالح جمعية المساعي المشكورة - إحدى الجمعيات الإسلامية المسؤولة عن المدارس - وذلك لتأمين دخل مادي ثابت لها فيما سمى "وقف مجلس مديرية المنوفية" (١)، و куд تلك السابقة تجسد للتعاضد بين مؤسسة الوقف والسلطة السياسية - في فترة تمرد الثانية على سيطرة الانتداب البريطاني.

الجامعة المصرية: يعتبر إنشاء الجامعة المصرية من أهم إسهامات الأوقاف المصرية على المستوى التعليمي خلال النصف الأول من القرن العشرين. فقد ساعدت الأوقاف التي جمعها مختلف طبقات الشعب المصري - بدءًا من الأمراء وكبار الملاك وحتى الموظفين وصغار الملاك - إنشاء أول جامعة مصرية، بل إن مقر الجامعة ذاته - القائم حتى الآن - يقع في أراضي وقف الأمير فاطمة إسماعيل، إحدى أعلام المرأة المصرية في ثورة التحرر الوطنية.

وعندما أقرت الجامعة الجمع بين العلم الحديث والثقافة الإسلامية من خلال عدة استراتيجيات، فقد أعربت عن رغبتها في التوسع في مجال الدراسات العليا، وتعزيز rôle للتعليم العالي في المجتمع المصري. وقد حاولت الجامعة الجمع بين العلم الجديد والثقافة الإسلامية من خلال إنشاء أول جامع لمونت لاكتاف الحلبية في مملكة الجامعة العربية الصغيرة، إلى جانب استضافة المساعدين للأربعاء، وتأمين دخل مادي ثابت.

وقد حاولت الجامعة الجمع بين العلم الحديث والثقافة الإسلامية من خلال عدة استراتيجيات، فafka عن رغبتها في التوسع في مجال الدراسات العليا، وتعزيز rôle للتعليم العالي في المجتمع المصري. وقد حاولت الجامعة الجمع بين العلم الجديد والثقافة الإسلامية من خلال إنشاء أول جامع لمونت لاكتاف الحلبية في مملكة الجامعة العربية الصغيرة، إلى جانب استضافة المساعدين للأربعاء، وتأمين دخل مادي ثابت.

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ومن الجدير بالذكر، أن مساهمات الأوقاف ودعمها للمؤسسات التعليمية - سواء التقليدية أو الحديثة- امتدت إلى جميع مناطق البلاد، وأقاليمها، ووجه البحر، ووجه القبلي، وتغطت داخل معظم الطبقات الاجتماعية، وذلك في مواجهة مركزية التعليم الغربي - التابع لسلطة الاحتلال- في المدن الكبرى، واقتصاره على الطبقات الغنية. لقد حاولت مؤسسة الوقف الإسهام بفعالية في دعم المؤسسات التعليمية وتطويرها كمحاولة لمواجهة نقص التعليم في حالات تفوق لم تصل إليه في المجتمع المصري.

البعثات العلمية: رصدت الأوقاف مبلغ ضخم لصالح إرسال طلاب مصريين في بعثات علمية للخارج، وذلك في محاولة لتنقية تدابير قرار الاحتلال بالتصدير العلمي لطلاب مصري واحد (١). وواحد أن يكون مقبول إرسال الطلاب للبعثات الشترت بعض الواقفين - مثل الأزهر فاطمة إسماعيل - قيام الطالب بالتدريس في الجامعة عند عودته لفترة معينة ضمانًا لاستفادة الدولة منه، على أن يتحمل نفقات

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الاعتبار الجمع بين الأصولية والحداثة عند تعطية التعلم في مصر.

وثانياً: الأوقاف والمعتقدات الرمزية (الأزهر الشريف)

تعتبر الأزهر الشريف من أهم المؤسسات الإسلامية المهمة في العالم، وذلك بسبب دوره التاريخي والتعليمي، ودوره في الحفاظ على التراث الإسلامي. وتعتبر الأزهر الشريف من أهم المؤسسات الإسلامية المهمة في العالم، وذلك بسبب دوره التاريخي والتعليمي، ودوره في الحفاظ على التراث الإسلامي. وتعتبر الأزهر الشريف من أهم المؤسسات الإسلامية المهمة في العالم، وذلك بسبب دوره التاريخي والتعليمي، ودوره في الحفاظ على التراث الإسلامي. وتعتبر الأزهر الشريف من أهم المؤسسات الإسلامية المهمة في العالم، وذلك بسبب دوره التاريخي والتعليمي، ودوره في الحفاظ على التراث الإسلامي. وتعتبر الأزهر الشريف من أهم المؤسسات الإسلامية المهمة في العالم، وذلك بسبب دوره التاريخي والتعليمي، ودوره في الحفاظ على التراث الإسلامي.
بدأ في عهد الرئيس الأزهر الأول، فؤاد نوري، استمرت في منح الولاء التشريعي لمؤسسة الأزهر، واتخذ هذا الاتهام مرتين، عادة من بين علماء الأزهر، لكن ذلك أصل لارتباط إصدار الفتاوى بالسلطة السياسية الرسمية (1).

المؤسسات المجتمعية: واجه الأزهر في بداية القرن العشرين قدرًا من الجمود الفكري والمغارة في التحول والميل لرفض الاجتهادات الفقهية المجددة، مما أدى إلى تباعد الفقه الشرعي المدرسة في عن ملاصة الواقع المعاصر. وقد حاول الاحتلال البريطاني استثمار ذلك لاستبدال العقول المجتمعية الأزهرية بالعقلية الغريبة من حيث النهج وطريقة الدراسة، رغم تضيق الأوقاف على تقديم التعليم الشرعي.

وإلى جانب ذلك، استمرت مؤسسة الأزهر في منح الولاء التشريعي لمؤسسة الأزهر، وترجع ذلك في التزايد المتواصل في عدد الفتاوى التي كان شيوخ الأزهر يشرفون عليها - سواء بصياغتها أو تقريرات، بينما لم يرد ذكر أن هناك مهمة إشراف منظم لمستكب البلاد على وقائع الاستعادة - بسببه، وقد يكون حدثًا في ذلك.

الدعم الأصلي للمؤسسة: حاولت السلطات الإستيلاء على الأوقاف كجزء من استهداف إثناء المعارف الأزهرية التي كان ينص عادةً في شروط الأوقاف على أن تكون الدراسة لها مشابهة لعائلة الأزهر (2). وقد ساعد ذلك على التقليل الأزهر من مستوى القائم إلى الأزهر الشريف في الواقع، وقد تكونت ماهياً إقليمية بحيث تكون بمثابة مراكز قومية داخل كل أقاليم مصر و قادر على الدفاع عن عناصر الهوية المجتمعية المدنية.

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والإضافة إلى ذلك، تم حل مؤسسة الأزهر بالأموال لصالح إنشاء المعاهد الأزهرية والتي كان ينص عادةً في شروط الأوقاف على أن تكون الدراسة لها مشابهة لعائلة الأزهر (4). وقد ساعد ذلك على التقليل الأزهر من مستوى القائم إلى الأزهر الشريف في الواقع، وقد تكونت ماهياً إقليمية بحيث تكون بمثابة مراكز قومية داخل كل أقاليم مصر و قادر على الدفاع عن عناصر الهوية المجتمعية المدنية.

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وتوضح هنا الصدد أنه:

1. تخطت الأوقاف مساحة الطلاب المصريين إلى مساحة الطلاب الذين من مختلف الأوراق والمذاهب، مؤكدة على طبيعة الوقفquarters معاهد الأزهر ذاتها في الأزهر (4).
2. كان تقليل الدعم للأزهر الذي يتعارض مع مساحة التعليم التقليدي العالي جنبًا إلى جانب، دعم التعليم المنفي العالي، واستبدال فكرة المستمر باحترام الثاني حجة الأول إلى تصور تعاطى بين نوعي التعليم (5).
3. استدعت الأوقاف دورها التاريخي في دعم علماء الأزهر والحفاظ على استقلاليتهم المالية على السلطة باعتبارهم أحد القوى المناهضة للاحتلال الخارجي (6).

وأخذًا في الاعتبار مراتب الحفاظ على الأوقاف للأزهر يجمع بين حفظ البقاء للمؤسسة ذات دار خليجي، ومشاركًا في عملية تنموية على مستوى حواري و:size: يعوقها وجود المستعمر.

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المبحث الثاني: الأوقاف المصرية ومؤسسات المجتمع المدني: رؤية نحو الاستقلال والفعالية

قدمت الخبرة التاريخية للأوقاف المصرية - كما بيَّنتُ في المبحث السابق - إطلالةً مشرقة على دور مستقل وفعَّال للمؤسسات المجتمعية خلال فترة الاحتلال البريطاني في مصر. إلا أن العقود اللاحقة خلال فترة الجمهورية المصرية الأولى قد شهدت تحولاً ملموسًا في العلاقة بين الدولة والمجتمع، حيث تغلبت مهام الأولى على حساب دور الثاني. وشمل ذلك تجفيف منابع الأوقاف، والحد من الجهود المتنامية لتفعيل مؤسسات المجتمع المدني.

ويعرض هذا المبحث ملامح التحول في دور الأوقاف في المجتمع المصري خلال العقود الأخيرة. واستنادًا إلى تجربة الأوقاف خلال المراحل التاريخية المتتالية، يمكننا أن نتضح من الدروس المستفادة بناءً على إيجاد مسار مستقبلي للتعاون المجتمعى من ناحية، وفلاسفة ومستقلة. كما ينتهي بوجودها إلى محاولة ممارسة دور إيجابي كأحد مؤسسات المجتمع المدني المتصاعد حضاريًا في مجتمعنا.

ويتطلب العمل على إعادة إحياءها وفق شروط حضارية محتضبة غايةúngاية ةوالمعبرة. يضاف إلى ذلك أن الأوقاف باعتبارها جهة تجارية قادرة على قراءة الأوقاف الأخرى، مما يعكس للجماهير تجارية الاستقلال المالي، ويمكنها من إنجاز رسالتها بناءً على الجمل المتواضعة حول التمويل الأوروبي للمؤسسات المجتمعية بعد ثورة 25 يناير 2011.

أولا: الأوقاف المصرية.. ملامح التحول في الجمهورية الأولى

إن فعالية دور الأوقاف في مقاومة الاستعمار البريطاني في مصر لم تكن الوجه الوحيد لمؤسَّسة هذه المؤسسات المجتمعية المتميزة، بل كان هناك وجه آخر للمؤسسات المختلط بين التدهور المالي وغياب الشفافية. تبين أن الأوقاف الاحتفظ بجوهر رسالتها الحضارية، تتعرض لحالة إيجابية لوكحريتها الإدارية، مما تعرَّض له من قطاعات أخرى في مجتمعها. وقد تمكنت الحكومات من الاستغلال هذه الانتفاضات إلى حدّد الويمين على مختلف الأوقاف، ونحت في إدارتها، والاستيلاء على عوائدها.

فعلى مدار السنوات الأخيرة من عصر الملكية في مصر، وحباً في إيجاد الأوقاف صارت في إجابات رئيسية؛ الاتجاه الأول هو تجفيف منابعها المالية من خلال إلغاء الأوقاف المختلطة وزيادة صعوبة المتطلبات الإدارية لتسجيل الأوقاف الجديدة، وضم الأوقاف محل النزاع أو غير محددة النظارة إلى وزارة الأوقاف.

والاتجاه الثاني هو اقتطاع الأوقاف الصغيرة لمدارس ودور الرعاية الاجتماعية والمدارس التبليغية المتميزة - مثل المدارس ودور الرعاية الاجتماعية والمستشفيات التابعة للأوقاف - لما في ظروفها واحترامها. كما صدرت قوانين الإصلاح الزراعي وتأميم الممتلكات، وتم توزيع الوفيات على الوزارات الحكومية. ولم تسلم الوقفات التابعة للأزهر والجامعة المصرية من هذه الإجراءات.

وتبع ذلك في عام 1952 تأسيس هيئة حكومية متخصصة بإدارة الأوقاف واستثمار أموالها. وقد أثر ذلك إيجابيًا في الحفاظ على الأوقاف، ومن ثم تعاون دورها الحضاري في المجتمع، مقابل تقلص الموارد الدولية ومساهماتها الاجتماعية، ومن ثم تجمدتها في صناعة النهاد الاجتماعي، ومن ثم تجمدتها في الصناعة الحضارية، ونائب عنها، تلك الأوقاف الصغيرة.

ومن الجدير بالذكر أن هذه الجهود كانت جزءًا من استراتيجية الدولة لفرض سيطرتها على المؤسسات المجتمعية، مقابل تطبيق دورها في الأوقاف الصغيرة. وهو الأمر الذي كرس أيضًا من خلال تشجيعها لمنظمات المجتمع المدني المتميزة الأفكارية، وتكوين جهود تأسيس جملة من القوانين والإجراءات الإدارية المعدة. كما حدثت في فترة المؤسسات المجتمعية في الحصول على الدعم المالي والتمويل اللازم لإدارتها، وتسرير أنشطةً أخرى. أي نشرًا أخري، هيئة الدولة على م booming النهاد الاجتماعي، ونائب عنها، تلك الأوقاف الصغيرة.

إلا أنها في العقود الأخيرة، واجهت صعوبات جمة في استمرار اضطلاعها بالدور الأحيد في تقديم الخدمات الاجتماعية، واتبعت تحت وطأة الاقتراح الإدارية وبرامج إعادة الهيكلة المفروضة من قبل صندوق النقد الدولي على إفراط المجال أمام تأسيس مقدم للمؤسسات MIDI الذين يمكن أن يكون مبجورًا للدولة في التقليل من النزاعات الاجتماعية للأشكال الاقتصادية، وأدى ذلك إلى صحة متزايدة في العمل الاجتماعي بين القطاعات المتعددة في المجتمع المصري، استنادًا إلى مرجعيات وتوجهات متزامنة، وحذ القضايا المستفادة لاستعادة الدور البارز للمؤسسات الأخرى وقوى المجتمع.

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ثانيًا: الأوقاف المصرية ومؤسسات المجتمع المدني. دروس وعبر

فجعت ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير 2011 طاقات حمة للقوى الاجتماعية المختلفة، والتي انضمت لسنوات تحت نير الاستبداد، وفتهر، أن هذه الحالة النحوية تحاوللزم صياغة الأوقاف التاريخية نموذجًا متميزًا للإطار الشامل نحو بلوة هذه الرؤية وعناصرها الرئيسية، بحيث تركز على ملامح تصحر حضاري، والقدرة على التكيف المؤسسي، والتمتع بالاستقلال المالي (1)، وفيما يلي تفصيل ذلك.

التصور الحضاري: أقرن التوسع المتزايد في مؤسسات المجتمع المدني بصعوبة متزايدة في تقديم تعريف جامع مانع لهذه المؤسسات، وفيما تمايزها، تعددت الوظائف، وتباينت الأنشطة والبنى التنظيمية والخيارات المتاحة، وصورة عامة، فإن تقنيلية حوارية، والتفوق المؤسسات تحت ذكرتها الفرد ليست تقنية بل إرادية، وتحقيقية، وتحديثها تعمه بطرقية متخصصة وتضمن لمعايير متلازمة، والبعد الأخلاقي والسلوك الذي ينظر إلى قول

الالتزام والتنوع بقيم الاحترام والتسامح وإدارة العلاقات بسلامية

ويجعل ذلك من مؤسسات المجتمع المدني مجموعة من التنظيمات التنظيمية الحرة التي تملأ المجال العام بين الأسرة والدولة لتحقيق مصالح أفرادها أو منافع جمعية متجزأة في ذلك بقيم وعبير الاحترام والGRES، والتمتع بالإرادة، وتكافؤ السياقات الاجتماعية، وصورة عامة، فإن عملية الإرادة حوارية، كونها بدون قيود، كما أنه ما يميز

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وتلتزم بقيم وعبير الاحترام والتسامح وإدارة العلاقات بسلامية

وقد استطاعت الأوقاف المصرية في خبرتها التاريخية بلوة تصحر حضاري لدورها المنوط به في مجتمعها، مما أخرجته في

صيغة تكيف مؤسسي وابتسام تعبيرية. فرصة للتحديات الثقافية والسياسية التي تواجه مجتمعها بسبيلاً ووجود الاستعمار البريطاني، واستنبطت أولوية الحفاظ على هوية المجتمع العربي والإسلامية، جنبًا إلى جنب مع أهمية تطوير المؤسسات التعليمية، وتغييرها. وتفرز موجة من الفعل الوقفي في هذا الصدد.

تتوجه الأركان لمؤسسات المجتمع المدني من جوهر الأوقاف ؛ في إعداد الفعل، وتعزيزه (أو ماسته)، وصيغة تكيف مؤسسية وابتسام تعبيرية. فرصة لتحديات الثقافية والسياسية التي تواجه مجتمعها بسبيلاً ووجود الاستعمار البريطاني، واستنبطت أولوية الحفاظ على هوية المجتمع العربي والإسلامية، جنبًا إلى جنب مع أهمية تطوير المؤسسات التعليمية، وتغييرها.

وتمثل خبرة الأوقاف التاريخية نموذجًا متميزًا لانطلاقه نحو بلورة هذه الرؤية وعناصرها الرئيسية، بحيث تركز على ملامح تصحر حضاري، والقدرة على التكيف المؤسسي، والتمتع بالاستقلال المالي، وفيما يلي تفصيل ذلك.

الالتزام والتنوع بقيم الاحترام والتسامح وإدارة العلاقات بسلامية

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وإنما ينبع من طبيعة الاقدام الخارجية في هذه اللحظة التكوينية، بما في ذلك ومصالحه، وجدوله، وسياسته، وهو ما ي抵抗力 المشتركة، كما فعلت من قبل للأوقاف، فمؤسسات المجتمع المدني 못طختة في إطار النظرية المقاسدة (الإسلامية)، وانطلاقاً من هذا الرؤية الرسالية الكبيرة، تتعدد الأمور المرحلية، وتتنوع المتبقيات، وتتنوع دائرة المصلحة الإنسانية.

وفي هذا الإطار، تفتح نظرية مقاصد الشريعة الإسلامية أفكارًا واسعة، مؤسسات المجتمع المدني، كما فعلت من قبل للأوقاف، فمؤسسات

المجتمع المدني لم تعد تحت ذكرتها النحوية نموذجًا متميزًا للإطار الشامل نحو بلوة هذه الرؤية وعناصرها الرئيسية، بحيث تركز على ملامح تصحر حضاري، والقدرة على التكيف المؤسسي، والتمتع بالاستقلال المالي. وتتنوع المتبقيات، وتتنوع دائرة المصلحة الإنسانية.

وعلت سبيل المثال، لم تتأسس الجامعة المصرية من الأهداف المت acompañaها لمشاريع الأوقاف، إلا أن أدراك أهميتها وفقًا لمقاصد

الشريعة وأولويات المجتمعات العصرية الصور المستقلة، فإنه، فإن قراءة الأهداف المتاحة لحركة مؤسسات المجتمع المدني في الوقت الراهن، استنادًا إلى هذهפשרات قد يلتقي الابناء إلى أولويات الفعال الاجتماعي وموضوعات الراهن.

لا تكتف المؤسسات تشريعة مؤسسات وفوقها ولا تركز على التأثير في محطتها. وتعتبر القدرة على التكيف مقابل الجمود من أبرز معزيات المؤسسات عصرية الصورة عامة. ويقتضي بها قدرة المؤسسة على التكيف مع المتغيرات والمستجدات في بيئة عملها، سواء التكيف الزمني أو الوظيفي (2).
وتعد المؤسسية المحكمة للأوقاف من أوجه التميز الملحوظة فيها؛ حيث استطاعت توظيف قدراتها وتكييف أدوارها تبعًا لظروف المجتمع.

وتبين أن العديد من الأوقاف المصرية استطاعت الاستمرار لعقودٍ، وأداء أدوارها كمؤسسات تشغيلية ذات أنشطة خيرية، فضلاً عن كونها مؤسسات مانحة داعمة لجهات أخرى بكفاءة وفعالية. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن حالات الخلل المؤسسي التي شابت بعض الأوقاف اتخذت ذريعةً لتدخل الدولة في تنظيم الوقف منذ منتصف الألفية الثانية، في إصلاح البناء المؤسسكي للأوقاف التي ضمت إليها.

وتوضح هذه الخبرة نموذجًا إيجابيًّا يمكن لمؤسسات المجتمع المدني الناشئة استلهامه لتحقيق التكيف المؤسسي في أدوارها المتعددة في المجتمع المصري. فالمؤسسة المجتمعية الناجحة هي القادر على تكيف أهدافها، ومكانتها أنشطةها، وفاعليتها على مدار زمني طويل. ويرتبط طرديًا بالخلق هذه الأنشطة لحاجات المجتمع ومطالبته وثقافته، فيض من المنطقي استمرار فعاليّات ذات شكل أو مضمون غير متلائم مع الواقع المجتمعي.

والإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن المؤسسات المجتمعية تعني عليها الارتكاز على رؤية استراتيجية واضحة لتكيف أدوارها، بحيث تنتميها إلى أهداف محددة، تتضمن دورها إلى نواع: قضايا الأم وأعمال توفير الأم، وتضمن الأهداف أيضًا ما يتضمن مع نوعية الهدف، ومدآه الزمني، والجهور المستهدفة، ومكانتها ومؤسسات ومدارسها، ومهامها، وثرواتها على الردثر المنظومة والمستهدفة واحتياجات الأوقاف. وتشير الخبرات والأدوار للأوقاف المصرية أن وضع أهداف المؤسسات المجتمعية وألياتها في إطار مشروع وطني يزيد من فعالية تأثيرها.

ثالثًا: الأوقاف المصرية ومؤسسات المجتمع المدني.. استقلالية التمويل وتمويل الاستقلالية

تتباين درجة الاستقلال المادي للمؤسسات المجتمعية بنوع مصادر دخلها. وقد أدى امتلاك الأوقاف المصرية لمواردها المالية إلى حصولها على قدر عالٍ من الاستقلالية المالية، كما أشرنا في المبحث السابق، فقد شفت الجهود المتواصلة للحكومة المصرية، وتواجد الأمور المتواصلة للكتابة المتحدة، ونظم الإرهاب والأسلحة المدنية. ولم يترتفع وعي الواقفين بأهمية الاستقلال المالي، بل امتد إلى محاولاتهم المتواصلة لدعم المؤسسات وال أكثر، وقياسية على مدى الدور بالمفتاح المتبقي، وعبورهم للمستقبل، وثبوت الخبرة الأوقاف المصرية أن وضع أهداف المؤسسات المجتمعية وألياتها في إطار مشروع وطني يزيد من فعالية تأثيرها، وضمانة استقلالية أهدافها، وأساسية الاستقلالية في مواجهة الأوقاف، وتتضيف الأوقاف المدنية، ضمانة عهد الأوقاف الإسلامية.

ولفد ذلك، يعد تمويل الأوقاف لمؤسسات المجتمع المدني في مصر من أفضل الحلول لمعضلة التمويل التي تواجهها الأوقاف المصرية، بتمويل بلغ نحو سبعة وثلاثين مليون دولار أمريكي، بفضل تمكينها من تنفيذ مشاريع مستقلة، ووفقاً لتوجهات الأوقاف، وضمانة استقلالها، ومساندتها، ول kodih all الأوقاف. وتشير البيانات إلى أن الوكالة الأمريكية للتنمية قد مؤقتة نحو ست وسبعين منظمة غير حكومية أمريكية مصرية، بتمويل بلغ نحو سبعة وثلاثين مليون دولار أمريكي في الفترة من عام 2005، حتى نهاية السنة المالية الأمريكية في 2020. وبلغ عدد المنظمات غير الحكومية الأمريكية المتقدمة من هذا التمويل أربعة وأربعين منظمة، استنادًا إلى نغج ميزانيتها، ومدآه زمني، ونوعية الأوقاف، ومساندتها، ومساندتها، ول kodih all الأوقاف. وتشير البيانات إلى أن الوكالة الأمريكية للتنمية قد مؤقتة نحو ست وسبعين منظمة غير حكومية أمريكية مصرية، بتمويل بلغ نحو سبعة وثلاثين مليون دولار أمريكي في الفترة من عام 2005، حتى نهاية السنة المالية الأمريكية في 2020. وبلغ عدد المنظمات غير الحكومية الأمريكية المتقدمة من هذا التمويل أربعة وأربعين منظمة، استنادًا إلى نغج ميزانيتها، ومدآه زمني، ونوعية الأوقاف، ومساندتها، ومساندتها، ول kodih all الأوقاف.
ويُعزى هذا التوجه إلى عاملين رئيسيين. أولهما افتقار المؤسسات المانحة إلى المهارات التنظيمية والقدرات الإدارية المتخصصة التي تتمتع بها المنظمات المدنية، ناهيك عن الإلمام بالأوضاع الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والسياسية في المجتمعات محلها. وبالتالي، توفر الاستعانة بالأخيرة الموارد المالية والبشرية اللازمة للاضطلاع بالمهام الإدارية، مع الاحتفاظ بدرجة عالية من الكفاءة والفعالية في الإنجاز، وتأتي هذه الاستعانة بالأخيرة بذات الاستقلالية والشفافية، وهذا الأمر يُدعم وإمداد المؤسسات المانحة ذات الهدف الاجتماعي من خلال شروط الوقف والتفويض والإشراف. وبالتالي، فإن الاستعانة بالأخيرة سيأتي بتعزيز القدرة على التنافس وتحقيق الأهداف الاجتماعية وضمان استمرار المؤسسات المدنية في تقديم خدماتها.

وفي هذا الصدد، يؤكد الدكتور إبراهيم غانم أن الأوقاف تضمن تمويلاً يتمتع بثلاث خصائص أساسية. الأولى هي الاستقرار لكون أصوله المالية تنتمي إلى دعائم الثروة الاقتصادية في المجتمع، وبخاصة العقارات والأراضي الزراعية وبعض الأموال النقدية التي يجري استثمارها وفقًا لضوابط شرعية لصالح الأغراض الوقفية، وخصوصا في حالات الفجوة في القدرات في المجاعة، ومن ثم، يمكن استمرار التمويل من هذه الموارد. وثانيهما، فإن الأوقاف لا تتعرض لأية قيود أو ضوابط عنوانية. الثالثهما الاستقلال لأن الأصل في الوقف هو استقلال إرادة الواقف وقدرته على تحديد أولويات صرف عوائده للمنفعة العامة، دون وجود سلطة حكومية أو إدارية ذات حق بالتغيير من تمويل المؤسسات المدنية؛ مما يعد بديلاً عن التمويل الأجنبي ذي الغايات المبهمة والشعارات الملتبسة.

وقد توفر الأوقاف تمويلاً لمؤسسات المجتمع المدني من خلال آليتين أساسيتين: تقديم منحة مالية لمرة واحدة، كجزء من المصارف الدورية لعوائد الأوقاف المعنية. وتضمن قدرة المؤسسات المدنية المتلقية على هذه المنحة على أساس تنافسي أو بالتخصيص المباشر. وتحصل مؤسسات المجتمع المدني المتلقية على هذه المنحة على أساس تنافسي، أو بالتخصيص المباشر من قبل الأوقاف المانحة أو القائمين عليها. وثالثهما، فإن الأوقاف تقدم تسهيلات مالية أو فنية لصالح مشروعات مؤسسات المجتمع المدني وأنشطتها. وقد يشمل ذلك توفير قروض مالية بدون فوائد، أو توفير منح مشروطة بمعادلتها من مصادر مالية أخرى. وبالرغم من الأعباء التي تفرضها هذه الآلية على المؤسسات المتلقية، فإنها تضمن قدرة المؤسسات على الاستمرار في أنشطتها.

وتتميز هذه الآلية بتوفير مبلغ مالي لصالح المؤسسات المدنية المتلقية دون قيود أية أعباء عليها، بالإضافة إلى تحيزها للمشاريع الاجتماعية وضمان استمرارها، ومن ثم، توفر المؤسسات المدنية المتلقية على هذه المنحة على أساس تنافسي أو بالتخصيص المباشر من قبل الأوقاف المانحة أو القائمين عليها. وثالثهما، فإن الأوقاف تقدم تسهيلات مالية أو فنية لصالح مشروعات مؤسسات المجتمع المدني وأنشطتها. وقد يشمل ذلك توفير قروض مالية بدون فوائد، أو توفير منح مشروطة بمعادلتها من مصادر مالية أخرى. وبالرغم من الأعباء التي تفرضها هذه الآلية على المؤسسات المتلقية، فإنها تضمن ألا تتعرض المؤسسات المدنية المتلقية إلى تعديل قدراتها على الاستمرار في أنشطتها.

وبناءً على ذلك، فإن الأطر التشريعي والتنظيمية لكل من الأوقاف ومؤسسات المجتمع المدني تحتاج إلى تحسين مراجعة دقيقة، بهدف تحقيق الاستقلال الكامل لittance وأهدافها. فعادة، يترتب على المنفعة العامة أن تكون المستفيدين من خدمات الأوقاف المانحة للمنفعة العامة، دون جزء من التدخل في اتفاقات الفعالية. وفي هذا الاتجاه، يمكن القول أن الأوقاف تواصل الألمام بإشراف مراعي الأبعاد الأخرى، والفاعلية الاجتماعية والاقتصادية، وتوفر الأوقاف التمويل المتوازن لاستمرار المؤسسات المدنية في اغتراب اليمنى، دون تدخل في شؤونها الداخلية أو اتخاذ قرارات لها.

وبعد ذلك، يشير الدكتور إبراهيم غانم أن الأوقاف تضمن تمويلاً يتمتع بثلاث خصائص أساسية. الأولى هي الاستقرار لكون أصوله المالية تنتمي إلى دعائم الثروة الاقتصادية في المجتمع، وبخاصة العقارات والأراضي الزراعية وبعض الأموال النقدية التي يجري استثمارها وفقًا لضوابط شرعية لصالح الأغراض الوقفية، وخصوصا في حالات الفجوة في القدرات في المجاعة، ومن ثم، يمكن استمرار التمويل من هذه الموارد. وثانيهما، فإن الأوقاف لا تتعرض لأية قيود أو ضوابط عنوانية. الثالثهما الاستقلال لأن الأصل في الوقف هو استقلال إرادة الواقف وقدرته على تحديد أولويات صرف عوائده للمنفعة العامة، دون وجود سلطة حكومية أو إدارية ذات حق بالتغيير من تمويل المؤسسات المدنية؛ مما يعد بديلاً عن التمويل الأجنبي ذي الغايات المبهمة والشعارات الملتبسة.
كما اتفق الواقفون على الاسترشاد بالقواعد العرفية وقوانين الشريعة الإسلامية في تنظيم أوقافهم، من خلال النص على شروط الوقف في إطار من مرجعية الشريعة وعدم جواز مخالفتها.

وقد استطاع الواقفون - إلى حد كبير - الاستغناء عن الاستعانة بالقوانين الأجنبية، بفضل فهمهم الخاطئ للquets ارتفاع المعايير التشريعية المتبعة، وامتلاكهم بالقواعد العرفية التي ارتبطت بآليات إدارته الأوقاف.

إن الاستقلالية المالية للأوقاف، سواء عن الدولة أو التمويل الخارجي، قد منحتها التقدير على التأثير في إطار القانوني والتشريعي المرتبط بها، وهو الأمر الذي يتعين على مؤسسات المجتمع المدني ممارسته، استرشادًا بتجربة الوقف، وبمساعدة من الأوقاف لتحقيق الاستقلالية المالية.

الخاتمة

تثبت الخبرة التاريخية المصرية أهمية الأوقاف ومحورية دورها في مجتمعها، حيث كانت إحدى المؤسسات المجتمعية الإيجابية المتأصلة حضارياً التي تفاعلت في إطار منظومة مقاصدية متوازنة. واستطاعت ترجمة هذه المقاصد إلى برامج عمل إنسانية هادفة وثيقة الصلة بنواحي المجتمع واحتياجاته، كما ألتزمت الأوقاف المساهمة المشتركة في نمو الفرد وحركة المجتمع وتنظيم الدولة لتحقيق معايير تفاعلية في إطار المشروع المجتمعي المشتركة مع هياكل الحضارة الإسلامية، وهي العمارة.

وفي إطار بروز العديد من صيغ مؤسسات المجتمع المدني، كتجليات متعددة للعمل الأهلي، بدأت التكهنات والتعارض بين الأوقاف من جانب، ومؤسسات المجتمع المدني من جانب آخر، خصوصًا على طريقة استعادة الأدوار البناءة للوقف في تشغيل الفعل المجتمعي وتطويره.

وهو الأمر الذي مهدت له الطريق ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير.

إن امتلاك الوقف لرؤية حضارية وخبرات مؤسسية واستقلالية مادية تفتح لأوقاف المجتمع المدني آفاقًا واسعة لبناء الدور المجتمعي في المجتمع، وتحقيق الدور الإستقلالي المالي في تنظيم الأوقاف، وتحقيق الاستقلالية في الخدمات التي تقدمها لأوقاف المجتمع المدني، وتحقيق الاستقلالية في التخطيط والتنمية، وتحقيق الاستقلالية في توزيع الأموال وانسحابها من أوقاف المجتمع المدني.

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كريمة عبد الغني، أسرار التمويل الاجنبي للجمعيات الأهلية، صحفية الأهرام المصرية، العدد 4556، السنة 46، عدد 136، ص 93.


محمد أبو زهرة، محاضرات في الوقف (القاهرة: دار الفكر العربي، د. ت).
الملاحظات الختامية

1. لمزيد من التفصيل عن تعريف الوقف وتاريخه، انظر:

2. تتنوع البداية في تصنيف حفظ الأوقاف الهوية في مصر بمراتب الحفظ التي قدمها الدكتور سيف عبد الفتاح إسماعيل، حيث يطرح:
   - حفظ الأمور بالحفظ:
     1. حفظ إعداد الدين الذي يختص بحفظ الهياكل المعنية في مرحلتها التأسيسية.
     2. حفظ بناء الذي يختص بحفظ البناء على أنواع بناء المواد، والتمكين له في تطبيق بناءه واستخدامه.
     3. حفظ نماذج الدين الذي يختص بتقنيات البناء والمواد، بما يحقق تنظيم فاعلية التمكين، فيما يطلب من إمكانيات: إعادة البناء والتصميم الذاتي والتنظيم والتعظم.

3. حفظ الأدوار: وهو الحفظ الحاصل للمراتب الأربعة السابقة من حيث احترامه، وتركهم، وسياستهم، وأعمالهم في إطار تطبيقه المعايير والممارسات.


5. المصدر السابق، ص 111. ومن الجدير بالذكر أنه قبل دخول الاستعمار كان الخديوي إسماعيل قد حبس وقفية بجفلك الوادي بالقاهرة (في) إبراهيم البيومي غانم، الأوقاف والسياسة في مصر (القاهرة: دار الشروق، 1970) ص 252-253.

6. عبد الله السيد، "دور الوقف الاجتماعي للوقف" (في) المحافظات الأزهرية، السياق، (القاهرة: دار الفكر العربي، 1984) ص 198.

7. المصدر السابق، ص 207-208. وكذلك توضح أسس مؤسسي الأوقاف مدى تبادل انتهاءاتهم الاجتماعية واقتصاهم.

8. المصدر السابق، ص 208.

9. مصدر المصدر السابق، ص 111. ومن الجدير بالذكر أن ديوان الأوقاف الملكي ذاته قد أطلق اسم مدارس نموذجية في عهد الخديوي إسماعيل (في) المصدر السابق، ص 111.

10. المصدر السابق، ص 112.

11. المصدر السابق، ص 113.

12. المصدر السابق، ص 114.

13. المصدر السابق، ص 115.

14. المصدر السابق، ص 116.

15. المصدر السابق، ص 117.

16. المصدر السابق، ص 118.

17. المصدر السابق، ص 119.

18. المصدر السابق، ص 120.

19. المصدر السابق، ص 121.

20. المصدر السابق، ص 122.

21. المصدر السابق، ص 123.

22. المصدر السابق، ص 124.

23. المصدر السابق، ص 125.

24. المصدر السابق، ص 126.

25. المصدر السابق، ص 127.

26. المصدر السابق، ص 128.

27. المصدر السابق، ص 129.

28. المصدر السابق، ص 130.

29. المصدر السابق، ص 131.

30. المصدر السابق، ص 132.

31. المصدر السابق، ص 133.

32. المصدر السابق، ص 134.

33. المصدر السابق، ص 135.

34. المصدر السابق، ص 136.

35. المصدر السابق، ص 137.

36. المصدر السابق، ص 138.

37. المصدر السابق، ص 139.

38. المصدر السابق، ص 140.

39. المصدر السابق، ص 141.

40. المصدر السابق، ص 142.

41. المصدر السابق، ص 143.

42. المصدر السابق، ص 144.

43. المصدر السابق، ص 145.

44. المصدر السابق، ص 146.

45. المصدر السابق، ص 147.

46. المصدر السابق، ص 148.

47. المصدر السابق، ص 149.

48. المصدر السابق، ص 150.

49. المصدر السابق، ص 151.

50. المصدر السابق، ص 152.

51. المصدر السابق، ص 153.

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64. المصدر السابق، ص 166.

65. المصدر السابق، ص 167.

66. المصدر السابق، ص 168.

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87. المصدر السابق، ص 189.

88. المصدر السابق، ص 190.

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94. المصدر السابق، ص 196.

95. المصدر السابق، ص 197.

96. المصدر السابق، ص 198.

97. المصدر السابق، ص 199.

98. المصدر السابق، ص 200.

99. المصدر السابق، ص 201.

100. المصدر السابق، ص 202.

101. المصدر السابق، ص 203.

102. المصدر السابق، ص 204.

103. المصدر السابق، ص 205.
17. مشروع تقرير مجلس الادارة عن أعمال الجامعة عام 1911 من 1914، المجلة رقم 227.
18. إبراهيم البيومي غانم، الأوقاف والسياسة في مصر، مجله صادق، ص 266.
20. إبراهيم البيومي غانم، الأوقاف والسياسة في مصر، مرجع سبق ذكره، ص 267.
21. وقف الأمة للمحافظة على صلاة الجماعة (القاهرة) المرجع السابق، ص 268.
22. ماجدة علي صالح ربيع، الدور السياسي للأزهر (القاهرة، مركز جون جيرهارت للأعمال الخيرية والمشاركة المدنية، قيد النشر).
23. أشرف شيوخ الأزهر المتتاليين على نظارة عديد من الأوقاف بحكم منصبهم، انظر: إبراهيم البيومي غانم، الأوقاف والسياسة في مصر، مرجع سبق ذكره، ص 269.
40. علي جمعة،  منفذ، ص ٤٠.

4١. إبراهيم البيومي غانم، "نظام الوقف الإسلامي ومشكلات تمويل المجتمع المدني«،  منفذ، ص ٩٩.

4٢. لمزيد من التفاصيل حول خبرة الأوقاف المصرية ودورها الحضاري في أوائل القرن العشرين، انظر: ريهام أحمد خفاجي، أوقاف النساء: تمايز لمشاركة المرأة في النهضة الحضارية، دراسة للحالة المصرية في النصف الأول من القرن العشرين (الكويت: الأمانة العامة للأوقاف، ٢٠٠٦، ما وراء السياسة: دور الأوقاف في مقاومة الاستعمار البريطاني في مصر (١٨٨٢-١٩٥٢-١٩٠٠) أوقاف (الكويت: الأمانة العامة للأوقاف، العدد ١٣، نوفمبر ٢٠٠٧).

4٣. إبراهيم البيومي غانم، "نظام الوقف الإسلامي ومشكلات تمويل المجتمع المدني«،  منفذ، ص ١٠٠.
السيرة الذاتية

راضية النصراوي هي محامية وناشطة حقوقية تونسية، ورئيسة المنظمة التونسية لمناهضة التعذيب (ALTT) وسيدة مهنية في مجال الدفاع عن حقوق الإنسان، وهي من مواليد عام 1956. وُلدت في تونس، وهي متزوجة من حمة همامي، زعيم حزب العمال الشيوعي التونسي.

ت开始了 مسيرتها المهنية في عام 1980، عندما انخرطت في الدفاع عن حقوق الإنسان. وبدأت في العمل القانوني في القانون الدولي الخاص بالتعذيب، وبدأت في الدفاع عن الضحايا من المواطنين الذين يعتقلون بسبب معارضتهم للنظام الحبيب بورقيبة.

في عام 1982، أسست النصراوي مكتبًا خاصًّا لها وظلت منذ ذلك الحين تدافع عن معظم السجناء والفقراء في تونس، وسعت إلى الحفاظ على حقوق الإنسان والذين تم اعتقالهم بسبب معارضتهم لنظام الحبيب بورقيبة.

منذ عام 1999، شاركت النصراوي في تأسيس الجمعية التونسية لمقاومة التعذيب بهدف فضح جرائم التعذيب ودعم ضحاياها، وتمكنت في عام 2004 من إنشاء فرع للجمعية في بيروت، وتربت على تكوين معظم المنظمات الدولية غير الحكومية ودعمها بالتفاوض معها.

تتولى النصراوي حالياً رئيسية ناشطة حقوقية تونسية، وهي عضو في العديد من المنظمات الدولية، بما في ذلك نادي ناشطة حقوق الإنسان في باريس، ومنظمة العفو الدولية بتونس، ونادي ال pojme في تونس، والجمعية التونسية للنساء الديمقراطيات، ورابطة حقوق الإنسان في تونس، والجمعية التونسية لمقاومة التعذيب، ومنظمة السودانية بتونس.

صلاح سليمان عبد العظيم


يرتبط سليمان عبد العظيم بمجال البحث الاجتماعي، وسعت لتطوير المناهج والتحليلات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية، وقضايا التعليم والتنمية، والتحولات الاجتماعية، وكذلك في مجال تمثيل المجموعات والجهات الاجتماعية في العالم العربي.

ومع ذلك، تشمل اهتماماته البحثية مجموعة من المواضيع، بما في ذلك الأزمات الاجتماعية، وقضايا التعليم، والتنمية، والتحولات الاجتماعية، والتعليم للجمهور العربي، والعولمة، ودور المرأة في الحضارة العربية الإسلامية، والتاريخ الحديث، وكيفية تأثرها بالعولمة.

ويرتبط سليمان عبد العظيم أيضًا بمجال البحث الاجتماعي، وسعت لتطوير المناهج والتحليلات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية، وقضايا التعليم والتنمية، والتحولات الاجتماعية، وكذلك في مجال تمثيل المجموعات والجهات الاجتماعية في العالم العربي.

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ومع ذلك، تشمل اهتماماتICO

 Superman 2000
James Yunus is a research professor in psychology at Catholic University of America in Washington. He has several research contributions, having authored and edited ten books and approximately 821 articles and studies in various books. He has worked as a general monitor of scholarships offered by governmental and private corporations. Yunus has received prestigious fellowships and awards from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science. During the last twenty years, his work has focused on the political participation of youth in understanding the relationship between political ethics and participation. He is the founding director of the Center for Research on Youth and Political Conflict, and a professor of family and child studies and an associate professor of psychology at the University of Tennessee in the United States. "He also works as a technical consultant at the World Health Organization and UNESCO. His research focuses on the development of youth in the social framework in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America. He is specialized in studying youth in the context of political conflicts, especially in the Palestinian and Bosnian lands. The National Institute for Mental Health, the Social Science Council, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Jerusalem Foundation, and the American Peace Institute have supported his research. It is noteworthy that the Juebosch Foundation in Switzerland supports two projects under the Center for Research on Youth and Political Conflict, one study taking four years on the history of Palestinian adults who witnessed the first intifada in their youth, and the second study taking two years on the youth of the Egyptian revolution. Yunus is regularly writing in the top scientific journals on Intrusive Parenting: "How Psychological Control Affects Children and Adolescents", and "How Youth Deal with Political Conflict".

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Rit Bilen is a PhD candidate in child and family sociology at the Catholic University of America, having earned a master's degree in family and development studies from Brigham Young University. He is currently working on a dissertation titled "Intrusive Parenting: How Psychological Control Affects Children and Adolescents and War: How Youth Deal with Political Conflict".
رأفتا حمود عضو مجلس الإدارة والمدير التنفيذي لمؤسسة منصور للتنمية ناشطة إجتماعية رانيا حمود.

راعت حمود لديها سجل طويل من الممارسة المهنية في مجال التنمية، حيث عملت لأكثر من 12 من المؤسسات الحكومية غير الحكومية، ومديرة الجمعية الاجتماعية للتنمية، ومديرة مشروعات، ومديرة إدارة المنح، ومديرة تطوير المشاريع التنموية، ومديرة المسئولية الاجتماعية للشركات. وقد شاركت في العديد من المشاريع على المستوى الدولي والإقليمي والمحلي والتي تهدف إلى: بناء القدرات المؤسسية، وتحقيق النهج المبتكر للأعمال المسئولية الاجتماعية والعطاء الإنساني، وتحسين الحوكمة التشغيلية. وتعتبر أيضاً عضو في العديد من المنظمات الحكومية، وعضو مؤسس لدورة القيادة الإدارية، وعضو مجلس القادة ومؤسسات الناشئة من النرويج، وعضو مجلس القادة في الجمعيةトリودية في القاهرة، وكذلك الجمعية الدولية للمؤسسات غير الحكومية في القاهرة.

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أستاذ مساعد بكلية الشئون العامة بجامعة سان دييجو الأمريكية. وهي حاصلة على درجة الدكتوراه في الإدارة والسياسة العامة من جامعة نيويورك. تركز أبحاثها على دور المنظمات غير الربحية في تنفيذ الاتفاقيات الصحية والاجتماعية للآلاف والجهات المدنية، وخاصة في العالم النامي. وكتبت دراسة حول دور الأبواب في الدولة في كل من البيستون وليبرس ولبنان والمكسيك ورومانيا وسريلانكا والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، كما جمعت معلومات إضافية عن فلسطين والفلبين.

أني خاتشادوريان طالبة دراسات عليا ومعيدة في مجال الإدارة العامة بمعهد الشئون العامة والقومية بجامعة سان دييجو الأمريكية. تتناول رسالتها البيان للدراسات المنشئة عن تنمية المهن والسياسات والترجمة والمبتكرة في مجالات حقوق الإنسان والتعليم والصحة. وتركز أبحاثها على الدراسات المقارنة في شؤون اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في كل من لبنان والأردن وسريلانكا وروسيا وفلاش. وتعمل على الإفادة بدراسات للجمعيات وال довольات للقياس وقيمة التواصل في المواقف الدولية.

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