


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Exploring the Paradoxical Consequences of State Collapse: the cases of Somalia 1991–2006 and Lebanon 1975–82

ERSUN N KURTULUS

ABSTRACT Relative social and economic well-being in the aftermath of a state's collapse is usually explained on the basis of a single case, Somalia, and with reference to the impact of endogenous factors such as the repressive and predatory nature of the state which collapsed and the ability of civil society actors and institutions to fulfil those functions that are normally performed by a state. This article challenges this theoretical view. As can be seen from a study of Lebanon, relative well-being after state collapse is more common than it appears to be at first glance. Moreover, given the limited role that the Lebanese state played in the economic and political spheres before the breakdown of state authority in 1975, the repressive and predatory nature of the collapsed state cannot be the explanatory variable in this case. Exogenous factors, such as remittances from abroad, international loans bestowed upon residual state institutions and 'political money' from foreign powers, are the decisive factors generating such paradoxical developments. Study of Somalia and Lebanon also shows the limitations of the conceptualisations of state collapse prevalent in the literature.

Paradoxical consequences of state collapse are usually regarded as being related to a particular case and explained with reference to endogenous factors. The particular case in question is Somalia which, after the fall of Siad Barre's regime and the collapse of state institutions in 1991, fared better in economic, social and political spheres. The endogenous factors, which purportedly explain these counter-intuitive developments, are considered to be two-fold: the repressive nature of the collapsed Somali state, which rendered statelessness better than Siad Barre's regime, and the capacity of civil society institutions and actors to fill the vacuum created by the breakdown of state institutions.

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This article challenges this theoretical view to the extent that this view is formulated as a general explanation of socioeconomic well-being in the absence of statehood. First, as indicated by the developments in Lebanon in the aftermath of the outbreak of civil war in 1975 and the ensuing collapse of state authority, there is nothing unique about paradoxical consequences of state failure. Furthermore, the positive developments in the case of Lebanon cannot be explained as emanating from the disappearance of state repression and predation prevailing before the collapse of the state. Since its independence in 1943 the Lebanese state, rather than being an oppressive institution suffocating society, has shown characteristic features of a night-watch state with minimal interference in the political, social and economic life of the country. Moreover, differently from Somalia, in the case of Lebanon predation started *after* the collapse of the state and the start of the militia rule, when various paramilitary organisations established territorial control over different parts of the country and started to extract resources. Nor can the counter-intuitively positive consequences that followed the collapse of the Lebanese state be explained with reference to the dynamics of civil society. Such civil society organisations appeared on the Lebanese stage only after the end of the civil war in 1990s.

As shall be shown in this article, factors which explain such paradoxically positive consequences in the Lebanese case are three-fold: welfare provisions provided by externally supported militia organisations; activities of the residual and fragmented elements of the Lebanese state, which were funded by loans from the international financial markets; and, finally, international labour mobility, which absorbed the excess Lebanese labour, and the ensuing remittances that flowed into the country. In short, it is *exogenous* factors which explain most of these paradoxical developments.

In what follows I will first survey the indicators of economic and social well-being in Somalia in the aftermath of state collapse in 1991. This will be followed by a section which concentrates on those factors, that is, the repressive and predatory nature of the collapsed state and the capacity of civil society actors and institutions to fill the gap created by state collapse, which putatively explains such positive developments under statelessness. The third section identifies similar positive social and economic developments in the post-state collapse era in Lebanon between 1975 and 1982. This is followed by a probe into various factors—the non-repressive nature of the Lebanese state, a favourable regional labour market, remittances coming from abroad and influx of political money from foreign powers—relevant to our understanding of relative well-being during this period of state collapse in Lebanon. The final section is devoted to three conclusions, formulated at empirical, theoretical and conceptual levels, respectively, that can be deduced from the analysis presented in this article.

Statelessness in Somalia and Economic and social well-being

During most of the three decades that followed the demise of Siad Barre's dictatorship in 1991 the Somali economy and society have not only survived

internal civil strife and an absence of functioning state institutions, but have also showed signs of positive development in several areas. At least until the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 Somalia had functioning local markets, a sustained economic boom, positive development in welfare indicators, relatively stable currency, informal financial services, considerable private investment and trans-border trade with neighbouring countries—all in the absence of a central state or any state authority to support or regulate these activities. Perhaps more surprisingly, Somalia fared better during this period than its neighbours, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, and many other African states, which were governed by more or less effective states.¹

These paradoxical developments following the collapse of the Somali state have been observed in several studies. As early as the mid-1990s Mubarak observed that Somalia was experiencing a ‘chaotic economic boom’, where ‘the informal market ... provided a functioning system that the Somali economy could fall back on’. According to Mubarak, ‘the Somali economy has suffered more from the violence of the civil war and recurrent droughts than from the collapse of state institutions’.² In a detailed study 10 years later Leeson identified ‘renewed vibrancy in key sectors of the economy and public goods’ and claimed that ‘statelessness has substantially improved Somali development’ and that ‘Somalia is doing significantly better under anarchy than it was under government’.³ According to another observer, Menkhaus, what we witness in Somalia in the aftermath of state failure is ‘governance without government’, characterised by ‘the rise of informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central government’.⁴ Similarly, a study published by a group of researchers in 2008 found that ‘there is evidence that Somalia has been able to increase its standard of living while remaining stateless’.⁵

Such positive developments have taken place in financial, commercial, economic, social and, to a lesser extent, in political spheres. After the collapse of the central state the value of the Somali currency remained remarkably stable throughout the period of statelessness. Initially, the only palpable threats to the stability of the Somali shilling were attempts on the part of several militia leaders to print and circulate new currency and the occasional appearance of counterfeit banknotes in the currency markets.⁶ During the 1990s the value of the Somali shilling plummeted only twice against the dollar. In both cases the reason was nothing other than attempts to pump new shilling notes into the market—first by the militia leader Hussein Aided in 1996 and later by the Transitional National Government in March 1999. Despite such events, the Somali currency remained significantly more stable under statelessness—even through the 2000s—than it did under Barre’s dictatorship.⁷ Also during this period of statelessness the old Somali shilling notes were in circulation—not only in Somalia but also in parts of Ethiopia—and were traded freely with other foreign currencies in the local markets.⁸ Perhaps most perplexingly this monetary stability was happening in the absence of a Somali central bank to support and regulate the national currency.⁹

Furthermore, the so-called *hawala* system provided informal banking services and facilitated repatriation of remittances and continuation of

informal foreign trade.¹⁰ In a similar fashion private investment, though cautious and concentrated at a local level, continued. Initially the investment was short-term, small-scale and geared towards acquiring quick profits by catering to international organisations, which were active in Somalia until 1995. However, a decade into statelessness, Somalia also attracted international corporations, such as Dole Fruit, DHL, General Motors and Coca-Cola, which were averse to investing elsewhere in Africa. Certain sectors of the economy, such as trade and transportation, real estate development and hotel businesses benefited from the presence of these corporations. Telecommunications were an area of particular success, where the number of individuals who had access to main lines, mobile phones, internet and televisions was significantly higher than that in many other African states.¹¹ Informal foreign trade flourished despite statelessness: the ports of Berbera and Bosaso were booming, while the cross-border cattle trade between Kenya and Somalia more than doubled between 1991 and 2000.¹² During this period Somali was the source of 60% of all livestock exports in East Africa.¹³

The most unequivocal evidence to indicate that Somalia has been faring far better under anarchy than it did under Barre's regime is provided by two separate studies published in the late 2000s. The first of these is Leeson's comparative study of welfare before and after the collapse of the Somali state. Of the 18 welfare indicators measured, Somalia shows a clear positive development in 14 and a decline in only two: adult literacy and school enrolment.¹⁴ Similarly, Powell *et al's* 'comparative institutional' study, which evaluates 'Somalia's relative performance over time' by comparing it with 41 other sub-Saharan African states on the basis of 13 development indicators, concludes that 'the loss of [Somalia's] government does not appear to have harmed standards of living' and 'since losing its central government ... Somalia improved measures of well being both in absolute terms and relative to other African states'.¹⁵

In the social and political spheres clan elders, the Islamic clergy and militia leaders constituted the three forms of non-state institutions providing peace and security—thereby purportedly preparing the ground for the economic boom discussed above.¹⁶ On a more practical level the economic order was based on 'a common law based dispute resolution system and a non-state monetary system'.¹⁷ Finally, during the post-statelessness era, there was also general improvement in the fields of individual freedoms and civil rights. Comparing this to the situation during Barre's regime, Leeson notes that 'today ... Somalis are free to travel as they please (restricted only by governments of other nations) and enjoy greater freedom of expression, both privately and publicly'.¹⁸ In addition to this, Somalis have access to 20 private newspapers, 12 radio and television stations, a number of internet sites, and satellite television channels.¹⁹

Such positive developments in the aftermath of state collapse are counter-intuitive and they are not in line with our traditional understanding of statehood and government. According to the orthodox conceptualisations of 'state and 'government', which have informed much of our political theoretical thinking since the 16th century, the absence of a state leads to

anarchy and chaos. It causes, in Hobbes's famous expression, a war of all against all where 'the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty brutish and short'.²⁰ Thus, the conditions in Somalia are paradoxical and require a social scientific explanation.

The repressive Somali state and civil society

In the available literature the repressive and predatory nature of the collapsed Somali state, often together with the capacity of its civil society to operate under conditions of statelessness, is identified as the independent variable that explains the above-mentioned positive developments in the stateless Somalia. According to Powell *et al's* study, 'in both the 1970s and 1980s, regardless of the formally declared economic system, the focus of the regime was on resource extraction for the benefit of Barre and his allies'. Thus:

The Somali national government was predatory and it existed largely to benefit Barre and his allies rather than the average Somali . . . The upside to the neglect and exploitation suffered under Barre's rule is that Somalis relied on traditional clan networks and informal markets to survive. These clan networks, which had existed for generations, and the new informal markets that emerged during the 1980s would play an important role in Somalia's economic performance after the national government collapsed in 1991.²¹

The connection between absence of a predatory government and positive development is especially conspicuous in the pastoral sector:

Overall, the performance of the rural pastoral sector in the absence of a state has been quite remarkable. Since the sector depended little on the state, and often *suffered under it*, pastoral Somalis have generally done better without a nation state than with one.²²

Similarly Mubarak maintains that the informal economy took over after the collapse of the Somali state and claims that there is a direct link between absence of state predation and positive economic development: 'as far as economic welfare is concerned absence of government has proven to be better than the repressive institutions and improper policies of Barre's government' and "'no-government'" has proven to be far better than the repressive government of Siad Barre'.²³ The repressive nature of the collapsed Somali state also appears in Menkhaus' analysis, although the linkage between the paradoxically positive developments under statelessness and the repressive nature of the collapsed state is somewhat indirect: the thriving civil society actors, especially businesspeople, view reconstruction of the Somali state as a threat because of its previous history of repression and, therefore, they turn into 'spoilers' who abort state reconstruction.²⁴

The connection between the repressive nature of the collapsed state and improved well-being in the aftermath of state collapse is most systematically expressed in Leeson's aforementioned study of Somali welfare. Leeson argues at a theoretical level that 'if a state is highly predatory and its behaviour goes

unchecked, government may not only fail to add to social welfare, but actually reduce welfare below its level under anarchy'.²⁵ Consequently, in Somalia, 'contrary to our typical intuition . . . it seems that social welfare has improved because of, rather than despite, the absence of a central state. Somalia's government was oppressive, exploitative and brutal. The extent of this predation created a situation in which social welfare was depressed below the level it could achieve without any government at all.'²⁶ Once absence of state predation is identified as the main cause, the normative choice becomes obvious: between 'ultra-predatory government and statelessness, statelessness may be preferable'.²⁷

While referring to internal factors such as the predatory nature of the collapsed state as the main cause of well-being under statelessness, this body of literature tends to de-emphasise the role that external factors may have played in a similar direction. For instance, Leeson points out that remittances and the intervention of UNOSOM in 1993–94 led to the transfer of resources to Somalia but he nevertheless claims that 'there is some reason to be skeptical that they, rather than state collapse, are responsible for Somali development'.²⁸

At an empirical level these accounts may be a valid explanation of what has been happening in Somalia, although, it has to be noted, the argument appears to be derived from a hypothesis which is rooted in a liberal conceptualisation of statehood rather than in a quantitative analysis which establishes a negative correlation between indicators of state predation and those of economic and social welfare.

At a more general theoretical level, however, there are reasons to presume that the picture is more complicated. On the one hand, collapse of a repressive state may explain improvements in the areas of civil liberties and personal freedoms. A comparison of stateless Southern Somalia with Somaliland and Puntland, which are governed by *de facto* states, would lend support to such a theoretical proposition. While Southern Somalia enjoyed the political goods—especially those related to a free mass media—mentioned above, Somaliland and Puntland, while faring better than they did under Barre's regime, experienced attempts on the part of authorities 'to interfere with media providers'.²⁹ On the other hand, however, as a general theoretical explanation, the proposition that identifies the repressive–predatory nature of the collapsed state—with or without any interaction with the dynamics of civil society—as the cause of paradoxical consequences of state collapse is not satisfactory: it overemphasises endogenous factors that are vested in the domestic arena, while neglecting the exogenous factors that operate at the regional and international level. In this respect the case of the collapse of the Lebanese state in 1975 is particularly informative.

Paradoxical consequences of state collapse in Lebanon in 1975–82

In April 1975, following an ambush of a bus carrying Palestinian demonstrators to the Tel Zatar refugee camp, armed groups started exchanging fire in the Lebanese capital Beirut and its surroundings. After

11 months of intensive communal fighting, in March 1976 the Lebanese army, which had so far taken a neutral stance in the conflict, disintegrated in the aftermath of a mutiny of Muslim troops under the leadership of Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib and the creation of the Lebanese Arab Army. During the following 14 years Lebanon, for all practical purposes, would fit into the category of collapsed states—at a time when this concept was hardly used by students of international relations and comparative politics.

Seen from the perspective of this article, there are striking similarities between Somalia between 1991 and 2006 and Lebanon between 1975 and 1982. In both countries state authority, conceptualised in terms of the Weberian notion of statehood as the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and exertion of territorial control, had collapsed as a result of civil strife. Similarly in both countries the initial period of intensive fighting was followed by a period of relative tranquillity in the frontlines and the emergence of a *de facto* truce that prevailed most of the time. Moreover, both in Lebanon and Somalia military invasions by regional powers—the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1982 and the Ethiopian invasion of Southern Somalia in 2006—put an end to this period of relative peace that had emerged under statelessness. Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of the argument presented here, in a manner that indicates that there is nothing unique about the case of Somalia, Lebanese society showed signs of well-being in the economic and social spheres after the collapse of the Lebanese state.³⁰

The paradoxical developments in Lebanon were observed by several scholars, who studied the issue from an economic rather than a political scientific viewpoint. As a consequence, these developments were not analysed with reference to the concepts of state collapse or state failure. According to a detailed study of Lebanese political economy conducted by Gaspard, the country's *laissez-faire* economy 'did display ... economic resilience in the unfavourable and frequently warring circumstances of 1975–1990' and 'there is little doubt that, during fifteen years of stop-go political crises and armed conflict, the economy performed reasonably well, displaying flexibility and a notable capacity of adjustment to uncertainty and difficult operating conditions'.³¹ Another study by Khalaf and Rimlinger of the Lebanese labour market during the first seven years of the conflict claims that 'normal macro symptoms of economic ravages; massive unemployment, runaway inflation, serious shortages, grave balance of payment difficulties and a rapidly deteriorating foreign exchange rate, [are not] visible in Lebanon after several years of debilitating political conditions'.³² Finally, according to a study of the Lebanese economy during the civil war carried out by Nasr, 'civil strife and continuous confrontation coexisted with economic prosperity' between 1975 and 1982 and 'during these years of strife the standard of living of most Lebanese remained stable or even improved'.³³

The positive developments after the collapse of the Lebanese state have taken place in the financial, economic and social spheres. One of the most salient features of the post-civil war Lebanese economy was financial stability. The Lebanese pound was relatively strong in relation to major

foreign currencies until the financial crisis of the mid-1980s. Although the value of the US dollar increased from 2.7 Lebanese pounds in 1972–74 to 3.7 in 1979–81, it was only during the two-year period of 1986–87 that, ‘after almost four decades of stability, the exchange rate depreciated by an annual average of 80 percent’.³⁴ The Lebanese banking sector remained robust and intact, to such an extent that an analysis of the financial situation during the first decade of the Lebanese civil war regarded ‘Lebanon’s banking system ... as an “international regime” that held the country together’ and ‘as the principle “regime” that supported the country’s political elite as well as its economy in the face of uncivil, multinational warfare’.³⁵ Moreover, there was steady increase in GDP per capita during this period, according to one estimate, from \$1415 in 1974 to \$2011 in 1982, a 42% increase during the first seven years of the civil war.³⁶ There was no significant drop in public revenue, but nominal increases combined with some amount of fluctuations.³⁷ Another paradoxical feature of the post-state collapse period was the flexibility of the Lebanese labour market. According to Khalaf and Rimlinger, during the first seven years following the start of the civil war there was no evidence of widespread domestic unemployment,³⁸ despite massive losses of jobs in the non-agricultural sector, from 436 650 in 1970 to 331 511 in 1977.³⁹ Gaspard, in turn, estimates that non-public sector employment between 1974 and 1987 increased by 11%—an average of 0.8% per year—largely as a result of ‘occasional or irregular employment’.⁴⁰

This period of state collapse in Lebanon also witnessed the redistribution of economic resources and enhanced welfare for wider sections of the population. In some respects this should come as no surprise. As pointed out by Nasr, as a result of the break-down of law and order ‘all kinds of extortion ... pillage, seizure, occupation, forced taxation, smuggling and other forms of forced transfer proliferated’. The outcome was a ‘redistribution’ which benefited ‘the lower middle classes ... the suburbs and peripheries ... segments of the Muslim sects ... [and] ... private armies and sectarian factions’ at the expense of ‘the old bourgeoisie’ ... Beirut and central Lebanon ... the Christian sects ... [and] ... state administration and financial institutions’.⁴¹ However, this redistribution was also partially attained through legitimate and peaceful means. According to one report, ‘efficient pressure by the trade unions, despite the political fragmentation of the country, allowed the working class to match [the general increase in national income per capita]: The monthly minimum wage rose from \$135 to \$195 between 1975 and 1982, an increase of 45 percent’.⁴²

Perhaps most perplexingly, although the Lebanese army disintegrated and the Lebanese state lost its Weberian monopoly of the legitimate use of violence over its territory and hence, was a collapsed state in this respect, several institutions of the state continued to function and even enhanced the scope of their operations. Before the eruption of the civil war the Lebanese state was a liberal *laissez-faire* state, which played a minimal role in the economic and social life of the country. However, ‘the war period’, in the words of Saidi, ‘led to a radical change in the importance of government in the structure of the economy’.⁴³ Public spending increased at an average of

5% annually during the period 1975–85, resulting in a threefold increase in the relative share of the public sector.⁴⁴ In order to compensate for the negative effects of the civil war on the Lebanese people, the government started to subsidise a number of basic commodities such as petrol, sugar and wheat. Public sector employees continued to receive their salaries, albeit with delays, in spite of widespread absenteeism. Together with the increase in defence spending after 1982, all these policy measures were funded by external borrowing, and this was to have devastating consequences by mid-1980.⁴⁵ However, during the first seven years of the post-state collapse era, these measures improved the general welfare of Lebanese citizens.

Expansion and decentralisation of higher education during this period is another paradoxical consequence of state collapse in Lebanon. Although the number of foreign students and foreign university establishments decreased—at least partially because of the emergence of new universities in other parts of the Middle East—there was a significant growth in the Lebanese higher education sector. In 1975 there were five universities and seven higher education institutions in Lebanon and, with the exception of the University of Kaslik, which was located in Jounieh, all these educational bodies were situated in Beirut. By the end of the civil war the number of universities had increased to six and the number of higher education institutions to 14, and most of the faculties of the Lebanese University were split and relocated in different regions of Lebanon. The number of students enrolled at universities increased from 56 600 in 1974–5 to 70 300 in 1981–82, while the proportion of Lebanese students increased from 42.7% to 62.5% during this same period.⁴⁶

The non-repressive Lebanese state and exogenous factors

What are the factors behind such paradoxical developments following state collapse? As mentioned above, in the context of Somalia scholars mainly—though on a theoretical rather than an empirical basis—explain the relative well-being of Somalis under statelessness with reference to the repressive nature of the collapsed state. In other words, Siad Barre's regime was so corrupt and predatory that Somalis were better off under statelessness than under such a repressive state. However, such an explanation would not be valid in the case Lebanon.

Since independence in 1943, the Lebanese state has been a non-repressive state, where confessional power-sharing arrangements within the framework of a consociational democracy,⁴⁷ minimal intervention in the economic and social spheres and a weak central state apparatus have been the hallmarks of the political system. The origins of this system can be traced back to the National Pact of 1943, an unwritten tacit arrangement between the Maronite and Sunni elites of the country that determined the foreign policy orientation of Lebanon and the power-sharing arrangements between the confessional groups. In Barak's words, 'that a strong state did not emerge in Lebanon in the wake of its independence was not a coincidence. The elite . . . who crafted the political system and monopolized it using an exceptionally effective

system of patronage, viewed the state essentially as negative . . . The Lebanese leaders did their utmost to restrain the capabilities of the state.⁴⁸ Thus the army was kept weak partially with reference to the neutrality of the country as it was stipulated in the National Pact and partially to avoid a similar development as in neighbouring Arab states, where the armed forces had become the dominant institution in politics.⁴⁹ Consequently, 'Lebanon's small, under-equipped security forces were incapable of defending against serious challenges to state authority'.⁵⁰ While other significantly less prosperous Arab states developed stable, albeit authoritarian state institutions, Lebanon has 'evolved' towards a 'non-state model . . . whose motto might well be *e uno plura*'.⁵¹ Moreover, in the political arena Lebanon did not promote a state ideology—ie an equivalent of Egypt's Nasserism, Syria's Baath Arab nationalism, Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism or Tunisia's secularism—that could weld the Lebanese society together. In the words of Farid al-Khazen, 'to a "state ideology" the Lebanon has preferred an "ideology" of community existence elaborated since the National Pact of 1943'.⁵²

The Lebanese state also had a minimal role in the economic sphere both as a provider of political goods and as an extractor of economic resources. In other words, it was not only a non-provider but also a non-predator state and hence was diametrically the opposite of the type of state that plundered Somalia during Siad Barre's regime.⁵³ To a certain extent the minimal economic role of the Lebanese state was the result of the social determinants of a 'confessional economy' which was

a natural outcome of an extensive intersection of interests of the then basically dominant Maronite Christian bureaucrats and Sunni Muslim trading families. The former group was primarily interested in developing and securing a stable source of public finance which, in the context of the then prevailing conditions and structures of the Lebanese economy, could only be based on custom duties on foreign imports. Much of this activity was controlled primarily by a handful of very powerful Sunni trading families in the coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. These traders saw their interests best served by a government restricted to building an efficient trade-accommodating physical and social infrastructure and maintaining a policy environment favourable to free trade.⁵⁴

The outcome of this intersection of confessional economic interests was an 'implicit economic and social contract', which

called for the public sector to invest heavily in building an extensive infrastructure of trade routes, ports, airports, warehouses, and an excellent communications network. It also required the government to restrict its activity in promoting competing commodity producing sectors or regions that could undermine the dominance and the free flow of imports. The terms also called for a pro-free trade, pro-business policy environment with minimal government interference, low or no income or profit taxes, bank secrecy laws, and a free foreign exchange market.⁵⁵

State involvement was also minimal in the sphere of social welfare. Somewhat surprisingly 'large-scale public welfare was only secured during

the Lebanese civil war through militias, to the constituencies within their mini-states. Social policies in these cantons exceeded the Lebanese state's own welfare'.⁵⁶ Furthermore, before the collapse of the state, one of the characteristic features of economic development in Lebanon was the 'absence of effective public economic participation and direction manifested by the absence of overall economic policy targets'.⁵⁷ The non-involvement of the government in the economic sphere was extreme, prompting Gaspard to write that 'for over 40 years, Lebanon has been the only laissez-faire economy in the developing world'.⁵⁸ Given the marginal political, social and economic role of the Lebanese state, it would be appropriate to conclude that the predatory or repressive nature of the collapsed state cannot be the independent variable in the Lebanese case. The relative well-being of Lebanese society in the post-state collapse era cannot be explained with reference to such an endogenous factor.

On the contrary, two exogenous factors,⁵⁹ remittances from Lebanese living abroad and the so-called 'political money' from regional powers account for the entry of large amounts of resources into the Lebanese economy, and hence explain the relative well-being in the country during the post-state collapse period. To start with, Lebanon has always had a very large diaspora community, mainly in South America and West Africa, and the eruption of the war in 1975 accelerated emigration, especially of skilled labour, and the growth of this diaspora community.⁶⁰ One consequence of this was an increase in remittances and transfers from emigrants living abroad to families living in war-torn Lebanon. According to one estimate, the amount of money which was pumped into the Lebanese economy increased from \$910 million in 1975 to \$2254 in 1980; thus the remittances constituted 35.4% of the Lebanese national income in 1980.⁶¹ As will be seen below, Lebanese living in the Gulf states played a predominant role in this respect: they were supplying more than one-third of the entire economic resources of their country by 1982.⁶² It is reasonable to presume that these figures account for only a fraction of the money coming into Lebanon. According to a study of the remittances economy in the Arab world, 'there is mounting evidence that remittances flow largely through informal channels. They are literally hand-carried'⁶³ and 'formally recorded remittances are only the tip of the iceberg. The size of that which remains submerged is not known.'⁶⁴

Emigration from Lebanon also partially explains the absence of massive unemployment during the post-state collapse era in the country. The collapse of the Lebanese state occurred at a favourable regional economic conjuncture which created demand for Lebanese labour:

Running almost parallel to the first period of the Lebanese internal war, the oil boom and the tremendous and sudden increase in the revenues of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf after 1973 led to a huge demand for labor power, goods and entrepreneurial skills. Lebanese workers and professionals alike responded in very large numbers to this historic opportunity, coming precisely at a time when the Lebanese economy was beginning to feel the effects of the

continuing internal strife. The number of Lebanese migrant workers in the Gulf states rose from 50 000 in 1970 to 98 000 in 1975 and 210 000 in 1979–80. These workers, who represented 13 percent of the national work force in 1975, had by 1980 reached the level of 34.6 percent of the entire work force.⁶⁵

Furthermore, two more factors contributed to the absorbing of the surplus workforce and eased the pressure on the Lebanese labour market. Before the start of the civil war Lebanon was displaying the typical symptoms of urban–rural imbalance that characterises the situation in much of the developing world. As Nasr points out, ‘on the eve of the civil war, the crisis and the depopulation of the Lebanese countryside was at an advanced stage’ and ‘a very large dispossessed population of rural origin was desperate to find jobs and housing in the miserable slums of Beirut’.⁶⁶ Although ‘these masses became a large reserve of cheap labour for the industries and tertiary sector firms in Beirut’ during the 1960s, no more than 19.5% of the 118 000 Lebanese who left the agricultural sector found employment elsewhere.⁶⁷ The civil war changed this situation. Since the hostilities were concentrated on urban areas, this migration pattern was reversed: the unemployed of the large cities started to move back to the countryside. According to Khalaf and Rimlinger’s detailed study of the Lebanese labour market during the first period of the civil war, ‘of the 281 000 members of the “displaced workforce”’—given the absence of unemployment in Lebanon during this period—between 105 000 and 143 000 must have been relocated within ‘the domestic economy’, mainly in ‘the informal and the agricultural sectors’.⁶⁸ The second factor, which will be surveyed in more detail below, has to do with employment and recruitment opportunities provided by militia organisations. With the eruption of the civil war many Lebanese men, who were living in destitute conditions, were recruited as foot soldiers by paramilitary organisations. This was particularly true for Shi’a Muslims, who constituted the most disadvantaged confessional group in Lebanon. Although the majority of the Shi’a fighters were recruited by the two communist organisations and later by the Amal movement, it was even possible to find Shia among the ranks of several Christian militia groups.⁶⁹ Another organisation which intensively recruited Shi’ites as foot soldiers was the PLO, prompting the Shi’a leader Musa Sadr to say that Arafat was ready to fight Israel to the last Shi’a. In a similar manner a survey of Sunni Muslims in Sidon published in 1983 found that ‘it is the poor who also belong to a militia’ and ‘the probability that militia members were from low income groups was 80 percent better than chance’.⁷⁰

The second exogenous factor explaining the relative well-being in Lebanon after the collapse of the state is what has alternatively been called ‘political money’,⁷¹ or ‘the Palestinian economy’.⁷² These expressions refer to cash and assets transferred from foreign powers into Lebanon to support their clients and allies. According to one estimate, by the early 1980s money pouring into the coffers of various paramilitary organisations and the 17 foreign intelligence services which were ‘financially active’ in the country had reached \$300 million a year—or some 6% of GDP.⁷³ During the period under

investigation the most important actor in this respect was the PLO which, after the defeat of its fighters in Jordan in September 1970, moved its headquarters to Beirut and started to use Lebanon as the base for its military, political, social and financial operations. As pointed out by Nasr:

In 1981, according to estimates, the 'Palestinian economy' generated more than 15 percent of the gross domestic product in all of Lebanon. The PLO and its affiliated institutions became one of Lebanon's major employers, creating 10 000 jobs directly and 30 000 indirectly. Its 15 000 fighters spent most of their salaries in Lebanon. The 'Palestinian economy' transferred substantial deposits to the banks of Beirut. It operated and developed important institutions (a radio station, a daily newspaper, several magazines, a research center, eight hospitals, 100 schools, 108 diplomatic missions abroad administered from Beirut). The entire PLO budget was by this time probably larger than that of the Lebanese state itself. In any case the contribution of the 'Palestinian economy' was a substantial factor in the first war period's relative economic 'prosperity'.⁷⁴

According to another study, which also covers the second, post-1982 period of the civil war, both Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias controlled one-third of the Lebanese GDP; their income was estimated to be around \$40 billion during the entire period of the civil war.⁷⁵

One of the most important effects of the political money pouring into Lebanon were the welfare services provided by militia organisations to their constituencies. Baylouny notes that 'it was the militias who were the main provider of social welfare for many Lebanese during the civil war. In their attempt to establish mini-states, create legitimacy, and forestall popular protest against their rule, militias furnished varying degrees of social services'.⁷⁶ The scope of these services was wide, covering anything from health care, social insurance and education to the provision of security, regulation of public beaches and rubbish collection. The development of such a broad range of services was a gradual process. Initially paramilitary organisations were concerned about the health of the fighters and their families. However, these services were subsequently expanded to the population living in the territories controlled by the relevant organisations, with the purpose of creating political loyalty among that population.⁷⁷ Consequently these organisations ended up providing welfare support to between one-quarter and one-third of the Lebanese population during the period of the civil war. The outcome was a somewhat paradoxical responsiveness on the part of the militia organisations. For instance, when one of the public opinion polls conducted during 1980s revealed that public support for the Christian paramilitary organisation, Lebanese Forces, had dropped by half because its welfare services were unable to keep up with the hyperinflation prevalent at the time, the response of the Lebanese Forces was 'to plan more elaborate social service programmes'.⁷⁸

There are two sets of evidence which indicate that provision of welfare, and hence the relative well-being of the Lebanese during the post-state collapse era, was not due to the internal dynamics of civil society during this period.

One emerges from a survey of civil society organisations in Borj Hammoud, a district in east Beirut, in the early 1970s. With the exception of Armenians and Palestinians all confessional groups were dependent on ‘family and patronage rather than formal political parties or other ethnic-sect organizations to obtain services and political protection’.⁷⁹ The high levels of civil society activity among Armenians and Palestinians could be explained with reference to exogenous factors. Both communities were highly networked at the regional and international levels. The Armenian diaspora was actively involved ‘in and effected strategy decisions made by [Armenian] parties, churches and other agencies in Borj Hammoud. Armenian organizations in Borj Hammoud became local arms of international organizations.’⁸⁰ Similarly Palestinians ‘felt the direct impact of foreign governments and international agencies’ and several Palestinian organisations were established under the sponsorship of foreign Arab states.⁸¹ This case study casts some light on the external dynamics of civil society activity in Lebanon before the start of the civil war and there is no reason to presume that this situation did not persist after the eruption of the war and the collapse of the Lebanese state.

More evidence emerges from a comparative study of civil society organisations during and after the end of the civil war. As mentioned above, the role played by residual state institutions as the subsidiser of basic commodities and the employer of civil servants, together with the dominant state-like militia organisations as providers of social welfare, characterised much of Lebanese socioeconomic life during post-state collapse era. However, the end of the civil war in 1990 and the reconstruction of the Lebanese state involved radical changes in both areas. On the one hand, with the exception of Hizbullah, all state-like militia organisations and their social welfare services disappeared from the scene, prompting nostalgic remarks on the part of Lebanese that ‘they missed the war’, that is to say ‘the welfare services that militias provided during the war.’⁸² On the other hand, the reconstruction of the Lebanese state was accomplished following neoliberal premises and the emergent state was much like the minimalist, laissez-faire state of the pre-war period. ‘The state’s role in the economy’, Baylouny writes, ‘declined in employment, social services, and subsidies’.⁸³ It is at this point in the 1990s—rather than during the civil war in the 1970s and 1980s—that civil society organisations such as kinship groups and ‘alternative social aid organizations’—proliferated in Lebanon to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of militia welfare and the retreat of the state from the public sphere as a provider of economic support to citizens. During the civil war such civil society institutions were marginal and confined to those Lebanese who were excluded from militia welfare because of their ethnicity or religion.⁸⁴

Conclusions

If the analysis presented in the previous pages is convincing, then it is possible to conclude this article with three general statements about the paradoxical

consequences of state collapse. At a theoretical level the case of Lebanon indicates that there is nothing unique or endemic about positive social and economic developments in the aftermath of state collapse and that we could expect such developments in other parts of the world as well as in Somalia. Similarly, as in the case of Somalia, Lebanon experienced relative well-being in the aftermath of the collapse of state authority in 1975. The banking system and the Lebanese pound were stable; there was a steady increase in GDP per capita; no mass unemployment; some degree of redistribution of resources within Lebanese society, partly thanks to trade union activism; subsidising of basic commodities by the residual government institutions that survived; and, finally, expansion and decentralisation of higher education. Equally importantly, the case of Lebanon also points towards the significance of exogenous factors in explaining the causes behind such positive developments. Factors such as political money pouring in from foreign powers, employment opportunities provided by paramilitary organisations, together with a regional labour market capable of absorbing the surplus Lebanese labour force, and remittances coming in from diaspora communities, generated positive social and economic developments in Lebanese society in the aftermath of state collapse. Consequently, at a more abstract and general level, there are reasons to be sceptical about explanations that emphasise endogenous factors, such as the repressive and predatory nature of the collapsed state and the capacity of civil society to move in and perform those functions that are normally performed by a state, as the *only* explanatory variables. At least in the case of Lebanon, and possibly in several other cases including Somalia, external factors do have an explanatory value in understanding relative well-being under statelessness.

At an empirical level, with insights gained from a case study of Lebanon, it is possible to question some of the results of previous research on Somalia. Is it really the case that the predatory and repressive nature of the Siad Barre regime explains the relative social and economic well-being under statelessness in Somalia? Do societies actually fare better under statelessness than they do under repressive states? A positive answer to these questions—and hence, refutation of the Hobbesian maxim—requires systematic studies that establish two types of linkages: a positive correlation between indicators of state collapse and indicators of state or state-like repression that departs from a broader notion of statehood, which also includes militia rule; and a negative correlation between indicators of state collapse and those of social and economic well-being. Furthermore, on the basis of a study of Lebanon, it is also possible to raise questions about Somalia that emphasise the role of exogenous factors. To what extent is it possible to explain the positive developments in the post-state collapse era in Somalia with reference to external factors such as remittances pouring in from the large Somali diaspora living in western Europe and North America, or investment by international companies or aid from international organizations, or by reference to political money which may be emanating from external powers with political ambitions in Somalia? Such questions, which focus on the role

of external factors, are not asked in the literature on Somalia and deserve more attention.

At a conceptual level the case of Lebanon shows the limitations of our understanding of state failure or collapse, which is informed by two different conceptualisations of these terms. One conceptualisation departs—often implicitly—from a Weberian notion of statehood as the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within a delimited piece of territory. Consequently state collapse is seen as ‘loss of control over political and economic space’ and a situation where the state is unable to carry out its basic functions such as being, among other things, the ‘security guarantor for a populated territory’, the ‘decision making center of government’, and ‘a symbol of identity’.⁸⁵ The other conceptualisation, which is adopted, for instance, by the Failed States Index, focuses on the output side of statehood, ie the state as an institution that provides services and ‘political goods’ for its citizens. Here, the point of departure appears to be an ideal type of a fully fledged liberal welfare state, which provides a hierarchically ranked set of political and public goods to its citizens, from provision of basic ‘security’ to ‘essential freedoms ... medical and health care ... schools and educational instruction ... physical infrastructures ... a money and banking system ... a beneficent fiscal and institutional context within which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals ... [and] methods of regulating the sharing of the environmental commons’.⁸⁶ As a result, state collapse or failure is conceptualised as the inability to provide a significant portion of these political goods and states are ranked, in accordance with their performance in these areas, as ‘strong’, ‘weak’, ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’.⁸⁷

In two ways the case of Lebanon demonstrates the problematic aspects of these notions of state failure and collapse. At one level, it reveals the *contradictory* nature of these conceptualisations. Due to a loss of territorial control and the deterioration of state authority the post-1975 Lebanon was a clear-cut case of state collapse according to the first notion, which departs from the Weberian concept. However, when we take into account the emergent role of several residual state institutions as providers of welfare through employment and subsidisation of basic commodities, we acquire a contradictory picture: some kind of state building or some improvement in the Failed States Index on the basis of a conceptualisation of state collapse that departs from an understanding of statehood as provider of public goods. At a deeper level, however, the case of Lebanon shows the limitations of both conceptualisations of state collapse or failure to the extent that both of these notions depart from the premise that a state is a unitary actor which achieves territorial control and/or provides public goods. In contrast to this assumption the case of Lebanon illustrates how fragmented a state can be: during the first period of the civil war several institutions of the Lebanese state, such as the army and the police, had declined to the point of becoming dysfunctional and unable to perform their basic duty of establishing law and order. This was happening at the same time as several other institutions of the same state, such as a number of ministries, were invigorated in such way that they took upon themselves the task of providing public goods like

employment and subsidisation of basic commodities, in order to alleviate the suffering of war-torn Lebanese citizens. This was something that the Lebanese state had refused to do in peace time both before and after the civil war.

Notes

- 1 P Leeson, 'Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse', *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 35(4), 2007, p 699. See also B Powell, R Ford & A Nowratesh, 'Somalia after state collapse: chaos or improvement?', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 67, 2008, pp 662–665.
- 2 J Mubarak, 'The "hidden hand" behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia', *World Development*, 25(12), 1997, pp 2027–2028.
- 3 Leeson, 'Better off stateless', p 692.
- 4 K Menkhaus, 'Governance without government in Somalia—spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping', *International Security*, 32(3), 2006–07, p 74.
- 5 Powell *et al.*, 'Somalia after state collapse', p 657.
- 6 Mubarak, 'The "hidden hand" behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia', p 2031.
- 7 Leeson, 'Better off stateless', p 703.
- 8 Mubarak, 'The "hidden hand" behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia', p 2031; and P Little, *Somalia: Economy without State*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003, p 144.
- 9 The central bank of Somalia was plundered and destroyed as early as in 1991. See Little, *Somalia*, p 144.
- 10 Mubarak, p 2032.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p 2033; Leeson, 'Better off stateless', p 703; and B Powell *et al.*, 'Somalia after state collapse', pp 661, 663.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p 701; and Mubarak, 'The "hidden hand" behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia', p 2032.
- 13 Little, *Somalia*, p 37.
- 14 Leeson, 'Better off stateless', pp 696–698.
- 15 Powell *et al.*, 'Somalia after state collapse', pp 664–6665. See also p 657.
- 16 Mubarak, 'The "hidden hand" behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia', pp 2034–2035.
- 17 Powell *et al.*, 'Somalia after state collapse', pp 667, 669.
- 18 Leeson, 'Better off stateless', p 698.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 T Hobbes, *Leviathan*, London: Penguin Books, 1968, p 186.
- 21 Powell *et al.*, 'Somalia after state collapse', pp 658, 659.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p 661, emphasis added.
- 23 Mubarak, 'The "hidden hand" behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia', pp 2028, 2038.
- 24 Menkhaus, 'Governance without government in Somalia', pp 75–76.
- 25 Leeson, 'Better off stateless', p 690.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p 706.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p 707.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p 699.
- 29 Cf *ibid.*, p 698.
- 30 It has to be noted that this view is not universally accepted. In the available literature two works tend to emphasise the negative economic consequences of the civil war. See A Kubursi, 'Reconstructing the economy of Lebanon', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 21(1), 1999, pp 72–75; and N Saidi, *Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon*, Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1986, pp 1–2.
- 31 TK Gaspard, *A Political Economy of Lebanon 1948–2002—The Limits of Laissez-faire*, Leiden: Brill, 2004, pp xx, 189.
- 32 NG Khalaf & GV Rimlinger, 'The response of the Lebanese labour force to economic dislocation', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 18, 1982, p 300.
- 33 N Salim, 'Lebanon's war: is the end in sight?', *Middle East Report*, January–February 1990, p 5.
- 34 Gaspard, *A Political Economy of Lebanon*, pp 192, 90. See also Saidi, *Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon*, p 18.
- 35 CH Moore, 'Prisoner's financial dilemmas: a consociational future for Lebanon?', *American Political Science Review*, 81(1), 1987, p 201.
- 36 Nasr, 'Lebanon's war', p 6.

- 37 Cf Saidi, *Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon*, p 10.
- 38 *Ibid.*, pp 306–307.
- 39 Khalaf & Rimlinger, ‘The response of the Lebanese labour force to economic dislocation’, p 303.
- 40 Gaspard, *A Political Economy of Lebanon*, p 191.
- 41 Nasr, ‘Lebanon’s war’, p 5. According to Harik, ‘looting on a massive scale’ was ‘the most visible and active “economic activity” among both the Christian militias and the Muslim ones’. I Harik, ‘The economic and social factors in the Lebanese crisis’, in SE Ibrahim & NS Hopkins (eds), *Arab Society Social Science Perspective*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1985, p 414.
- 42 Nasr, ‘Lebanon’s war’, p 6.
- 43 Saidi, *Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon*, p 10.
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 See *ibid.*; AM Baylouny, *Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East—Kin Mutual Aid Associations in Jordan and Lebanon*, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010, pp 60–62; and S Makdisi, ‘An appraisal of Lebanon’s postwar economic development and a look to the future’, *Middle East Journal*, 31(3), 1977, p 276.
- 46 C Nahas, ‘Finance and political economy of higher education’, in A Galal & T Kanaan (eds), *Financing Higher Education in Arab Countries*, Cairo: Economic Research Form (ERF) Policy Research Report No 34, 2010, pp 52–53.
- 47 A Lijpart, *Democracy in Plural Societies—A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, pp 147–150.
- 48 O Barak, ‘Lebanon: failure, collapse, and resuscitation’, in RI Rotberg (ed), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003, p 314.
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 *Ibid.*, p 315.
- 51 Michael C Hudson, quoted in S Goglio, ‘Lebanon: from development to civil war’, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Summer 1997, p 79.
- 52 Farid al-Khazen, quoted in *ibid.*, p 86. See also RH Dekmejian, ‘The consociational democracy in crisis—the case of Lebanon’, *Comparative Politics*, 10(2), 1978, p 261.
- 53 According to one study, predation in Lebanon started after the eruption of the civil war. See E Picard, ‘The political economy of civil war in Lebanon’, in S Heydemann (ed), *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000, pp 301–302.
- 54 A Kubursi & JJ Siam, ‘The economy of Lebanon, 1950–2002: what happened to the Lebanese economic miracle?’, *Journal of Social Affairs*, 23(89), 2006, pp 15–16.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p 16.
- 56 Baylouny, *Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East*, p 48.
- 57 Makdisi, ‘An appraisal of Lebanon’s postwar economic development and a look to the future’, pp 267–268.
- 58 Gaspard, *A Political Economy of Lebanon*, p xix.
- 59 It should be noted that there were also a couple of endogenous factors in operation in Lebanon between 1975 and 1982. As mentioned above, trade union activism in the mid-1970s may explain improvements in the living standards of the less privileged social classes. Moreover, at the start of the civil war, ‘Lebanon possessed a considerable economic reserve’ in terms of ‘surplus in its balance of payments of more than \$4 billion and very strong coverage of the Lebanese pound in gold and hard currencies’, in addition to private savings of the middle and upper classes. Nasr, ‘Lebanon’s war’, p 5. However, these factors, though important, appear to be less significant compared with the huge amount of money that poured into the Lebanese economy from abroad.
- 60 See Saidi, *Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon*, p 6; and Nahas, ‘Finance and political economy of higher education’, p 52.
- 61 Nasr, ‘Lebanon’s war’, p 5.
- 62 *Ibid.*
- 63 N Choucri, ‘The hidden economy: a new view of remittances in the Arab world’, *World Development*, 14(6), 1986, p 704.
- 64 *Ibid.*, p 697.
- 65 Nasr, ‘Lebanon’s war’, p 5.
- 66 S Nasr, ‘Backdrop to civil war—the crisis of Lebanese capitalism’, *MERIP Reports*, 73, December 1978, p 10.
- 67 *Ibid.*
- 68 Khalaf & Rimlinger, ‘The response of the Lebanese labour force to economic dislocation’, pp 307–308. However, the authors also note that it is particularly difficult to estimate the figures because of ‘the importance of family as well as seasonal labour’ in the agricultural sector.
- 69 Harik, ‘The economic and social factors in the Lebanese crisis’, p 414.

- 70 H Khashan & M Palmer, 'The economic basis of civil conflict in Lebanon: a survey analysis of Sunnite Muslims', in TE Farah (ed), *Political Behaviour in the Arab States*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983, p 78.
- 71 See, for instance, Nahas, 'Finance and political economy of higher education', p 52.
- 72 See, for instance, Nasr, 'Lebanon's war', p 5.
- 73 *Ibid*, pp 5–6.
- 74 *Ibid*, p 5.
- 75 Baylouny, *Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East*, p 64.
- 76 *Ibid*, p 62.
- 77 *Ibid*.
- 78 See *Ibid*, pp 62–63.
- 79 S Joseph, 'Local-level politics and development in Lebanon: the view from Borj Hammoud', in LJ Cantori & Iliya Harik (eds), *Local Politics and Development in the Middle East*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, p 147.
- 80 *Ibid*, pp 149–150.
- 81 *Ibid*, p 150.
- 82 Baylouny, *Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East*, p 47.
- 83 *Ibid*, p 68.
- 84 See *ibid*, pp 71–72.
- 85 W Zartman, 'Introduction: posing the problem of state collapse', in Zartman (ed), *Collapsed States—The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp 9, 5.
- 86 R Rotberg, 'The failure and collapse of nation-states—breakdown, prevention, and repair', in Rotberg (ed), *When States Fail—Causes and Consequences*, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004, p 3.
- 87 *Ibid*, pp 2–10.

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