

**CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project**

**CIVIL SOCIETY IN UGANDA:  
AT THE CROSSROADS?**

**DENIVA, June 2006**

## FOREWORD

The Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) is working in partnership with CIVICUS to assess the state of civil society in Uganda through the Civil Society Index. Established in 1988, DENIVA provides a platform to mobilise diverse experiences, knowledge and skills of civil society organisations in Uganda to promote their collective action. Our overall objective is to provide a common voice to influence poverty reduction and good governance policies in favour of the poor and the marginalised. DENIVA was therefore keen to participate in the CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation, a project aimed at strengthening citizen participation and civil society.

The role of Civil Society has been increasing in Uganda, especially regarding development and democratisation. We however have very limited information on the characteristics, roles and impact of civil society towards positive social change. The information collected so far will therefore be important in informing the strategies and activities of the national and international community in advancing sustainable development, good governance, a culture of democracy and human rights.

Many stakeholders including government, development partners, academicians, and civil society informed the CSI implementation exercise. This information will be very relevant therefore in advancing the advocacy role of civil society. It also provides an opportunity to measure, document and share the status, health and impact of civil society the world over.

The implementation exercise will continue, specifically publishing and widely disseminating the findings to a wider audience.



Prof. J.B Kwesiga  
Executive Secretary

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) would like to acknowledge the efforts of a wide range of stakeholders who participated in carrying out the Civil Society Index (CSI) in Uganda. The CSI was implemented using the methodology developed by CIVICUS. We would like to thank all the people and organisations that participated in the different phases of the implementation process, at the national, district and community level. We recognise the support received from donors, Ms Uganda and CIVICUS, without whom this work would not have been completed.

Thanks to the National Advisory Group (NAG) for volunteering their very precious time, knowledge, skills and finances to the CSI right from its initiation. The members of the NAG include: Okello Geoffrey – Gulu NGO Forum, Abdul Busulwa – National Union of the Disabled Persons of Uganda, Muguzi Henry – Anti Corruption Coalition of Uganda, Grace Ssebugwawo - National Association of Uganda Small Business Organizations, Babirekere Cotilda - Uganda Media Women's Association, Chris Businge - Kabarole Research Centre, Kabarole, Fr. Silverster Arinaitwe – Uganda Joint Christian Council, Japhes Mukiibi Biimbwa – Ms Uganda, Charles Businge - DFID, Peter Sentongo – Prime Ministers Office, Fredrick Mugenyi Ssansa- Prime Minister’s Office and Moses Omiat – Soroti Civil Society Network. We look forward to your continued cooperation.

We are also grateful to the special individuals who carried out the different stages of research. The Overview Report was done by John De Coninck, Private Consultant, the Community and the Regional Surveys were conducted by the Community Development Resource Network. Bichachi Odoobo, of Fountain Publishers, conducted the Media Review and finally the Fact Finding Studies were done by John Bagoza Mugabi, working with the Parliament of Uganda. We also appreciate the efforts of Stephen Bahemuka and Anthony Matovu of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, for analysing and interpreting all the statistics used in this report. We would also like to recognise the special work done by John De Coninck, (Civil Society Expert) in writing the Uganda National CSI Report.

Finally, we would like to thank the CIVICUS Team; Benita Young, Navin Vasudev, Andria Hayes-Birchler and Volkhart Finn Heinrich for their tireless support, technical advice and patience exhibited at all times during the implementation process.



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
## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document was prepared by the Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), as part of an international initiative, the Civil Society Index (CSI) project, coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The CSI assesses the state of civil society in more than 50 countries around the world, in order to “*enhance the strength and sustainability of civil society, and its contribution to positive social change*”.

For the purposes of this study, civil society was defined as *the space between family/households, state and the private sector, and is characterised by its emphasis/focus on the common good of the society*”.

The report analyses 72 indicators, relevant for understanding Uganda’s civil society. The scores are classified under four main dimensions: structure, environment, values and impact. These dimensions are then visually presented in the Civil Society Diamond, which summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society.

**FIGURE I: CIVICUS Civil Society Diamond for Uganda**



Within the **structure** dimension, the size, strength and vibrancy of civil society are analysed, in terms of human resources, organisational and economic features, extent and depth of citizen participation, diversity of civil society participants, level of organisation, inter-relations and civil society resources. The score for this dimension is **1.8**, indicating a ‘rather strong’ structure for Uganda’s civil society.

When examining the structure of Uganda’s civil society, a mixed picture emerges. On the one hand, citizen participation in CSOs appears to be very extensive. To a great extent this is because rural life, in this largely agrarian country, is often accompanied by membership in various forms of community and other mutual help groups, which are rather socially inclusive, and to which church-linked organisations can be added. Thus, volunteering and

other forms of community action appear to be prevalent. However, for reasons often linked to the country's history of civil strife and repressive regimes, such participation does not necessarily mean an 'activist' political involvement. This was highlighted as a 'weakness' of Uganda's civil society at a National Workshop, which was held to discuss the research results at the conclusion of the CSI project.

Super-imposed upon this large number of community groups are other, often more recent, forms of CSOs. These include 'NGOs' and their many networks and coalitions, trade unions and other forms of mostly urban-based forms of collaborative undertakings, such as professional associations. These appear to often be a donor-dependent part of civil society, with staff, vehicles, projects and agendas that ordinary people do not always associate with, or feel close to. It is a somewhat fragmented and competitive sector that is often governed by suspicion, and where accountability to donors often takes precedence over accountability to the local population. Nevertheless, there is evidence that it is gradually re-structuring itself, for example through networks, and by attempting to regulate itself. National Workshop participants voiced their desire that efforts in both these directions be amplified and sustained.

When analysing the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment within which civil society exists and functions, the score for the **environment** dimension is **1.4**. This indicates an environment that is somewhat more "disabling" than "enabling" for civil society.

This is partly explained by the analysis of the political and socio-economic contexts, which are seen as rather disabling for civil society. While enshrined in the Constitution, political and civil rights, information rights and press freedom are not always respected and the opening of political competition is still recent and seen as pregnant with uncertainties. Insurgency continues in the northern part of the country at considerable human and economic cost.

Uganda remains an extremely poor country, although less poor than 20 years ago, with a growing gap between the rich and the poor. Corruption is rampant, although the effectiveness of state services has improved significantly in the last two decades. Connected to these deficiencies, the CSI also found moderate levels of interpersonal trust, tolerance and public spiritedness among Ugandans.

The legal environment for civil society is also judged to be not as enabling as it could be. This is due to the cumbersome registration procedures for CSOs, which, to the dismay of National Workshop participants, may soon be tightened even further, the poor tax environment and the Government's ambivalent attitude on what constitutes allowable advocacy activities for CSOs, especially when they 'stray' into what it considers the political arena.

The latter point highlights a relationship between the state and civil society where, overall, both parties see their role as one of collaboration, rather than confrontation. This echoes the low degree of 'political activism' within civil society, and the historical role of CSOs in Uganda, which focuses on service delivery. Nevertheless, this relationship is changing on several fronts. Both parties are increasingly seeing advocacy work as a legitimate area of work for CSOs to engage in. It is also one that donors support, and government is opening avenues for, especially at the district level, where CSOs are being contracted for service delivery. The tendency is increasing and replacing the rather weak State apparatus. NGOs

must now temper their accountability role and may even adopt more business-like attitudes, which are both positive and negative.

Less important at the present time is the relationship with the private sector. CSOs do not feel especially concerned with this relationship, since they currently do not benefit much from funding from the private sector, except in a few high-profile cases.

However, are CSOs themselves increasingly turning into private businesses? This question is a symptom of a broader one, linked to a profoundly changing operating environment, as the boundaries between the state, the private sector and civil society become increasingly blurred. It is a question that underlines a growing challenge for CSOs wishing to retain autonomy, which cannot be nurtured without a strong sense of identity. Can civil society hold the state accountable to the people, without a strong sense of values to effectively perform their 'fourth estate' role?

The analysis then turned to civil society's **value base**. Overall, Uganda's civil society was rated to practice and promote positive social values to a "moderate extent", with a score of **1.9** for this dimension.

Having noted the changing context within which CSOs operate and how their positioning with regard to "democracy" has shifted with time, and recalling their important role in the fight for independence and their subsequent intimidation by the neo-colonial state, it was found that some CSOs continue to struggle with living and promoting values that are frequently associated with the 'voluntary sector'. This is especially true of CSOs grappling with internal democracy and transparency and the promotion of democracy, but it also applies to other values, such as 'tolerance', 'non-violence' and 'gender equity'. In all such cases, there seems to be a hiatus between rhetoric and practice, which, in the case of NGOs, reflects the social desirability and material benefits associated with "NGO work". This can lead to disillusionment among other stakeholders, such as donors, who then question the legitimacy of CSOs in representing the poor.

CSOs appear more comfortable with 'poverty eradication' as a value, and, to some extent, 'environmental sustainability'. This corresponds with their historical role and the way most of them define their current primary role in Uganda's civil society. It is apparent that this also comes through when examining the 'impact' of civil society.

The **impact** dimension describes the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions in Ugandan society and politics. The score for Impact is a rather high **2.3**.

The overall picture that emerges is one of intense CSO activity, including that of faith-based organisations, in service delivery and citizens' economic and social empowerment, rather than other forms of engagement, such as policy advocacy work or holding Government and private corporations accountable. The direct provision of social and economic services is also where one finds the most substantial traces of impact. There are several reasons for this. The strengths of civil society in these areas of work include: proximity to beneficiaries, the diversity of its skills and competences and civil society's commitment. However, one can add the weight of history and tradition; the large number of community organisations, specifically set up to meet members' livelihood needs; the rather donor-driven nature of advocacy work and the limited credibility of CSOs in this area. Another important issue is the desire, on the

part of CSOs, to complement the work of Government, rather than question it, either because it corresponds to their worldview and social make-up or because they find a measure of benefit in this positioning, such as contracts for service delivery work.

In spite of these obstacles, noticeable change is taking place. NGOs are increasingly involved in trilateral meetings with donors and government on major policy priorities. The voice of civil society is beginning to be heard more loudly on issues, including human rights, basic needs and people's marginalisation.

Some networks and coalitions are proving to be effective in this respect, providing members with fora through which the collective consensus of organisations can be expressed to policy makers and others. Efforts are also being made to develop skills, and to enhance citizen participation in local governance. Taking a medium-term perspective, there is some evidence that opportunities for influencing Government are growing.

While further efforts were considered desirable by National Workshop participants, it was recognised that this will require better collaboration among CSOs, more autonomy from Government and enhanced credibility in the eyes of all stakeholders. This, however, can only be realised if suspicions among CSOs are allayed, sub-contracting from government is controlled and an emerging 'NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism' is implemented.

This is a significant agenda item for CSOs in Uganda to move ahead with. In a sense, Uganda's civil society is at a crossroads. Will it confine itself to a somewhat docile role, focusing on service delivery and sub-contracting from government? Or will it further develop its capacity to question the socio-political make-up of Uganda, striving to augment its autonomy, its sense of independent identity, its cohesion and its local ownership?

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACFODE	Action for Development
ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
CBO	Community-based organisation
CDRN	Community Development Resource Network
CPRC	Chronic Poverty Research Centre
CS	Civil Society
CSI	Civil society Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DENIVA	Development network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations
DETREC	Development and Training Resource Centre
DRT	Development Research and Training
FHRI	Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives
FIDA	Association of Women's Lawyers
FOWODE	Forum for Women in Development
IDP	Internally displaced person
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
KRC	Kabarole Research Centre
LC	Local Council
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDGs	Millenium Development goals
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Development Services
NAG	National Advisory Group
NAPE	National Association of Professional Environmentalists
NOCEM	National Organisation for Civic Education & Monitoring
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PMA	Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture
UDN	Uganda Debt Network
UGRC	Uganda Gender Resource Centre
UJCC	Uganda Joint Christian Council
ULS	Uganda Law Society
UMA	Uganda Manufacturers' Association
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
UPDNet	Uganda Participatory Development Network
USSIA	Uganda Small-scale Industries Association
UWONET	Uganda Women's Network
WVS	World Values Survey

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## INTRODUCTION

This document has been prepared as part of a project implemented by the Development network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), the Civil Society Index (CSI) project. This is part of a broader international endeavour, spearheaded by the CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, which assesses the state of civil society in more than 50 countries around the world, in order to eventually “*enhance the strength and sustainability of civil society, and its contribution to positive social change*”.

The project is inserted in a context where, according to CIVICUS, “*despite the increasing role of civil society in development and democratisation, there is a crucial lack of a body of knowledge about the characteristics, roles and impact of civil society towards positive social change. This knowledge is crucial to inform the strategies and activities of the national and international community in advancing sustainable development and good governance and a culture of democracy and human rights*”.

In Uganda specifically, the project is meant “*to map out the NGO Sector in Uganda and contribute towards improving the quality of their structures, credibility and policy advocacy activities for a vibrant, active and independent Civil Society that will command respect among other stakeholders in development and governance activities in Uganda.*” More immediately, the mapping exercise will “*generate and share useful and relevant knowledge on the state of civil society*” and “*increase the capacity and commitment of civil society stakeholders to strengthen civil society.*”

### Structure of the Publication

The structure of this report broadly follows the methodological process outlined above, with Section IV-VI mostly reflecting the discussions held at the National Workshop.

Section II, Putting Civil Society in Context, offers a description of key national characteristics, of the history of civil society in Uganda, and of the local definition of this concept.

Section III, Mapping Civil Society, presents a brief overview of the make-up of civil society in the country, as a result of a “social forces analysis” and “civil society mapping” exercises carried out by the NAG.

Section III, entitled Analysis of civil society presents the information and data collected during the CSI project implementation. It includes analyses of individual indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions, albeit in varied levels of detail. This section is divided along the four dimensions of the CSI diamond: Structure, Environment, Values and Impact. At the beginning of each section, graphs are provided with scores for all its sub-dimensions on a scale from 0 to 3. The findings for each dimension are then examined in detail. A separate box provides the scores for the individual indicators for each sub-dimension.

Section IV, Strengths and Weakness of Uganda’s Civil Society, summarises part of the discussions and results of the National Workshop.

Section V, Recommendations, presents the specific recommendations identified by the same workshop participants and at the regional consultations.

Section VI, Conclusion, offers a brief recap of the main outcomes of the CSI work in Uganda.

The report concludes with a full bibliography of consulted published and ‘grey’ sources, as well as a list of the researchers who contributed to the process.

# I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT & APPROACH

## 1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index (CSI) originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics at the time, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI (Anheier 2004). The CSI concept was tested in 14 countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1.1).

**Table I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005<sup>1</sup>**

1. Argentina	19. Germany	38. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Ghana	39. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Greece	40. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Guatemala	41. Russia
5. Bulgaria	23. Honduras	42. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Hong Kong (VR China)	43. Serbia
7. Chile	25. Indonesia	44. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Italy	45. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Jamaica	46. South Korea
10. Croatia	28. Lebanon	47. Taiwan
11. Cyprus <sup>2</sup>	29. Macedonia	48. Togo
12. Czech Republic	30. Mauritius	49. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Mongolia	50. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Montenegro	51. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Nepal	52. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Netherlands	53. Vietnam
17. Gambia	35. Nigeria	54. Wales
18. Georgia	36. Northern Ireland	
	37. Orissa (India)	

## 2. PROJECT APPROACH

The CSI is based on a broad definition of civil society and uses a comprehensive implementation approach, which utilises various research methods. In order to assess the status of civil society in a certain country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society: structure, environment, values and impact. Each dimension comprises a number of subdimensions, which include a number of individual indicators. The indicators represent the basis for data collection within the CSI. The data is collected through several methods:

<sup>1</sup> This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted, as of August 2006.

<sup>2</sup> The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

secondary data collection, a population survey, a civil society stakeholder survey, regional workshops, a media review, structured expert consultations and several case studies. The indicators are then separately assessed and discussed by the NAG. The outcomes of the research and assessment are also discussed by the representatives of the key stakeholders at the National Workshop. The task at the National Workshop is to identify the specific strengths and weaknesses and to provide recommendations for key actions aimed at strengthening civil society. The CSI project approach, the conceptual framework, research and assessment methodology are described in detail in this section.

## 2.1. Conceptual framework

### *How to define the civil society?*

CIVICUS defines *civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests.*<sup>3</sup> The CSI has two interesting features that contrast other civil society concepts. First, its goal is to avoid the conventional focus on formal and institutionalized civil society organisations (CSOs) by also considering informal coalitions and groups. Second, whereas civil society is sometimes perceived as an area with positive actions and values, the CSI seeks to assess both the positive and the negative manifestations of civil society. This concept consequently includes not only the humanitarian organisations and associations active in environmental protection, but also, groups such as skinheads and aggressive football supporter groups. The CSI does not only assess to what extent the CSOs support democracy and tolerance, but also the extent of their intolerance or even violence.

### *How to conceptualize the state of civil society?*

To assess the state of civil society, the CSI examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- ? The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- ? The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state, as well as the private sector);
- ? The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- ? The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).

Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of subdimensions, which contain a total of 74 indicators.<sup>4</sup> These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and form the basis of the data presented in this report. The indicator – subdimension - dimension framework underpinned the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report, the NAG’s assessment of Croatian civil society and the presentations at the National Workshop. It is also used to structure the main section of this publication.


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<sup>3</sup> In debates about the definition of civil society in regional stakeholder consultations, the NAG meetings and the National Workshop participants agreed to use the word *space* instead of *arena*.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix 1. However, in the case of Uganda only 72 indicators were used.

To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool (see figure I.2.1 below as an example).<sup>5</sup> The Civil Society diamond graph, with its four extremities, visually weaknesses of civil society. The diagram is the result of the individual indicator scores aggregated into sub-dimension and then dimension scores. As it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about how civil society looks like in a given country. As the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot, and should not, be used to rank countries according to their scores for the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time, as well as compare the state of civil societies across countries (Anheier 2004).

**FIGURE I.2.1: CIVICUS Civil Society Diamond**



## 2.2. Project methodology

This section describes the methods used for collecting and aggregating of various data used in the project.

### 2.2.1. Data Collection

The CSI recognised that, in order to generate a valid and comprehensive assessment of civil society, a variety of perspectives and data should be included – insider, external stakeholder and outsider views, as well as objective data ranging from the local, the regional to the national level. The CSI therefore includes the following set of research methods: (1) Review of existing information, (2) Regional stakeholder consultations, (3) Population survey, (4) Media review and (5) Fact-finding studies.

It is believed that this mix of different methods is essential to generate accurate and useful data and information, and also accommodates the variations of civil society, for example in rural versus urban areas. The CSI also seeks to utilise all available sources of information to avoid ‘re-inventing research wheels’ and wasting scarce resources. Lastly, the research methodology is explicitly designed to promote learning and, ultimately, action on the part of participants. Besides feeding into the final national-level seminar, data collection processes also aim to contribute to participant learning. This is done, for example, through group-based approaches that challenge participants to see themselves as part of a “bigger picture”, to think beyond their own organisational or sectoral context, to reflect strategically about relations within and between civil society and other parts of society, to identify key strengths and weaknesses of their civil society and assess collective needs. It is important to note that the CSI provides an aggregate needs assessment on civil society as a whole, and is not designed to exhaustively map the various actors active within civil society. However, it does examine power relations within civil society and between civil society and other sectors, and identifies

<sup>5</sup> The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier 2004).

key civil society actors when looking at specific indicators under the structure, values and impact dimensions.

The CSI process, initiated and managed by civil society organisations (CSOs), has, to the extent possible, been participatory. DENIVA has worked with a number of stakeholders including government, private sector, CSOs and CIVICUS on this. DENIVA has been assisted by a National Advisory Group (NAG), of 12 organisations representing civil society, the business sector, government and donors, and a team of locally based researchers.

After assessing the state of civil society, the project identifies strengths and weaknesses of civil society and develops an action-agenda to address any weakness and build on any strengths. The process has comprised a number of stages, starting with preparing a map of civil society in the country, as well as:

- ✍ A review of existing secondary data on civil society to draft a preliminary overview report and identify ‘knowledge gaps.’ An *overview report* was prepared in June 2005, with some data subsequently updated to reflect more recent developments and information.
- ✍ A *community survey* in 11 districts throughout the country. This involved sampling from all residents in 5 purposely selected villages/Local Council (LC)1s (3 rural and 2 urban) per district. Five hundred fifty respondents were randomly selected in these villages, with a response rate of about 50%.
- ✍ A *regional survey* that, contrary to the community survey, was mostly targeted at CSO-oriented respondents. There were 185 respondents to this survey, 68% of whom worked for a CSO; 11% worked for a government agency, interfacing with civil society; 6% dealt only marginally with civil society; 3% worked in the business sector and did liaison work and 3% did research/wrote on civil society issues. Eight percent belonged to other groups. Fifty-six percent of respondents said that their primary level of work is at district level; 16% operated at national level and another 16% operated at regional level; 12% operated at ‘other’ levels (community level, such as community based organisations (CBOs), and international level).
- ✍ *Regional consultations.* A consultation was held in Northern, Western, Eastern and Central Uganda each, with the aim of further probing selected issues arising from the regional surveys, discussing definitions of civil society, its strengths and weaknesses, and to identify a way forward. These consultations were held in November and December 2005 and altogether brought together 69 participants
- ✍ A *media review survey.* The media review surveyed print, radio and TV media, examining the exposure they gave to civil society issues over one month: October-November 2005 for the broadcast media and January-February 2005 for the print media. However, this work suffered from its timing (election time) and the short periods involved. In addition, political parties were included as CSOs, making the compatibility of the data with other sources sometimes difficult to establish.
- ✍ *Fact finding studies,* which attempted to look into corporate social responsibility, the ‘impact’ of CSOs on the situation of internally displaced people in Northern Uganda, the impact of CSOs on the situation of street children and on the national budget process.
- ✍ A *national workshop,* held on 7 June 2006, brought together 80 participants, mostly with an NGO background, to discuss the survey findings, analyse civil society strengths and weaknesses, as well as identify a knowledge-based policy and advocacy agenda to strengthen the sector.

### 2.2.2. Aggregating data

The project team collected various types of data for the draft report and structured them according to the CSI indicators, subdimensions and dimensions. Each indicator was attributed a score between 0 and 3 (0 being the lowest value and 3 the highest). Each potential indicator score (0, 1, 2 and 3) was described in either qualitative or sometimes quantitative terms. The NAG scoring exercise is modelled along a “citizen jury” approach (Jefferson Centre 2002), in which citizens come together to deliberate, and make decision on a public issue, based on presented facts. The NAG’s role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence (or data) presented by the National Index Team (NIT) in the form of the draft country report.

The process of indicator scoring, performed by the NAG, was based on a discussion on the information provided for each indicator. Based on this discussion and the scoring matrix featuring the indicator score descriptions, the NAG decided on a score for each respective indicator. The National Workshop also played a role in validating the indicators, if an adequate rationale was provided, national workshop participants could decide to change the indicator score provided by the NAG. This only happened in one case, and national workshop participants were also asked to provide comments and inputs related to the CSI findings. As a result of the workshop, participants built a common understanding of the current state of civil society and recommended initiatives for civil society strengthening.

## 2.4. Project outputs

The CSI implementation in Uganda delivered several products, including:

- ? A comprehensive report on the status of civil society in the country;
- ? A list of recommendations, strategies and priority actions developed by various stakeholders, aimed at strengthening civil society in Uganda;

This final country report includes research findings, scores, and the outcomes of the national workshop. It will be published for national and international readership. CIVICUS will analyse and integrate the findings and lessons learned and publish a synthesis report, together with a set of analytical and comparative papers. The data generated by the CSI will also serve as the foundation for a global database on civil society established by CIVICUS.

## II PUTTING CIVIL SOCIETY IN CONTEXT

### 1. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT IN BRIEF

**FIGURE II.1.1: Country Information**

Surface area (sq.km)	236,000	Uganda, while geographically small by Africa standards (236,000 sq. km), is a diverse country, with 15% of its land area covered by water, with semi-desert regions, as well as fertile agricultural land and permanently snow-capped mountains, in spite of its situation straddling the equator. Its current population, estimated at 27 million, is predominantly rural as the country has one of the lowest urbanisation rates on the continent, although it also has one the fastest population growth rates in the world.
Population:	27,000,000	
Population density (person/sq.km):	114	
Population growth rate (% p.a.)	3.2	
Population under 15 years (% of total):	49	
Urban population (% of total):	12	
Form of government:	Parliamentary	
Democracy		
Freedom House Democracy rating:	Partly free	
Seats in parliament held by women (%)	23	
Official language:	English	
Religion: Roman Catholic (% of total)	42	
Protestant (% of total)	36	
Pentecostal (% of total)	5	
Muslim (% of total)	12	
Human Development Index (ranking):	146	
GDP per capita (US\$):	250	
Literacy rate (%):	70	
Unemployment rate (% of labour force):	3.2	
Underemployment (% of labour force):	15	

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, led by President Museveni, has been in power since 1986. This followed a long period, post independence, of political violence and state failure. A referendum held in July 2005 led to the adoption of a multi-party system and the presidential and parliamentary elections held in February 2006 were the first multi-party elections in Uganda for 25 years. Incumbent President Museveni was re-elected with 59% of the vote, while his main challenger got 37%.

Despite significant economic growth for over a decade, Uganda remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with 38% of the population living below the poverty line (approx. \$1 per day) and a per capita income of around \$300 per annum. Peace throughout the national territory has proved elusive with an insurgency that has devastated the northern part of the country for much of the last two decades.

With much donor support, Government has steered Uganda's economic recovery from the near total collapse of the 1970's and early 1980's: after a focus on rehabilitating key social and economic infrastructure, then establishing and maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment, the government has turned its attention to structural strategies aimed at translating macroeconomic success into improvements in people's standards of living. This has been concretised in Uganda's main policy framework, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), initially formulated in 1997 and under implementation since then. The PEAP spells out Government's intentions, with a view to eventually reducing absolute poverty to less than 28% by 2013/14 and reaching most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by then (CPRC, 2005).

Uganda has made substantial progress towards achieving some of the MDGs. The country is on track to meet the universal primary education MDG, with 86% of school age children enrolled in primary school in 2003. Progress has been made in health with, for example, an increase in the proportion of children immunised from 41% in 1999 to 89% in 2004 but further progress is needed if the targets for maternal mortality and under-5 mortality are to be reached by 2015. Uganda's achievements in the fight against AIDS have attracted attention, with a reduction in the HIV prevalence from 18% to 6% in the last decade (DFID, 2006).

## 2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL SOCIETY<sup>6</sup>

The current characteristics of Uganda's civil society find many of their roots in the country's experiences in the past eight decades, going back to the colonial era, when the State was the main provider of social services within the overall design of an export-oriented economy based on small-holder agricultural producers. A measured (though highly regulated) development of CSOs was then encouraged, with CSOs primarily consisting of co-operatives of export crop growers and trade unions/associations, as well as mission-established hospitals and educational establishments, and other charitable institutions.

After World War II, trade associations and co-operatives increasingly engaged in political activism and the fight against colonialism (Mamdani, 1976: 181). In addition to restrictive legislation, the authorities responded by guardedly opening certain avenues, such as with assistance to cooperatives to acquire cotton ginneries. With Independence approaching, in an attempt to ensure the development of a 'middle class', a delicate relationship was created with CSOs, some of which were indeed to give rise to pre-Independence political parties (De Coninck, 2004a). In addition, organisations along kinship lines or on a self-help basis were tolerated. Thus, most local organisations before the mid-1980s occurred along a self-help basis at the very local level, including burial societies, neighbourhood associations and other very small-scale and non-political groups (Dicklich, 1998:48ff).

After independence, the peasant cooperative societies and trade unions were taken over by the Government and bureaucratised (enmeshing the "state", "civil society" and the "market")<sup>7</sup>. Consequently, the demarcation between "civil society" and "government" started to become blurred. CSOs were challenged in other ways too: mission schools were integrated within the state system; political parties were eventually banned and other forms of political dissent, often associated with the traditional kingdoms, curtailed. CSOs were henceforth confined to the more 'traditional fields' ('charity', health delivery) and sustained in doing so by the earlier interventions of 'charity'-oriented international NGOs (De Coninck, op. cit.).

The 1970s saw Idi Amin's repressive regime. *"Most Ugandans were too terrorized by the state for the duration of the 1970s and 1980s to engage in any overt political or economic activity, and therefore restricted their participation to covert, low-key activities"* although the churches became were extremely committed and strong on the issue of human rights observance. Those in power, however, also manipulated religion to serve their ends (Dicklich, 1998:48ff). The only space then left for organised civil society was in the "traditional fields" of charity and service delivery, especially health. With the increasing inability of the state to provide social amenities, churches and like-minded groups played an increasing role in the provision of welfare services, which was further expanded with Amin's departure in 1979 and the return of Obote II (1980-1985), which also attracted international

<sup>6</sup> This section is mostly an edited excerpt from De Coninck (2004a) and De Coninck (2004b).

<sup>7</sup> This phenomenon of enmeshment still exists with people moving effortlessly from one sector to the other.

NGOs (De Coninck, op.cit). People organised themselves to overcome challenges caused by the various insurgencies. *“Although during the colonial period, most CSO activity was restricted to humanitarian, missionary, business and farmers needs, the subsequent civil wars created an opportunity for the CS to grow and expand”* (Hansen and Twaddle, 1998:147)

By 1986, therefore, *“chaos had only allowed a truncated form of civil society to emerge, much weaker than in some other parts of East Africa at the time. Young, cowed, and used to close State supervision, it emerged either ‘politicised’ (the Churches), moribund (the Trade Unions), banned (the ‘traditional kingdoms’) or complacent with its cosy, non-confrontational relationship with the State (development organisations, mostly expatriate-managed and dominated by high-profile international relief NGOs)”* (De Coninck, op. cit).

The National Resistance Movement government took over power in 1986 and inherited a near collapsed economy. This was then followed by a period of reconstruction and relative freedom that provided space for the emergence of indigenous CSOs. Simultaneously, the relative peace that prevailed in many parts of Uganda after 1986 encouraged people to build their own CBOs, including self-help farmers’ groups and many other types of voluntary associations. The 1990s also witnessed a very rapid growth in the numbers of CSOs<sup>8</sup> because many donors preferred to channel their financial support to them, as they were considered “less corrupt, more efficient and closer to the community”. Wallace (2004) asserts that the concern at that time about the ‘overblown nature of the state’ and its related inefficiencies in Uganda (as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa) led to its re-definition as a stumbling block to the economic reforms considered necessary to achieve development.

This era of growth saw most NGOs engaged in service delivery. It also established (...) *the tendency for NGO growth to be driven by the availability of donor funding at least as much as by the need to provide an answer to specific locally rooted social or economic imperatives; (...this) was also the time when NGOs established their position at the apex of social desirability. Working for a recognised NGO, often ‘middle-class’ and ‘urban’ in its cultural and political orientation, especially where an international NGO is concerned, became a prized social achievement, accompanied by what many consider a luxurious lifestyle, rather than a commitment to an alternative societal vision”* (De Coninck, 2004:5)<sup>9</sup>.

Subsequently, the NRM (and its often fervent donors or “development partners”) re-affirmed the centrality of the state, but in a decentralised form with many responsibilities for service delivery located at district level. The role of many NGOs – still primarily engaged in service delivery – was also redefined with new funding channels opened for *sub-contracting* at district and lower levels for the provision of social services. While funding channels for NGOs have witnessed a significant change (although direct donor funding is still available, especially for those NGOs which espouse the much heralded shift towards holding government to account and other forms of “advocacy” work), NGOs still view themselves primarily as service deliverers.

The NRM government has been in power since 1986 and has recently succeeded in securing another 5 years in power. Recent constitutional amendments (especially the removal of ‘term limits’ on the presidency) have bred some resistance within civil society ranging from being

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<sup>8</sup> From 160 registered NGOs in 1986, their number grew to 600 in 1990 and 3500 in 2000. In 1992-3, for instance, expenditure by NGOs in Uganda was estimated at US\$ 125 million, almost equivalent to the World Bank’s contribution to the Rehabilitation and Development Plan that year (Dicklitch, ibid.)

<sup>9</sup> The term ‘briefcase NGO’ also emerged then to characterise shady undertakings masquerading as NGOs.

muted to openly challenging the government and questioning government policy. Churches and some CSO have taken a stand on this and other contentious issues, at times leading to suspicion and mistrust between the state and civil society.

### 3. OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

CIVICUS defines civil society as *the arena, outside of the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests*. To what extent is such a definition applicable to the context of Uganda? Reflecting the relatively recent character of the concept and its lack of indigenous characterisation (for reasons discussed below), we find relatively few local definitions, which can be broadly classified under:

*a. Legal definitions* These have centred on “NGOs”, rather than civil society or CSOs, a fact explained by the existence of the ‘NGO statute’ since 1989, a time when the label ‘civil society’ was not a common currency; and because of the ambivalent meaning given to the term ‘NGO’, also a product of history (see above). The Statute defines an NGOs as “*an organisation established to provide voluntary services including religious, educational, literary, scientific, social and charitable services to the community or any part thereof*” (Uganda Government, 1989, section 13).

This definition is not without its difficulties. Commentators have thus argued that the term “voluntary” is rather vague; that the focus on service provision may no longer describe current circumstances; that the definition does not allow for the existence of services to be paid for (no fees are allowable), and there no distinction made between NGOs and CBOs, or between membership and non-membership organisations, networks, groups, etc.

*b. Definitions from academia* J. Barya proposes: “*Civil society (...) lies constituted by the traditionally well known civic and political associations on the one hand and what in the last two decades have come to be referred to as Non-Governmental Organisations (although) not all NGOs would necessarily qualify as civil society organisations. The traditional civil society organisations include: trade unions, employer's associations, professional associations, religious organisations, cooperatives (...) in the process of social struggles generally or struggles against the state. NGOs are a heterogeneous category that ranges from politically active organisations, to local mutual self-help groups, reasonably organised income generating associations and religious or cultural organisations*”(Barya, 1998: 4,5). The same author later suggested: “*(...) we disagree that political parties should be included in the conceptualisation of the phenomenon of civil society. This is because political parties aspire to capture state power...*” (Barya, 2000:5).

Of particular relevance here is the attempt by scholars of civil society in Africa to demarcate themselves from the more Western-inspired notions, with a strong emphasis on engaging the state and on formal organisations. Tripp, for instance, makes a strong case for the inclusion in any analysis of civil society in the African context (and her focus is Uganda) of small groups, where women predominate, leading to a gender-aware definition of civil society space (as opposed to a limiting oneself from the male dominated formal organisations normally associated with this notion)<sup>10</sup> and where action is not necessarily always directed towards directly engaging the state.

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<sup>10</sup> “If gender relations are recognised as political, it is essential to reconceptualise civil society to include the struggles of women’s groups for social change in male dominated society African societies. A similar point can

*c. Definitions from “practitioners”* DENIVA, of the national apex organisations for CSOs in Uganda, offers this definition in one of its recent brochures (2003): “Civil society are organisations, organised groups, individuals that come together voluntarily to pursue those interests, values and purposes usually termed the “common good”. CSOs are diverse and include Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community groups, labour unions, professional associations, faith-based organisations, and parts of academia and the media. They operate at all levels, from the village and community through to national and international levels. CSOs are self-governing, voluntary and non-profit distributing. They often work in partnership with governments; Some CSOs are involved in commercial activities but any profit is used to further “common good” objectives”.

Another (indirect) attempt at definitions is provided by the Allavida Foundation, whose presentation of NGOs is meant in part as a showcase to attract financial support: “There are many different types of NGOs in Uganda, which encompass a huge variety of organisations. This report focuses largely on CBOs, such as self-help, mutual-interest (organisations), and non-profit organisations (NPOs), which are defined as organisations established with charitable or humanitarian goals and include umbrella organisations, communal land associations, trusts and foundations. These organisations can work at local, national and/or international levels” (Allavida, 2003:10).

Third, we note the “home-grown” nature of any definition. Thus De Coninck (2004a:58) notes: “This era of growth for civil society organisations [the late 1980’s and early 1990’s], established (...) the lasting association – even equation – of ‘civil society’ with ‘NGOs’, while trade unions and co-operatives, were being undermined by structural adjustment, liberalisation and retrenchment...” We also note that some representatives of Uganda’s ‘civil society organisations’, when asked their opinion, do not wish their organisations to be considered part of civil society. This is for instance often the case with Church leaders, with media workers and with trade union leaders.

The CSI NAG brainstormed on the meaning of civil society in Uganda (participants were asked to mention what comes to mind when the word civil society is mentioned), at which the notion of working for a common good featured prominently. The private sector and Government with all its arms were excluded, as well as where “no common good is reflected in terms of actors or activities aimed at benefiting large sections of the community”. In the event, the NAG developed the following working definition: *Civil society is the space between family/households, state and the private sector, and its characterised by its emphasis/focus on the common good of the society”.*

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be made for other marginalised groups – peasants and the urban poor” (Kasfir, 1998:16), on Tripp “Expanding Civil Society: Women and Political Space in Uganda”.

## 4. MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN UGANDA

Our selection of civil society organisations to examine for the CSI project closely follows the DENIVA and NAG definitions. This is presented in the table below

**FIGURE II.4.1: Organisations that are part of civil society**

Included organisations	Excluded organisations
? NGOs (non-governmental organisations)	? Private sector for profit organisations.
? Faith-based/religious organisations	? For profit media organisations
? Community-based organisations (CBOs)	? Schools and universities
? Community groups	? Political parties
? Trade unions / federations	? Independent constitutional commissions
? Professional associations	? Any type of Government body
? Parent-teacher associations and other user committees (e.g. water point committees).	? Bilateral and multi-lateral donor agencies
? Associations of NGOs and or CBOs.	? Resistance and (later) local councils
? Business associations/federations.	
? Independent academic institutes.	
? Sports associations	
? Not-for-profit media organisations	

*Traditional cultural institutions* Are traditional leaders and their institutions part of civil society? Tindifa argues that this may differ with the region, quoting Nsibambi who argues that “*the institutions of chieftainship are institutions of civil society with a lot of potential for the mobilisation of people.*” (Tindifa, 1998:204). Oloka Onyango notes that the inclusion of traditional monarchies within civil society is “*a vexed issue (...) several of these groups are beginning to play more concerted roles in the determination of local-level politics in particular.*” (2000a:14)<sup>11</sup> Overall therefore traditional kingdoms have been excluded, but other local traditional cultural institutions, such as burial groups and other self-help groups have been included as CSOs.

## 5. CIVIL SOCIETY IN RELATION TO OTHER INSTITUTIONS

The most influential groups within civil society were mapped by the NAG and included Human rights organisations; Anti-corruption coalitions; Gender-based groups; Child-focused coalitions; Conflict and peace-building coalitions; Faith-based institutions and National networks, indicating the strength of CSOs working together (this is further discussed in section IV.1 below).

As part of the preparatory work for this project, the NAG also attempted to map those sectors, institutions, and groups that play an important part in influencing society (such as political parties, churches, and the military), with key reasons.

*Among the most influential were:*

- ✍ The executive arm of government – because almost all policies are derived from there.
- ✍ The president – because he sets Uganda’s political agenda and many people can now refer to him for all sorts of help; he controls resources and uses them as ‘instruments of coercion’.

<sup>11</sup> Similarly, “*so far as the Buganda monarchy is concerned, it continues to invigorate itself and plays an increasingly prominent role (...) as a quasi-state institution*”(Logan et al, 2003:3).

- ✍ International donors – because they fund over 50% of the national budget, although local influence is less when intermediaries are involved.
- ✍ Faith-based organisations in terms of behaviour change
- ✍ Members of parliament
- ✍ CSOs within the reach of community because they are responding to specific priority interests.
- ✍ The business community because they make consumables available.
- ✍ Local councils in terms of law enforcement, coordinating district activities and central government.

*Among the moderately influential were:*

- ✍ Religious institutions because they have a large following and are respected.
- ✍ Civil society – more focussed on addressing specific needs of communities
- ✍ The private sector.
- ✍ Gender related campaigns because many have influenced a number of institutions to mainstream gender into their programmes and organisations.
- ✍ The central government because it approves the policies for the country.

*Among the less influential were:*

- ✍ Institutions of higher learning - because they have not been able to effectively relate theory with practice.
- ✍ Political parties – they have a very low level of credibility
- ✍ Groups for the elderly – they have received little or no attention, with no strong institution championing their interests.

This analysis fits with the historical trajectories outlined above: thus, the state apparatus has succeeded in re-emerging as a central, all-powerful player in Uganda's society, buttressed in doing so by influential donors, who fund close to half the government's budget. The economic and social policies espoused by the NRM in recent years have allowed for the growth of a fairly vibrant (and unfettered) private sector, while rural communities have been allowed (and encouraged) to form their own groups and organisations. Within other sections of civil society, religious institutions remain influential, as well as other CSOs involved in the provision of social services.


### III ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

This section presents the information collected during the CSI project. It includes analyses of individual indicators, sub-dimensions and dimensions. This section is divided along the four dimensions of the CSI diamond: **Structure, Environment, Values and Impact**. At the beginning of each section, graphs are provided with scores for all its sub-dimensions on a scale from 0 to 3. The findings for each dimension are then examined in detail. A separate box provides the scores for the individual indicators for each sub-dimension.

#### 1. STRUCTURE

Within the Structure dimension the size, strength and vibrancy of civil society are described and analysed in terms of human resources, and organisational and economic features. The score for this dimension, averaging the scores for the relevant six sub-dimensions presented in the bar chart below, is **1.8**, indicating a ‘rather strong’ structure for Uganda’s civil society. The 6 sub-dimensions are: extent and depth of citizen participation, diversity of civil society participants, level of organisation, inter-relations and civil society resources.

**FIGURE III.1.1: Subdimension scores in structure dimension**



#### 1.1. Breadth of citizens’ participation in civil society

This section provides details on the analysis of survey data collected regarding various aspects of citizen participation in Uganda’s civil society. Table III.1.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.1.1: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	1
1.1.2	Charitable giving	3
1.1.3	CSO membership	3
1.1.4	Volunteer work	3
1.1.5	Community action	3

*1.1.1 Non-partisan political action.* Uganda does not have a strong tradition of non-partisan political action. Thus, 84% of the community survey respondents said they had never taken part in non-partisan political action, with political action defined as having written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, and attended a demonstration. This matches international data. In 2005, only 10% of respondents to an Afrobarometer survey, when asked whether they had had attended a march in the previous year, answered ‘yes’ and the World Values Survey (WVS) indicates that only 26% of respondents have been involved in a boycott, demonstration or signed a petition.

Due to long years of authoritarianism and repression, dating back to colonial and post-colonial experiences, people have often tried to keep clear of actions that may bring them into conflict with the different regimes. This subdued political activism is said to be reinforced by cultural norms that tend to emphasise respect for authority (see CDRN 2005a; Kabwegyere, 2000). Local “traditional” groups are widespread in many parts of the country but here again the level of “political activism” is low (Tindifa in Hollands, 1998:204).

Nevertheless, the literature suggests that, in recent years, people and people’s organisations have been more forthright in claiming spaces for protest, helped in this by a relatively free press. There have been strikes at academic institutions and by other professional bodies, for example doctors, and demonstrations, on particular issues, such as the Domestic Relations Bill, land issues and students protesting cost-sharing at universities. The Media has played a key role in raising civic issues, such as criticising poor service delivery and human rights abuses. The main newspapers run lively readers’ letters pages. Service delivery committees, such as parents’-teachers’ associations, health and water committees and some religious institutions and religious leaders have taken a position on social issues, such as immorality and corruption.

*1.1.2 Charitable giving.* The CSI community survey shows that 72% of respondents had made a charitable donation in the last year, prompting a score of 3 on this indicator. This reflects a widespread and long-standing tradition of giving to those in need, mostly in kind.

*1.1.3 Membership of Civil Society Organisations.* Uganda scores high on this indicator, with all surveys indicating a high proportion of respondents being members of at least one CSO (80% according to the World Values Survey). The 2003 Afrobarometer survey reported that “*on the whole Ugandans continue to exhibit one of the highest densities of associational life of any of the countries surveyed*” (Logan et al 2003:212:42-43). The 2005 Afrobarometer survey indicates that 52% of respondents stated that “*they are active members of a religious group*” and 25% of a community self-help organisation.

The recently released 2002 census figures indicate that Uganda’s population is overwhelmingly Catholic, Protestant (Church of Uganda) or Muslim, with 90% classified under these three main religions. These established churches have a number of CSOs attached to them, among these Mothers’ Union, a groups of women wedded in church who support each other and local community initiatives, the Fathers’ Unions and other similar bodies linked to other faiths, diocesan development offices and youth associations.

The widespread nature of rural community groups and organisations is especially noteworthy, given Uganda's low urbanisation rate.<sup>12</sup> Localised information on such CSOs highlights their prevalence, and a high degree of membership to at least one CBO among the rural population. In a single parish, recently surveyed in South-western Uganda, for instance, 80 organisations were enumerated (CARE, 2002). In the same part of the country, *every* local adult resident is a member of a traditional 'stretcher group'.<sup>13</sup> Women' groups are reporting to have rapidly increased in some districts (Mwesigye, in Hollands, 1998). Drinking groups are said to be among the oldest CBOs found in Eastern Ugandan Districts with membership prevalent, by men (Allavida, 2003:26). Among ancient institutions are the clans and burial associations: (...) *compared to women's groups or any other CBOs, their membership is larger, more stable and more committed and disciplined* (Tindifa in Hollands, 1998:204). We must finally note that many people belong to Parents' Teachers' Associations and other service committees in rural areas. These are widespread, just as schools, water points and small health centres are.

*1.1.4 Volunteering.* This is also widespread in Ugandan society, with the community survey report indicating that 81% of respondents provide support beyond their immediate family for members of the community on an unpaid basis. This finding is backed by the WVS, which found that 75% of respondents volunteer for at least one organisation. The 2003 survey of NGOs found that volunteers account for just fewer than 50% of the manpower available to the sector (Barr, 2003:21).

Much of this volunteering takes place in local communities, because, as one observer states "*Most people are concerned about the affairs of their village. An organisation that can relate to these pre-occupations will find that many ordinary people will be more than willing to be involved*" (Kabwegyere, 2000:89). This is reinforced by the traditional cultural of sharing within the family, and bearing in mind the extended nature of the family system.

*1.1.5 Collective Community Action.* Here again, Uganda scores high with, 83% of community survey respondents reporting having participated in at least one form of collective community action over the past year. The same survey indicates that 81% could remember people in their community coming together in the last year for voluntary work, such as clearing community roads of bushes and potholes and cleaning water points. In the Afrobarometer 2005 survey, 80% of respondents claimed to have attended a community meeting at least once in the past year. Asked whether they had joined with others to raise an issue at least once in the past year, 63% of respondents answered affirmatively, compared to an African average of 44% in 2003 (Logan et al, 2003:21).

Much local and anecdotal information exists to show that the large number of CBOs mentioned above reflects a need for citizens to engage in collective action, especially at the group and village levels. This is partly due to Uganda's recent history of civil war and the collapse of service provision by the state, which forced communities to make up, as much as possible, for these deficiencies, through popular initiatives (see Nabuguzi, in Semboja et al, 1995: 192-3). Uganda's decentralised governance, with elected local councils reaching every village, as well as local church-based organisations, have also spurred community initiatives.

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<sup>12</sup> In comparison, other groups (trade unions, professional organisations) are much smaller. In 1999, there were 6,238 registered cooperatives and 17 trade unions, but with declining membership (Bazaara, 2000:9ff).

<sup>13</sup> The 'Engozi' or stretcher group focuses on the provision of community ambulance services (a wicker stretcher) in distant mountain communities in South-western Uganda.

## 1.2. Depth of citizen participation

If Ugandans are numerous in their participation in civil society, what is the depth of this participation? This subdimension score, with an average of 1.7, indicates a less clear-cut picture than for the ‘breadth’ for their participation.

**TABLE III.1.2: Indicators assessing the depth of citizen participation**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.2.1</u>	Charitable giving	<u>0</u>
<u>1.2.2</u>	Volunteering	<u>3</u>
<u>1.2.3</u>	CSO membership	<u>2</u>

*1.2.1 Charitable giving.* The share of income that Ugandans regularly give to charity is low: the community survey indicates that the poorest 45% respondents, with an annual income below U.shs. 600,000, give approximately 0.5% of this to charity, while for the 14% in the highest income band, U.shs. 2,280,000 and above, the proportion given is 0.1%. This reflects Uganda’s socio-economic make-up, as one of the poorest countries in the world, with a very small middle class (Allavida, 2003:31). One consequence is that NGOs must depend on foreign funds for their work, rather than local contributions, which only amounted to 2.5% of the funds available to the sector, although this accounts for more than a quarter of the funds available to smaller NGOs (Barr, 2003).

However, some donations are non-monetary. The same survey shows that 37% of NGOs had gracious access to land or buildings belonging to others (Barr, 2003:23). Religious groups in particular were given pieces of land to build mosques, churches, schools and health centres by Kings, chiefs and individuals over the years. The NAG, in its score, strictly followed a ‘financial definition’ of this indicator.

*1.2.2 Volunteering.* Using community survey data, a median figure of 15 hours being spent on volunteering by respondents per month is found. This relatively high score reflects the nature of civil society in the country, with its large number of community groups and organisations, to which many people regularly contribute with their labour.

*1.2.3 Membership of more than one CSO.* Here too, the evidence suggests that a large majority of people belong to more than one CSO (65% according to the WVS). As noted above, many people belong to a CSO and, given the prevalence of rural community self-help groups, of religious groups and users’ associations, this largely explains the high degree of multiple memberships. Of course, formally belonging to a CSO does not indicate the ‘depth’ of the engagement. It is thus “(...) *common for people to make a reference to NGO facilities as ‘theirs’, whereas those of religious institutions are referred to as ‘ours’*” (VECO, 2000:21).

## 1.3. Diversity of civil society participants

This subdimension provides an analysis from three perspectives: social inclusiveness in terms of the membership of CSOs, inclusiveness in terms of the CSO leadership and the geographical distribution of CSOs. Overall, averaging the three scores below, Uganda’s civil society scores 2 or “representing almost all social groups, but not equitably”.

**TABLE III.1.3: Indicators assessing the diversity of civil society participants**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	CSO membership	<u>2</u>
1.3.2	CSO leadership	<u>1</u>
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs	<u>3</u>

1.3.1 *CSO Membership*. The extent to which various groups are represented in CSOs was scored by respondents to the CSI regional survey as follows:

**TABLE III.1.4: Representation of various groups in CSOs**

	Excluded	Severely under-represented	Under-represented/somewhat represented	Equitably represented	Don't know
Women		15%	41%	43%	
Rural population		22%	27%	45%	
Ethnic minorities		24%	19%	20%	27%
Religious minorities		26%	21%	23%	
Poor people	16%	25%	23%	30%	
“Upper class”			15%	58%	

The rather favourable scores regarding representation of women and the rural population reflect the prevalence of rural community organisations in Uganda, many of which are women's groups. Thus, in the consultations in the central region of Uganda, most organisations were said to consciously *'take care of women'* although a majority were said to still be under represented, because of cultural, reproductive, and literacy-related challenges.

The score is less favourable for membership of smaller groups. Thus, ethnic minorities are often said to be excluded from mainstream civil society groups and some groups have exclusionary mechanisms that make membership by ethnic minorities in particular districts difficult. Similarly, some religious minorities, at the consultations in the central region, such as Owubusozi, Mungu Yu Mwema and Moslems, were said to be excluded and some what under represented because of their lack of organisation and a negative societal perception as “cults”, as opposed to ‘mainstream religions to which, according to the Census, 90% of the population belongs.

The relatively low score for ‘poor people’ in part reflects the existence of CBOs that exclude the poor through membership fees or physical ability requirements. But the poor can exclude themselves too. Thus, at the consultations in the central region, poor people were considered absent/excluded because they lacked confidence in themselves. Conversely, the better off are well represented in terms of membership. In the consultations in the central region, the elite was said to dominate civil society, because of their level of exposure and access to information and to funds. A similar comment is made by Passi: “[t]he PTAs were originally started as school welfare associations in 1967. The most influential are where rich parents exist and can mobilise their own resources through payment of a PTA fund” (Semboja, 1995:217).

Among NGOs, while there may be an attempt to target the less well-off communities (Barr, 2003:42), it has been noted that NGOs “appear to be dominated mainly by the urban middle class (...) it is, therefore, doubtful whether existing institutions, especially the NGOs are actually true representatives of a society that is predominantly agrarian” (Tumushabe in Oloka Onyango, 2000). Further, “many individuals have also turned to creating CSOs as a

means of self employment. CSOs thus have in effect taken on a dual mandate: that of ensuring the leader's/founder's own personal survival (and that of their extended families) as well as that of alleviating poverty in their respective communities" (De Coninck, 2004).

1.3.2 CSO leadership. Respondents to the regional survey scored as follows:

**TABLE III.1.5: Representation of various groups in CSO leadership**

	Excluded	Severely under-represented	Under-represented/somewhat represented	Equitably represented	Don't know
Women		22%	38%	38%	
Rural population		25%	31%	32%	
Ethnic minorities	15%	26%	22%	20%	21%
Religious minorities	11%	26%	25%	24%	14%
Poor people	25%	29%	21%	21%	
"Upper class"				72%	

With regard to leadership, women and the rural population score lower in terms of membership, given on the one hand, the cultural and attitudinal dimensions of Uganda's patriarchal society, although women do lead the numerous women's rural community groups. The Barr survey found a male director in 75% of the surveyed NGOs (Barr et al, 2003).

According to respondents, religious minorities are excluded from the leadership of mainstream CSOs, save for those organisations that they have started themselves.

If the poor lead organisations that they started themselves, such as rotational saving groups, in larger organisations, the poor are largely excluded from the leadership positions and therefore tend to participate 'only' as 'ordinary members' (CSI regional consultations report), an observation confirmed by other studies (CARE/CDRN 2003:iv-v).

Conversely, the 'upper class' dominate the leadership of many CSOs, especially where they are seen to be more educated and socially connected. This is especially true with NGOs. The Barr survey shows that two thirds of the surveyed NGOs "come from the middle class. Only 30% consider their parents as being poor." This makeup strengthens local views of NGOs being 'elitist'. For example, Human Rights and Women's Organisations have been described as "(...) an elite phenomenon, urban-based, have a narrow social base (...) The leadership draws mainly from the educated English-speaking middle class elite" (Opolot, Undated: 4). Similarly, a study on NGO leadership asserts that "NGO constitute a quasi-elite." The same study explains the social expectations that local norms place on such leaders: "NGO leaders are expected to have well furnished offices, and driving the latest car model in the capital, and to adhere to the social habits of the well-to-do.(...) If these social pressures and expectations of patronage have major psychological consequences on the leaders, they also find themselves "lifted" to a social class which they have difficulty to distance themselves from (CDRN, 2005a:33).

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs. Overall, these are considered to be well distributed throughout the national territory. Thus, three-quarters of respondents to the regional survey felt that CSOs are either "present in all except the most remote areas of the country" (32%) or "present in all, even the most remote areas of the country" (43%). Participants at the regional

consultations argued that people have organised themselves even in very remote areas and have their own small-scale arrangements, such as burial and digging groups.

If one looks at NGOs specifically, however, a different picture emerges. For example, the 2003 NGO survey shows that many, even in the districts, are urban-based or urban-oriented. One fifth of registered NGOs are located in Kampala (Barr et al, 2003). Another analysis on the national NGO register in 2000 indicates that, “*the majority of the NGOs operate in the central region, with Kampala hosting over 550 NGOs, about 18% of the total NGOs registered in Uganda. (...) The poorer regions (the north and Eastern) are relatively less served by NGOs*” (Wallace: 2004:21-22).

## 1.4. Level of organisation

How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure does it benefit from? This was analysed using 5 indicators, as summarised in the table below. Overall, the NAG gave a score of 1.6 or “quite organised” for this subdimension.

**TABLE III.1.6: Indicators assessing the level of organisation of civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of CSO umbrella bodies	2
1.4.2	Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies	2
1.4.3	Self-regulation	2
1.4.4	Support infrastructure (CSO support organisations)	1
1.4.5	International linkages	1

*1.4.1 Existence of CSO umbrella bodies.* There are a number of different umbrella bodies within Uganda’s civil society. These include workers apex organisations, student bodies, peasant cooperative unions, faith-based (religious) apex organisations and business sector and manufacturers’ movements, and NGO, CBO umbrella organisations. Their presence was confirmed in the media survey.

The available evidence suggests that these umbrella bodies are quite numerous and growing in numbers. During the regional consultations in the East, participants said more than 60% of the organisations mentioned belonged at least to a network of sorts either at the national, regional or district level. Some of them said belonged to more than one network.

This is corroborated in a 2003 study of NGOs that notes: “*Ugandan NGOs are heavily networked into each other, with 72% belonging to a network or umbrella organisation*” (Barr et al, 2003:24). NGO umbrella bodies include issue-based coalitions and formal networks. The former represent a growing movement, with coalitions focusing on a number of different themes, such as civic education, peace in northern Uganda, gender issues, micro-credit, HIV/AIDS, anti-corruption work and environmental issues. However, these mostly bring together NGOs, rather than the multitude of community organisations. Such umbrella organisations exist at both national and district levels, with more than 80% of these having at least one district NGO Forum or network, complemented by district thematic networks (Okille, 2005, p.1).

Regarding other CSOs, the National Organisation of Trade Unions has 17 affiliates, and represents the major professional unions in the country (Bazaara, 2000:15). The Uganda Cooperative Alliance is the apex organisation for all cooperatives, and there are also 31 district unions and 6 national unions. The Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) brings

together the main Christian churches, mostly recently to engage in civic education, policy advocacy (peace and justice) and election monitoring. The mainstream churches also have their own apex bodies, such as bishops' conferences, Caritas and mothers and fathers unions.

The growth of networks is likely to continue, partly because donors increasingly find this channel attractive. Thus, the largest official programme of support to CSOs, funded by the European Union, places emphasis on funding apex organisations and networks. Of the current British Government-funded umbrella programme to support civil society, of the nine CSOs being supported, several are networks or apex organisations.

*1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies.* Forty-three percent of respondents to the regional survey stated that networks and umbrella organisations are generally effective in achieving their goals; 32% said they are both effective and ineffective and 13% that were largely ineffective.

Such mixed feelings were echoed in most of the regional consultations, where participants felt that some of these umbrella bodies had been able to raise funds, but were poor at communicating with their members and in engaging in effective advocacy work, due to their limited information and analytical ability. When networks proliferate, they also confuse members and many members' expectations continue to be to receive material benefits from them. Some organisations were unwilling to join networks because of lack of benefits or dominance by powerful members. Duplication of work with members, rather than playing a coordination role, was also stated as a recurrent problem, as this creates a situation of competition between networks, and accusations of retaining donor funds, and its membership, eventually leading to the formers' disintegration. Further, they could not rely on membership fees, hence a high degree of donor dependence and accountability towards them, rather than to the members. Several studies confirm this assessment.<sup>14</sup> On the last point, one commentator argues that *"This has important implications: it reduces the potential presence of member organisations on decision-making; (their) activities may be determined by the amount of financial support available from donors. Accountability may not respond to demands for effective representation"* (Gariyo: 1998:134). Similarly, a support organisation reports facing *"daunting challenges. A major one has been the building of the capacities of these networks to manage themselves and the agendas they set. Some of these networks and associations have been set up without clear objectives while others were simply following what seems to be trend to form associations and networks"* (DENIVA, 1999:7).

The literature survey however also provides examples of a number of umbrella bodies that have focused on single issues and have achieved successes. UPDNet, UDN, NGO Forum, UWONET, the Uganda Land Alliance and others have been able to make some progress in influencing policy (see section 4.1) or holding the state accountable (4.2). At the district level, the development of networks and alliances is said to be one of the NGO responses to Uganda's decentralisation policy (Kwesiga & Nabunnya, 2002).

*1.4.3 Self-regulation.* How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

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<sup>14</sup> See for instance, CDRN (forthcoming); Ssonko in Wallace (2004); (VECO, 2000: 41).

While codes of conduct often exist among NGOs and apex organisations, their implementation is frequently hampered by financial and human resource constraints, and, for membership organisations, by their voluntary nature. In the regional consultations in the North, West and East, it was agreed that codes of conduct existed in “all” or “many” organisations, even among CBOs, but they often existed on paper only. Thus, 31% of respondents stated that preliminary efforts are in place or that some mechanism for self-regulation is in place (42%), but with ‘limited’ or ‘extremely limited’ impact. Only 18% answered “mechanisms for self regulation are in place and function effectively.”

Professional bodies often have a code of conduct, whose application is in some cases legally enforceable (Law Council, Uganda Society of Architects, etc) and some trade associations have also developed theirs, sometimes to enforce adherence to trade regulations, such as ISO standards among the membership.

A donor coordination mechanism, the CSO donor working group, has recently issued a paper that proposes common principles for CSO support. The paper points towards a need for “*self-regulation, for annual monitoring and evaluation.*” Partly as a result of this, NGOs have recently developed A Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism for NGOs active in Uganda, which is yet to be implemented. Such a mechanism “*sets out principles and defines standards of behaviour for responsible practices with an aim of protecting the credibility and integrity of civil society organisations in Uganda.*” Participants at the Northern and Western consultations mentioned the existence of this mechanism and welcomed it. The “Coalition on the NGO Bill”, a group of CSOs, has also proposed a text that includes mechanisms to ensure that NGOs “*maintain adequate standards of governance and accountability*”.

*1.4.4 Support infrastructure.* In spite of the existence of support organisations, resource centres, information data banks and technical assistance programmes, the level of support infrastructure for civil society and its effectiveness was considered ‘limited’ by the NAG.

There are a growing number of international NGOs, national NGOs, consultancy firms and academic and private institutions involved in capacity building for CSOs. In addition, there are regional training institutions, donor and bilateral arrangements and financial institutions that provide and/or fund support services or include a “CSO capacity-building” component in their programmes. In recent years, academic institutions, both in Uganda and in the region, have launched various courses designed to build the capacity of CSOs, especially in development work and management issues. International NGOs have generally moved away from direct service delivery and embraced capacity building for local CSO partners. Specialist CSOs, such as DETREC, KRC, CDRN, DRT, also provide training, organisational development and other forms of support to CSOs. A growing number of consultants are also available to provide capacity-building services for CSOs.

Why then the low score given on this indicator? This was in part informed by the regional survey respondents, who said infrastructure for supporting capacity building of CSOs in Uganda is either ‘very limited’ (57%) or ‘moderate’ (30%). This reflects the urban-based nature of this infrastructure, the cost of accessing services, and poorly developed ICT, which were mentioned at the regional consultations.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Areas of success were nevertheless mentioned, such as raising awareness, especially in human rights and governance issues in the region. Some sectors were better supported (especially with information sharing): micro finance, poverty resource monitoring, human rights.

Sometimes support is also of doubtful quality, such as when expensive external consultants, with limited local experience, are employed (CDRN, 2004b). Questions have also been raised as to who determines the capacity needs of local CSOs: a recent report notes that while:

*“[s]ome of the [capacity-building] support was much appreciated (...) their training had often focused the project cycle and project management tools, on developing log frames (...), while the skills of listening, flexibility, managing conflict and handling change have not been included on most donor-run capacity building agenda” (CDRN, 2004 b:16-17).*

**1.4.5 International linkages.** While half of respondents to the regional survey said very few CSOs in general participate in international civil society events or belong to international networks (50%), the Barr et al (2003) survey suggests that NGOs specifically appear to be well networked internationally. It found that 38% of the NGOs surveyed were members of regional or international networks, once again suggesting that what might apply to CSOs generally, including the vast majority of them, community-based groups, might not apply to the more ‘elitist’ NGOs. As a result, this indicator was given a low score of 1.

Furthermore, these linkages, because of the dependence of CSOs on donors, often reflect global concerns that may not be much felt locally, leading to a situation where *“Pre-determined programmes that leave no initiative or democratic control by the population are presented in NGO form as popular, democratic and bottom-up”* (Oloka-Onyango, 1996:194).

## 1.5. Inter-relations

This subdimension examines the strength of relations among civil society actors, both in terms of communication and cooperation. Overall, Uganda’s civil society scored 1.5.

**TABLE III.1.7: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.5.1</u>	Communication	<u>1</u>
<u>1.5.2</u>	Cooperation	<u>2</u>

**1.5.1 Communication.** The low score for this indicator is partly explained by the more than three-quarters of the regional survey respondents who felt that the level of communication between civil society actors is either “moderate” (44%) or “limited” (34%). In part, this reflects uneven access to means of communication: thus while urban-based NGOs normally make use of e-mails, workshops, seminars and telephone to communicate among themselves, rural CSOs, especially CBOs, do not have access to communication infrastructure, such as computers and internet, a disadvantage only partially compensated by the growing numbers of localised CSO networks, hence the mention of a ‘digital divide’ between urban CSOs and the rural ones.

In addition, the regional consultations indicated that *“some organisations do not want to share with others information on their plans and activities. This is because of the competitive spirit that is penetrating the sector. The literature echoes this: competition among CSOs for funding leads to lack of trust and “claiming credit has become vital: impact is appropriated and logos multiply”* (Wallace, 2004). Suspicion also arises because funding systems: *“(…) promote upward accountability to the donors, but do little to promote strong bonds between NGOs and the communities they work with”* (CDRN, 2004b:25).

*1.5.2 Cooperation.* We noted above that the number of networks and alliances is growing. This explains why 42% of respondents to the regional survey said they knew of “some examples” of organisations from different sectors of civil society forming alliances/networks or coalitions on issues of common concern, although 31% said examples were very few.

According to DENIVA (2005), the increased formation of networks is a result of a need for collaborative partnerships, especially to do advocacy and lobbying work. According to an unpublished report by CDRN about the ‘Effectiveness of development networks’, the explicit reasons include advocacy work, capacity building for members and learning from one another. The implicit reasons include attracting donor funding, raising the profile of members and being a source of survival/power for members.

Besides the increasing number of networks and coalitions, other forms of collaboration among CSOs are emerging, including joint proposals, joint conferences, joint researches, joint fundraising and co-funding and co-implementation of projects and programmes. However, there is still a long way to go in this direction, as most NGO projects are implemented separately, not as part of a broader strategy for a sector (DENIVA, 2002e: 27). In a study on CSO involvement in economic policy empowerment, the authors similarly identified “*the lack of open and mutual sharing of information and close collaboration among the CSOs*” as a constraint on their participation (Alfa, 2003:6). Churches also find cooperation challenging, in spite of their joint efforts, such as those that led to the creation of UJCC, often related to their political allegiances, with the Church of Uganda (Protestant), which is traditionally at odds with the Catholic Church (Dicklich, 1998:115-116).

## 1.6. Resources

This subdimension examines the adequacy of the financial and human resources available to CSOs to achieve their goals. So far as finances are concerned, CSOs are judged to be ‘quite well resourced’, whereas human resources are considered ‘quite poor’.<sup>16</sup>

**TABLE III.1.8: Indicators assessing resources available to civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>1.6.1</u>	Financial resources	<u>2</u>
<u>1.6.2</u>	Human resources	<u>1</u>

*1.6.1 Financial resources.* The financial resources that pass through some sections of civil society are substantial and growing, with total resources available in 1998 estimated at US\$ 89 million or 1.4% of Uganda’s GDP (John Hopkins:31). Some estimates suggest even higher figures. An estimated 25% of all official aid to Uganda (*NGO Task Force 1991*) and *this has translated into approximately US\$125 million per year in aid since 1990/91*” (World Bank, 1996:18-19). In terms of growth, Barr et al, compared respondents’ answers with regard to NGO revenue in 2001 and 2002: there was an increase of 14% (Barr, 2003).

So far as NGOs are concerned, most of these resources come from donor grants, which amount to 86% of total NGO revenues (Barr, 2003: 29), although subcontracting income is growing. Just less than one-quarter of surveyed NGOs had ever been paid to provide a service, 40% by another NGO or 25% by Government. One-third of surveyed NGOs owned a business to finance charitable activities, often a farm, shop or canteen. The preponderance of donor funding suggest the observation that NGOs are “*an offshoot of international charity,*

<sup>16</sup> Information was judged insufficient to score a third indicator, “Technological and infrastructural resources”.

*and the mode of operation of Ugandan NGOs largely reflects the agenda and concerns of international charitable organisations (...) There is very little solicitation from the general public in Uganda” (Barr, 2003:3).*

In a recent study on NGO subcontracting, this was seen by the CSOs concerned as ‘*as attractive and potentially “lucrative” (...). It fits with their self-perception as service providers and with the dominant view among local government officials that CSOs should supplement the work of government, and that local government is under obligation to subcontract private entities for delivery of government programmes*’ (CARE/CDRN,2005:vii) The consequences of such a development are however not only positive (for a discussion, see section 2.6.3. below).

Donor dependence is also much in evidence in other sectors of civil society.

*“(...) FIDA (U) (the Association of Women’s Lawyers), USSIA (the Association of Small-scale Industries) and even the Uganda Law Society (ULS) are heavily dependent on foreign funding. USSIA stated it was 80% dependent on foreign funding; ULS depends 80% on the support of donors; FHRI depends 98% on foreign funds” (Barya, 1998: 24-25).*

In spite of such volumes, only 50% of respondents to the CSI regional survey felt that financial resources available to CSOs are “adequate”, with 36% answering “rather adequate”. This may be due to the wide disparities in revenue within the sector. Thus, CBOs essentially survive on their own income and, within the NGO community, 30 NGOs in a survey accounted for 90% of the funds received (Barr, 2003). Further, funding sources for the larger NGOs (donor funds) are very different from those for the smaller NGOs, which depend much more on fees and other types of local funding.

*1.6.2 Human resources.* The regional consultations only covered this issue in the East, where the level of human resources for CSOs was felt to be “adequate”. Participants explained that some of the organisations could afford to employ technical staff while others depended on volunteers and, while most of them lack experience, they have degree-level qualifications and some have been attracted from government employment.

The Barr (2003:22) study shows that “*surveyed NGOs as a whole muster considerable manpower resources. The average number of staff members and volunteers is 129 (...) but with a median of 18, hence there are considerable disparities. Surveyed NGOs had on average 15 full-time staff and 18 part-time staff*”, with very few foreigners, and quite a large percentage of professional and management staff. These numbers are expanding rapidly, prompting the conclusion that “*The Uganda NGO sector may depend on foreign funding; it does not depend on foreign manpower.*” The same survey shows that 84% of the NGO directors had a tertiary or university degree and 14 years of education on average. Using Social Security figures, the John Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project estimates that “*the workforce in the civil society sector exceeds that of the public sector [in 1998]*” (2003:30).

Nevertheless, the NAG group scored 1 for this indicator, given the perceived limited adequacy of human resources, especially in terms of quality, for most CSOs to achieve their goals, echoing a report that states that:

*“Ugandan NGOs urgently need professional skills development (including) identifying and retaining a comparative advantage over competitors. Some organisations need support to think strategically about their work. (...) often low*

*remuneration make it difficult to retain staff, “making the need for professional skills development even greater” (...) NGOs working in the different sub-sectors – such as education, health and social welfare – also face problems and needs specific to their own particular area of activity” (Allavida, 2003: 11).*

## **Conclusion**

When examining the structure of Uganda’s civil society, a mixed picture emerges. On the one hand, citizen participation in CSOs appears to be very extensive, to a great extent because rural life in this largely agrarian country is often accompanied by membership in various forms of community and other mutual help groups, that are rather socially inclusive, and to which church-linked organisations can be added. Volunteering and other forms of community action, such as mutual help or church-linked groups, thus appear to be prevalent. However, such participation does not necessarily mean ‘activist’ political involvement, which for reasons often linked to the country’s past, does not feature prominently in the lives of ordinary Ugandans.


Super-imposed upon this large number of community groups are other, often more recent, forms of CSOs. These include so-called ‘NGOs’, and their many networks and coalitions, trade unions and other mostly urban-based forms of collaborative undertakings, such as professional associations. These appear to be an often donor-dependent part of civil society, with staff, vehicles, projects and agendas that ordinary people do not always associate with, or feel close to. It is a competitive sector that can be governed by suspicion, such as when it comes to sharing information about funding sources, and where accountability to donors often takes precedence over accountability to the local population. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the sector is gradually structuring itself, such as through networks, including district networks and other coalitions, and attempting to regulate itself, through the emerging voluntary NGO Quality Standards Certification mechanism.

Overall, an analysis of the structure of Uganda’s civil society shows a very diverse sector, dominated by rather socially inclusive small community groups. This reflects broad, rather than ‘deep’ citizen participation, with a focus on social, rather than political activism.

## 2. ENVIRONMENT

We now analyse the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment within which civil society functions. The score for this dimension is **1.4**, indicating an environment that is somewhat more “disabling” than “enabling” for civil society. Figure III.2.1 presents the scores for the seven relevant sub-dimensions.

**FIGURE III.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension**



### 2.1. Political context

The political context is analysed using the six indicators presented in the table below. Overall, the context was found to be somewhat disabling for civil society, with a score of 1.

**TABLE III.2.1: Indicators assessing the political context and its impact on civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.1.1	Political rights	1
2.1.2	Political competition	2
2.1.3	Rule of law	1
2.1.4	Corruption	0
2.1.5	State effectiveness	1
2.1.6	Decentralisation	1

**2.1.1 Political rights.** The Freedom House Index, which incorporates indicators such as a degree of freedom/fairness of elections, room for opposition, any involvement by the military in political affairs, the power of economic oligarchies, self-determination, autonomy, self-government, participation for ethnic groups, rates Uganda as “*partly free*”. On a scale ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), Uganda is rated 5 on its ‘political score’ for 2005/06. Its ‘democracy rank’ was 95<sup>th</sup> out of 150 nations in the same year. The 2005 “Freedom in the World” report highlights a number of issues, which also appear in the last available Amnesty International report on Uganda. This ranking is explained by the facts that multi-party politics has only recently been re-introduced after 20 years of “Movement system”, but term limits on the presidency have also been removed and the NRM “*continues to dominate the nation’s*

*political life through direct and indirect means*”, while intermittent violence in the North has continued. Election processes have been criticised by observers, donors and others. The mobilisation of official resources for electioneering purposes appears as a given.<sup>17</sup> However, Uganda has legislated quotas for women officials in all elected bodies from village councils to the national parliament. District women representatives alone represent 23% of the total number of parliamentarians in the recently elected chamber (February 2006). One-third of local council seats must, by law, go to women.

Using the World Bank’s governance data set, Uganda ranks as follows: (percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country):<sup>18</sup>

**TABLE III.2.2: Selected governance indicators for Uganda**

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)	Regional Average, Percentile (sub-Saharan Africa)
Voice and Accountability	2004	30.6	32.7
Political Stability	2004	10.7	32.8
Regulatory Quality	2004	54.7	29.5

*2.1.2 Political competition.* Uganda recently adopted a multi-party system and the first parliamentary, local and presidential elections under this regime were held in early 2006. Parties that contested ranged from established parties whose roots can be found in the colonial struggle for independence (UPC), to new opposition entities with more limited political experience, to small parties that represent the interests of individual groups. This has been a swift change, reflecting the influence of the then ruling political ideology. In the 2005 Afrobarometer study, 57% of respondents rejected multi-party rule, whereas the return to multi-party-ism was sanctioned by a 92% “Yes” vote in a 2005 referendum. Given the very recent opening of the political space to multi-party politics, it may be premature to comment on the operation of political parties in Uganda.

With regard to “*polarisation*”, political commentators argue that parties are not very polarised in relation to their political and economic agenda, but rather with regard to personalities. It has also been argued that the ruling party is increasingly dependent on the development of patronage-based support systems (see Hickey, 2003). With regard to “*institutionalisation*”, one notes that most parties are recent, although a few survive from earlier regimes. The ruling party has been in power as a single party for 20 years.

With regard to “*competition*”, the dominant position of the ruling party has been reaffirmed in the 2006 elections, although with only minority support in the northern half of the country. It is able to continue in power without having to forge coalitions with other parties (200 NRM MPs, out of a total of 309 MPs), although local governments in Northern Uganda are in the hands of opposition parties in several districts.

Therefore, overall, Uganda was judged to have ‘multiple parties’, but rather weakly institutionalised.

<sup>17</sup> See DEMGROUP report in New Vision, 1/3/06; Commonwealth Observers' Report on 2006 elections.

<sup>18</sup> Source: *World Development Indicators 92005*, <[www.worldbank.org/data](http://www.worldbank.org/data)>

*2.1.3 Rule of law.* The World Bank governance dataset<sup>19</sup> rates Uganda in this respect with a percentile rank, the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country, of 25.6 in 2004, compared to 27.6 for sub-Saharan Africa and figures of 34.1 in 2000 and 55.7 in 1998. This suggests a deteriorating situation and a relatively poor performance in regional terms.

**TABLE III.2.3: Rule of law indicators for Uganda**

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)	Regional Average, Percentile (sub-Saharan Africa)
Rule of Law	2004	25.6	27.6

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)
Rule of Law	2004	25.6
	2000	34.1
	1996	17.5

While some courts (especially at the local level) are “*subject to bribery and corruption*” (Amnesty International), the judiciary has marked its independence in a spate of recent decisions by the constitutional and other higher courts.

The 2004 Amnesty International report states that “*reports of torture increased against a background of government campaigns against crime and “terrorism”. Throughout the year operatives from the police, various security agencies and the army (...) were persistently reported to have tortured people detained on suspicion of political or criminal offences. Suspects were held incommunicado at unrecognised detention centres.*”

Women experience discrimination based on traditional law, particularly in rural areas, and are treated unequally under inheritance, divorce, and citizenship statutes. In most areas, women may neither own nor inherit property, nor retain custody of their children under local customary law. Domestic violence against women is widespread. The Amnesty report states that “*there were many cases of violence against women. Few cases of sexual violence in the home, including rape in marriage and rape of minors, were prosecuted. Children, including orphans, were frequently subjected to sexual assault and violence by relatives, as well as by schoolteachers, people helping in the home and other carers. (...) The absence of a law criminalising domestic violence limited legal recourse for abuse in the home. In December a Domestic Relations Bill was presented to parliament for debate. It addressed issues such as the criminalisation of marital rape, property in marriage, polygamous marriages, bride price, widow inheritance and minimum age for marriage and cohabitation*”<sup>20</sup>. Women and girls living and travelling in areas affected by insurgencies in northern Uganda were raped and suffered other forms of violence, including abduction and sexual slavery.

*2.1.4. Corruption.* Transparency International rates Uganda in 2005, through its “Corruption perceptions Index” as 117th out of 159 countries, with a CPI index score of 2.6 in 2004.<sup>21</sup> The World Bank governance dataset rates Uganda, with regard to the “control of corruption”,

<sup>19</sup> Source: *World Development Indicators 92005*, <[www.worldbank.org/data](http://www.worldbank.org/data)>

<sup>20</sup> At the time of writing, this is still pending in Parliament.

<sup>21</sup> CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

with a percentile rank of 30.0 in 2004, compared to an average of 30.1 for sub-Saharan Africa, and figures of 18.5 in 2000 and 29.0 in 1998, suggesting an improving situation and average performance in regional terms.

**TABLE III.2.4: Corruption indicator for Uganda**

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)
Control of corruption	2004	30.1
	2000	18.5
	1996	32.0

These low ratings were given in spite of the establishment by the current regime of specialist anti-corruption institutions, such as the Inspectorate General of Government, an independent Constitutional body *charged with the responsibility of eliminating corruption and abuse of office*. The Inspectorate has the duty of enforcing the Leadership Code, which requires specified leaders to declare their assets, income and liabilities and prohibits the same leaders from engaging in conduct such as receiving bribes or gifts, conflict of interest, and misuse of state funds or property. The implementation of the Code and the fight against corruption has been constrained by limited implementation and monitoring capacity. Other problems include political shielding and the lack of dedicated courts to prosecute culprits.

*2.1.5 State effectiveness* Compared to the virtual collapse of the state and government services in the mid-1980's, there is widespread acknowledgement that Uganda has witnessed a remarkable recovery since. The World Bank governance dataset rates Uganda, with regard to "government effectiveness", with a percentile rank of 38.5 in 2004 (compared to an average of 27.6 for sub-Saharan Africa) and 50.0 in 2000 and 56.3 in 1998.<sup>22</sup> These figures suggest a deteriorating situation, but a better-than-average performance in regional terms. Improved state services in health, education, especially with the introduction of Universal Primary Education, and road infrastructure are most frequently mentioned.

**TABLE III.2.5: Government effectiveness indicator for Uganda**

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)
Government Effectiveness	2004	38.5
	2000	50.0
	1996	43.0

State effectiveness is still seen as poor, or even non-existent in three areas: first, inability to ensure peace and security for the entire national population, with the northern part of the country still suffering from insurgency (see below, socio-economic context); second, inability to effectively tackle corruption and third, faltering economic growth rate and widening gap between the rich and poor, including in terms of access to quality state services (see below).

*2.1.6 Decentralisation.* The Uganda Constitution states that: "*Decentralisation shall be a principle applying at all levels ... to ensure people participation and democratic control in decision-making ... to ensure full realisation of democratic governance at all levels.*" This provision has mainly been effected through the Local Government Act 1997, which confers both legislative and executive power to local councils.

<sup>22</sup> Source: *World Development Indicators 92005*, <[www.worldbank.org/data](http://www.worldbank.org/data)>

The 2003 Allavida report notes that:

*“Although Government has made great strides (and) although there is a strategy to further devolve recurrent and development budgets, and despite the fact that the bulk of the service delivery responsibilities have been decentralised (...) only 34% of the national budget is allocated to financing these responsibilities.”* (p.38)

Opinions differ as to the impact of decentralisation (see below) on corruption levels. On the one hand, central government is currently planning to trim and reform the fiscal latitude of district authorities. On the other hand, some argue that “[d]ue to the decentralization process the citizens are now having a voice. (...)The voice of the citizens has made the Local authorities more accountable to the citizens, increasing the political costs of inefficient public decisions” (Ruzindana, 1998:100).

## 2.2. Basic freedoms and rights

The extent to which rights and freedoms is ensured in law and in practice is gauged using three indicators, averaging a score of 1.3 for this sub-dimension:

**TABLE III.2.6: Indicators of basic freedoms and rights**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.2.1</u>	Civil liberties	<u>1</u>
<u>2.2.2</u>	Information rights	<u>2</u>
<u>2.2.3</u>	Press freedoms	<u>1</u>

*2.2.1 Civil liberties.* Uganda’s Constitution guarantees *“the freedom to form and join associations or unions and political and other civic organisations’* (Art.29.1e). The State encourages (does not merely tolerate), the existence of civic associations, and such associations should *‘retain their autonomy’* (National Objectives, Article II (v) and (vi).

Nevertheless, in Freedom House’s surveys, Uganda scored 4 (with 1 being the best, 7 being the worst) on civil liberties in 2003, 2004 and 2005. This is because, in spite of the space allowed for parliament and civil society to function and the respect for freedom of worship, freedom of association is restricted and there are *“stringent legal restrictions on NGOs”*. *“Prison conditions are difficult, especially in local jails. More than 500 prisoners die annually as a result of poor diet, sanitation, and medical care”*. Serious human rights violations by rebel groups and Uganda’s Army have been reported and torture has continued. Up to 12,000 Northern Ugandan children have been abducted by the rebel LRA since 2002.

Further, at least 432 people were under sentence of death, although the death sentence is not carried out, except within the Army. Death row inmates recently filed a petition before the Constitutional Court challenging their death sentences on the grounds that they were unconstitutional, inhuman and degrading.

*2.2.2. Information rights.* The Constitution guarantees citizens’ rights of access to official information and an Access to Information Act was enacted in 2005, after a long campaign. This prescribes the procedure for access to official information, although access was less than anticipated by many, with one commentator describing it as a *“catalogue of exceptions”* (New Vision, 4/05). In the meantime, the State has often successfully restricted access to information, using various pieces of legislation such as the Official Secrets Act or Public service standing orders. (See Image Consult, 2004:15).

2.2.3 *Press freedoms.* In 2005, Freedom House ranked Uganda 99 out of 194 countries on press freedom, rating it as “partly free” with a score of 44.<sup>23</sup> Its 2005 report notes that “*The constitution provides for freedom of expression, but laws enacted ostensibly in the mane of national security, together with the harassment of journalists (...) produce much self-censorship in the Ugandan media.* Publishing news that is “likely to promote terrorism” can result in up to 10 years’ imprisonment and reporters continue to face harassment at the hands of both the police and rebels. The closure of the *The Monitor* newspaper is given as example, while “*the State broadcasters wield considerable clout and are generally viewed as sympathetic to the government.*”(Nevertheless) independent media outlets, including more than two dozen daily and weekly newspapers as well as a growing number of private radio and television stations, are often highly critical of the government”.

The Amnesty International 2004 report adds that numerous official warnings and directives have been added to existing legislative limitations regarding the enjoyment of freedom of expression. Thus, the Defence Ministry and army cautioned media houses and their staff that they would be prosecuted before a military court if they published classified information. The Uganda Law Council issued a directive forbidding lawyers from writing articles, speaking to the media or making any other media appearance without the Council’s permission. The trial continued, at that time, of the managing editor, the news editor and a reporter with *The Monitor* newspaper, charged in 2002 with publishing information prejudicial to national security and false information. The media council – a censorship committee - has also for instance recently banned a controversial play on sexual exploitation, much to the disgust of women’s organisations that had sponsored it.

Nevertheless, the literature suggests that, in recent years, CSOs have been more forthright in claiming spaces for protest and that this has been fostered by a measure of press freedom. The media has played an important role in raising civic issues, such as criticising poor service delivery and human rights abuses (Dicklish, 1998:100; Ruzindana, 1998:4).

### 2.3. Socio-economic context

Uganda’s socio-economic context, in relation to the effective functioning of the country’s civil society, is gauged using a set of 8 criteria, on the basis of which the NAG scored this subdimension with a 1, as Uganda had at least four of the criteria present.

**TABLE III.2.7: Composite Indicator for socio-economic context**

Ref. #	Indicator	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	1

✎ **Poverty** (Do more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day?) Uganda’s successes in poverty reduction have been widely acknowledged. Thus, consumption poverty has decreased from 56% of the population living below the poverty line (approximately \$1 per day) in 1992 to an estimated 35% in 2000. Despite this, Uganda remains among the

<sup>23</sup> The degree to which each country permits the free flow of information determines the classification of its media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having "Free" media, 31 to 60, "Partly Free" media, and 61 to 100, "Not Free" media. Indicators include: the structure of the news-delivery system as functioning under the country's laws and administrative decisions; their influence on the content of the print and broadcast media; the degree of political influence over the content of news media; economic influences on media content (pressure by government funding, corruption, withholding of government advertising as a selective pressure point...)

poorest countries in the world<sup>24</sup>, and, among the poor, many live well below the poverty line for many years. Further, the overall proportion of poor people increased from 35% (or 7.7 million people) in 2000 to 38% in 2003 (CPRC, 2005).

- ✎ **Civil War/ “severe ethnic conflict”** (Has there been armed conflict in last 5 years?) Since independence in 1962, strife has been common. According to the latest CIDCM peace and conflict data set (2003), Uganda scores as among the world’s red flagged countries that are at serious risk of armed conflict and political instability for the foreseeable future.<sup>25</sup> Much of Northern Uganda has suffered for the past 18 years from conflict, which continues to persist, with most of the population, well over a million people, living in camps.<sup>26</sup>
- ✎ **Severe economic crisis.** (Is external debt is higher than GNP?) Uganda’s present value of debt has been reduced from US\$ 4.7 billion to \$500 million, well below its GNP, as a result of recent write-off for heavily indebted nations (New Vision, 11/5/2006).
- ✎ **Severe social crisis** (over last 2 years).
  - War and displacement in the North As noted above, this has resulted in profound dislocation of the entire society of Northern Uganda, with the majority of people having to live in camps for displaced people and the social fabric further undermined by the lack of peace for 18 years.
  - The impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis This has been primarily responsible for a lowering of life expectancy to 48 in 2004 (UNICEF, 2006). Recent figures indicate a reduced HIV prevalence rate, but the impact of the crisis will be felt for many years to come.
  - Other long-term changes The continued rapid growth rate of the population makes for a deepening imbalance with the natural resource base. The 2002 Census indicates a population growth rate of 3.3% (1991-2002), with a fertility rate approaching 7.
- ✎ **Severe socio economic inequities.** (Gini coefficient above 0.4). A recent report from the Chronic Poverty Research Centre informs us that *“there are sections of the society that have not benefited from the available economic opportunities for poverty reduction. Differentiation has increased, in a context where disparities are already wide.”* (CPRC (2005:6-7). Inequality has been rising since 1997, with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.35 that year to 0.43 in 2003 (Uganda Government, 2004).
- ✎ **Pervasive adult illiteracy** (adult illiteracy higher than 40%). The UNDP Human Development Report for 2004 gives 31.1% as the percentage of Uganda’s population aged above 15 that is illiterate. According to the World Bank Development indicators, the adult male literacy rate (% of males aged 15 and above) was 78.8% in 2002, and 59.2% for females in the same year. (World Development indicators, database 2005).
- ✎ **IT infrastructure** (Less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants) The International Telecommunications Union Report for 2003, rates Uganda as having 1 host per 10,000 inhabitants. The World Bank indicators tell us that there were 4.0 personal computers and 4.9 Internet users per 1,000 Ugandans in 2003.

<sup>24</sup> It ranked 146<sup>th</sup> out of 185 countries in 2002, according to the UN Human Development Index (UNDP, 2004 report). Its GNI per capita was US\$ 250 in 2003 (World Bank World Development indicators, 2005)

<sup>25</sup> It then goes on to rank Uganda according to 9 dimensions (rank is between brackets from high ability –green – to lowest –red): *“We rate a country’s peace-building capacity high insofar as it has avoided recent armed conflicts (Yellow), provided reasonable levels of human security (Yellow), shows no active political or economic discrimination against minorities (Yellow), successfully managed movements for self-determination (Yellow), maintained stable democratic institutions (Yellow), attained substantial human and material resources (yellow), and is free of serious threats from its neighbouring countries (Red). Countries are listed by world region and within each region from lowest (Red) to highest (Green) peace-building capacity.*

<sup>26</sup> The Amnesty International 2004 Uganda report notes: *“The 17-year conflict between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) intensified, resulting in a sharp rise in the number of internally displaced persons to over 1,200,000.”* At the time of writing, the conflict appears to be subsiding.

## 2.4. Socio-cultural context

Uganda's socio-cultural context was examined using the three indicators presented below. Overall, an average score of 1.7 ("Somewhat enabling") emerged for this subdimension.

**TABLE III.2.8: Indicators of socio-cultural context**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.4.1</u>	Trust	<u>2</u>
<u>2.4.2</u>	Tolerance	<u>2</u>
<u>2.4.3</u>	Public spiritedness	<u>1</u>

*2.4.1 Trust.* How much do members of society trust one another? According to the CSI community survey, out of 548 respondents, 50% said that most people could not be trusted while 47% indicated that most people could be trusted. However, according to the World Values Survey, only 8% felt that most people could be trusted, while 92% felt that you need to be very careful with others. In view of this the NAG scored 2, or "a moderate level of trust among members of society".

*2.4.2 Tolerance.* How tolerant are members of society? According to the WVS Tolerance Index (which ranges between 0, most tolerant attitude and 5, most intolerant attitude) Uganda has a score of 1.5, a moderate level of tolerance.

This moderate level of tolerance was confirmed by respondents to the community survey, who were asked about who they would not like as their neighbours. Twelve percent said they would not like people from different tribes, 14% indicated that they would mind people of a different religion as neighbours; 6% that they would mind foreign immigrants and 6% mentioned that they mind having people with AIDS as neighbours, although the 29% would mind having homosexuals as neighbours.

*2.4.3 Public spiritedness.* According to WVS, Uganda's public spiritedness index is 2.8, which corresponds to a society with a low level of public spiritedness (on a scale from 1 (best) to 10 (worst).) However, since everyone answers on the positive end of the scale, we judge on a scale of 1 (best) to 3.5 (worst). Therefore the score of 2.8 is relatively low.

Community survey respondents were also asked their perception about certain practices that depict one's level of untrustworthiness, by asking them if it is always or sometimes justifiable not to pay for a trip on public transport (to which 32% responded that it can sometimes be justified). For 51% it is sometimes (29%) or always (22%) justifiable to fiddle with one's taxes if an opportunity presents itself. Finally, 13% said it is sometimes acceptable to apply for a state benefit even though one is not eligible for it.

Given the limited relevance of the indicators used for the community survey, the score of 1 was given, primarily reflecting the WVS data.

## 2.5. Legal environment

This subdimension examines the extent to which the legal environment is enabling for civil society, using 4 indicators. Overall, the NAG scored 1.3 on this sub-dimension.

**TABLE III.2.9: Indicators assessing the legal environment and its impact on civil society**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.5.1</u>	CSO registration	<u>1</u>
<u>2.5.2</u>	Allowable advocacy activities	<u>2</u>
<u>2.5.3</u>	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	<u>1</u>
<u>2.5.4</u>	Tax benefits for philanthropy	<u>1</u>

*2.5.1 CSO registration.* The CSO registration process was deemed ‘not very supportive’ when examining five of its characteristics: (1) simplicity, (2) rapidity, (3) cheapness, (4) following legal provisions, and (5) consistent application.

For CSOs, the main registration route is to register as an NGO, but CBOs can register locally and cooperatives and trusts follow other routes. The registration and oversight of NGOs is currently informed by legislation passed in the late 1980’s. This provides, among others, for a Registration Board, within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. An application to register as an NGO follows a number of hurdles and vetting processes. Some districts also require registration. Registration certificates are only issued for a specified period of time and renewal is sought from the Board offices in Kampala. This process has been commented upon by the 2005 Freedom House report as making for “*stringent legal restrictions*”.

The responses to the regional survey are summarised in the table below, where quickness was defined as taking less than two months. Registration requirements include having a bank account, a work plan and a constitution.

**TABLE III.2.10: CSO registration: Regional survey responses**

Registration Process is...	% Yes	% No	% Don’t know
Quick	33	58	10
Simple	36	55	9
Inexpensive	54	34	12
Follows legal provisions	70	14	16
Consistently applied	60	22	19

However, not all NGOs find this process restrictive. For example, a 1998 survey noted that “[a]lmost all the [surveyed] organisations that are registered had no major complaint about the NGO Statute (...) probably because the state has not enforced the *daonian law*” (Barya, 1998: 22-23). This comment can still apply today, given the Registration Board’s limited administrative capacity.

The Local Government Act (1997) provides freedom for NGOs to operate, but does not specify how NGO activities can, or should, be aligned with those of other development agents in the same area of operation (Allavida 2003: 34) and the extent to which NGOs’ activities are required to conform explicitly with district development plan. The Act also makes the executive committee of the district local council responsible for “monitoring and coordinating” the activities of NGOs.

CBOs increasingly seek “registration” with the district authorities. To some extent this is because this is necessary for gaining access to decentralised government funds. This can be an income generating exercise on the part of local authorities (Allavida, 2003:35).

This legislation is being revised and an amendment, recently passed by Parliament, is currently awaiting presidential assent. This provides for an even stricter registration process, requiring, among others, mandatory annual registration and including security agency representatives on the registration Board.

The law grants a right for Trade Unions to exist and provides for mechanisms to make Trade Union leaders accountable to the membership. The law also stipulates that, where the majority of employees are members of a Union, the employer is bound to negotiate with it. The registration process is nevertheless quite restrictive (Barya (1998:9)). The Registrar of Trade Unions is vested with powers to register, oversee and deregister trade unions, in addition to inspecting books of accounts and interdicting any union official if satisfied that the officer is guilty of misuse or misappropriation of funds. In its 2003 report, Freedom House also reminds us that: *“An array of essential workers are barred from forming unions. Strikes are permitted only after a lengthy reconciliation process”*.

Overall, the registration process was deemed not to be very supportive for CSOs.

*2.5.2 Allowable advocacy activities.* While 49% of the regional survey respondents said there were “reasonable restrictions” on civil society’s advocacy activities, or even none at all for 22% of respondents, regional consultations highlighted instances of intimidation of CSOs, especially when advocacy work touches governance issues. Some participants also worried about the implications of the new NGO Bill, which provides for non-registration of any NGO “whose objectives are in contravention of any Government law”.

Other cases where the government tends to discourage or to react harshly towards those NGOs dealing with political issues, such as addressing corruption, civic education, and opposition-oriented opinions have been documented (Makara, 2000:4; National Organisation for Civic Education & Monitoring in Dicklich, 1998: 105).

Allowable advocacy activities, however, are also a function of civil society’s determination to occupy and extend the space where such activities can take place. Historically, CSOs have not always demonstrated such determination. Thus, there has been less than a mass-CSO movement to advocate for peace in Northern Uganda (DENIVA, 2003b).

*2.5.3 Tax laws favourable to CSOs.* After a period when selected NGOs benefited from tax exemptions, such privileges were abolished in 1995. Currently, while NGOs are not liable to corporation tax, they are expected to pay taxes on salaries, as well as on goods and services (VAT). Although, in practice, not all NGOs fulfil obligations, as employers, to pay taxes. This is a result of the limited enforcement capacity of the tax authority (Barr, 2003:30).

*2.5.4 Tax benefits for philanthropy.* Individual or company donors can benefit from some income tax relief under the 1998 Income Tax Act. The relief cannot exceed 5% of a person’s chargeable income and has to be made to an exempt organisation, “any company, institution or irrevocable trust including a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public character”. However, this provision is not well-known among the general public (CDRN, 2004b:28).

## 2.6. State-civil society relations

To assess the quality of relations between the state and civil society, three indicators are used, to gauge the autonomy of civil society, its dialogue with the state, and cooperation between the two. The NAG scored an average of 1.7 for this subdimension.

**TABLE III.2.11: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.6.1</u>	Autonomy	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.2</u>	Dialogue	<u>1</u>
<u>2.6.3</u>	Cooperation/support	<u>2</u>

*2.6.1 Autonomy.* In giving a score of 2, the NAG judged that the state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to “occasional unwarranted government interference”.

While, as seen above, the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy guarantee the autonomy of civic organisations, in the regional surveys, 53% of respondents, said there is occasional or frequent undue state interference in civil society activities, against 35% who said that the state rarely or never interferes.

Several observers have commented on the limited autonomy of CSOs vis-à-vis the State (see for instance, Juuko who argues that the state has used “*intimidation, bribery, subterfuge, regulation and surveillance and other methods of co-option and control*” (Juuko, in UJCC, 2003:4)<sup>27</sup> Limited autonomy can take various forms: “*‘Civil society’ has been closely ‘enmeshed’ with the state and, thanks to decentralisation, the many interfaces between CSOs and government stretch from Kampala to the most isolated villages. The demarcation between ‘civil society’ and ‘government’ remains blurred: individuals, for instance, move from one to the other.*” (De Coninck, 2004b:7)

Given the special position of churches in Uganda’s political history, the autonomy of the churches vis-à-vis the State deserves special mention. Dicklich summarises: “*Churches and religion are still used by political parties, for political purposes and political manipulation*” (1998:115-116). However, as seen above, some faith-based organisations have become increasingly vocal in their criticisms of government practices and policies.

*2.6.2 Dialogue.* The NAG judged that “the state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis”. In the regional surveys, 50% of respondents found dialogue and collaboration between the state and civil society “moderate”. Thirty-three percent said the dialogue is “limited”, reflecting “suspicion”, a word used to characterise the relationship, especially where the State considered CSOs as security threats and the latter fail to share budgets and work plans.

Other observers similarly mention the attitudes of suspicion and mistrust that informs Government-CSO relationships, both at national and, especially, local levels. (see DENIVA, 2002d:3). Similarly, the media survey only detected 7 instances of dialogue, prompting the author to remark: “*The general findings where that the government has very limited dialogue*

<sup>27</sup> An opposite view also exists in the literature, that of CSOs having acquired *too much* autonomy and undermining the State (Nabuguzi (1995: 206).

*with CSOs. Moreover the dialogue only related to a small sub-set of CSOs and it was mostly on an ad hoc basis.”*

Government expresses concerns at rapid CSO growth, making registration and monitoring difficult, at briefcase NGOs, at those that change their mandate and areas of operation, at their failure to submit work plans and budgets to district authorities, at overcrowding in certain sectors, at lack of integrity vis-à-vis donors and intended beneficiaries and at NGOs causing division among people or being used for political gains. In sum, NGOs appear to suffer from a growing credibility gap<sup>28</sup> in the eyes of government, although some NGOs have, on their side, recognised the occasional arrogance they display (UPDNET, 2002:4-6).

Nevertheless, CSOs have been given the opportunity to participate in national debates and programmes. Thus, Government welcomed their participation in the PEAP (see section 4.1.) and in a series of nationwide Participatory Poverty Assessments. Given the make up of Uganda’s economy, this is a critical sector. CSOs have recently engaged with the government Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture as well as with the implementation of a component of this, the National Advisory Agricultural Development Services (NAADS).

*2.6.3 Cooperation/support.* This takes a number of different forms, starting with legal cooperation agreements, with one-third of the NGOs surveyed in 2003 having an MOU with at least one Ministry, most often Health or Gender (Barr, 2003:31) and Government is currently attempting to promote the development of “Partnership principles” with NGOs.

We have also seen that sub-contracting income is growing: in 2003, just under one-quarter of surveyed NGOs had ever been paid to provide a service (Barr, 2003). The PEAP recognises the roles of CSOs in (i) service delivery where it has a comparative advantage; advocacy and lobbying and (iii) independent monitoring. CSOs are often enthusiastic to participate in national Government programmes (UPDNET, 2002:4), although, in terms of sub-contracting, this may result in a blossoming of ‘briefcase’ NGOs and others established specifically to target government contracts, and CSOs adopting the value system of private business, both positive and negative. In addition, from dependence on ‘traditional’ donors, CSOs now increasingly have to account to local government, rather than being CSOs acting on behalf of the people to hold government to account (CARE/CDRN (2005).

These roles reflect a relationship that is constantly evolving and is one of “*both collaboration and conflict...*” (Bazaara, 2002:23), or a “*love/hate affair*” (Kwesiga, 2003:9), reflecting mixed reactions in official circles: “*(...) although allowed to operate, NGOs are sometimes perceived as competitors with government for scarce resources and patronage, or as agencies whose close links with foreign NGOs can undermine national integrity*” (quoted in Dicklich, 1998:101-2). While the State-civil society relationship has been changing, we must also recall that, in spite of efforts dating back almost 10 years, there is no overall policy framework for NGOs in Uganda.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> For more on this, see sections on “values” and “self-regulation”.

<sup>29</sup> The 1998 Riddell et al report was commissioned to provide guidance in developing such a policy. It was never acted upon.

## 2.7. Private sector-civil society relations

Having examined the evidence related to the three indicators used to characterise the relationship between the private sector and civil society, the NAG assigned a score of 1.7 for this sub-dimension, a ‘mostly productive’ relationship.

**TABLE III.2.12: Indicators assessing private sector civil society relations**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.7.1</u>	Private sector attitude	<u>2</u>
<u>2.7.2</u>	Corporate social responsibility	<u>1</u>
<u>2.7.3</u>	Corporate philanthropy	<u>2</u>

*2.7.1 Private sector attitude.* This was gauged as ‘generally positive’, reflecting the opinions of respondents to the regional surveys, 29% of whom described it as “supportive” and 31% “indifferent”, an outcome verified by the media survey.

*2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility.* The regional survey also covered the issue of corporate social responsibility on the part of private sector companies. Thirty-four percent of respondents rated the work of major companies in Uganda in taking into account the social and environmental consequences of their activities (corporate social responsibility) as “limited”, 24% as “moderate” and 21% as “insignificant”.

The CSI “Fact finding study” on corporate social responsibility (CSR) examined the practice of the 10 largest companies in Uganda and found that all, except one, where information was lacking, are involved in some CSR activities. Most support health activities, with a focus on HIV/AIDS issues, but also education and community development initiatives. One company (Bell breweries) invested in an affluent treatment plant for its own waste. Barclays Bank earmark 1% of their annual profits to CSR activities, including HIV, disability issues and support to small enterprises. Examples from other companies, such as Shell, Uganda Breweries, Total, Caltex, British American Tobacco, Century Bottling and Nile Breweries, were also documented. While documenting the extent of CSR among major international companies, it is important to remember that Uganda’s private sector consists overwhelmingly of very small companies, not covered by the survey.

*2.7.3 Corporate philanthropy.* The NAG gauged that the available evidence points towards only a very limited range of CSOs receiving funding from the private sector. Thus, while 38% of the regional survey respondents said that business associations/private sector sometimes participates in broader civil society activities, another 36% felt that such participation is rare. Although, in the central region consultations, participants mentioned training carried out by the private sector on micro-finance, from which CSOs had benefited.

The Fact Finding study lists UWESO as a beneficiary from several of the companies studied. Sports associations also frequently benefit. MTN, a mobile phone company, contributed U.shs. 220 million in the last 2 years to Habitat for Humanity to construct 120 houses, among other initiatives. Education, HIV and disability issues are frequently mentioned by these companies. However, this study only looked at the 10 largest corporations and other sources argue that corporate philanthropy is not well developed in Uganda (Allavida 2003:31). Very few NGOs are successful in mobilising support from the private sector (CDRN, 2004:15). It is also noted in this context the “standard” donation by multi-national corporations to high profile causes (such as Sanyu Babies’ Home). The media survey confirms this, with a total of 11 incidences of corporate philanthropy detected and the range of support thinly spread.

This indicator assumes a clear boundary between civil society and the “private sector”, although recent research indicates that this boundary may become increasingly blurred. Thus, as noted above, the search by NGOs for contracts instils business practices that are not always “above board”. As one respondent in a study said:

*“CSOs are not united, they are more like a business” [Socially...] senior government officials run large business enterprises and may even have a spouse as the head of a national CSO. They frequently meet in the same corridors in workshops, sports clubs, or even drinking “joints”. In short they are the same people” (cited in De Coninck, 2004b:7).*

Some NGOs are also undertaking business-type consultancy work, occasionally pushed in this direction by their donors that emphasise the need for “financial sustainability”, or establish a business arm to allow them to seek and implement contracts, just as another business entity would.

## Conclusion

Among the four dimensions of Uganda’s civil society, the environment within which civil society operates scores lowest. This is partly explained by the analysis of the political and socio-economic contexts, which are seen as rather disabling for civil society. Political and civil rights, information rights and press freedom, while enshrined in the Constitution, are not always respected and the opening of political competition is still recent. Insurgency continues in the northern part of the country, at considerable human and economic cost.

Uganda remains an extremely poor country, although less poor than in the last 20 years, with a growing gap between the rich and the poor. Corruption is rampant, although the effectiveness of state services has much improved in the last two decades. This also relates to moderate levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness in the society

The legal environment is also judged to be not as enabling as it could, given the cumbersome registration procedures for CSOs, which may soon be tightened up even further, the poor tax environment, as well as the ambivalent attitude of Government on what constitutes allowable advocacy activities for CSOs, especially when they ‘stray’ into what it considers the political arena).

The latter point informs a relationship between the state and civil society where, overall, both parties see their role as one of collaboration, rather than confrontation. This echoes the low degree of ‘political activism’ within civil society, as well as the historical role of CSOs in Uganda in service delivery. Nevertheless, this relationship is changing on several fronts. Both parties increasingly see advocacy work as legitimate for CSOs to engage in, a move supported by donors, and government is opening avenues, especially at district level, for CSOs to contract service delivery from its own coffers. This tendency is growing and replacing the previous tendency of the rather weak State confronting well-funded NGOs, where the latter have to temper their accountability role and may even adopt more business-like attitudes, both positive and negative.

Less important at the present time is the relationship with the private sector. CSOs do not feel especially concerned with this relationship and currently do not benefit much from any funding from the private sector, except in a few high-profile cases.


However, are CSOs themselves increasingly turning into private businesses? This question is a symptom of a broader one, linked to a profoundly changing operating environment, as the boundaries between the state, the private sector and civil society become increasingly blurred. It is question that underlines a growing challenge for CSOs wishing to retain autonomy, which cannot be nurtured without a strong sense of identity. Can civil society hold the state accountable to the people without a strong sense of values to effectively perform their ‘fourth estate’ role?

We therefore now turn to the analysis of the third dimension, the values that inform Uganda’s civil society.

### 3. VALUES

This part of the analysis looks at seven selected values: how do these inform the work of CSOs and to what extent do they find their expression within such organisations? The scores for each of these values are presented in the table below. Overall, Uganda’s civil society was rated to have practices and to promote positive social values to a “moderate extent”, with a score of **1.9** for this dimension.

**FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension**



#### 3.1. Democracy

Do CSOs practice democracy themselves? Do they promote democracy? Examining these two questions, the NAG ascribed a score of 1.5 for this sub-dimension.

**TABLE III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy as a value**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.1.1.</u>	Democratic practices within CSOs	<u>1</u>
<u>3.1.2.</u>	CS actions to promote democracy	<u>2</u>

*3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs.* The NAG gauged that a majority of CSOs do not practice internal democracy. This was partly informed by the results of the regional survey where, although 63% of respondents said that CSOs leaders are elected by members, the influence of members was judged to be little, limited or moderate by 45%.

Similarly, the 2003 NGO survey indicates that only 10% of those surveyed had neither a Board of Trustees nor a Board of Directors; in half the cases, the director is elected by the members, and in one third, selected by the board. However, the authors mention the possibility that such practices may be of a “rubber stamping” nature” (Barr, 2003:33-35).

This caveat is echoed in a study that argues that “...*the NGO sector is young and some CSOs are somewhat ephemeral. This makes for vibrancy but also highlights some of the weaknesses associated with formative years: dependence on founder members, lack of focus, poorly*

*developed governance structures and questionable stability*” (quoted in CDRN, 2005a: 21). The “founder syndrome” is commented upon by several researchers: “Some are simply dominated by single “strong” leaders” and “One of the major problems internal to NGOs is that either they have no real membership or the membership is too detached from the leadership (...) (Barya,1998:28). Similarly, within CBOs, ‘members are often resigned to seeing their leadership amass power, resources or other privileges. NGOs often also uneasily combine ‘philanthropic’ objectives for donor consumption, with economic advancement objectives for their membership and leadership. It is therefore not surprising that questions are consistently raised about the legitimacy of NGOs...’ (quoted in CDRN, 2005a:22).

This study makes the point that ‘autocratic leadership practices are culturally very deeply rooted, within civil society’ and that “recent demands for participatory decision-making therefore pose a new kind of challenge for NGO leaders” (CDRN, 2005a:34-35). Similar problems affect Trade Unions where, according to one observer, ‘leaders have manipulated their own internal rules to cling on the leadership, including bribery of delegates, or have used state connections to thwart democracy within the unions (...)’ (Barya, op.cit).

*3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy.* The higher score of 2 for this indicator reflects the regional survey results, where 37% of respondents could think of only one or two examples in the last year of civil society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting democracy, while 30% could think of several or many examples. In the Central, Western and Northern regions, participants mentioned the ‘Minimum agenda’, constitution amendment process, policy dialogues on the political transition, and the Women CSO Minimum agenda among others.<sup>30</sup> These efforts were however said to be uncoordinated and therefore not sector-wide.

Of respondents, 32% stated that the role of civil society in promoting democracy at community level has been ‘significant’, while 27% said ‘moderate’, possibly reflecting the active role of CSOs in civic education at community level. A number of other areas of engagement were mentioned during the regional consultations, such as education activities for Local Councils and (in Teso) the formation of civil society/military cooperation centres to review military operations in terms of freedom of movement and access to essential services.

However, some observers have voiced scepticism as to the depth of this involvement. Thus, reflecting on the critical role played by foreign donors on the operation and even creation of civil society actors, Oloka-Onyango wonders: “Are we then not simply witnessing the recreation of a privileged “civil-ocracy” that is well connected to the purse strings of donors and whose real objectives in the arena of democratisation can at best be labelled as suspect” (2000a:3). Similarly, during a 2003 consultation with district CSOs elicited further reasons for hesitation (Adong et al). The fear of being tainted by corruption, or feeling sidelined from the policy process, with some respondents admitting: “We do not stick our necks out, we are quiet, fragmented and adopt quiet means of communication (e-mail). (...) We fear persecution and lack solidarity” (in De Coninck, 2004b:9-10).<sup>31</sup> Similar reluctance is mentioned with regard to Trade Unions and some professional associations, with the exception of the Law Society (Oloka, 1996:134) and the Churches (Waliggo, cited in Kassimir, 1998:68). This

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<sup>30</sup> For a description, see below.

<sup>31</sup> See also *The Monitor*, cited in Bazaara (2000: 43) “There is a lot of irony (...) Most independent human rights groups (...) have shunned the activist role which directly campaigns against violations and chosen show activities, like seminars and workshops (...) They fudge or claim they are ‘working quietly behind the scenes.’”

might explain why the media survey failed to identify “*big and organised campaigns to promote democracy by CS actors either as a group or individually*”.

The remarks above, however, should not suggest a uniform picture characterised by co-option, hesitance or disinterest. Some examples to the contrary can be advanced. Thus, for the 2001 elections, NOCEM trained some 4,054 voluntary civic educators, monitored 20 pilot districts and had some 5,000 poll-watchers covering polling stations nationwide. The involvement of UJCC in monitoring the 2006 elections was also extensive. As Uganda moves into a multi-party environment, some CSOs have also developed “manifestoes”: the “Women’s Minimum Demands to Political Parties and organisations” issued by UWONET in 2004 and “A Civil Society Minimum Agenda for 2006 and Beyond”, to “*outline our political stance as civil society organisations (and) what we, as part of civil society, expect our future leaders to sign up to, as they compete for power under the new rules*” (DENIVA et al, 2004).

The CSI Media survey concludes: “*Service CSOs spoke out mostly about health issues (28 entries) and social welfare (17 entries) but were totally inaudible on issues such as environment, justice, transparency, etc. which have a bearing on social welfare that they seek to promote. The same can be said of the faith-based CSOs (...)*”

### 3.2. Transparency

The NAG used three indicators to score on this subdimension and determined a “moderate” average score for this value of 1.7

**TABLE III.3.2 Indicators assessing transparency as a value**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Corruption within civil society	2
3.2.2	Financial transparency of CSOs	1
3.2.3	CS actions to promote transparency	2

3.2.1 *Corruption within civil society.* The NAG agreed “that there are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS”, justifying a score of 2.

This was partly warranted by responses to the regional survey, where 40% of respondents said instances of corruption within the sector were ‘occasional’ and, for 27%, ‘very rare’. The media survey only captured two instances of corruption. One involved embezzlement by leaders of the Uganda Football Federation “*and the other copyright infringement by an artists’ association*”, although another observer remarks that the media is “*awash with stories about unforgivable behaviours by some NGOs and some of them have actually been de-registered. Fortunately, this remains the exception, rather than the rule*” (Kwesiga, 2003:10).

If cases of corruption are relatively rare, they do tend to undermine the reputation of the sector as a whole. In a recent paper developed for a proposed Certification mechanism for NGOs, there is mention of a growing “*degree of scepticism among civil society observers, the general public and – occasionally – within its own ranks too.*”<sup>32</sup> However, such judgements significantly depend on the definition of ‘corruption’. Participants at the consultations in the North considered corruption to be frequent, especially with changes of CSO constitutions to avoid re-election of certain individuals on to their Board of Directors.

<sup>32</sup> See above, “self-regulation” section.

Some individuals in the sector were also alleged to have forged signatures so as to obtain funding from the Government's Northern Uganda Social Action Fund. The move towards sub-contracting is also relevant here, since, as a recent study argues, "*awarding and receiving contracts can in some instances compromise values, accountability and transparent practices. CSO can get involved in non-accountable practices, such as bribery and influence-peddling*" (CDRN, 2005a:16).

3.2.2 *Financial transparency of CSOs.*<sup>33</sup> In giving a score of 1, the NAG agreed that only a small minority of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available. This primarily reflected the data from one survey of NGOs, where only two-thirds could provide income and expenditure figures (Barr et al, 2003:25) and regional survey figures, whereby 50% of respondents stated that CSOs make financial accounts publicly available, and 36% stated they do not.<sup>34</sup>

The author of the media review report comments: "*On the whole, CSOs were portrayed mostly in neutral light (499) as opposed to 238 positive and 87 negative. Among the negative were a few cases of corruption and bickering/infighting with CSOs*". However, the same report states: "*Issues of CSO transparency and internal democracy feature highly*".

This lack of transparency can lead to a difficult relationship with government authorities, such as with the frequent accusations levelled by district officials, at NGOs, that they are unwilling to share their plans and budgets (for an example in the medical field, see Cannon, 2000:112ff). Accountability to donors is in practice often of greater importance than accountability to the beneficiaries. This can undermine group participation and "*accountability mechanisms towards 'target groups' are indeed, practically everywhere conspicuous by their absence*" (De Coninck, 1992:3). Lack of transparency also seems to afflict Trade Unions (Okwe, 1999:27).

3.2.3 *CS actions to promote transparency.* The NAG assessed the strength of civil society in this respect in terms of activities being undertaken, but with limited visibility and broad-based support.

A number of anti-corruption initiatives aimed at holding government accountable have been promoted by CSOs. Thus 57% of respondents to the regional survey indicated that they could think of either 'one or two' or 'several examples' of public campaigns, actions or programmes by civil society to promote government transparency in the last year. These campaigns have contributed to larger efforts and pressure on local governments to display their plans and corresponding budget lines on public notice boards. In a few places too, local communities have been involved in activities to demand services from public leaders and to hold them to account. Nevertheless, in assessing civil society's current role in promoting government accountability, 64% of respondents said it was 'limited' or 'moderate'.

As part of the regional survey, respondents were asked how active and effective civil society is in influencing public policy on corruption. Of respondents, 59% said civil society has been 'active' or 'very active'; but with only 22% saying civil society has been 'successful' or 'very successful' in these campaigns. Campaigns carried out by CSOs on corruption

<sup>33</sup> Non-financial forms of lack of transparency have also been noted. Thus, *a cynical view appears to be gaining ground: "successful" NGO leaders are described as manipulative, skilful in managing their Board and staff, able to discern the latest donor interests and good at "donor speak"* (quoted in De Coninck, 2005:6).

<sup>34</sup> There were however very few responses availed in the database (only 11 responses and 183 non responses)

contributed to efforts to establish a national plan against corruption, and passing the Access to Information Bill (also highlighted in the media review), which are looked at as avenues to reduce poverty in the country. Of particular note are the efforts of the Uganda Debt Network (see box)<sup>35</sup>.

#### The Uganda Debt Network

*UDN was formed in 1996, reflecting civil society concerns that Uganda's debt burden had reached unsustainable levels, with adverse implications for the country's social and economic development.*

*UDN has sought to influence the policy process at both the local and national level through a number of initiatives: a) by working with people at the grassroots to monitor the quality and delivery of services and thus ensuring that the voices of the poor are heard, b) through regular media programmes, c) by participating in policy review workshops such as Public Expenditure Workshop and others organised by government, d) through Civil Society initiated and organised policy forum, and e) through networking with other CSOs. These and other approaches "have enabled UDN to cut through the rhetoric of officialdom or to fill the gap and become the serious actor in policy advocacy at both national and local levels".*

*Among its current programmes, especially innovative has been the Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System, to increase the participation of the communities and strengthen their capacity to carry out continuous monitoring (in the use of public resources). Since 2002, over 12,000 people at the grassroots have been mobilised "and are now actively participating in monitoring the quality and delivery of services (...). One of the key critical outcomes is that members of the community and those involved in monitoring at the grassroots own the process and this has enabled them to demand services from service providers at the local level."*

*UDN also participates in national budget consultations organised by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and UDN has facilitated people at the grassroots to attend such meetings and present some of their ideas and concerns.*

Of respondents to the regional survey, 38% said that they did not know whether civil society had held public campaigns, or had actions or programmes for promoting **corporate** transparency in the last one year, and a further 19% could not think of any example. This limited engagement reflects the government's strategy to promote private investments and indeed to protect private investors in almost all circumstances and, as noted above, the limited interaction between the private sector and civil society.

### 3.3. Tolerance

The NAG gave civil society a 'limited' to moderate' score on tolerance, with an average of 1.5, reflecting two indicator scores, as presented in the table below.

**TABLE III.3.3 Indicators assessing tolerance as a value**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the CS arena	<u>2</u>
3.3.2	CS actions to promote tolerance	<u>1</u>

*3.3.1 Tolerance within the CS arena.* A score of 2 was given for this indicator. While there are some intolerant forces within civil society, they are isolated from it at large.

<sup>35</sup> This is summarised from Half-Year Narrative Report, January to June 2004.

This assessment reflected regional survey data, with 46% of respondents saying that the impact of forces that foster ethnic favouritism, discrimination and other intolerant forces within civil society is ‘limited’ or ‘moderate’. Of respondents, 28% said these forces are ‘completely isolated and strongly denounced by civil society’; 21% said they are ‘a significant actor within civil society’; while 19% said they are ‘a marginalised actor’.

A recent study on the effects the funding system for CSOs in Uganda notes that it does not allow for much tolerance of competitors and that NGOs and CBOs are also part of a very diverse and fragmented sector. Competition for various donors’ funds, contracts and recognition *among* NGOs fosters self-interest, disunity, distrust and a greater distance from common social agenda (Wallace, 2004).

**3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance.** Promoting tolerance is not seen as a priority area in Uganda’s civil society. Indeed. Of the regional survey respondents, 65% could not think of any examples in the last one year of civil society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to promoting tolerance and 21% could only think of one or two examples.

The survey also indicates that 26% of respondents thought that civil society’s role in promoting tolerance at the community level is ‘moderate’; 25% that it is ‘significant’ and 19% that it is limited. In *The Uganda we Want*, a publication issued by UJCC in 2003 that outlines a vision for Uganda’s future, a demand is made for a “*united, peaceful, healthy and prosperous country, free of authoritarianism, wars, inequality, intolerance (...)* Similarly, the “Minimum Agenda” mentioned above list “peaceful coexistence, tolerance, reconciliation” as one of the seven values to cherish (DENIVA et al, 2004).

The media survey detected the activities of two CSOs in this area, namely Always Be Tolerant (ABETO) and UJCC, with the latter promoting tolerance in the political arena ahead of elections. However, these initiatives lack broad based support or public visibility. Indeed of the 25 stories captured under this dimension, only a few enjoyed prominence in the coverage.

### 3.4. Non-violence

Having scored two indicators with regard to ‘non-violence’ as a value in Uganda’s civil society, an average score of 2 or ‘moderate’ is obtained for this sub-dimension.

**TABLE III.3.4 Indicators assessing non-violence as a value**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.4.1</u>	Non-violence within the CS arena	<u>2</u>
<u>3.4.2</u>	CS actions to promote non-violence	<u>2</u>

**3.4.1 Non-violence within the Civil Society arena.** The available evidence points to some isolated groups within CS occasionally resorting to violent actions, but these are broadly denounced by civil society at large.

According to the regional survey data, the most frequent response (36%) was that ‘isolated groups regularly use violence’, followed by ‘isolated groups occasionally resort to violence (17%)’. The media survey notes that violence in the civil society arena is committed by small and marginal actors, and there is no wide condemnation of this violence by the mainstream civil society actors, with only four stories of condemnation of violence recorded.

This reflects cultural norms, reinforced by the political repression of the colonial and much of the post-colonial periods. Demonstrations are regulated and police authorisation must be sought before any such demonstration is held. There have been instances of demonstrations turning violent, such as those involving students. Unauthorised demonstrations are considered illegal and dealt with harshly by the police. Within sections of civil society, there have been only rare incidents of violent conflicts, such as factional in-fighting within church dioceses (Busoga, Kisoro) and among Islamic sects.

*3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence and peace.* Historically, the role of CSOs in advocating for peaceful conflict resolution has been limited, for reasons outlined above. Among other factors, the colonial and post-colonial periods were characterised by the introduction and extension of legal systems that circumscribed or proscribed the role of elders and other traditional institutions in conflict resolution. A number of civil society activities in this area could therefore be detected, but without broad-based support or public visibility.

This is reflected in the regional survey, where 36% of respondents said they could think of only one or two examples in the last year of civil society public campaigns, actions or programmes to promote non-violence and/or peaceful conflict resolution in the country. While 17% could think of several such examples and 27% did not know of any.

The media review notes that only 15 out of the 67 stories recorded in this area got a prominence point. Two consistent campaigns were, nonetheless, discernible: the push for a peaceful resolution of war in northern Uganda and domestic violence against women. The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative was featured three times, and Always be Tolerant which launched a 'peace education manual' to promote coexistence in the community, was also prominent. Others were the Democracy Group (DemGroup), Save the Children Uganda, the Uganda Law Society, ACFODE, Uganda Adventist Women Association, World Vision and Oxfam.

Active condemnation of violence by local CSOs has mainly been with those that are operating in conflict areas themselves and, historically, this is a rather new role. Thus, CSOs that are playing key roles to end the armed conflict in northern Uganda are organisations such as the Gulu Support the Children Organisation, Concerned Parents of the Abducted Children, and the Community of St. Egidio (see Mugaju J. et al, 2000: 124). Other local CSOs have also been instrumental in designing programmes for peaceful conflict resolution among conflicting ethnic groups, especially in North Eastern Uganda.

It has also been argued that such condemnation took long to come about with the Church. Examples include, the church being largely unwilling to press Government for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda until 1996, and the church's peace and justice programme "moribund in most dioceses" (Kassimir, 1998:60). A number of CSOs have promoted tolerance and non-violence in other arenas, such as domestic disputes. Thus FIDA uses extra-legal measures of reconciliation and mediation where possible in its work with clients (Opolot, undated: 2).

### 3.5. Gender equity

To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity? An average score of 1.7 (close to ‘moderate’) is derived for this sub-dimension, having examined three indicator scores, as presented in the table below:

**TABLE III.3.5 Indicators assessing gender equity as a value**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>3.5.1</u>	Gender equity within the CS arena	<u>2</u>
<u>3.5.2</u>	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	<u>1</u>
<u>3.5.3</u>	CS actions to promote gender equity	<u>2</u>

*3.5.1 Gender equity within the CS arena.* The indicator places a focus on the representation of women in civil society leadership positions: women were considered ‘under-represented’ in this respect.

According to a recent survey of NGOs (see 1.3. above), 75% of NGO leaders surveyed are men (Barr, 2003). Of regional survey respondents, 22% stated that women are severely under-represented from CSO leadership roles and 38% felt that they are under-represented/somewhat represented. Only 38% considered women equitably represented.

While many CSOs do not have women as leaders because of cultural and attitudinal perceptions in Uganda’s patriarchal society, for rural-based CSOs, such as the numerous CBOs, women are often equitably represented in the leadership, especially where women largely or entirely constitute their membership. Nevertheless, part of the problem may reside in the way in which discriminatory practices against women, within civil society, are publicly denounced by other civil society actors. It was felt that this happens only ‘rarely’, according to 35% of the regional survey respondents, although 52% said they are ‘always’ or ‘usually’ denounced.

*3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs.* Only a minority of CSOs with paid employees were thought to have policies in place to ensure gender equity, hence the low score (1) on this indicator, although the regional survey data was inconclusive.<sup>36</sup>

A recent study on gender knowledge and practice in NGOs in Uganda however notes that there is often “*ambiguity or plain dismissal*” around matters related to gender, despite having structures and policies in place to address gender sensitivity.

*“While NGOs are adopting western approaches to gender in their structures, behaviour is significantly influenced by traditional African and/or religious values, at both community and organisational levels”. Further, “because changes in organisational structures have not developed together with organisational culture, women hold positions but have little power to influence policy or decision-making in organisations” (CDRN/ Transform, 2005: 19).*

*3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity.* A number of civil society activities in this area can be detected, although broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives were found to be lacking.

<sup>36</sup> 34% of the respondents to the regional survey said “No Gender/equal opportunity policies are in place”, 44% responded that “CSOs have gender/equal opportunity policies” and 22% did not know.

Forty-two percent of the regional survey respondents rated civil society's current role in promoting gender equity at community level as 'significant' and another 30% said it was 'moderate'. The same survey indicates that respondents could think of 'several' examples (28%) or 'many' examples (44%) of campaigns, actions or programmes to promote gender equity. However, the impact of civil society in promoting gender equity at the societal level was thought to be 'limited' by 38% of respondents, 'moderate' by 16% and 'significant' by 18%

This less than satisfactory impact might have several causes. Several observers have argued that the commitment to gender equity is only 'skin deep' for many CSOs, those which 'masquerade' as gender activists, mostly for donors' ears. It has thus been argued that *"There is little to show that the position of the less privileged women in the countryside has changed as a result of the urban-based women's associations and NGOs"* (Adong, op.cit.) Neither do all women's organisations see change as necessary: *"for some Christian organisations and communities, institutions such as the Mothers Union is a source of gender knowledge where women are 'taught their place', thus complementing traditional training that reminds them of their culturally expected roles"* (CDRN/ Transform, 2005:37).

Nevertheless, there are areas of achievement: one has been the emergence of many women CSOs, recalling how women activism was manifested in the critical role it played in mobilising people for independence, after which the women's movement was unfortunately driven by the opinions and wishes of the political leadership that *"relegated women's role to that of cooks and entertainers during political/party functions"* (Adong, 2004). From the mid-1980s however, *"various new women organisations (...) were formed, such as Action for Development (ACFODE) and many professional bodies (e.g. female engineers), promoting equality, peace, rights and development. Associations now cut across religion and ethnic backgrounds, with interests ranging from addressing legal and educational issues, increasing women's access to credit facilities, uplifting women's condition and networking. They take on board the interests of the poor, the disabled, and other vulnerable groups"* (CDRN/ Transform, 2005:12). At the local level, women's groups and other community based organisations are widespread in all parts of the country: and *"have contributed to the growth of civil society and the process of modernisation"* (Kabwegyere, 2000:89).

The media survey detected a number of actions in this area although, out of the 19 stories captured, only two received prominent coverage. One was about a demand for a 50-50 women/male representation in parliament and the other was about a safe motherhood project. Three campaigns were discernible: on the health and welfare of young pregnant mothers, girl-child/women's education and violence against women. At UWONET, one of the civil society actors, had specific mandate to promote gender equity, which featured prominently. Others were Mama Club, ACFODE and Christ Women Fellowship.

### 3.6. Poverty eradication

A high score of 3 was awarded for this sub-dimension, reflecting a single indicator score, indicating a 'significant' promotion of poverty eradication by civil society actors.

**TABLE III.3.6 Indicator assessing poverty eradication as a value**

Ref. #	Indicator	Score
3.6.1	CS actions to eradicate poverty	3

*3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty.* Civil society is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty, with civil society activities enjoying broad-based support and strong public visibility.

More than half (54%) of respondents to the regional survey said that in the last year, they could think of several or many examples of civil society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to eradicating poverty; 44% of respondents rated civil society's current role in this area as 'significant'; 28% as 'moderate'. Echoing this, the media survey report notes that this is one area *"where a lot of civil society activities can be detected and these enjoy broad based support and public visibility"*. One hundred forty-four stories were captured under this subdimension.

As noted above, many different types of community organisations in Uganda are established specifically to enhance welfare and reduce poverty among their members. Further, CSOs, especially NGOs, quite often touch base with the remotest areas, and civil society has been keen on monitoring the revision and implementation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP); some CSOs are members of national Budget Working Groups that are responsible for analysing the budget process to ensure that it is pro-poor.

However, a number of observers have noted that NGOs have recently been formed to fulfil another poverty reduction agenda, such as creating employment for CSO founders and their colleagues. *"This implies that the formation of NGOs may not necessarily be out of voluntarism, but opportunism"* (Makara: 2000:4) and leads to situations where the interests of development bureaucrats take precedence over their missions: *"Over-generous per diems, expensive cars and plush offices not only divert the much needed resources from 'poverty eradication' but also (and more importantly) remove us psychologically from the poverty we are meant to eradicate"* (quoted in VECO, 2000:41). It is therefore not surprising that questions are often raised about the legitimacy of NGOs, including their ability to represent the poor (see CDRN, 2005a:22).

### **3.7. Environmental sustainability**

To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability? Moderately, according to the evidence presented to score against this one indicator:

**TABLE III.3.7 Indicator assessing environmental sustainability as a value**

Ref. #	Indicator	Score
<u>3.7.1</u>	CS actions to sustain the environment	<u>2</u>

*3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment.* Environmental issues do not feature prominently in the agenda of CSOs in Uganda. While a number of activities could be detected, broad-based support and or public visibility of such initiatives, however, appears to be lacking.

A sample from the NGO registration data bank at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2000, shows that 12% were engaged in environmental protection programmes (Wallace, 2004: 23-24). A few local NGOs, mostly active at national level, focus on such issues, such as the Uganda Wildlife Society, ACODE, NAPE, Environmental Alert, etc. These often work in close partnership with international NGOs, such as ECOTRUST, IUCN, ICRAF, etc. Some other NGOs, including some religious institutions, also have an environmental protection

element in their rural development initiatives. Thirty-eight percent of respondents to the regional survey could indeed think of only one or two examples in the last year of civil society public campaigns, actions or programmes dedicated to protecting the environment, while another 34% could think of ‘several’ or ‘many’ examples. Of respondents, 34% rated civil society’s current role in protecting the environment as ‘significant’ and 30% as ‘moderate’.

The media survey states that only Ramsar Civil Society Forum, Green Watch and NGO Forum were detected in the area of promoting environmental conservation. No specific campaign was detected during the survey period.

A few NGOs have also focused on topical environmental issues, such as attempts by large corporations to use forest reserves, or to halt the construction of a large hydro-electric dam (NAPE and the campaign against the destruction of Bujagali falls). Nevertheless, Government has continued to de-gazette land in Uganda and most CSOs appear to have kept a rather low profile on environmental protection issues and the Government’s economic arguments, especially with regard to foreign investors’ needs. Some examples are Bujagali falls, Pian Upe Reserve, Namanve Forest Reserve and Butamiira Community Forest.

There have also been a few more localised initiatives. Thus, in 1998 Rukungiri Functional Adult Literacy Centre (RFLRC), convinced residents of Kyeshero parish to set aside land that had previously been forested and subsequently degraded. RFLRC and the residents oversaw the regeneration of a natural forest on private land at the periphery of Bwindi National Park. Some local and international NGOs, such as CARE, are also involved in mobilising and building the capacity of CSOs to protect and manage resource sustainability. Lobby efforts, mostly by international NGOs, have also taken place to develop revenue-sharing mechanisms for communities living in the proximity of Uganda’s national parks.

## Conclusion

Having noted the changing context within which CSOs have operated and how their positioning with regard to “democracy” has shifted with time, and recalling in particular their important role in the fight for independence and subsequent cowing by the neo-colonial state, it is found that CSOs continue to struggle with living and promoting those values that are frequently associated with the ‘voluntary sector’.<sup>37</sup> This is especially true of CSOs struggling with internal democracy and transparency and the promotion of democracy, as the instances of corruption and of a ‘founder syndrome’ within CSOs exemplify. However, this also applies to other values, such as ‘tolerance’, non-violence and gender equity. In all such cases, there seems to be a hiatus between rhetoric and practice which, in the case of NGOs, also reflects the increased social desirability of “NGO work”.

This can lead to disillusionment among other stakeholders, as a donor agency representative is quoted in a recent research paper: *“My problem is with the values behind the formation of NGOs. Most people see NGOs as another job, another means for survival. Where is the poor man? When you come out with a policy brief, whose policy brief is it?”* (quoted in CDRN, 2004a:22)

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
<sup>37</sup> See, among others, section on Civil Society history.

Nevertheless, CSOs appear to be more comfortable with ‘poverty eradication’ as a value, and to some extent ‘environmental sustainability’, as illustrated by, among others, the many community organisations specifically created for this purpose. Poverty eradication also corresponds well to their historical role of civil society and the way most CSOs define their primary role in Uganda’s civil society. This becomes apparent when examining the ‘impact’ dimension of civil society as well, as explained in the next section of this report.

## 4. IMPACT

We now describe the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions in Ugandan society and politics. The score for the Impact Dimension, taking into account five sub-dimensions is a rather high **2.3**. Figure III.4.1 presents the scores for the five relevant sub-dimensions.

**FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension**



### 4.1. Influencing public policy

This subdimension assesses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy. Table III.4.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.4.1 Indicators assessing influence on public policy**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1.	Human rights impact	2
4.1.2.	Social policy impact	2
4.1.3.	Impact on national budgeting process	2

*4.1.1 Impact on human rights.* The NAG felt that civil society is active in this area, although its impact remains limited. This was based on the review of secondary literature, which highlights much CSO activity, including the provision of legal aid and the training of security agencies in human rights (Kakaire in UJCC, 2003:56). NGOs are also numerous as watchdogs on Human Rights, so far as women's rights, children rights, rights of people with disabilities, rights of prisoners and rights of old persons are concerned. NGOs have also played a role in advocating for the rule of law and defending the constitution (Kwesiga et al, undated:7). This includes Law Society (Oloka-Onyango 1996:134). The Fact Finding study on internally displaced persons also indicates that NGOs have collaborated with Uganda's Human Rights Commission in stationing staff to receive complaints of abuses by cam presidents. NGOs have also participated in a national policy to protect internally displaced people.

This widespread involvement is, however, tempered by the continued existence of human rights violations and the traditional perspective adopted by human rights organisations. In the constitution-making process in the mid 1990's, for example, *‘There was really no attempt at radical reformulation of the typology or the content of the Bill of rights {...hence the relative neglect of economic and social rights}’* (Oloka-Onyango, 2000b:33). Finally, the media survey detected no CSO activity of any consequence in this area.

*4.1.2 Impact on social policy.* In giving a score of 2 to this indicator, whereby civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited, evidence was principally drawn from the regional survey. Respondents were asked how active and effective civil society is in influencing public policy in three areas: corruption, the environment and land issues.

With regard to corruption, 59% of respondents felt that civil society had either been ‘active’ or ‘very active’, with success or partial success mentioned by 68% of respondents. This reflects that CSO campaigns contributed, among others, to the establishment of a national plan against corruption as well as to passing the Access to Information Bill, which are looked at as avenues to reduce corruption in the country.

Concerning influencing public policy on the environment; activity was also rated high (17% said ‘very active’ and 47% ‘active’), as was effectiveness (53% said civil society has been ‘somewhat successful’ for 53%; ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’ for 31%)

As far as land issues are concerned, 55% said civil society has been ‘active’ or ‘very active’ with a degree of effectiveness rated as ‘somewhat successful’ by 39%, and 32% as ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’

Similarly, respondents to another study, all with a background in CSO, felt that CSOs were having an impact in influencing Government policy, especially where international NGOs are concerned. Thus, 65% of respondents felt that international NGOs were having a ‘high participation and influence in the policy framework’ (compared to 28% who felt this was ‘middling’ and 7% for whom this was ‘low’). When rating the ‘effectiveness of participation in influencing policy’, 22% of respondents felt that CSOs were ‘very effective’, 55% ‘somewhat effective’ and 22% ‘not so effective’ (Twijukye, 2003: 20). Other instances were noted, such as in the fact-finding report, that highlights CSO participation in the development of the policy on Internally Displaced People, especially relevant to the emergency in Northern Uganda. A coalition of CSOs has also conducted focused advocacy at national and international levels on the cost of the emergency, which has found a wide audience.

The CSI fact-finding report also notes that:

*“FIDA (U) petitioned parliament on the establishment of the Equal Opportunities Commission and contributed to the establishment of the Orphans and Vulnerable Children Policy. Uganda’s policies and laws on children, including the 2004 Ugandan National Strategic Programme and Plan of Interventions for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children, the National Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children Policy and the Children Statute 1996 pay particular attention to the problem of street children”* (Mugabi, 2006:37).

Nevertheless, this picture is not one of unmitigated success. Thus, participants to the consultations in northern Uganda noted that some CSOs were unable to focus on issues of common interest and to incorporate their plans with the local authorities. Rather, they “talk

like politicians.” Urgent issues of advocacy like advocacy against rape, which was rampant, were not taken care of.

*4.1.3 Impact on the National Budgeting process.* A study was commissioned by the CSI project, to examine the impact of civil society on the national budgeting process. The study found that, while CSO participation in the process is still limited, it is evolving and three examples are given of tangible successes, such as that of the NGO Forum for Women in Development (FOWODE) that has managed to convince the government to start gender budgeting. There is evidence that a gender budget advocacy campaign has begun to bear fruit, with the Ministry of Finance developing gender and equity guidelines, which will guide sector ministries on engendering their plans and budgets.

Another example is the Uganda Debt Network (UDN), which was the lead agency for civil society participation in the revision of the Poverty Eradication Plan (PEAP) since 2000 and coordinated the Civil Society Task Force in this respect. Civil Society has documented its input in the 2003/4 revision process (NGO Forum 2004), which included specifically commissioned research on several aspects of poverty reduction strategies and a consultative process acknowledged by Government (Uganda Government, 2004:3-4).

UDN has facilitated the formation of participatory monitoring communities to track savings from debt relief and provides inputs for policy formulation on various issues such as debt sustainability, thus strengthening the role of CSOs in influencing policy, planning and formulation in the country. UDN produces and circulates 45,000 copies of its Policy Review Newsletter on the quarterly basis. The Newsletter has become an important source of policy analysis for both the government and the public and, to ensure wide circulation, it is circulated as an insert in the main daily newspaper. UDN has also initiated various radio programmes that are presented by staff and partner groups (see also Barya, 1998:26).

Nevertheless, civil society engagement with the PEAP is still somewhat restricted to a few CSOs and their networks. One reason for this has been the skills deficit. A study conducted for the NGO Forum of 416 CSOs throughout the country showed that respondents, while aware of the PEAP and other government policies, had little detailed understanding of them (Twijukye, 2003).

Third, the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) submits proposals to the Ministry of Finance during the drafting stage of the budget. Meetings are also called between the members of UMA to discuss how the approved budget has addressed the issues raised and those which have been pending from the previous budget.

## **4.2. Holding the state and private corporations accountable**

This subdimension assesses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in holding (1) the State and (2) private corporations accountable. The NAG gave an overall score of 1.5 for this subdimension. Table III.4.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

**TABLE III.4.2 Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.2.1.	Activity and impact in holding the state accountable	<u>2</u>
4.2.2.	Activity & impact in holding private corps. accountable	<u>1</u>

*4.2.1 Holding the state accountable.* In scoring 2 for this indicator, indicating an active civil society engagement, but with limited impact, the NAG reflected both information collected during the regional survey and evidence from the secondary literature.

Thus, 51% of the regional survey respondents said civil society has been ‘somewhat active’ in holding the state accountable; 37% said it has been ‘active’ or ‘very active’. However, 53% said that civil society has only been ‘somewhat successful’ in holding the state accountable; 16% said it has been ‘successful’ and 23% said it has not.

Such limited impact may partly be due to the recent and foreign nature of “holding government to account” for many CSOs. Recent research thus found that local, as opposed to international, CSOs generally do not have an ‘accountability agenda’ and hesitate to venture in this field, unless they work as a coalition or they are instigated and nurtured by an international CSO. This may reflect CSOs desire to collaborate with Government and, at times, also obtain lucrative contracts (CARE/CDRN, 2005).

Donor influence is also felt: as Adong explains, “*As a result of donor pressure, CSOs engagement in advocacy is also still centred in Kampala. District-level CSOs have mixed feelings about participating in advocacy work: some feel that contributing to policy making is a corrupting process, (...) others feel that they are never invited, and that if they invited themselves, they would be ignored*” (Adong, 2004:9-10). At times, some CSOs have also actively supported government’s stance on several issues. Thus, “*On the other extreme were the women groups which were happy with the current political arrangement or not to overly bothered about it, such as the Mothers Union: "Government policy on political organisations is very O.K: the movement type of organisation is good, multi-partyism divides the people, leads to killings*” (Barya, 1998:28).

Nevertheless, the area of election monitoring is of increasing concern to CSOs. The Churches, through UJCC, have for instance taken a prominent role in recent election monitoring, although it has been argued that the *religious institutions have not claimed, let alone used the available political space for advocacy*” (VEDCO, 2000, 21). Prominence at elections time also appeared in the media review, conducted when local and national elections were being prepared, with “*considerable media attention in areas such as building capacity for collective action (...) CSO action to promote democracy and holding the state accountable*”.

DENIVA, the NGO Forum, UJCC and CDRN jointly issued “A Civil Society Minimum Agenda for 2006 and Beyond” to “outline what we, as part of civil society, expect our future leaders to sign up to” (DENIVA et al, 2005:3). For each of the seven core values it outlines, the Minimum Agenda sets out benchmarks or practical undertakings that leaders or aspiring leaders are expected to adhere to. Further, “*We intend to use these benchmarks to measure, evaluate and appreciate our leaders’/ political entities’ behaviour, actions and programmes, to hold them accountable*” (DENIVA et al, 2004: 5).

*4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable.* The low score of 1 for this indicator reflects limited activity and lack of impact.

Although 49% of the regional survey respondents mentioned some level activity in holding private corporations accountable, 52% said civil society has been unsuccessful or did not know of any such success. Such perceptions are echoed by the limited number of documented efforts by CSOs to publicise the negative consequences of some private companies' activities (with one or two examples in the mining and coffee plantation industry).

We also recall that an often silent Trade Union movement has not regularly secured workers' rights and interests, a state of affairs not helped by intra-labour movement conflicts (Okwee, 1999:31). Although some trade unions have advocated against some of the negative elements in the current economic liberalisation drive, and for improved workers' conditions, their strategies have rarely appealed and involved the wider Ugandan public (VEDCO, 2000:21).

### **4.3. Responding to social interests**

While evidence was thought to be insufficient to score civil society on its responsiveness to priority social problems, the NAG scored high (3) on the indicator of public trust.

**TABLE III.4.3. Indicators assessing response to social interests**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.2.	Public trust in civil society actors	3

This high score reflects evidence from the World Values Survey with a large proportion of respondents (87%) stating their trust in CSOs, and the results of a survey of 2566 individuals, leading to the conclusion that communities generally thought highly of NGOs, especially when they had a physical local presence in the community (Barr, 2003). The CSI community survey, whose participants were asked about their degree of confidence in different types of organisations, echoes such assessments:

**TABLE III.4.4 Community survey: degree of confidence in various organisations**

	<b>A great deal of confidence</b>	<b>Quite a lot of confidence</b>	<b>Not much confidence</b>	<b>No confidence at all</b>
<b>Churches/ Faith-based organisations</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>2%</b>
Army	25%	34%	23%	11%
Local defence forces	28%	30%	25%	12%
Police	20%	36%	28%	11%
Press	26%	34%	18%	7%
Television	12%	17%	13%	19%
<b>Labour unions</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>22%</b>
Central Government	34%	23%	29%	6%
District local governments	26%	37%	25%	5%
Sub-county local govts.	24%	39%	27%	6%
Political parties	11%	10%	19%	37%
Major companies	25%	17%	15%	22%
<b>NGOs</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>6%</b>

In spite of this level of trust, in a recent paper developed for a proposed Certification mechanism for NGOs, there is mention of a growing “*degree of scepticism among civil society observers, the general public and – occasionally – within its own ranks too*”.<sup>38</sup> Recent high profile cases have documented instances of corruption within civil society and this may undermine trust. Thus, the media review report shows that, while CSOs were mostly portrayed in a neutral light (499) as opposed to 238 positive and 87 negative (...), issues of CSO transparency and internal democracy also feature.

#### 4.4. Empowering citizens

The NAG overall, scored a relatively high 2.2 for this sub-dimension, as an average of the following 6 indicators:

**TABLE III.4.5: Indicators assessing empowering citizens**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>4.4.1</u>	Informing/educating citizens	<u>3</u>
<u>4.4.2</u>	Building capacity for collective action	<u>2</u>
<u>4.4.3</u>	Empowering marginalised people	<u>3</u>
<u>4.4.4</u>	Empowering women	<u>2</u>
<u>4.4.5</u>	Building social capital	<u>1</u>
<u>4.4.6</u>	Supporting livelihoods	<u>2</u>

*4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens.* Civil society was judged to play an important role in informing and educating citizens, for which examples of success could be detected. While 42% of community survey respondents could remember CSOs having informed people about important issues in the past 12 months, almost two-thirds of the regional survey respondents (64%) indicated that civil society had either been ‘active’ or ‘very active’ in undertaking

<sup>38</sup> See above, “self-regulation” indicator

public information or public education activities. Such activity had resulted, for 48% of respondents, in CSOs being ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’ (a further 41% said ‘somewhat successful’).

Respondents to the regional survey were asked about the degree of success of civil society public campaigns on 3 issues: HIV/AIDS awareness (where civil society public campaigns were rated by 69% of respondents as ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’); Human rights (with 49% rating civil society public campaigns as ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’) and Peace building and conflict resolution (with a corresponding score of 35%)

The literature review confirms that many civil society actors are involved in providing information and education to the community (messages regarding improved livelihood - health, family planning, new farming approaches, environmental protection, etc. are especially prevalent, in addition to messages concerning topical advocacy issues (the war in the North, current legislation being debated in parliament, e.g. the Domestic Relations Bill).

Means to communicate include: purchasing space in the press; purchasing space on radio and TV stations (commercial “spots”, taking part in debates and talk shows, or buying space to air documentaries); day-to-day implementation work with local communities on government programmes; workshops, conferences, seminars: these are themselves varied, including “public dialogues”, “dissemination” and other workshops; own newsletters, either in a physical form or as electronic documents. However, the media review only captured two success stories in this area, namely the Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda, with an annual week of dialogue and a public procession against corruption, and environment NGOs sensitising the public on environment conservation measures.

*4.4.2 Building capacity for collective action.* Civil society was judged active in this area, although its impact is limited. While just over half of the community survey respondents, when asked whether CSOs had helped the community come together around a specific problem in the past 12 months, responded negatively, regional survey respondents were more nuanced: 65% said civil society had been ‘active’ or ‘very active’ in building the capacity of local communities, resulting in 46% finding these ‘successful’ or ‘very successful.’

Reflecting this mitigated picture, the literature informs us that strengthening groups and CBOs has been a common approach used by NGOs. This has had unexpected consequences, such as where groups form themselves to take advantage of external benefits (see CARE/CDRN, 2005:iv). Some CSOs also continue to use “top-down” approaches that create dependency, instead of enhancing self-reliance, especially where relief is concerned (see UPDNet, various). Even where participatory approaches, such as Participatory Rural Appraisal, later Participatory Learning and Action, (PRA) are adopted, these are sometimes used as a fashion and in a bid to attract donor funds. Poor quality training and a mechanistic application have also contributed to a limited impact of these approaches (Adong, 2004:3-4).

*4.4.3 Empowering marginalised people.* Civil society was judged to play an important role in this area, with significant examples of success.

If we assume a large degree of overlap between “marginalised people” and the “chronic poor”, we can list the most affected groups, which might represent approximately 20% of the national population, as people with a disability, widows, street children, orphans and other disadvantaged children, the elderly, refugees and internally displaced people, HIV/AIDS-

affected households and isolated communities, such as ethnic minorities (CPRC, 2004). The literature shows that a number of CSOs have been involved in supporting these groups, focusing on building local skills and knowledge, establishing minority group-specific social services, confidence building and peace building to reduce conflicts with neighbouring communities. Other CSOs have focused on “the poorest of the poor”.

An example of an empowering approach is the increasing access to justice through legal aid services. FIDA, the Uganda Gender Resource Centre (UGRC), the Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives (FHRI) and the Legal Aid Clinic of the Law Development Centre have all run legal aid clinics to people who cannot afford the fees of private practitioners. Another example is the Uganda Organisation for Batwa Development Union, which has supported Batwa people in Uganda.

Nevertheless, 61% of respondents to the community survey did not mention any organisation helping poor people in their community to improve their lives in the past 12 months, reflecting a common allegation by the public that a majority of CSO activities target the productive poor, rather than the very poor in the communities they work in. Still, 65% of regional survey respondents said CSOs were either ‘active’ or ‘very active’ in this area; 40% said civil society has been somewhat successful in building the capacity of local communities and 46% said civil society has been ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’.

*4.4.4 Empowering women.* Many civil society interventions have been put in place with the purpose of empowering women. These include income generation, micro-credit, affirmative action, advocacy for fair policies, skills acquisition, increased girl and women educational opportunities, infrastructure development, housing schemes, awareness and assertiveness training, peace initiatives, better legal processes and protection of the girl child.

While civil society was thus deemed active in this area by the NAG, impact was judged as limited, although 58% of the regional survey respondents judged it either ‘successful’ or ‘very successful’. Further, 62% of respondents to the community survey did not mention any organisation helping to improve women’s lives in their community in the past 12 months.

These activities have resulted in some change, both a national and local levels, such as the fight for equitable land rights, which entailed legal education programmes through organisations such as ACFODE, FIDA to sensitise women and men; inviting members of parliament to dinners and breakfasts to lobby them; using the media to sensitise the population about women and land rights; coordinating international efforts around land; and convening public hearing on how women have been denied land. (Asiimwe in Mukama et al, 2002:49) and eventually led to more favourable legislation for women.

In terms of CSOs’ lobby efforts for affirmative action for women, a number of national leaders have also “transited” through CSOs. These include judges, national and international positions, women parliamentarians, nationally and at regional level, ministers and political party leaders, including the NRM (Opolot, undated:2-3). ACFODE has also made an impact in influencing government institutions, such as the then Ministry of Women in Development, and in the establishment of Makerere University’s Department of Women’s Studies (Nakirunda (2001).

*4.4.5 Building social capital.* The World Values Survey suggests that the overall level of trust in Uganda is quite low, with 92% of non-members stating mistrust and 92% of CSO

members stating mistrust. The community survey indicates that those who trust others, irrespective of whether they are members of CSOs or not, account for 49% of the responses; and those not trusting others, irrespective of whether they are CSO members or not, accounted for 51%. This would indicate that CSO membership has a negligible influence on levels of trust and that CSOs are not contributing to the building of social capital in Uganda.

*4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods.* The NAG judged civil society as active in this area, but its impact as limited. Although 52% of the community survey respondents did not mention any group or organisation helping the community that is set up income generating activities, the media survey detected 18 instances of CSO supporting livelihoods, although mostly in relief.

Nevertheless, the micro-finance sector has expanded rapidly in Uganda and a number of CSOs have taken up the provision of micro-finance to the poor as an important activity. There are now 900,000 micro-finance clients, up from 600,000 in 2001, and the number of micro-finance institutions has doubled to 1,000 in the same period, with a loan portfolio of U.shs. 127 billion (The Monitor, 16/3/05). However, there is some doubt as to extent to which of the very poor have been reached, such as when land is required as collateral (Kwesiga et al, undated:10). NGOs' activities for income-generation also include heifer projects, seed farming, among other types of projects. NGOs are offering advisory services on new methods of farming, commercial agriculture and market information, all important areas for the rural farming population and to enhance the capital assets of the poor (Ibid.:8).

The Churches have also been active in this area, promoting income generating activities for women's groups. Women and girls have had opportunities to develop skills to run nursery schools and tailoring workshops, increase farm production and practice poultry and animal husbandry.

## 4.5. Meeting societal needs

How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups? Overall, this was scored rather 'significant', given an average of 2.7 for the three indicators under this subdimension:

**TABLE III.4.6 Indicators assessing 'meeting societal needs'**

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1.	Lobbying for state service provision	2
4.5.2.	Meeting pressing societal needs directly	3
4.5.3.	Meeting needs of marginalised groups	3

*4.5.1 Lobbying for state service provision.* Uganda's civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited. Sixty-seven percent of respondents to the regional survey said they could think of examples of civil society lobbying the government to provide public services to the population. Regarding the success of such initiatives, 42% said they have been 'somewhat successful' and a further 25% said 'successful' or 'very successful'.

During the consultations in Northern Uganda, participants mentioned a 'significant' role played by CSOs in campaigns against building poor quality schools and roads, and a number of improvements in the level of service delivery. Government established a national plan against corruption; the Access to Information Bill was also passed as a result, and a national Internally Displaced People's policy was also established.

When lobbying for governmental service provision, it is necessary to recall the growing importance of sub-contracting by CSOs, especially from district authorities (see 1.6.1.). This introduces special constraints for CSOs to advocate for direct state engagement in service provision. It has also been seen that to some extent this mirrors civil society's partial determination to occupy and extend the space where such lobby activities can take place, and a reluctance, on the part of some NGOs in particular, to go beyond service delivery, their traditional sphere of activity.

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Government is opening up and several NGOs have taken up new areas of advocacy and participate in national government programme conceptualisation and design. Such growing engagement is visible in a number of policy areas, including, most importantly, the recent revision of the PEAP (see 4.1.1.), which is directly relevant to state provision of social services. In a different way, one of the civil society manifestoes mentioned in Section 3.1.2, under the principle of "equitable distribution of services" urges the forthcoming government, since "resources are limited, they need to be managed equitably and prudently", to ensure that the more disadvantaged are included in planning process, and have access to state resources, through open and fair allocation mechanisms (DENIVA et al, 2004:10).

The media survey report, however, detected only four instances of activity in this area. They were a call on government to invest in irrigation; district civic leaders calling on the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund to approve development projects at district level; the Soroti District Advocacy Coalition fight for food security by engaging government on its food policy and the Ministry of Health's funding ICOBY, an NGO, to construct a hospital.

*4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly.* Direct service provision remains an area of focus for many CSOs in Uganda and civil society was gauged to play an important role in this respect, reflecting in part the 67% of the regional survey respondents who found civil society's role in meeting community needs 'significant' or 'moderate', with 84% stating they could think of specific examples of such service provision and 57% saying civil society had been 'successful' or 'very successful' in providing these to their target audiences. Similarly, when asked about the role of CSOs in directly meeting community needs, participants in the Northern Uganda consultations noted that "*CSOs significantly met community needs. The only challenge mentioned however was that many of them were donor driven depending on where the wind blew*".

At the national level, the role of NGOs in service delivery is especially evident. A 2002 survey found that "*education, health, micro-finance were the most popular sectors, with work in advocacy, HIV/AIDS, water and other sectors also emerging as key intervention areas*"(cited in Wallace, 2004). Another study summarises: "*Service activities dominate (...) about two-thirds of all Uganda civil society organisation workers, paid and volunteer, are engaged in service activities*" (John Hopkins:36). The Global Civil Society Index finds 74% of the workforce engaged in the civil society sector involved in "services".

It is perhaps in the health sector that CSO presence is most visible, since the voluntary sector established and ran nearly one third of Uganda's health centres, and 6,000 hospital beds, compared to 8,000 in government hospitals in 1999 (Allavida, 2003:54). At the local level, CSOs are found to be venturing into new areas. In his study in south-western Uganda, Tindifa found that, "*[t]he modern, more cosmopolitan, village has given rise to new forms of*

social organisation (...) new forms of burial association have emerged taking on rural banking in addition to providing relief for people burdened by a family death” (1998:206). The remarks of the Fact Finding report concerning the emergency in Northern Uganda are also relevant. (See box below).

*The role of CSOs in camps for internally displaced people in Northern Uganda*

*“The obvious fact is that camps (for internally displaced people- IDPs) are still largely underserved (...). Needs are still overwhelming, particularly in the health, water and sanitation sectors. The IDPs were still under a situation of poverty and helplessness.*

*“In the water sector, for instance, conditions remained inadequate in most camps. USAID (2004) noted that, despite ongoing interventions by NGOs and local authorities, water and sanitation conditions remained inadequate in most camps. A Catholic Relief Services (CRS) survey of Kitgum IDP camps revealed (...) that, on average there were 2,410 persons per water point and 6 litres of water per person per day, far below the international standard of 500 person per water point and 15 litres/day in an emergency situation.*

*“Similarly, health centres were overwhelmed by rising incidents of malaria and malnutrition, mainly among women and children (USAID, 2004). Furthermore, WHO (2005) found the crude mortality rate and under-5 mortality rate were four times higher than non-crisis levels in Kitgum and Pader districts.*

*“However, without the assistance from CSOs this situation would have been worse. Thus, the International Committee of the Red Cross launched an anti-malaria campaign, starting with the distribution of insecticide-treated nets to 40,000 households in over 15 camps (one per household), primarily to children and pregnant women. This helped to reduce malaria in the camps. Oxfam provided clean water and sanitation, dormitories for women and girls, and health and hygiene to night dwellers in Kitgum town. It also worked in Padibe and seven other camps in Kitgum district, supporting around 200,000 people. And increased presence of UN and NGOs in the affected areas enabled sharing more accurate updates and monitoring the situation through inter-agency assessments resulting in immediate provision of assistance.”*

4.5.3 Meeting the needs of marginalised groups. In giving the high score of 3, the NAG judged CSOs to be significantly more effective than the state in meeting the needs of the marginalised. This is reflected in the opinions of 71% of respondents to the community survey, who said that voluntary organisations provide better services to vulnerable groups than the state.

Further, 54% of these respondents indicated that voluntary organisations were more helpful to them personally in providing assistance during the last 12 months, as opposed to 12% who experienced the contrary. This mirrors the frequent proximity of CSOs to communities, as opposed to the perceived distance from state services.

A recent study of health sector NGOs in two districts, stated that:

*“NGOs' target groups were mainly vulnerable groups - those prone to poverty and ill health. Gender, age, and socio-economic status were the criteria used to determine vulnerability. (However,) low involvement of communities in NGO planning resulting in lack of ownership of the NGO activities by the communities” (Wamai et al, 2000:14-19).*

The Fact Finding report examined services provided to another marginalised group, street children (see box below).

*CSOs working with street children: excerpts from the Fact-finding Report*

*“It is estimated that there are currently over 10,000 street children in Uganda, and 85% of these are homeless. A number of CSOs are involved with them, with major achievements in the micro-credit, group homes, schools, formation of HIV/AIDS prevention clubs, and re-integrating street children in society. Rubaga Youth Development Association (RYDA), for instance, has been supporting a community based training programme targeting street children, out of school youth, girl prostitutes and poor women from the urban areas of Kampala. RYDA has worked with 150 of Kampala's most vulnerable street children. Another CSO, Kids in Need, has, since its founding 1996, taken off the streets some 800 once-suffering children and helped them to become productive members of their communities.*

*“An Inter-NGO forum meets monthly and has produced ‘Practice Guidelines for Working with Street Children’ (including the principle of ‘no unconditional handouts’) and a National Street Children Committee has been established involving both government and NGOs.*

*“However, demand for services still outstrips supply and CSOs have concentrated their efforts on supporting children who are already on the streets, as opposed to developing policies and programmes that will limit children going to the streets in the first place”.*

## **Conclusion**

The overall picture that emerges is one of intense CSO activity, including that of faith-based organisations, in service delivery and citizens’ economic and social empowerment, rather than other forms of engagement, such as policy advocacy work. The direct provision of social and economic services is also where one finds the most substantial traces of impact.

There are several reasons for this. These include: the weight of history and tradition; the large number of community organisations specifically set up to meet members’ livelihood needs and the rather donor-driven nature of much advocacy work. Therefore, there is a limited degree of ‘ownership’ of some advocacy activities, which are considered to be ‘projects’ to be implemented by some CSOs. Also relevant is the limited credibility of CSOs in this area and their desire to complement the work of Government (and the latter’s reluctance to see CSOs engage in non-service delivery work), rather than question it, either because this corresponds to the CSOs’ world view and social make-up or because they find a measure of benefit in this positioning, such as contracts for service delivery work.

In spite of these obstacles, noticeable change is taking place. NGOs are increasingly involved in trilateral meetings with donors and government on major policy priorities. The voice of civil society is beginning to be heard more loudly on issues, including human rights, basic needs and people's marginalisation. Some networks and coalitions are proving to be effective in this respect, providing members with fora through which the collective consensus of organisations can be expressed to policy makers and others. Efforts are also being made to develop skills, including efforts to enhance citizen participation in local governance. Taking a medium-term perspective, there is some evidence that opportunities for influencing Government are growing.

## IV STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

This section summarises the discussions held at the National Workshop, held on 7 June 2006. Some 80 participants, overwhelmingly from CSOs, especially with NGO backgrounds, participated.<sup>39</sup> After the presentation of the project outcomes, participants analysed the respective civil society dimensions in four smaller workgroups, and were invited to make comments, suggestions and recommendations.

Overall, the participants endorsed the findings, as presented in this report, but complemented them, based on their own experiences (overwhelmingly those of NGO personnel) as follows:

### 1. STRUCTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Strengths: Breadth of citizen participation was seen as wide-ranging and quite inclusive.

In terms of resources, CSOs could muster skills and experience in some areas, especially in service delivery work, and a growing number of university courses were making skilled personnel available to the sector.

Weaknesses: Fear of voicing concerns and avoiding the ‘political terrain’ was highlighted as a weakness. The depth of participation was seen as constrained by the country’s poverty, especially with regard to the extent of charitable giving and many CSOs’ dependence on donors.

The ‘personalisation’ of CSOs was also raised as a concern by the group. At times, CSOs can focus on private concerns and this may hamper the quality of leadership available and reduce the participation of ordinary people in organisations to which, in principle, they belong.

The lack of communication within the sector was highlighted, as was the degree of suspicion brought about by competition. Remarks concerning the ‘fragmented’ nature of civil society were also raised. Resources were felt to inadequate in some areas, such as skills to engage in policy work.

The results of the survey, on the support infrastructure, indicated a limited reach. It was agreed that smaller, more distant organisations have little access to such infrastructure and the forms of support might not always be appropriate, especially when they reflect donor concerns.

### 2. ENVIRONMENT

Strengths: The political context was seen as having some conducive elements for civil society. Examples include: the recent opening to multi-party-ism; the recognition of the right of people to associate and form CSOs, to take up an increasing role in the country’s political life and functioning governmental structures at national and district levels.

The current relative independence of CSOs was lauded, as well as government operational and financial support to them, such as in the health sector, when there is no interference.

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<sup>39</sup> These came from many parts of the country, as well as Kampala, the capital city. There were only a few government representatives for part of the day.

The political space for CSOs to operate was considered secure, especially when they engage in service delivery. In this respect, it was agreed that there was focus, by Government, CSOs and donors on poverty eradication, and that laws and structures were in place to foster people's socio-economic emancipation.

There was a sense of optimism that CSOs will be able to continue growing and operating, even though donor support is not assured in the long term. With regard to basic freedoms and rights, it was noted that people can express and organise themselves.

Weaknesses: The opening of the political space, however, led to concerns about possible future instability and partisanship undermining national unity, which the cultural context would also undermine, given its tendency towards ethnic strife, nepotism, and permissiveness.

There were expectations that restrictions on press freedoms would continue and that the independence of the judiciary is also under threat.

The economic context was seen as constraining civil society, given Uganda's poverty and development efforts undermined by civil strife, donor dependence and poor implementation, as well as environmental degradation, since biomass constitutes the only source of energy for most poor people.

Many fears were voiced on the impending changes in CSO registration (the NGO Registration Amendment Bill), which is already considered long (though open) and bureaucratic and, should the new bill be assented to by the President, will further tighten restrictions.<sup>40</sup>

### **3. VALUES**

Strengths: CSO efforts, to make people aware of their rights, were seen as a strength, and community trust and donor support were seen as opportunities to further strengthen these.

Another area of strength was seen as the promotion of peace, especially in Northern Uganda, but the lack of internal conflict resolution mechanisms within CSOs was also noted.

Efforts to mainstream gender awareness and empowerment were noted, helped by national policies, such as affirmative action and the educational system, although cultural beliefs and 'gender extremists' made this a quite difficult task. To some extent this reflected civil society's strong commitment to poverty eradication, reflected in strong links with the 'grassroots', involvement in budgeting processes, and making use of the favourable policy context.

Weaknesses: The democratic deficit within CSOs was acknowledged: while many have some moral authority, this was compromised by errand CSOs and the lack of legitimacy stemming from donor dependence, when CSOs adopt a donor agenda without much of a sense of ownership.

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<sup>40</sup> At the time of writing, this had just been assented to by the president and awaiting official publication to become an Act.

Transparency, with ‘secretive finances’ and more accountability to donors than their constituents, was also a problem for some CSOs, although the growing national efforts to fight corruption and lack of transparency (including the Government national strategy for dealing with this and the Civil Society Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism) were acknowledged as opportunities for CSOs to clean their act.

#### **4. IMPACT**

Strengths: The legitimacy of CSOs in meeting social needs was noted as a strength, along with experience, local ownership, resources and not being too bureaucratic.

The special strengths of Uganda’s civil society in this respect included proximity to beneficiaries, the diversity of its skills and competences, its commitment and voluntarism, its vision and its participatory group approach, mainstreaming the vulnerable in many cases. The goodwill of the people and the relative autonomy of CSOs were also considered to be a strength, ensuring that it not be compromised by any partisan approach and that it utilises the political space, favourable government policies and donor support available in the broad area of poverty reduction.

Weaknesses: However, civil society’s involvement in service delivery was not considered an unmitigated success. For example, some CSOs, treat partner communities ‘*as objects*’ and assume a mandate to think for them, which is suspect. They can also find it difficult to go beyond basic needs and service delivery, may get compromised, for instance at times by sub-contracting from local governments in a questionable fashion.

Other areas of weakness include project focus and short-term solutions to meet donor requirements, such as not sufficiently concentrating on the ‘poorest of the poor’, concentrating on accessible communities or on the same recipients. The dangers of fostering a dependency ‘syndrome’ within communities, and favouring communities on the basis of religious affiliation were also noted as weaknesses, as was the fact that many needs still go unmet, such as when larger projects, such as irrigation and cattle dams, are needed, but are beyond CSOs’ resource.

A final problematic area is the lack of coordination and competition among CSOs, which leads to duplication of efforts. The fragmented nature of civil society was noted, particularly in the area of policy influencing work and holding government accountable, which were acknowledged to be much weaker areas of civil society intervention.

The ability to influence policy was said to be present, but undermined by several factors. These factors include: a lack of collective voice, including less than effective apex organisations in this respect, and strategy, a limited collective agenda on accountability, limited skills and knowledge and instances of corruption within civil society itself, with briefcase NGOs, intra-sector conflicts and NGOs used by politicians.

When CSOs engage in policy advocacy, it tends to be reactive and focus only on policy design, not monitoring implementation. Donor support and the existence of a wide consensus around the MDGs were therefore considered as opportunities that, to date, are only partially utilised.

## V RECOMMENDATIONS

Participants at the National Workshop also elaborated a number of recommendations. These are summarised below:

### 1. VALUES AND CREDIBILITY OF CSOS

- ✍ CSOs need to finalise the ongoing development of the self-regulatory mechanism, a “Quality Assurance Mechanism for NGOs” and ensure its timely implementation.
- ✍ This mechanism is a pre-condition for CSOs to deepen their engagement in work to influence policy, since they need to strengthen their credibility and autonomy vis-à-vis Government.
- ✍ Civic education is also needed for and by CSOs themselves and their partner communities.

### 2. STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY ACTION

- ✍ CSOs need to mainstream human rights issues in their day-to-day activities and programmes, in the same way that they mainstream vulnerability and gender concerns.
- ✍ Civil society needs to develop a concrete long-term collective strategy to meet social interests and reduce donor dependence. Where CSOs are involved in direct service delivery, every effort should be made to avoid creating dependency, through effective project research, design and collaboration with other development actors.
- ✍ Apex organisations and district CSO networks are well placed to provide better information than hitherto to CSOs on policy issues. They should further develop their communication channels in this respect. Civil society needs to collectively develop a coordinated structure for policy work in a holistic fashion, as well as a well-defined empowerment framework, that can lead to certification.
- ✍ Civil society needs to strengthen its involvement in several areas, including conflict resolution, monitoring government poverty eradication programmes, inter-cultural networking and sensitisation of communities on their rights. Independence of the media and judiciary are also issues of concern for civil society vigilance.
- ✍ This will require more autonomy by CSOs from Government, which can only be realised if sub-contracting from government is controlled, the NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism is put in place and inter-CSO collaboration is enhanced.

### 3. STRENGTHENING THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

- ✍ Additional efforts are needed to train CSO personnel, particularly in areas of fundraising and leadership. This should be accompanied by sensitising people to the dangers of CSOs being ‘personalised’, so that they assert their ownership.
- ✍ Given the current deficiencies of the support infrastructure currently available for CSOs, support organisations themselves need capacity-building and common resource centres need to be established in the country.
- ✍ Collaborative mechanisms within civil society, such as networks and coalitions, need to be further strengthened.

#### **4. PROMOTING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CSOs**


- ✍ All opportunities need to be seized to strengthen the partnership between CSOs and Government, however, without undermining the formers' autonomy.
- ✍ The NGO Bill currently awaiting Presidential assent should be reviewed to allow for decentralised registration. The role of CSOs and the rules governing them also need to be clarified.
- ✍ Tax benefits to promote charitable donations should be developed and publicised, in part as a measure to reduce CSO dependence on foreign donors.

## VI CONCLUSION

This section summarises the overall findings, observations and recommendations from the National Workshop, using the four dimensions of civil society that have informed this analysis as a guide.

Summarising the findings in the form of a diamond, as presented below, one recognises a civil society with average scores for its ‘structure’ and ‘values’ dimensions, a slightly less-than-average score for its ‘environment’ and a rather higher score for its ‘impact’ (figure VI.1).

**FIGURE VI.1: CIVICUS Civil Society Diamond for Uganda**



Within the **structure** dimension, with an overall score of **1.8**, the ‘breadth’ of citizens’ involvement is highlighted, reflecting the multitude of rural community organisations in the country, as well as the many other forms of community-level CSOs that people belong to, such as Parents’ Teachers’ Associations, religious organisations and other mutual help groups, that are rather socially inclusive. This is also reflected in the prevalence of volunteering and other forms of community action.

However, such participation, which involves many citizens, does not necessarily mean an ‘activist’ political involvement, which, for reasons often linked to the country’s past, does not feature prominently in the lives of ordinary Ugandans. This avoidance of the ‘political terrain’, in favour of practical community activities, such as contributing to the building of a church or clearing a road, was highlighted as a weakness of civil society by National Workshop participants. The ‘depth’ of participation was also seen as constrained by the country’s poverty, especially with regard to the extent of charitable giving.

Super-imposed on the numerous community groups are other, often more recent, forms of CSOs. These include so-called NGOs and their many networks and coalitions, trade unions and other mostly urban-based forms of collaborative undertakings, such as professional associations. These are often donor-dependent, with staff, vehicles, projects and agendas that

ordinary people do not always associate with, or feel close to. It is a competitive sector that is often fragmented, governed by suspicion and where accountability to donors often takes precedence over accountability to the local population. Nevertheless, there is evidence that it is gradually re-structuring itself, through networks, and by attempting to regulate itself.

The ‘personalisation’ of CSOs was raised as a concern. As seen above, CSOs can suffer from a founder syndrome; and CSOs can become focused on private concerns, as quasi-enterprises for one or a few individuals. This can hamper the quality of leadership available to CSOs and reduce the participation of ordinary people in organisations to which, in principle, they belong.

Resources were seen as inadequate in some areas, such as skills to engage in policy work, but CSOs could muster skills and experience in others areas, especially in service delivery. The results of the survey on support infrastructure indicated a limited reach, with smaller, more distant organisations having limited access to such infrastructure and where the forms of support might not always be appropriate, especially when they reflect donor concerns.

Recommendations that stand out include strengthening apex organisations and promoting communication within civil society, both to promote cohesion within the sector and to enable more engagement in policy work.

The score for the **environment** dimension is **1.4**, the lowest of the four dimension scores. The political context was seen as having some conducive elements for civil society, such as the recent opening to multi-party-ism and recognition of the right of people to associate and form CSOs, especially when they engage in service delivery work. While enshrined in the Constitution, political and civil rights, information rights and freedom of the press are not always respected and the opening of political competition is still recent. Insurgency continues in northern Uganda at considerable human and economic cost. There is concern about possible future instability and partisanship undermining national unity, which the cultural context could also undermine, with its tendency towards ethnic strife, nepotism and permissiveness.

Many fears were voiced by National Workshop participants on the impending changes in CSO registration (the NGO Bill), which is already considered long (though open) and bureaucratic. Should the new bill be approved by the President, it might tighten restrictions on CSO activities, given Government’s ambivalent attitude on what constitutes allowable advocacy activities, especially when they ‘stray’ into what it considers the political arena.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, there was a sense of optimism that CSOs will be able to continue growing and operating, although donor support is not assured in the long term. The current relative independence of CSOs was noted, as was the government’s support of them, such as in the health sector, when this is not interference.

The latter point highlights a relationship between the state and civil society where, overall, both parties see their role as one of collaboration, rather than confrontation. This echoes the low degree of ‘political activism’ within civil society mentioned above, the historical role of CSOs in Uganda, that of service delivery, and, as the policy context is established by Government, one that is seen as pro-poor. Nevertheless, this relationship is changing on several fronts: both parties increasingly see advocacy work as legitimate for CSOs to engage

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<sup>41</sup> At the time of the workshop, this was still uncertain.

in, which donors support, and government is opening avenues, especially at district level, for CSOs to contract service delivery work from its own coffers. The latter tendency is growing and replacing the earlier situation of a rather weak State apparatus confronting well-funded NGOs, with a situation where the latter may have to temper their accountability role and may even adopt more business-like attitudes, both positive and negative.

Uganda remains an extremely poor country, although less poor than in the last 20 years, with a growing gap between the rich and the poor. Corruption is rampant, although the effectiveness of state services has improved over the last two decades. This also relates to moderate levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness in society. However, National Workshop participants agreed that Government, CSOs and donors focus on poverty eradication, although efforts are undermined by civil strife, donor dependence and poor implementation.

Less important, at the present time, is the relationship with the private sector. CSOs do not feel especially concerned with this relationship and currently do not benefit much from funding from the private sector, except in a few high-profile cases.

With regard to civil society's **value base**, a score of **1.9** for this dimension reflects a mixed picture. Therefore it is found that some CSOs continue to struggle with living and promoting values, such as democracy and transparency, tolerance, non-violence and 'gender equity'. Although public trust in CSOs is pervasive, there is a gap between rhetoric and practice, which can sap civil society's moral authority, justify Government's efforts to further regulate the sector and lead donors to ask hard question on the legitimacy of CSOs as 'representatives of the poor.'

However, are CSOs themselves increasingly turning into private businesses? This question is a symptom of a broader one, linked to a profoundly changing operating environment, as the boundaries between the state, private sector and civil society become increasingly blurred. Being more accountable to donors than their constituents, is also seen a problem for some CSOs, although the growing national efforts to fight corruption and lack of transparency, including the Government national strategy for dealing with this and civil society current effort to self-regulate, the NGO Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism, are opportunities for CSOs to 'clean up their act'. Finalising and implementing this mechanism featured as a recommendation made by National Workshop participants, as did the need for 'civic education' for CSOs themselves.

More positively, CSOs appear to be comfortable with 'poverty eradication' as a value, and to some extent 'environmental sustainability'. This fits with their historical role and the way most define their primary role in Uganda's civil society. To some extent this reflects the strong commitment to poverty eradication in civil society, its strong links with 'grassroots' efforts, its involvement in budgeting processes and making use of the favourable policy context. This becomes more apparent when examining the 'impact' dimension of civil society as well.

The score for **impact** is a rather high **2.3**, reflecting much activity and some successes, especially in service delivery and citizens' economic and social empowerment, rather than other forms of engagement, such as policy advocacy work and holding the state and private corporations accountable. There are several reasons for this: the weight of history and tradition; the large number of community organisations specifically set up to meet members'

livelihood needs; the donor-driven nature of much advocacy work and the limited credibility of CSOs in this area; the desire, on the part of CSOs, to complement the work of Government, rather than question it, and the latter's reluctance to see CSO venture in this area, either because this corresponds to their world view and social make-up or because they find a measure of benefit in this positioning, such as contracts for service delivery work.

The special strengths of civil society in these areas of work include proximity to beneficiaries, the diversity of its skills and competences and its commitment. Positive aspects include: the goodwill of the people, the relative independence of CSOs, favourable government policies and available donor support, in the broad area of poverty reduction. However, civil society's involvement in service delivery is not considered an unmitigated success. It is often project-driven, may not concentrate sufficiently on the 'poorest of the poor' and may foster dependence among the communities it is working with.

In spite of these obstacles, noticeable change is taking place. NGOs are increasingly involved in trilateral meetings with donors and government on major policy priorities. The voice of civil society is beginning to be more loudly heard on issues, including human rights, basic needs and people's marginalisation. Some networks and coalitions are proving to be effective in this respect, providing members with fora through which the collective consensus of organisations can be expressed to policy makers and others. Efforts are also being made to develop skills, including efforts to enhance citizen participation in local governance. Taking a medium-term perspective, there is some evidence that opportunities are growing for influencing Government.

The National Workshop highlighted the challenges of moving beyond current areas of intervention for most CSOs. The fragmented nature of civil society was especially noted in the areas of work to influence policy and holding government to account, which were acknowledged as much weaker areas of intervention for civil society. Several recommendations pointed towards the *desirability* of further engagement in these directions, such as the need for CSOs to 'mainstream' human rights issues in their activities, to have apex organisations and district CSO networks provide better information to CSOs on policy issues and to collectively develop a coordinated structure for policy work

It was recognised that this will require better collaboration among CSOs, more autonomy from Government and enhanced credibility in the eyes of all parties concerned. This can only be realised if suspicions among CSOs are allayed, sub-contracting from government is controlled, and the NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism is put in place.

This is a significant agenda for Ugandan CSOs to move ahead with. In a sense Uganda's civil society is at the crossroads. Will it confine itself to a somewhat docile role, focusing on service delivery and sub-contracting from government? Or will it further develop its capacity to question the socio-political make-up of Uganda, striving to augment its autonomy, its sense of independent identity, its cohesion and its local ownership?

**ANNEXES**

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## **ANNEX 1: LIST OF NATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERS**

Abdul Busulwa	– National Union of the Disabled Persons of Uganda
Charles Businge	- DFID,
Chris Businge	- Kabarole Research Centre, Kabarole,
Fr. Silverster Arinaitwe	– Uganda Joint Christian Council,
Fredrick Mugenyi Ssansa	- Prime Minister’s Office,
Grace Ssebugwawo	- National Association of Uganda Small Business
Organizations, Babirekere Cotilda	- Uganda Media Women's Association,
Japhes Mukiibi Biimbwa	– Ms Uganda,
Moses.omiati	– Soroti Civil Society Network,
Muguzi Henry	– Anti Corruption Coalition of Uganda,
Okello Geoffrey	– Gulu NGO Forum,
Peter Sentongo	– Prime Ministers Office,
Prof. J.B Kwesiga	- DENIVA

## ANNEX 2: OVERVIEW OF CSI RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

The implementation process of the CSI in Uganda included the Review of Secondary Data Sources, Regional Stakeholder Survey, Community Sample Research, Fact Finding Studies and the Media Review Exercise.

### REGIONAL STAKEHOLDERS SURVEY

Regional consultations were conducted at two levels. First, a select number of informed CSO stakeholders in Uganda responded to a self-administered questionnaire. These questionnaires were coded and analysed. The resulting study findings were discussed in consultative workshops where brainstorming sessions critically synthesized all divergent responses with the aim of reaching consensus. Four regional workshops were organized in the central, eastern, western and northern regions of Uganda. The regional stakeholder workshops provided an opportunity to triangulate individual responses to the questionnaire and enabled stakeholders to collectively reflect on major issues surrounding CSOs.

**TABLE A.1: Type of Stakeholder Organizations That Participated In The Regional Survey**

Category label	Code	Count	Responses	Cases
Non Government Organization	1	139	50.2	97.9
Faith/Religious based Organization	2	20	7.2	14.1
Trade unions/Private sector	3	4	1.4	2.8
Community Based Organizations	4	77	27.8	54.2
Professional associations	5	3	1.1	2.1
Co-operatives	6	16	5.8	11.3
Partly involved in CSO activities	7	5	1.8	3.5
Village committee	8	4	1.4	2.8
Local accountability associations	9	5	1.8	3.5
Others	10	4	1.4	2.8
Total responses <sup>a</sup>		277	100	195.1

<sup>a</sup>15 missing cases; 142 valid cases

The involvement of Professional associations was very low because they don't seem to understand that they make part of the CS in Uganda. The same refers to the Private sector and trade unions.

**TABLE A.2: Area of organizations activities**

Category label	Code	Count	Responses	Cases
International	1	25	9.1	18.1
National	2	70	25.5	50.7
District Village	3	139	50.5	100.7
Village	4	41	14.9	29.7
Total responses <sup>a</sup>		275	100	199.3

<sup>a</sup>19 missing cases; 138 valid cases

The survey findings indicated a high representation of mostly service delivery institutions that are mainly the majority in the civil society sector at all levels. The policy advocacy

organizations are less because of the risks involved in those kinds of activities but are represented here as well in the survey.

**TABLE A. 3: Area of CS Activities**

<b>Organizational type</b>		<b>Frequenc y</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid	I work for a civil society organization	101	64.3	71.1	71.1
	I work for a government agency, interfacing with civil society	12	7.6	8.5	79.6
	I work for a corporate sector company and do liaison work	6	3.8	4.2	83.8
	I do research/write on civil society issues	2	1.3	1.4	85.2
	I deal only marginally with civil society	9	5.7	6.3	91.5
	Others	12	7.6	8.5	100.0
	Total	142	90.4	100.0	
Missing	System	15	9.6		
Total		157	100.0		

**TABLE A.4: Characteristics of individuals: Sex**

		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid	Male	30	19.1	22.4	22.4
	Female	104	66.2	77.6	100.0
	Total	134	85.4	100.0	
Missing	System	23	14.6		
Total		157	100.0		

**TABLE A.5: Characteristics of individuals: Age group**

		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid	21 - 30	43	27.4	29.3	29.3
	31 - 40	55	35.0	37.4	66.7
	41 - 50	34	21.7	23.1	89.8
	51 - 60	14	8.9	9.5	99.3
	61+	1	.6	.7	100.0
	Total	147	93.6	100.0	
Missing	System	10	6.4		
Total		157	100.0		

**TABLE A.6: Characteristics of individuals: Religious Denomination**

		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid	Roman catholic	58	36.9	43.3	43.3
	Protestant	56	35.7	41.8	85.1
	Christian Orthodox	2	1.3	1.5	86.6
	Muslim	8	5.1	6.0	92.5
	Buddhist	2	1.3	1.5	94.0
	Others	7	4.5	5.2	99.3
	DK	1	.6	.7	100.0
	Total	134	85.4	100.0	
Missing	System	23	14.6		
Valid	YES	136	86.6	95.1	95.1
	NO	7	4.5	4.9	100.0
	Total	143	91.1	100.0	
Missing	System	14	8.9		
Total		157	100.0		

**TABLE A.7: Characteristics of individuals: Character of community of origin**

		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid	Village /Rural area	60	38.2	40.8	40.8
	Trading centre	19	12.1	12.9	53.7
	Town	63	40.1	42.9	96.6
	City	5	3.2	3.4	100.0
	Total	147	93.6	100.0	
Missing	System	10	6.4		
Total		157	100.0		

**TABLE A.8: Characteristics of individuals: Primary level of work done by institution**

		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Valid	National level	25	15.9	17.0	17.0
	Regional level	23	14.6	15.6	32.7
	District level	77	49.0	52.4	85.0
	Other	22	14.0	15.0	100.0
	Total	147	93.6	100.0	
Missing	System	10	6.4		
Total		157	100.0		

**TABLE A.9: Characteristics of individuals: Level of education**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Seven years and below	1	.6	1.2	1.2
	8 to 11 years	5	3.2	5.9	7.1
	12 to 13 years	8	5.1	9.4	16.5
	14 to 17 years	46	29.3	54.1	70.6
	18 Plus years	25	15.9	29.4	100.0
	Total	85	54.1	100.0	
Missing	System	72	45.9		
Total		157	100.0		

## REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS

A total of four regional consultations were held in the following areas: Northern, Western, Eastern and Central Uganda each. These aimed at discussing CSI goals and objectives, methodology and implementation process. Share preliminary key findings of the survey and probe further on selected issues arising from the regional surveys. Based on the findings discuss the strengths and weaknesses, and identify a way forward. These consultations were held in November and December 2005 and brought together 59 participants.

**TABLE A.10: Participants in Regional Consultations**

Region	Number of participants
Central	9
North	18
East	12
West	20

Some of the consultations especially those held in Central and Eastern were greatly interrupted by the political situation in Uganda at the moment especially after the arrest of the main opposition leader Dr. Kiiza Besigye of Forum for Democratic Party. There was a lot of suspicion building up and people feared to travel and sit in meetings, lest they are mistaken to be plotting against government. Therefore many feared and never turned up for the meetings. The media and private sector representatives hardly turned up for these meetings too though they confirmed receipt of the invitations. Most of the representatives therefore were largely from the civil society sector. The information provided from the different regions was important for the CSI Report because it distinguished the different dynamics and challenges in the different regions.

## COMMUNITY SAMPLE RESEARCH

Ten districts were covered by this study, representing the four main regions of Uganda. They included Mbarara, Gulu, Soroti, Masindi, Busia, Arua, Luweero, Mukono, Kotido and Kampala. Questionnaires were directly administered to individual respondents to express their views on various aspects of civil society activities. In addition, focus group discussions were held with community representatives to obtain in-depth information and general perceptions about civil society.

In every district, two sub counties from both rural and urban settings were selected. In the urban areas, two villages (equivalent to L.C 1) were selected while in the rural sub counties; three villages were covered. The villages were randomly selected in different parishes of the sub county. Caution was made to ensure that not more than one village was selected in a particular parish. Respondents were identified at household level. Ten households were selected from each village using a sample interval  $k$ , that is  $k=N/10$  where  $N$  is the number of households in a village. The number of village households was obtained from the Local Council (LC) chairperson. Emphasis was made to ensure that the respondents equally represent both males and females. Out of 535 respondents, 50.1% were male and 49.9% were female. Survey results were obtained through analysis of questionnaires of interviewed individual households.

**TABLE A.11: Sex of respondents the Community Survey**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	268	48.7	50.1	50.1
	Female	267	48.5	49.9	100.0
	Total	535	97.3	100.0	
Missing	System	15	2.7		
Total		550	100.0		

**TABLE A.12: Religious Denomination of respondents the Community Survey**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Roman catholic	243	44.2	44.6	44.6
	Protestant	201	36.5	36.9	81.5
	Muslim	53	9.6	9.7	91.2
	Born again	40	7.3	7.3	98.5
	Seventh Day Adventists	6	1.1	1.1	99.6
	Other	2	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	545	99.1	100.0	
Missing	System	5	.9		
Total		550	100.0		

## MEDIA REVIEW

The media review largely adopted the methodology provided by CIVICUS and it was carried out by a renowned journalist formerly with one of the leading Daily English Newspaper (Daily Monitor) and currently working with Fountain Publishers in Kampala, Odoobo Charles Bichachi with the support of trained students from the department of Mass Communication and Development Studies, Makerere University.

The broadcast media survey was conducted over a period of one month (30 days) stretching from 24 October 2006 to 24 November 2005. Two bulletins were monitored each day; namely the main evening news broadcast at 20.00hrs (some stations air their main evening news at 21.00hrs) and the lunchtime (13.00hrs) news broadcast. For the print media, two randomly selected months following each other were monitored. These were January and

February 2005. The media outlets were carefully chosen taking into account their geographical and editorial scope, ownership and national or regional significance.

This survey was conducted on select leading media outlets in both the print and electronic/broadcast categories. They are: *The Monitor* (now *Daily Monitor*), *The New Vision* – both in the print category; KFM, Radio West, Mega FM, CBS, and Radio Uganda – in the radio category; and Uganda Television (UTV – now UBC TV for Uganda Broadcasting Corporation television) and WBS TV (Wavah Broadcasting Station) – in the television category.

*The Monitor* and *The New Vision* are the only English language daily newspapers in Uganda with national coverage and wide circulation. They are the leading print media with a combined circulation of just under 70,000 copies. *The Monitor's* average daily circulation is a little under 30,000 copies while *The New Vision* is at about 40,000 copies. *The Monitor* is a privately owned “independent” newspaper while *The New Vision* is government owned and enjoys great latitude and autonomy especially on non political issues.

Among the radios, KFM is a sister outlet of *The Monitor* and is the most professional of the country's FM stations in terms of news and other editorial programming. Its programming is fully in English and enjoys wide listener-ship around Kampala and surrounding districts. It rides on the countrywide network of correspondents of its sister company, *The Monitor* which makes its news perhaps the most comprehensive and diverse. Radio West, which is based in Mbarara town, (western Uganda) is the dominant radio station in western Uganda, having extensive coverage of nearly the entire region and Kampala and surrounding areas. It broadcasts in the Runyakitara dialect, which is the most widely spoken language in the area. It too has a wide correspondent network in nearly all towns in western Uganda. It is privately owned. Mega FM is based in the northern region town of Gulu and its broadcasts cover much of the region. Jointly owned by the government and private investors, it was set up to help in the mobilization against the 19-year-old insurgency in the region that has pitted Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels against the government of President Yoweri Museveni which captured power in 1986. It broadcasts mainly in Luo, the local dialect, English and Kiswahili. CBS FM on the other hand is the dominant local language radio in the Central region. Its reach however extends to parts of the near east and near west. Broadcasting in Luganda, a language widely spoken in Uganda, CBS covers local news well and has a lot of influence in Buganda region. The station is owned by the Buganda Kingdom, one of the old monarchies in Uganda, and is the official mouthpiece of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda. Radio Uganda is the national broadcaster and has by far the widest coverage, broadcasting on both FM and AM. Its inefficiency and seemingly pro-government leaning notwithstanding, the station that is received in every part of Uganda has a national network of correspondents who are the information officers in every district.

The televisions sampled included UTV and WBS since they are the major local television stations. UTV, which recently changed its name to UBC TV is government owned and covers most of the country (note that at the time of this survey however, the station was still known as UTV). The WBS TV on the other hand is private owned and while not having as much coverage as UTV has better programming and therefore enjoys audience leadership in the capital Kampala and major towns in central and southern Uganda.

It is important to note that the period when the media were monitored was highly political i.e. 2005 was politically critical in Uganda as it was the final year of President Yoweri

Museveni's second term. It was also the year when Uganda was on transition from the 'no-party' Movement system to a multi-party system ahead of the presidential elections in February 2006.

All the information collected was analysed according to the identified indicators. The summary and actors were both included in the standardized database. This was done in frequent consultations with CIVICUS.

## ANNEX 3 MEDIA ANALYSIS - “REPORT ON CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MEDIA”

### Introduction

The Civil Society media review project was conceived to assess the representation of civil society organizations in the media. The central question of this survey therefore was to establish how much civil society organizations are represented in the Ugandan media and in what light.

The study is important in that today, the media is a central pillar in the communication and development process. It is not only relied upon as a source of information, it is also central in any attempts aimed at influencing society for it is the vehicle through which innovation is diffused to the wider public and feedback channelled. How CSOs are represented in the media therefore has a direct bearing on the successes or failures of their programmes. The media also provides perhaps the quickest avenue of evaluation hence timely intervention, of public perception of CSO activities.

The review included print and electronic media. Two dailies (Monitor and New Vision) were sampled for a period of January, February, May and June 2006. During this time the electronic media was monitored for one month in November 2006.


### Findings of the Media Review Exercise

#### Main Features of CSO Reporting in the Media

This analysis includes Radio, Television and Newspapers. Radio Uganda scored highest probably because it’s a national radio station though owned by government and therefore dwells a lot on issues with a nationalistic outlook covering all regions of the country. The break down is indicated below;

**TABLE A.13: Number and percentage of articles addressing civil society topics**

Medium	Count Of Medium	%
CBS	57	6.92%
KFM	60	7.28%
Mega FM	56	6.80%
Radio Uganda	174	21.12%
Radio West	60	7.28%
The Monitor	116	14.08%
The New Vision	173	21.00%
UTV	61	7.40%
WBS	67	8.13%

**FIGURE A.1: Count of CSO stories per medium****Placement within media**

Number of articles placed in the media regarding their placement – covered from page 1 – 3 and for the radio and TV, which items came first, second or third in the reading.

**TABLE A.14: Placement within the media**

Page Number	Count Of Prom Pts
1	134
2	94
3	82
Op/Ed	1

Most of the CSO items appeared to come on the first page/reading of the news items, followed by the second page, which indicates that civil society is a relevant sector to the media in terms sources of news.

## THEMATIC FOCUS

### Main themes

**TABLE A.15: Thematic focus**

CSO Type	Number	Percentage
None	49	5.95%
Business	1	0.12%
International Politics	11	1.33%
Conflict Resolution	6	0.73%
Natural disasters	16	1.94%
War	13	1.58%
Advocacy	5	0.61%
Crime	15	1.82%
Corruption	23	2.79%
Justice	365	44.30%
National Politics	4	0.49%
Local Government	1	0.12%
Unemployment	38	4.61%
Education/ Training	2	0.24%
Housing	58	7.04%
Health	14	1.70%
Sustainable Development	3	0.36%
Corporate Social Responsibility	12	1.46%
Poverty	41	4.98%
Service Delivery / Welfare	11	1.33%
Land - redistribution policies	14	1.70%
Agriculture	20	2.43%
Human Rights	8	0.97%
Racism, Ethnicity, Xenophobia, Caste	12	1.46%
Migration/ Refugees	9	1.09%
Gender Issues	14	1.70%
Sexuality/ Sexual rights	13	1.58%
Children	2	0.24%
Media & ICT	39	4.73%
Arts, Entertainment	2	0.24%
Personalities and Profiles -	1	0.12%
Culture, Tradition, Religion and Language issues – cultural, traditional and religious beliefs, practices and language issues.	2	0.24%


The survey reported mostly issued to do with Justice with 365 articles, which are pertinent to every citizen therefore carrying a nationalistic agenda. There were various debates concerning corruption in the courts of law, the scrapping of the death penalty, issues to do with amnesty for the rebels, State attorney General's office among others. This was followed by housing issues and poverty with 41. the survey further indicates that CSOs are not very involved in business and local government issues or even if they are, then the media has not captured those areas.

**TABLE A.16: CSO Actors and issues**

Reporting on CSO Types	N	%age	Reporting on CSO Types	N	%age
Faith-based organizations	79	9.59%	Economic interest CSOs (e.g. cooperatives, credit unions, mutual saving associations)	6	0.73%
Trade unions	18	2.18%	Ethnic/traditional/indigenous associations/organizations	23	2.79%
Advocacy CSOs (e.g. civic action, social justice, peace, human rights, consumers' groups)	59	7.16%	Environmental CSOs	16	1.94%
Service CSOs (e.g. CSOs supporting community development, literacy, health, social services)	92	11.17%	Culture & arts CSOs	1	0.12%
CSOs active in education, training & research (e.g. think tanks, resource centres, non-profit schools, public education organizations)	18	2.18%	Social and recreational CSOs & sport clubs	6	0.73%
Non-profit media	5	0.61%	Grant-making foundations & fund-raising bodies	3	0.36%
Women's associations	24	2.91%	Political parties	340	41.26%
Student and youth associations	17	2.06%	CSO networks/federations/support organisations	29	3.52%
Associations of socio-economically marginalized groups (e.g. poor people, homeless, landless, immigrants, refugees)	5	0.61%	Social movements (e.g. landless people, peace movement)	1	0.12%
Professional and business organizations (e.g. chambers of commerce, professional associations)	43	5.22%	Others	30	3.64%
Community-level groups/associations (e.g. burial societies, self-help groups, parents' associations)	9	1.09%			

**CIVIL SOCIETY ISSUES**

Taking the diamond approach of analysis of CSO issues i.e. environment, impact, structure and values, media coverage was more or less balanced on all the four issues. Environment accounted for 24.99%, Impact for 24.93%, Structure for 25.15% and Values for 24.96%.

**FIGURE A.2: Dimension count****FREQUENCY OF REPORTING PER INDICATOR**

The results of this indicated that CSOs scored highly on Responsiveness with 193 articles, holding government accountable with 160 articles, cooperation/support with 152 and the collective community action with 100.

**TABLE A.17: Number of articles per indicator**

Indicator	No.	Indicator	No.
4.2.1 Holding state accountable	160	3.4.2 CS action to promote non violence and peace	67
4.4.1 Informing/educating citizens	23	2.6.3 Corporation/support	152
4.1.2 Social policy issue	0	1.5.2 Cooperation	11
1.1.1 Non-partisan political action	79	1.4.5 International linkage	15
2.6.2 Dialogue	15	4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people	22
3.2.3 CS action to promote transparency	129	3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs	125
1.1.5 Collective community action	100	4.1.1 Human rights policy issues	0
3.7.1 CS action to sustain the environment	21	2.7.1 Private sector attitude	14
3.3.2 CS action	39	4.3.1 Responsiveness	193
1.1.2 Charitable giving	80	4.5.3 Meeting needs of marginalized groups	36
1.2.1 Charitable giving	1	2.7.2 Corporate social responsibility	38
4.2.2 Holding private corporations accountable	37	1.5.1 Communication	24
4.5.2 Meeting pressing societal needs directly	6		

### **Civil society structure in the Media**

The structure dimension had a total of 811. The dimensions that scored highest included Collective Community Action and Charitable giving with 100 and 80 articles respectively. This reflects the wider community action to respond to immediate needs through the community-based organisations.

### **Civil Society Environment in the Media**

The limited involvement of CSOs in major issues like the political transition from Movement to Multiparty Politics featured a very low picture in the media. The only example there was on CSOs in demand for enfranchisement of all eligible voters and managing the political transition from one-party “movement system” to political pluralism.

During this period the information captured included; the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) calling for an end to the 20-year-old armed conflict in northern Uganda, and the call for security during the election period ahead of the February 23 general elections.

The other issues that appeared were in relation to the campaign to operationalise the access to information bill that was passed in 2005 and the campaign against corruption by Anti Corruption Coalition Uganda and Transparency International – Uganda Chapter. In the same direction, CSOs held a number of government organs accountable to fight against corruption and efficient service delivery.

### **Civil society values**

This is one area that recorded a high number of stories – 161. However an analysis of the content of the stories indicates that most of them were about political governance. A few organizations were involved in debates on the political transition while the rest of civil society seemed to attribute much less importance to the issue of societal democracy and stayed largely silent.

From the media survey, there were no big and organised campaigns to promote democracy by CS actors either as a group or individually. Anyhow, two campaigns for democracy are visible, namely; the demand for enfranchisement of all eligible voters and managing the political transition from one-party “movement system” to political pluralism. These stories, 29 in all were all prominently covered. Many organizations with a mandate to engage in activities to promote democracy at a societal level are shy towards the media and therefore all efforts are hardly captured.

In terms of corruption within civil society, only two instances were captured. One instance involved the embezzlement of funds by leaders of the Uganda Football Federation (FUFA), and the other involved copyright infringement by an association of performing artists. Clearly there are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within civil society.

A number of civil society actions in this area can be detected. Broad based support or public visibility of such initiatives is however lacking. There exist, however, some CSOs with a specific mandate to promote governance and corporate transparency, notable among them is Transparency International – Uganda Chapter and Anti-Corruption Coalition – Uganda (ACCU).

The only campaign that was visible was the operationalisation of the Access to Information Act, which was passed in 2005.

### **Civil society impact**

*The CS actions to promote gender had a number of actions detected.* Broad-based support or public visibility was however lacking. Notably, out of the 19 stories captured, only two received prominent coverage – one about a demand for a 50-50 women/male representation in parliament and the other about safe motherhood project.

Anyhow, three campaigns were discernible, namely, the health and welfare of young pregnant mothers, girl-child/women’s education and violence against women, each recording three, two and four stories respectively. Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET), one of the CS actors, with specific mandate to promote gender equity, featured prominently. Others were Mama Club, Action for Development (ACFODE) and Christ Women Fellowship.

*Civil society actions to eradicate poverty.* This is one area where a lot of CS activities can be detected. In fact it is apparent that civil society is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty and it enjoys broad based support and public visibility. One hundred and forty-four (144) stories were captured under this dimension and in these, four broad campaigns were detected, namely a campaign to improve farming and farm marketing approaches through cooperatives, improvement of household incomes through micro credit and communal pooling of resources, investment in education, and support for marginalised and disadvantaged groups.

While there are many *environment* specific civil society organisations only one NGO Ramsar Civil Society Forum formed under a specific mandate to promote environmental conservation surfaced. Others included Green Watch NGO campaigning against the use of DDT pesticide by the government to eliminate mosquitoes, and CSOs opposing aspects of the proposed Land Bill granting automatic power to government to give any land to investors. Though very low activities were recorded during the survey period, environment CSOs have enjoyed great success on a campaign to save Bujagali Falls from being developed for hydropower generation and the de-gazetting of some forests in the Ssesse Islands in Lake Victoria to open way for a huge palm oil project. It also important to not that even in instances where civil society activity in the area of environmental sustainability is detected, their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by civil society as a whole, leaving only a few specialized CS actors to lead and articulate the issues.

### **CSO Image in the Media**

**TABLE A.18: CSO Image in the Media**

<b>Rep CSO</b>	<b>Count Of Rep CSO</b>	<b>%</b>
Negative representation	87	10.56%
Neutral representation	499	60.56%
Positive representation	238	28.88%

The CSO image in the media is largely neutral with 60.56% and or positive.

## **Conclusion**

The media survey considered newspapers, radio and T.V, which attempted to capture the different sources of information for the public in general. This is because there is a large percentage of persons that are illiterate and most times cant afford to purchase a newspaper. Most of the people in the countryside listen more to their local radio stations that broad caste in the local languages. T.V too is becoming very popular with many people watching it especially when Parliament is in session to assess the performance of their representatives in Parliament.

Many issues were raised by the survey and most notable is the level of engagement between the media and civil society. It is apparent that save for the political CSOs, the other civil society organisations seem to be media shy. There is limited deliberate action to pro-actively engage the media to publish the many issues CSOs are engaged in. Any reporting about them therefore seems to be incidental, rather than deliberate. CSOs therefore have the potential to engage and become part of the media agenda by supplying content in an organised and consistent manner.

However this could best be done through CSO umbrella and network with the mandate of engaging national media while members work with the local media.

Radio emerged as the medium that seems to provide more news coverage to CSO in comparison to television and newspapers, accounting for 49.39%. Considering that radio reaches more people, CSOs need to cultivate a deliberate strategy to engage the radios more.

Another significant trend in the review was the tendency for particular CSOs to confine themselves to their little areas of operation and not speaking out on wider related issues. Almost no items were mentioned about human rights, education, social welfare, environment, etc yet these are inter-related with core CSO activities. CSOs might therefore consider engaging in wider advocacy rather than only confining themselves to their little fiefdoms.

On the whole, CSOs were portrayed mostly in neutral light (499) as opposed to 238 positive and 87 negative. Among the negative were a few cases of corruption and bickering/infighting with CSOs. It is important that CSOs take note of this downside as these few cases can have a wider effect on their public perception and dealings.

## ANNEX 4: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN UGANDA

CSR started in Uganda in 2001 and has grown among corporate companies. The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) started in 1998 has been spearheading the training in corporate governance with CSR as one of the areas of training. According to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) -ICGU, the subject of CSR is not yet well understood but several companies have gone ahead to participate in this new phenomenon. CSR involves considering all stakeholders while making business decisions that manage stakeholder relationships and interests in balance with the profit motive of the enterprise.

The CEO-ICGU noted during the interview that different reasons have been advanced for participation of companies in CSR. One of the major reasons is competition among companies especially in the same sector. It is perceived that customers feel more comfortable dealing with a company that shares with them than companies, which are distanced from them. Also some companies look at the long-term benefits by improving people's lives today so as to improve on the standard of living and make the people able to afford their services in future. Some companies support something that will make them look better in the eyes of society but will also benefit society. Training has also influenced companies to participate in CSR as companies have realized the importance of sharing profits with clients. With the current trend in CSR, customers are aware of its importance. This has prompted many companies to participate in CSR.

There are two models CSR and these are the American model and the European model. For the American model, profit is made first and at the end of the year; a certain percentage of the profits are given out to society while the European model provides for communities as the need arises. However, the need for availability of funds must be considered. In some companies where the European model like MTN Uganda is used, money is put in the annual budget for CSR. The American model uses a philanthropic approach while the European model uses an integrated approach.

A report by Friends of the Earth (FEO) (2005) found out that the finance sector had failed to embed corporate responsibility on a voluntary basis. The areas in which the financial sectors had failed in CSR were that it provides a heaven to siphon off much-better needed tax revenue from cash-strapped developing countries, has abjectly failed to factor in the financial risks of climate change, is a primary conduit for bribery and corruption, perpetuates poverty and social exclusion by providing unscrupulous levels of debt at high rates, regularly undermines human rights protection, by financing projects which pose a threat to the implementation of human rights laws in developing countries, and often fails to assess adequately the environmental impacts of projects. The FEO (2006) report recommended that any CSR initiatives must include an independent monitoring and enforcement regime and binding and credible sanctions for instances of no-compliance must also be implemented and enforced.

In Uganda there are some Private Sector (PS) companies such as MTN, Uganda Telecom Limited (UTL), Barclays Bank among others that have put in place policy to guide them on CSR when cooperating with CSOs in supporting community developments. For instance Barclays Bank Uganda reported, *“As a leading player in the financial services industry, we are highly engaged in investing in communities in which we operate. We dedicate 1% of our annual profits on Corporate social Investment programmes focusing on education, public*

*health-specifically HIV/AIDS, support for small and medium enterprises and disadvantaged people including people with disabilities” (Barclays Bank Supplement in the Daily monitor of Monday, 12 Dec 2005 page 16-27, focusing on Barclays Bank Corporate social investment initiatives)*

The above further seems to indicate that it is good for business companies to institute CSR policies within the business but a critical examination of business indicates that CRS policy will be followed when the business is good. Remember CSR is not the main agenda of business companies, yet even when the business is bad or good the companies still exploits the poor. No wonder the CSR policy restricts funding areas to the ‘visible and welfare’ aspects of development rather than the structural causes of poverty to which they are partially a cause.

### **CSR Performance of selected Companies in 2004**

#### **MTN Uganda**

MTN Uganda launched commercial services in Uganda in 1998 and it has since grown into the dominant telecommunications company in Uganda servicing customers estimated to reach one million in 2006 and was the leading taxpayer in 2004/05. MTN Uganda supports initiatives such as education, through which they have assisted schools in different ways since 1999. MTN’s CSR is aimed at giving back to the communities in which the company staff live and work.

In the Environment sector, MTN Uganda contributed 10 Spare Wheel Covers Raffle Prizes in aid of the Rhino Fund Uganda. MTN has ensured that it has established Mobile phone network to support Gorilla tracking. Similarly MTN supported the Human Rights cause for the people in Northern Uganda by being among the sponsors of the ‘Hope Concert’ for the people of Gulu.

In giving back to the community, jointly with Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) supports provisions of Internet services to schools through the schools connectivity programme that is managed by U-connect where schools benefit from subsidized Internet connectivity<sup>42</sup>. MTN encourages people to embrace an education that involves computer knowledge and exposure to ICT through higher institutions of learning by giving them computers. The MTN Village Phone- extends telecommunications access to rural villages across Uganda. The village phones create opportunities for poor rural individuals to become “village phone operators”.

MTN has a partnership with Habitat for Humanity (HFH) to provide low cost housing to the people of Uganda. MTN has partnered with a renowned Christian NGO-HFH to assist in construction of low cost houses amongst various communities that HFH identifies from time to time. MTN has contributed more than U Shs 220 million over the last 2 years toward the construction of 120 houses in different parts of Uganda. The relationship between HFH-Uganda and MTN appears to be neither ad hoc nor one-off support but long term, each party seem to be benefiting from the relationship. In addition, sponsors MTN Nakivubo Youth club a group of Former Street children are rehabilitated through sports.

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<sup>42</sup> U-CONNECT, a project that supplies cheap information communication technology to schools.

### **Others areas of CSR by MTN are:**

- ✍ Sponsored the inaugural MTN Kampala Marathon 2004 that drew over 1,264 participants both local and international
- ✍ Supports the activities of Forum for African Women Educationists (FAWE) Uganda
- ✍ Developed the mobile telephone concept because fixed booths were too far apart and people had to walk long distances to use them

### **Shell Uganda**

Shell Uganda was among the sponsors of the 'Hope Concert' by a registered non-profit making initiative for the people of Gulu. In its efforts to give back to Society Shell Uganda, in 2001, joined a network of companies to form the Uganda Business Coalition (UBC) to design, develop, implement and evaluate innovative HIV/AIDS interventions across the different segments of the business sector in Uganda. The activities of the coalition have been donations in kind to hospitals to expand AIDS clinic services, HIV education among employees and negotiations with clinics to provide ARV in Health packages. UBC has set up a workers treatment centre in Kampala for employees and their families.

### **Uganda Breweries Ltd**

Uganda Breweries Limited (UBL) one of the beer companies in Uganda carried out the following CSR activities:

- ? **Ugandan Wetlands:** To minimize on the impact of UBL's activities on the aquatic ecosystems, UBL has recently invested in a new plant to treat brewery effluent. The company has also launched a conservation project in partnership with the National Wetlands Programme.
- ? **Sickle Cell Association (SCA):** UBL has continued to support the SCA of Uganda through provision of education materials. UBL built the SCA offices at Mulago Hospital.
- ? **Art and Design Workshop:** UBL constructed an art and design workshop for the Kamwokya Christian Caring Community Centre. The investment, which will serve around 40,000 people, seeks to improve the quality of life of the local community.
- ? **HIV/AIDS:** During 2004, UBL adopted a new policy on HIV/AIDS with the objective to minimize, monitor, and manage the impact, spread and consequences to the employee. UBL provides a variety of workplace programmes that cover non-discrimination, awareness and prevention, voluntary counselling and testing plus provision of free Anti-retroviral Drugs (ARVs) to employees.
- ? A new occupational health and safety policy has been adopted at the production site; officers are fully complaint with the new risk management standards.
- ? UBL has commissioned Makerere University to carry out a study on Lake Victoria quality.

### **Total Uganda**

Total Uganda is UBC Member and has partnership with Uganda Women's Efforts to Save Orphans (UWESO) and facilitates the smooth implementation of Programmes and to reach the orphans and their families, mitigating the impact of HIV and other adverse circumstances. In addition, Total Uganda painted the Makindye zebra crossing for school children and donated textbooks to St Mary's Nsumba- Mpigi District.

### **Caltex Oil (Uganda)**

The notion of CSR in Caltex Oil (Uganda) Limited is based on United States legislation and approach. As reflection of their mission of being the most admired company for its people and partners, Caltex's CSR efforts are in the areas of health, safety and environment. While ensuring the profitability of the company, Caltex takes it as a responsibility to pay all taxes to government, offer good terms to the employees, and give price support to the dealers.

Caltex has a strictly anti corruption policy and observance of human rights in all undertakings. The employees are trained on product and material handling. It has no employees who are under age and is an equal opportunity employer as the evidence shows that some of the employees are People with Disabilities (PWDs). It promptly pays its contributions to the NSSF and in addition it has a provident fund for the employees.

Caltex has contributed to road safety through:

- ✍ Bought speed cameras and four highway patrol cars for the Uganda Police at US \$ 225,000
- ✍ Has road safety programmes on WBS Television to educate motorists on safe driving tips
- ✍ Caltex takes responsibility for its product by ensuring no adulteration by coding their products.

Others areas of CSR by Caltex are:

- ✍ UDC collected money for buying Mama Kits –delivery kits for expectant mothers
- ✍ Sponsors the Golden Pens Environment Award for environmental journalist for high standards reporting on the environment
- ✍ Sponsored the Caltex Havoline rally 2004 event
- ✍ Contribute to the King Oyo Fund

### **British American Tobacco Uganda**

British American Tobacco Uganda (BATU) is an example of a business company with good CSR but producing a harmful product that affects people's health. The general situation on tobacco use among young people all over the world, and in less developed countries like in Uganda in particular shows that young people are at a high health not only as users but non-users exposed to smoke. In Uganda many people consider tobacco use an unhealthy social habit especially among adolescents (Mpabulungi, 2003).

BATU believes in adding value to the communities in which it operates. CSR initiatives supported include: participation in a Ushs1billion campaign to eliminate child labour in tobacco growing in Uganda; forestation and biodiversity initiatives; construction of health and community infrastructure to improve living conditions in the country; promotion of the development of small and medium scale enterprises (Jua Kali) through annual sponsorships; education support and bursaries to farmers and staff children. The Public Relations Director estimated that the company spends in excess of U Shs 300million on CSR annually.

The challenge is what should be CSR policy of a business company that produces products that are risky/harmful to the lives of the people? These investments in the community portray BATU as a good company with a commitment to CSR in the areas that it operates. However, it should be noted BATU's CSR may be more inclined at promoting/popularising BATU and its products to the people than focusing on the dangers associated with BATU products to the people's health -which are harmful to people's health and indeed leads to death.

In addition BATU is UBC Member and The Surgery and International Medical Centre provides subsidies of 50% for ARV therapy for staff sponsored by BATU. BATU also has partnership with Uganda Women's Efforts to Save Orphans (UWESO) and facilitates the smooth implementation of Programmes and to reach the orphans and their families, mitigating the impact of HIV and other adverse circumstances. In the areas of culture and sports, it had been a long time sponsor the Uganda Sports Press Association (USPA)

### **Century Bottling Company**

In its 2005 report- The Coca-Cola African Foundation pledges commitment to achieving sustainability of business and to contributing to the sustainable development of the communities where they operate. In this vein, in Uganda through servicing its retail customers in remote communities has led to innovative approaches and new employment opportunities. The system has helped local people establish small-scale distribution centres to meet these customers' needs.

The 'Buy One Help One' programme in Uganda has been successful. For every soft drink sold, the Company donated money to a charity in the local community to support AIDS orphans. The fundraising drive for the education of children orphaned by Aids through a donation of two shillings per bottle sold going to UWESO. In 2004, provide funding of U Shs 16.2 million (US \$ 8,838) to the UWESO HIV/AIDS orphanage at Masulita. In partnership with UWESO facilitates the smooth implementation of Programmes to reach the orphans and their families, mitigating the impact of HIV and other adverse circumstances.

In addition, Coco-cola sponsored production and school distribution costs of a special comic book series aimed at inspiring quality relationships and positive sexual behaviour. Similarly a school fees project raised more than U Shs 100 million (US \$ 54,555) in 2004.

Since November 2000, The Coca-Cola Company in Africa has provided its employees, their spouses and children with comprehensive healthcare benefits, including full access to ARVs following the strict guidelines of the World Health Organisation (WHO). In recognition of its HIV/AIDS Awareness Programme Uganda's Century Bottling Company Limited (CBC) was presented with an "Employer of the Year" award. CBC was selected for this award on the basis of its best practice and the extensive hands-on approach the Company takes to combat the problem of HIV/AIDS in the workplace. CBC's programme incorporates awareness and education initiatives. It also conducts anonymous saliva testing and implements an AIDS treatment and prevention scheme. The initiatives in 2004 included:

- Awareness conducted for over 200 employees
- Fortnightly poster promotions on all company notice boards
- Monthly campaigns championed by peer educators in all capabilities
- Intensive communications on the objective of saliva tests to get employee buy-in
- Voluntary saliva tests carried out for 395 employees
- Database at Mild May Treatment Centre with personal information for all employees
- Voluntary counselling and testing at Mild May Treatment Centre for 17 staff members
- Condoms available in all convenience rooms

### **Nile Breweries**

The Nile Breweries has a partnership with UWESO and facilitates the smooth implementation of Programmes and to reach the orphans and their families, to mitigate the impact of HIV and other adverse circumstances.

Nile Breweries has single-handedly played a key role in the commercialisation of sorghum (*Epuripur*) production. Continues to invest in new products and processes, as well as new technologies to improve overall operational effectiveness. The group's scientific research has yielded solid progress in brewing, raw materials, new brands and packs and in proprietary technologies. Using local suppliers enables Nile Breweries to reduce costs and respond quickly to market opportunities. Creating new markets for farmers by using a locally-produced grain in Uganda not only managed to create a top selling beer but also helped the government crack a major problem. Until launched the new beer, Eagle Lager, over 60% of Uganda's alcohol was produced by unlicensed private breweries, depriving the government of excise duty and exposing consumers to all the risks of unregulated beer production.

Other CSR activities were:

- ✍ Contributing to Lowering the human and commercial costs of HIV/Aids
- ✍ Putting responsible drinking at the forefront through education
- ✍ Promoting responsibility internally through publishing and distribution of a communication pack- 'The Responsible Way' that provides businesses with all the information and guidance needed to implement the alcohol manifesto
- ✍ Sponsored the 3rd Nile Freestyle Festival 2004 Nile Kayaking Championship on the friendly rapids on the White Nile

### **Petro Uganda**

Information on CSR for Petro Uganda was not readily available and their management did not responded to the information request.

### **Stanbic Bank**

Operates 65 points of representation and have 76 ATMs in Uganda to offer universal banking services to customers in the retail and wholesale markets. It was rated bank of the year in Uganda in 2004. Stanbic Supports education, health services, childcare, community development and self-help projects in the Uganda community. Stanbic Bank CSR activities in Society in 2004 were:

- ✍ Sponsors the Kampala Kid's League, a voluntary organization established in 1997 to promote sporting skills, recreational involvement and team spirit among children. Committed U Shs 50 million to KKL for 2003 and 2004
- ✍ UBC Member. Invested U Shs 6.97 million in The Nile Football Academy; an academy aimed at identifying Ugandan Sporting star of the future.
- ✍ Partnership with UWESO and facilitates the smooth implementation of Programmes to reach the orphans and their families
- ✍ Partnered with Lincoln International School to support worthy causes like street children, supporting the physically disabled and Aids orphans.
- ✍ Sponsored participants for The African Leadership Initiative activities, which seeks to develop the next generation of community –spirited leaders in Africa.

In conclusion, CSR in Uganda has grown among corporate companies. CSR is not yet well understood but several companies have gone ahead to participate in this new phenomenon. CSR activities are mainly an initiative of individual companies and could be as a result of companies having realized the importance of sharing profits with clients. Most companies studied have supported health activities especially the HIV/AIDS but the magnitude of the support varies from company to company. Lastly, the development of CSR in Uganda could greatly benefit from studying the FEO (2005) report recommendations that encourage CSOs

to advocate CSR for an independent monitoring and enforcement regime and binding and credible sanctions for instances of no-compliance.

## ANNEX 5: POLICY IMPACT STUDIES

### 1. Human Rights Situation in internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps

#### Background to IDPs

IDPs are a particularly vulnerable group of society and a segment of the population that requires the attention of the international community (Nikitchina, 2003). Unlike refugees that flee their countries in fear of persecution and human rights violations, IDPs remain within the borders of their own country. They do not benefit from an internationally established system of refugee protection and assistance. Instead they stay in a country, which lacks predictable structures of support for the principles of human rights protection.

IDPs receive very little if any support or protection. Conflicting parties in a civil war, for example, may prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need or even abduct displaced children and women as forced labour, army recruits or sexual slaves. IDPs who are forced to leave their homes due to their political beliefs or ethnic background often find themselves in constant fear that their identity will be discovered (Lobe 2002).

In Uganda, since 1986, violent conflict has gripped the country especially northern Uganda. Thousands of people have been displaced as a result of protracted conflicts which affect a quarter of the country. The main areas of displacement are the North, the Rwenzori Mountains on Uganda's western border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Eastern Uganda where displacement is caused by violent raiding of villages by Karimojong pastoralists. The war in Northern Uganda has led to IDPs in the districts of Apac, Gulu, Katakwi, Lira, Masindi, Pader and Soroti.

In 2004, more than 1.6 million IDPs lived in more than 180 camps and temporary shelters that were set up as long as eight years ago and were never intended for long-term use (UN, 2005). Many settlements were developing problems similar to those of small cities, but without the resources needed to address them. All camps were highly congested and overcrowded, and living conditions were squalid. Limited water supply and low sanitation have led to disease outbreaks, contributing to increased morbidity and mortality. Children and women, who comprise 80% of the IDPs, are the most vulnerable groups. Oxfam reported many children in Northern Uganda are terrified of being abducted by LRA. Many run away or are sent by their families to Karamoja areas where the LRA is not active<sup>43</sup>.

The Northern region has endured conflict and social disruption for about two decades. Economic and social indicators demonstrate that districts in the war areas have not fully benefited from the steady growth that has occurred in the rest of the country. Armed conflict has been a decisive factor in the impoverishment of the North. Further, many local people, district officials, and northern politicians believe that the North has been deliberately marginalized, both politically and economically.

While the poverty incidence decreased in the rest of the country, it increased in the North. Since 1997/98, more than 60% of the population in Northern Uganda has been living below the poverty line. The people living below the poverty line in Uganda (national level) were 44.4 in 1997/98 and the poverty levels dropped to 38% in 2002/03 (MFPED, 2004). Conflict resolution and effective support to this conflict-afflicted area are essential for poverty

<sup>43</sup> [http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what\\_we\\_do/where\\_we\\_work/uganda/conflict2/childsoldiers.htm](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/where_we_work/uganda/conflict2/childsoldiers.htm)

eradication. Full reintegration of the North into Ugandan economy and society will be a long-term process and is dependent upon achieving a lasting peace.

## **Review of the IDPs Situation in 2004**

### **IDP camps**

Until August 2004, there was general agreement that two kinds of camps co-existed: camps recognised (or “gazetted”) by the government, which were physically protected in varying degrees by the UPDF and/or militia, and benefiting from the World Food Programme (WFP) food distribution and some humanitarian assistance; and non-recognised camps (“non-gazetted”), which were not permanently physically protected by the UPDF or militia and which did not receive direct food distribution, although some IDPs were registered in nearby camps and were receiving food assistance there (UN, 2005). Unrecognised camps, particularly in the Acholi sub-region, were easy targets for the LRA throughout the year. On several occasions when such camps were attacked by the LRA, the army generally explained the casualties by noting that the camps were “unrecognised” and as such were not protected. UN (2005) reported the conditions in these camps were very poor, as IDPs did not benefit from much humanitarian assistance.

### **Security**

During the first half of 2004, there was a serious worsening of the security situation as LRA rebels intensified their attacks on the displaced people in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Lira districts. The situation of IDPs further deteriorated, making the conflict in Uganda one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Killings and abductions continued unabated on a daily basis (UN, 2005).

The most significant and brutal LRA attack occurred on 21 February 2004 in Barlonyo, a non-recognised IDP camp in Lira district. According to local authorities, almost 300 people were massacred. The immediate consequence was an increase in ethnic tension and clashes between groups of Langi and Acholi people (the LRA is largely composed of ethnic Acholi). However, calm between the communities was quickly restored. Exasperated by the LRA atrocities and by what was perceived as an insufficient reaction by the government to the emergency situation in the north, the Parliament passed a motion asking that the war-ravaged areas of northern and eastern Uganda be declared disaster areas. This motion was supported by the Donor Group on Northern Uganda, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict (DG NARC).

There was marked improvement in the general security situation following high rates of LRA desertions in the later part of 2004. LRA attacks on camps became less frequent, creating a feeling, that the LRA had been significantly weakened and that the war was about to end.

### **Access by aid organizations to affected populations**

The unpredictability of the LRA has created a strong fear amongst the population and aid workers alike that attacks could take place at any time. This has generally limited access to camps (UN, 2005). A number of aid agencies reached IDP camps with military escorts from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) who were considered a deterrent to LRA attacks. However, a number of organisations such as Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), Aktion Afrika Hilfe (AAH), Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Uganda Red Cross (URC) do not use escorts.

During 2004, access has improved in Teso, Lira and Gulu, but has remained relatively unchanged in Kitgum and Pader.

### **Night Commuters**

The average daily number of “night commuters” represents an indicative barometer of people’s perceptions of their household safety in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. The number of night commuters increased from about 44,200 at the beginning of the year to 52,000 (an increase of 15%) at peaked in Gulu, Kitgum and Kalongo towns.

### **Resettlement and re-integration of ‘returnees’ (former LRA rebels/former abductees)**

Children and adults, male and female, reported to the UPDF and to reception centres at a high rate in 2004. The capacity of the children’s centres was adequate, but the capacity for adults was insufficient (UN, 2005). There were concerns within the aid community that returning former LRA soldiers, after going through the reception centres and receiving amnesty, could be integrated in a separate battalion without having the choice not to do so, without adequate screening, and without a transparent civilian oversight mechanism.

**Sexual gender-based violence** (SGBV) and exploitation of displaced girls and women were reported to aid workers across the conflict-affected areas, including in IDP camps, the night commuters’ sites, public places, etc. The UN (2005) noted that there were few established child (and women’s) protection agencies or networks, and victims found it difficult confidentially to report for medical treatment or counselling.

### **Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus / Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS)**

The prolonged displacement and poverty, coupled with the weakening cultural traditions and values, have worsened the problem of HIV/AIDS (UN, 2005). Official figures are still lacking from the conflict-affected districts, but Lacor Hospital AIDS Control Programme (ACP) surveillance figures indicated that prevalence rates amongst mothers attending the antenatal clinic ranged between 10 and 12%,<sup>44</sup> which is nearly twice the national rate of 6.2%<sup>45</sup>. Northern Uganda continues to have the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the country, ranging from 9.3% in Kitgum to more than 13% in Gulu compared to the national average of 6% (USAID, 2004).

### **International Criminal Court**

A team from the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrived in Uganda in August 2005 to prepare for the investigation of crimes committed in the conflict between government troops and the LRA. This followed a government request at the end of 2003 to the ICC to investigate the crimes committed by the LRA rebels. However, local and international human rights groups and religious national groups urged the ICC to investigate crimes by all sides in the conflict, including those committed by the Ugandan army. The government pledged support for the ICC and promised to prosecute officials implicated in crimes (UN, 2005). Nonetheless, religious leaders and civil society groups were worried about the timing of the ICC investigation. They were concerned that it would disrupt the amnesty process and discourage the LRA, especially its top commanders, from surrendering for fear of being prosecuted.

<sup>44</sup> HIV Seroprevalence in Northern Uganda: The Complex Relationship between AIDS and Conflict, by Dr. Filippo Ciantia.

<sup>45</sup> The State of Uganda Population Report 2004, p. 52.

### **Peace talks**

UN (2005) noted that increase in defections from the LRA ranks in 2004 was viewed as a sign of the positive impact of the Amnesty Act, 2003. President Yoweri Museveni issued several statements reiterating the government's willingness to hold talks with the LRA leadership either directly or through intermediaries, in order to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Several attempts to open direct talks with the LRA were made, but have did not result in success (UN, 2005).

CSOs for Peace in Northern Uganda have advocated for a peaceful solution to the northern Uganda conflict. The consortium of CSOs has managed to convince government for peace talks to continue whenever there is a chance. The organizations have also sensitized people to avoid ethnic conflict in the region which would only sour up the conflict. The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) an internationally acclaimed organization played a pivotal role in negotiating a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Northern Uganda. This had resulted in the population being hopeful to the possibility of negotiated peace instead of only the military solution to the conflict.

### **Food security**

The majority of Uganda experienced below normal rainfall in 2004, hindering the growth of first season crops, such as banana, beans, maize, millet, and sorghum, that normally account for the larger part of crop production in Uganda (USAID, 2004). Deteriorating security conditions continued to prevent IDPs in northern Acholil and from accessing fields, and the ability of IDPs to complement food aid from their own production has been largely curtailed. Improved security in Langi and Teso sub-regions enabled limited access but did not resulted in large-scale food production due to insufficient rains. USAID (2004) reported that IDP populations in the north continued to depend on food aid rations for survival in 2004.

According to the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) (2004), all camps still have poor access to sufficient food. The result of this can be seen from the malnourished children and emaciated adults in IDP camps. Insufficient food supply will continue to have long lasting negative impact on the health of especially children and ultimately their academic performance for those who go to school. Food in IDPs is provided by WFP and is supplied once in a months. Each family gets 7.5kg of posho and 1.5kg of beans, which is not enough for a family.

Besides the problem of food insecurity, Human Rights Watch (2005) reported that the UPDF has also committed abuses in the north, including arbitrary detention, torture, rape, and stealing. A few civilians have pending civil actions for damages on account of this ill treatment; the UPDF soldiers are rarely criminally prosecuted for abuse of civilians. In 2004, the UHRC Develop a plan with NGOs and donors to assist in the protection of IDPs through stationing UHRC staff in camps to receive complaints of LRA and UPDF abuses.

### **Water and sanitation**

USAID (2004) noted despite ongoing interventions by NGOs and local authorities, water and sanitation conditions remained inadequate in most camps. A Catholic Relief Services (CRS) survey of Kitgum IDP camps revealed substandard water and sanitation conditions. Although wide variances exist between camps, on average there were 2,410 persons per water point and 6 liters of water per person per day, compared to Sphere standards of 500 and 15 respectively. An IDP in a camp generally collects less than five litres of water per day, far below the SPHERE (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response)

standard of 15 litres/day in an emergency situation. CRS also advocated for funding to be made available to provide critical personnel, additional shelters, and resources for “night commuters” in affected areas of the North (CRS, 2004).

Similarly, only half of the survey respondents used pit latrines while the remainder stated they did not have access (USAID, 2004). Meanwhile, 97 percent reported recent illnesses due to water born diseases, such as diarrhoea, parasites, and typhoid. Camps located in urban areas try to observe a high level of hygiene and cleanliness; many rural camps have a poor level of hygiene. They lack enough pit latrines and the environment is dirty and stinking. There is need for supply of many more mobile toilets in most of the camps. The mobile toilets supplied in 2004 were not enough to cater for the high population. In some parishes, only one toilet was provided to be shared by about 7000 IDPs.

The camps located in the urban areas have access to water while the camps in rural areas have limited access to water. People in IDPs in rural areas fear to go outside the camps to fetch water due to rebels who hide in the nearby bushes. In some IDP camps, the boreholes are broken down and have not be repaired. Ajuii IDP camp has three bore holes in place to cater for the population of 7,235 people with about 1,100 household in addition to another borehole, which was being constructed by the District Administration.

In Kitgum, water and sanitation problems are exacerbated by fees required by water source management committees. IDPs, who for the most part have no source of income, are unable to pay water fees of \$0.28 per month and have consequently resorted to using water from unprotected sources. District authorities intervened by setting a standard fee of \$0.11 per household per month. Oxfam is providing clean water and sanitation (which benefits Kitgum town as well as the night dwellers), dormitories for women and girls, and health and hygiene to 10,000 night dwellers in Kitgum town.

Oxfam works in Padibe and seven other camps in Kitgum district, supporting around 200,000 people, installing water and sanitation systems, training community –based extension workers; and providing hoes, seeds and cassava and more recently plough-oxen<sup>46</sup>. Lutheran World federation project in Katakwi District aims to alleviate the suffering of IDPs, to improve the well being of the population and to assist in rehabilitation development. Their activities focused on: improvement in health and hygiene conditions by providing services to meet basic water, sanitation and non-food needs; developing infrastructure; initiation of peace and reconciliation efforts; and awareness building for AIDS and STDs.

### **Poor shelter**

Shelter in the long established camps is fairly satisfactory, the newly created camps both in town and rural areas lack proper shelter. Some IDPs sleep under the shop verandas, tree shades and poorly grass thatched huts. Some international agencies like UNICEF, Red Cross and MSF gave some tarpaulins for roofing but were very few compared to the needs of the IDPs. Poor shelter conditions are a major characteristic of most IDP camps.

### **Health and Medical facilities**

Health centres in IDP camps throughout northern Uganda were overwhelmed by rising incidents of malaria and malnutrition, mainly among women and children (USAID, 2004).

<sup>46</sup> [http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what\\_we\\_work/where\\_we\\_work/uganda](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_work/where_we_work/uganda)

There was high malaria prevalence attributed to the exposure of night commuters who sleep in the open. Lacor Hospital in Gulu reported seven confirmed cases of cholera in June 2004, prompting district leaders to set up a cholera task force to monitor the situation. USAID/OFDA continues to support ongoing nutrition programs, but many have registered high default rates due to IDP movements. The International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched an anti-malaria campaign, starting with the distribution of insecticide-treated nets to 40,000 households in over 15 camps (one per household), primarily to children and pregnant women. This helped to reduce malaria in the camps.

The general health conditions in most IDP camps are in a poor state. Health and medical facilities are located far away from some camps, in other camps there are inadequate numbers of health units, lack of drugs, overwhelmed personnel, and high incidences of diseases arising out of poor sanitation, inadequate and congested housing facilities, and unprotected water sources. For example, Amida IDP camp has one health unit with two enrolled nurses, serving a population of 23,000 people. Furthermore, the WHO (2005) found the Crude Mortality rate (CMR) and under 5 mortality rate (UM5R) were four times higher than non-crisis levels in Kitgum and Pader districts

Children continue to suffer from frequent illnesses, despite the Child Days in May in which the District Directorate of Health Services (DDHS), assisted by UNICEF, implemented an immunization programme for children under five, provided Vitamin A supplementation to children 6 months to 5 years of age and de-worming medicines for children 1 year and above. The training of close to 2,000 community resource persons (CORPS) to deal with the most common childhood illnesses. The Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate in Kitgum IDP camps ranges from 7.4 to 18.3% of children under five, and in Pader from 4.4 to 12.2%, which is significantly higher than the 10% that signifies a nutrition emergency (SPHERE standards). There has been limited focus on HIV/AIDS programme setting and implementation.

### **Education**

All IDPs camps have high pupil to teacher ratios, pupil to classroom ratios, inaccessibility to schools due to long distances, the general lack of scholastic materials, high drop out rates and late reporting by teachers who stay out of camps as a security precaution. Government policy of paying part of the fees for children in camps applies to government schools, and those studying in private schools are left out. Yet 70% of children in IDP camps go to private schools, and experience shows that private schools perform better than government schools. Geographical inaccessibility to secondary education was evident in Oyam North Constituency in Apac district where the only nearby school Otwal SSS was transferred to Ayer Sub county, 20 miles away from Ujil IDP camp for instance, further away from the other camps in the district. Besides, it's a boarding school with high school charges, making the poor IDPs unable to meet such high school costs for fees.

There have been efforts to create learning centres in the camps, the general centres lack facilities and teachers negatively affected the quality of education being imparted. The camps in rural areas are being marginalized compared to the ones in urban areas. UNICEF has been on the forefront in helping set the learning centres to absorb the displaced children. Oxfam is working building and updating school dormitories, providing fencing, cooking equipment,

blankets, clothes, soap, and toiletries for schools so the children can live on site in safety and receive the education they deserve<sup>47</sup>.

### **Access to IDPs**

After deteriorating early in 2004, access improved in the middle of the year in most districts. All agencies were able to travel without armed escort since April 2004 (UN, 2005). Access in Lira has also improved. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) travel without escorts in the south, and the UN is assessing whether it can adopt the same approach. In Kitgum, all NGOs use armed escorts with very irregular access, more often due to the non-availability of escorts than to security difficulties. ICRC is the only organisation in Kitgum that does not use escorts.

A recurrent constraint on access was the UPDF's inability to provide sufficient military escorts, causing agencies to cancel planned humanitarian operations (UN, 2005). Aid organisations also had to hire vehicles to transport the escort soldiers and feed the soldiers for the day. In the most isolated and insecure areas, access for the delivery of non-food items (NFI) and basic services was irregular, resulting in dramatic consequences for the IDPs in these sites.

### **Improved protection for all vulnerable groups**

Through the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator awareness of protection issues increased among official and humanitarian duty bearers (government, districts, military, UN agencies, NGOs and donors). This resulted from the deployment of UNICEF child protection officers, the work of OCHA field staff and the active engagement by some INGOs (e.g. Norwegian Refugee Council [NRC], Save the Children [SC] and Oxfam), this work has been supported by inter-agency protection working groups established in Gulu, Kitgum and Lira. However, there was still progress to be made towards developing a common understanding of protection, a process that has been aided at the national level by a "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict" workshop.

In the same way, the Coalition of Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU)<sup>48</sup> a loose advocacy coalition of approximately 50 member organisations, local and international CSOs was involved in advocacy for a just peace. CSOPNU was founded in 2002, out of the frustration of CSOs working in northern Uganda realising limited impact for their interventions as a result of the worsening security situation resulting from the LRA conflict<sup>49</sup>. CSOPNU's has conducted and supported focused advocacy at national and international levels through research, analysis, discussion and policy advice.

CSOPNU has produced reports of major national significance in key semantic areas including protection of civilians, land rights, protection of children, national identity and obstacles to peace. In 2004, CSOPNU produced a report on Humanitarian protection threats in northern Uganda. CSOPNU research showed that the conflict has cost Uganda's national economy at

<sup>47</sup> [http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what\\_we\\_work/where\\_we\\_work/uganda](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_work/where_we_work/uganda)

<sup>48</sup> CSOPNU has a steering committee of twelve CSOs these are CARE International, Oxfam GB, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Norwegian Refugee Council Save the Children in Uganda, Pader NGO Forum, Gulu District NGO Forum, Quaker Peace and Social Witness, Soroti District Association of NGOs Network, Concerned Parents' Association (CPA), Uganda Child Rights NGO Network (UCRNN) –Chair and Uganda National NGO forum.

<sup>49</sup> <http://www.csopnu.org/research.htm>

least US \$ 1.33 billion since it started approximately 3% of GDP or US \$ 100 million annually<sup>50</sup>.

### **IDP Policy**

In 2004, the Ugandan Cabinet adopted the National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons. The Policy establishes rights of IDPs, specifies the roles and responsibilities of various branches of the government, humanitarian and development agencies, donors, displaced persons and other relevant stakeholders. This policy provides guidelines on the provision of services like water, education, security and health to the IDPs. In an interview with the HURINET officials the co-coordinating organization for all the organizations, which are involved in increasing the human rights of IDPs, it was found HURINET together with United Nations (UN) helped in coordinating the activities of the CSOs in the drafting the IDP policy.

### **Funding towards the IDPs**

Inadequate government capacity (human and financial) to respond to the emergency continues to be a major limiting factor. The 2003 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) totalled US\$ 148.1 million, of which US\$ 123.6 million were received, representing 83.4% of the total. The 2004 CAP totalled US\$ 142.8 million, of which US\$ 104 million were received as of 19 October 2004 (72.8%). The Consolidated Appeal (CA) 2005 includes projects from the different parts of the humanitarian community in Uganda. National and international NGOs (INGO) have submitted projects, complementing those submitted by the UN system. The humanitarian community of Uganda appeals for a total amount of **US\$ 157,686,167** to address the basic needs of more than 1.6 million IDPs and 218,846 refugees.

### **Overall Assessment of IDPs in 2004**

The obvious fact is that camps are still largely underserved. Needs are still overwhelming, particularly in the health, water and sanitation sectors. IDPs in the Acholi sub-region are still dependent on food relief for more than 75% of their needs on average, due to the longstanding displacement and the erosion of their coping mechanisms. Thousands of children still gather under makeshift schools in camps and do not get any education in such circumstances.

The 18-year war has taken a toll on the social, economic and cultural lives of the people in Northern Uganda. Cultural values, identity, social esteem and food security have all been lost in a wasteful conflict that seems to be unending. The lives of thousand mainly civilians have been claimed in this senseless cycle of brutality. Furthermore, up to 20,000 children have since the beginning of the war, been abducted by the LRA, some as young as 8 years. Many are turned into sex slaves, labourers and fighters.

Visits by senior UN officials and international donors to the affected districts have acted as eye-opener at the national and international levels. The increased presence of UN and NGO international and national staff in the affected areas enabled sharing more accurate updates and monitoring the situation through inter-agency assessments, particularly after crises such as rebel attacks and camp fires, resulting in the immediate provision of assistance to the victims. However, there is still not enough assistance reaching camps.

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/press/releases/uganda060105.htm>

The international response to the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda remains largely inadequate. The response of the UN – with the exception of the World Food Programme – as well as those of non-governmental organisations has not yet met the scale of the crisis. Despite the presence of the UN agencies for children (UNICEF), agriculture (FAO), health (WHO), human rights (OHCHR) and relief coordination (UNOCHA), a vast majority of IDPs are continuously unable to meet their basic needs.

To sum it up human rights abuses continue in IDPs. In 2004 the IDPs were still under a situation of poverty and helplessness, children have suffered neglect and harassment by adults. The girls and women have been raped, defiled and sexually exploited by soldiers, their male counterparts and those who have money. IDPs continue to live under fear for their lives and property; they are insecure and have to rely on food rations provided by humanitarian organizations. They continue to be uncertain about their future. The humanitarian situation in northern Uganda remained dire in 2004, with 80 percent of the entire northern population in displaced persons' camps. However, without this assistance, malnutrition and the death rates of young children would increase rapidly.

## 2. CSOS SUPPORT TO STREET CHILDREN

### **Rubaga Youth Development Association**

It is against this background that Caritas Australia, and working through the local partners the Rubaga Youth Development Association (RYDA), has been supporting a community based training program targeting street children, out of school youth, girl prostitutes and poor women from the urban areas of Kampala, Uganda's capital. Founded in 1992, RYDA is a non-government charitable organisation whose main philosophical aim is to empower these groups with skills information and knowledge that can enhance their ability to initiate and determine their own development.

RYDA operates one of the largest street children skills training in Uganda. The program assists children to gain the skills, and supports their need to be reintegrated successfully in the community. RYDA has worked with 150 of Kampala's most vulnerable street children, providing them with shelter, health care, personal development opportunities, counselling, formal and vocational education, credit and financial management skills, and child advocacy training.

Upon entering the centre, the children sign a social contract. They receive food, health care, clothing and shelter in exchange for participation in RYDA's educational programs (formal, non-formal and vocational skills training). The children also have to work towards **reintegration**. The orphans attend vocational training workshops where funds have been spent on tools and equipment, technical assistance, training activities and educational materials. This means that they can gain the skills necessary to get decent paid work and provide for themselves. With the incentive of receiving nourishing food, regular attendance by the children is secured.

RYDA operates one of one of the largest street children skills training in Uganda. The program assisted children to gain skills and supported their **reintegration** successfully in the community. Approximately, 65 children receive practical support in a range of areas at a given moment and over 100 courses are carried in a year. Another part of the program is resettlement and post training. In addition, RYDA' research focuses on collecting and analyzing information to strengthen child rights awareness and advocacy in Uganda

Similarly, The **Sunrise Project** takes young children - mostly orphans - off the street and uses scouting to provide a structured home environment, school education, and a value system based on duty to God, duty to others, and duty to Self.

### **The Baada Project**

The Baaba project sensitizes street children on Peer Education: The Project trains Baabas who are street peer educators. In Luganda, Baaba means older sibling and represents someone who will give you advice and guidance. The Baaba project has successfully reached street children with HIV messages. It has developed better working relations between NGOs and used advocacy to break down prejudice about street children. It has also increased the capacity of partners to address HIV/AIDS issues and reported behavioural change due to peer education activities.

The Baaba project helps street children to be able to exercise their rights to sexual and reproductive health within an environment where information and services are freely accessible and their rights are respected by the community and its members. This is based on the premise that street children with increased knowledge, skill and confidence are able to make their own informed choices for a healthier future. The project adopts a variety of strategies including advocacy, capacity building and peer education to achieve this goal. Through street and community outreach, HIV prevention clubs and training workshops, an innovative project called the Baabas takes HIV prevention messages to street children.

### **Bethesda International**

Bethesda International exists to restore and uphold hope and a future to the most vulnerable children by providing physical, social and spiritual needs. Due to their marginalization, the most vulnerable children, have lost all hope. Bethesda works hand in hand with the government to support the aids orphans, street children, abandoned, and poor children to secure a future for them by providing education, vocational training, and meeting their basic needs

### **African Youth Alliance**

African Youth Alliance (AYA) believes strongly that micro-credit is the best way to help many orphans and to prevent destitute children from becoming street children. By providing small loans or grants to guardians caring for these children so they can start income-generating activities, AYA is helping the guardians increase the family's income. With more income, the children can eat better and attend school. The on-going programs supported by AYA include the Fort portal Micro Grant program whereby 40 of the neediest guardians are able to purchase a cow in Uganda each year, and several micro-credit programs in the slums of Nairobi, Kenya.

In Kenya and Uganda, millions of children lack the \$1 to \$1.25 per month needed to go to primary school and do not, therefore, receive any education. AYA has partnered with over a dozen schools in Kenya and Uganda to provide on-going support so that orphaned or abandoned children can attend. AYA asks sponsors to donate \$18 per month, with each month's donation sending one child to school for a whole year. In addition, AYA has raised money to build desperately needed classrooms at Rehema Day Care Center and Kwa Watoto centre and School. The children receive monitoring and career guidance through out their school life to help them grow and mature. In 2004, AYA funded 200 children under this program. However, AYA noted the number of street children was still increasing.

### **Kids in need: An NGO Solution**

Kids in Need (KIN) is a nongovernmental organization in Uganda that targets children living on the streets and working in the worst forms of child labour. KIN has centres in Kampala, Mbale, and Wakiso that provided street children with shelter, counselling, education, medical care, and basic needs, and reintegrates them into society. Since its founding 1996, KIN has taken about 800 once-suffering children off the streets and helped them to become productive members of their communities.

### **Uganda Youth Development Link**

Uganda Youth Development Link (UYDEL) with support from Pathfinder, International Labour Organisation (ILO) WFP runs a shelter programme to integrate the street and slum youths in their communities. Kasirye (2006) found out that so far 560 youths above 16 years who graduated from the streets and slums have already benefited from vocational skills training programmes with local artisans and have been assisted to get employment at building sites, in saloons, workshops and tailoring.

### **The Inter-NGO fora**

In addition, the Inter-NGO forum meets monthly and has produced 'Practice Guidelines for Working with Street Children' (including principle of 'no unconditional handouts'). The Family and Children Protection Unit was established in police force and the draft government street children policy in place. The National Street Children Committee has been established involving both government and NGOs. Lastly, alternative education strategies have been developed and the magistrates' courts have recognized informal foster care schemes.

### **Challenges in supporting street children**

Despite Civil Society and Government efforts to fight children off the streets, they are often faced with a number of challenges that include the collapse of social support networks and continuous increase in numbers of street children. The pockets of political instability especially in the Northern part of the country and cattle rustling in the Karamoja region have continuously contributed to the numbers of street children.

Similarly, even with free primary education, high classroom numbers, poor quality education and drain of teachers to the private sector and subsidiary costs still lead to high school dropout rates. In addition, lack of family and children's courts, girls adversely affected by bride price and forced marriages have contributed to the problem of street children.

Neema et al noted a number of organizations have come in to help street children, including Friends of Children Association and UYDEL; there is still a need for such services. CSOs have concentrated their efforts on supporting children who are already on the streets as apposed to developing policies and programmes that will limit children going to the streets. CSOs should not only stop on supporting street children but they should also identify ways and means and develop policies that will reduce children going on streets. On the other hand, for orphans and street children, 'life skills' and vocational training are urgently needed, and these should be included in debates around complementary basic education' (CBE) and secondary school education.

## **3. CIVIL SOCIETY AND NATIONAL BUDGET PROCESS**

Civil society has been known to have a mandate of influencing policies; therefore a research on their impact on policy was carried out to inform the CSI Report. Three national challenges

to Uganda were identified and these included; the Internally Displaced People in Northern Uganda; the street children and finally the budget process.

This civil society policy impact study assesses the impact of CSOs on the human rights situation in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in Uganda. Economic and social indicators demonstrate that districts in the war areas have not fully benefited from the steady growth that has occurred in the rest of the country. The human rights issue was selected after the review of related literature, consultations with HURRIET, random review of the newspapers that revealed that there were many NGOs handling the two issues of IDPs. The approach used to conduct the study involved field interviews, review and content analysis of human rights reports.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence. In Uganda IDP camps are in the Northern Part in Gulu, Kitigumu, Soroti, Amuria, Katakwi and Lira. The reasons for displacement are the war in Northern Uganda of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and cattle rustling by Karamojong. In 2004, more than 1.6 million IDPs lived in more than 180 camps under temporary shelters. The first half of 2004 show a serious worsening of the security situation as LRA rebels intensified their attacks on the displaced people. The general security situation improved towards the later part of 2004 following high rates of LRA desertions. Attempts to open direct talks with the LRA were made, but have did not result in success.

IDP populations in the north continued to depend on food aid rations for survival in 2004. Some IDPs sleep under the shop verandas, tree shades and poorly grass thatched huts. Health centres in IDP camps throughout northern Uganda were overwhelmed by rising incidents of malaria and malnutrition. Another problem sighted in all IDP camps was poor education facilities leading high drop out rates. A survey of Kitgum IDP camps revealed substandard water and sanitation conditions

The UHRC Develop a plan with NGOs and donors to assist in the protection of IDPs through stationing UHRC staff in camps to receive complaints of LRA and UPDF abuses. CSOs participated in the development of the IDPs policy. Even with interventions by NGOs and local authorities, water and sanitation conditions remained inadequate in most camps. Oxfam provided clean water and sanitation dormitories for women and girls, and health and hygiene to night dwellers in Kitgum town. It also worked in Padibe and seven other camps in Kitgum district, supporting around 200,000 people. Lutheran World federation project in Katakwi District works to improve the well-being of the population and to assist in rehabilitation development.

International agencies like UNICEF, Red Cross and MSF gave some tarpaulins for roofing but they were very few. The International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had an anti-malaria campaign and distributed 40,000 insecticide-treated nets. UNICEF has been on the forefront in helping set the learning centres to absorb the displaced children. Oxfam is working, building and updating school dormitories and providing other requirements for school children. The international response to the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda remains largely inadequate. Despite the presence of the UN agencies a vast majority of IDPs are continuously unable to meet their basic needs. However, increased presence of UN and NGO in the affected areas enabled sharing more accurate updates and monitoring the situation through inter-agency assessments resulting in immediate provision of assistance.

The humanitarian situation in northern Uganda remained dire in 2004, with 80 percent of the entire northern population in displaced persons' camps. The IPDs were still under a situation of poverty and helplessness. They continued to live under fear for their lives and property; they are insecure and have to rely on food rations provided by humanitarian organizations. However, without the assistance from CSOs this situation would have been worse; malnutrition and the death rates of young children would have increased rapidly.

### **Civil Society Impact on the National Budget process**

The budget making process in Uganda is a consultative one involving many stakeholders like Parliament, Civil Society, Donors, Local Governments and Line Ministries. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) generates the medium term forecasts of the resource envelope. This stage then leads to the compilation of the budget estimate book containing revenue, recurrent and development expenditures for all Ministries and Agencies. But before that, MFPED submits comments on the indicative budget framework to Parliament of Uganda for verification. The Parliament of Uganda has a wide mandate to ensure that government officials, civil society and the general public participate.

The budget is considered the most important economic tool of the Government and provides a comprehensive statement of the nation's priorities (Krafchik 1999). To ensure that the budget best matches the nation's needs with available resources; this calls for the involvement of virtually all stakeholders at all the different stages of the budgeting process (Krafchik W. 1999). The budget process includes policy and management analyses needed to take decisions and actions related to implementing them ((Fjeldstad, *Hansohm, Isaksen, & Naimhwaka*, 2004).

Greater civil Society involvement with parliament on the budgetary issue helps compensate for limited legislative capacity for fiscal analysis and review. In the last five fiscal years Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been involved in the budgeting process in Uganda at the invitation of the MFPED. Uganda Debt Network, Forum for Women in Development (FOWODE) and Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) are the lead CSOs involved. CSOs are involved in the drafting stage, legislative stage, implementation stage, and auditing stage. The activities carried out by CSOs in Uganda and indeed worldwide are centred on:

- ✍ Simplifying and disseminating budget information
- ✍ Identifying and Setting Priorities
- ✍ Influencing Revenues Policies
- ✍ Identifying trends and providing projections
- ✍ Highlighting best practices
- ✍ Tracking Revenue and expenditures

UDN facilitates the formation of participatory monitoring communities of savings from debt relief and participates in various budget conferences as representative of CSOs on the budget formulation process and carries out on a regular basis the analysis of the policies that are formulated for poverty reduction. They further carry out awareness creation on the budget process in local councils and villages by simplifying the Acts on the budgeting process.

Uganda Manufacturer's Association carries out consultation meetings with their members and submits contributions during the drafting stage; discuss the approved budget by identifying the gaps, and proposing new ideas. Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) submits proposals to MFPED during the drafting stage of the budget. Their participation is usually very high during the drafting stage. Information on multiple goods like electricity and fuel are disseminated with alternative ideas on how to cut down costs of production to the members of the association. The UMA submits proposals in the areas of.:

- ? Taxation policies
- ? Infrastructure development
- ? Utility policies
- ? Energy and power
- ? Tax administration
- ? Reforms like pension, contribution to NSSF

In 2004/05, UMA and individual companies requested the involvement of the Parliamentary Committees of National Economy, Budget and Finance and Planning in uncompetitive taxes on cigarettes and iron roofs that favoured one tobacco manufacturer and iron sheets producer against the others.

While FOWODE is a gender based organization operating in Uganda with the mission of promoting gender equality in all areas of decision-making through advocacy, training, research and publication. The organization has a Gender Budget Programme (GDP) which advocates for gender balanced budgets that addresses the needs of poor women and men, as well as girls and boys equitably and gives full attention to other marginalized groups such as people with disabilities. The overall achievements in the budget process were: Building capacity in gender budget skills Increasing awareness of the importance of gender budgeting as a tool for equitable distribution of resources; Generating and documenting gender information and materials; Increasing awareness and participation in the budget-making process. There is evidence that aggressive gender budget advocacy campaign has begun to bear fruit with the MFPED developing gender and equity guidelines, which will guide sector ministries on engendering their plans and budgets. The greatest achievements are that FOWODE has managed to convince the government to start gender budgeting.

In conclusion, CSOs participation in the budget process is still minimal. The few CSOs that are involved in the budget process concentrate on participating in the drafting stage, implementation stage, and auditing stage. The Legislative stage has little or no input from the CSOs and CSOs refer to Parliament only when they fail to agree with the MFPED. UDN, FOWODE and UMA have made significant progress in participating in the budget processes but there is still a lot more to be done and it is not easy to assess the impact of their contribution directly. The tangible results are that FOWODE has managed to convince the government to start gender budgeting and CSOs have provided information on budget and policy to stakeholders in the budget process.

## ANNEX 6– THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

### 1 – STRUCTURE

#### 1.1 - Breadth of citizen participation

*Description:* How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engage in civil society activities?

##### 1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

*Description:* What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

A very small minority (less than 10%).	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

##### 1.1.2 - Charitable giving

*Description:* What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

##### 1.1.3 - CSO membership

*Description:* What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

##### 1.1.4 - Volunteering

*Description:* What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A small minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A minority (31% to 50%)	Score 2
A majority (more than 50%)	Score 3

##### 1.1.5 - Collective community action

*Description:* What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% -50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

#### 1.2 - Depth of citizen participation

***Description:* How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?**

##### 1.2.1 - Charitable giving

*Description:* How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

Less than 1%	Score 0
1% to 2%	Score 1
2.1% to 3%	Score 2
More than 3%	Score 3

##### 1.2.2 - Volunteering

*Description:* How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

Less than 2 hours	Score 0
2 to 5 hours	Score 1
5.1 to 8 hours	Score 2
More than 8 hours.	Score 3

### 1.2.3 - CSO membership

*Description:* What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

## 1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

**Description: How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?**

### 1.3.1 - CSO membership

*Description:* To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	Score 2
CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

### 1.3.2 - CSO leadership

*Description:* To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people, and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.	Score 2
CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

### 1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

*Description:* How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	Score 0
CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	Score 1
CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	Score 2
CSOs are present in all areas of the country.	Score 3

## 1.4. - Level of organisation

**Description: How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?**

### 1.4.1 - Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

*Description:* What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 70%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 70%)	Score 3

### 1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

*Description:* How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

Completely ineffective (or non-existent)	Score 0
Largely ineffective	Score 1
Somewhat effective	Score 2
Effective	Score 3

### 1.4.3 - Self-regulation

*Description:* Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Score 0
Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Score 1
Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Score 2
Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.	Score 3

#### 1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

*Description:* What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 0
There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	Score 1
Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	Score 2
There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 3

#### 1.4.5 - International linkages

*Description:* What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

Only a handful of "elite" CSOs have international linkages.	Score 0
A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 1
A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 2
A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.	Score 3

### 1.5 - Inter-relations

**Description: How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?**

#### 1.5.1 - Communication

*Description:* What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

Very little	Score 0
Limited	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Significant	Score 3

#### 1.5.2 - Cooperation

*Description:* How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 0
It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 1
CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 2
CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 3

### 1.6 - Resources

**Description: To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?**

#### 1.6.1 - Financial resources

*Description:* How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.	Score 3

#### 1.6.2 - Human resources

*Description:* How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	Score 0
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On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.	Score 3

### 1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

*Description:* How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.	Score 3

## 2 - ENVIRONMENT<sup>51</sup>

### 2.1 - Political context

***Description:* What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

#### 2.1.1 - Political rights

*Description:* How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	Score 0
There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Score 1
Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	Score 2
People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.	Score 3

#### 2.1.2 - Political competition

*Description:* What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

Single party system.	Score 0
Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Score 1
Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction.	Score 2
Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.	Score 3

#### 2.1.3 - Rule of law

*Description:* To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	Score 0
There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	Score 1
There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Score 2
Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.	Score 3

#### 2.1.4 - Corruption

*Description:* What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

High	Score 0
Substantial	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Low	Score 3

#### 2.1.5 - State effectiveness

*Description:* To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or	Score 0
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<sup>51</sup> For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

social crisis).	
The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	Score 1
State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	Score 2
State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.	Score 3

### 2.1.6 – Decentralisation

*Description:* To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Score 0
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Score 1
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% and 49.9%.	Score 2
Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.	Score 3

## 2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

**Description:** To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

### 2.2.1 - Civil liberties

*Description:* To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

Civil liberties are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	Score 1
There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Score 2
Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

### 2.2.2 - Information rights

*Description:* To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Score 0
Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Score 1
Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Score 2
Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.	Score 3

### 2.2.3 - Press freedoms

*Description:* To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

Press freedoms are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	Score 1
There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Score 2
Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

## 2.3 - Socio-economic context<sup>52</sup>

**Description:** What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

### 2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

*Description:* How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP)	Score 0
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<sup>52</sup> This subdimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The subdimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years)	
6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4)	
7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%)	
8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)	
Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 1
Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 2
Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.	Score 3

## 2.4 - Socio-cultural context

### **Description: To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?**

#### 2.4.1 - Trust

*Description:* How much do members of society trust one another?

Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	Score 0
There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 1
There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 2
There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 3

#### 2.4.2 - Tolerance

*Description:* How tolerant are members of society?

Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Score 0
Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Score 1
Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Score 2
Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).	Score 3

#### 2.4.3 - Public spiritedness<sup>53</sup>

*Description:* How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5).	Score 0
Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5).	Score 1
Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5).	Score 2
High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5).	Score 3

## 2.5 - Legal environment

### **Description: To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?**

#### 2.5.1 - CSO registration<sup>54</sup>

*Description:* How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	Score 0
The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent.	Score 1

<sup>53</sup> The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

<sup>54</sup> This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for subdimension 3. The indicator scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	Score 2
The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.	Score 3

#### 2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

*Description:* To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticize government?

CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	Score 0
There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Score 1
Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	Score 2
CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.	Score 3

#### 2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

*Description:* How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	Score 0
The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations).	Score 1
The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	Score 2
The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.	Score 3

#### 2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy

*Description:* How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Score 0
Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 1
Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 2
Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 3

## 2.6 - State-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?**

#### 2.6.1 - Autonomy

*Description:* To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

The state controls civil society.	Score 0
CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	Score 1
The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	Score 2
CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.	Score 3

#### 2.6.2 - Dialogue

*Description:* To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	Score 0
The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	Score 1
The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Score 2
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.	Score 3

#### 2.6.3 - Cooperation / support

*Description:* How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 1

A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 2
The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

## 2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

**Description: What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?**

### 2.7.1 - Private sector attitude

*Description:* What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

Generally hostile	Score 0
Generally indifferent	Score 1
Generally positive	Score 2
Generally supportive	Score 3

### 2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility

*Description:* How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Score 0
Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 1
Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Score 2
Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 3

### 2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy<sup>55</sup>

*Description:* How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 2
The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

## 3 - VALUES

### 3.1 - Democracy

**Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

#### 3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs

*Description:* To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 0
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 1
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 3

<sup>55</sup> The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

### 3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy

*Description:* How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

## 3.2 – Transparency

**Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?**

### 3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society

*Description:* How widespread is corruption within CS?

Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.	Score 0
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	Score 1
There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Score 2
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.	Score 3

### 3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs

*Description:* How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?

A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 0
A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 1
A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 3

### 3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency

*Description:* How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

## 3.3 – Tolerance

**Description: To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?**

### 3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena

*Description:* To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Score 0
Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	Score 2
Civil society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	Score 3

### 3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance

*Description:* How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

### 3.4 - Non-violence

**Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?**

#### 3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena

*Description:* How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Score 0
Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	Score 2
There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.	Score 3

#### 3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace

*Description:* How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility	Score 3

### 3.5 - Gender equity

**Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?**

#### 3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena

*Description:* To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Score 0
Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Score 1
Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Score 2
Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.	Score 3

#### 3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs

*Description:* How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

A small minority (less than 20%)	Score 0
A minority (20%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

### 3.5.3 – Civil society actions to promote gender equity

*Description:* How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

## 3.6 - Poverty eradication

**Description: To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?**

### 3.6.1 – Civil society actions to eradicate poverty

*Description:* To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

## 3.7 - Environmental sustainability

**Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?**

### 3.7.1 – Civil society actions to sustain the environment

*Description:* How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

# 4 - IMPACT

## 4.1 - Influencing public policy

**Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?**

### 4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.1.3 - Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components. <sup>56</sup>	Score 1
Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

**Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?**

##### 4.2.1 - Holding state accountable

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

##### 4.2.2 - Holding private corporations accountable

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.3 - Responding to social interests

**Description: How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?**

##### 4.3.1 - Responsiveness

*Description:* How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 0
There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 1
There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 2
Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 3

##### 4.3.2 - Public Trust

*Description:* What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

A small minority (< 25%)	Score 0
A large minority (25%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-75%)	Score 2
A large majority (> 75%)	Score 3

#### 4.4 - Empowering citizens

**Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?**

<sup>56</sup> The term "specific budget component" refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the overall budget.

#### 4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.4.3 - Empowering marginalized people

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.4.4 - Empowering women

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.4.5 - Building social capital<sup>57</sup>

*Description:* To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Score 0
Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Score 1
Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Score 2
Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.	Score 3

#### 4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

### 4.5 - Meeting societal needs

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

<sup>57</sup> To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see subdimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

#### 4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

*Description:* How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

#### 4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

*Description:* To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

CSOs are less effective than the state.	Score 0
CSOs are as effective as the state.	Score 1
CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	Score 2
CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.	Score 3

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